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FOREWORD 
 
This cross-country report is a joint product with Line Nyhagen Predelli, Beatrice 
Halsaa, Cecilie Thun and Adriana Sandu as the authors.  The report is largely based 
on three individual country reports from Norway (main authors Beatrice Halsaa and 
Cecilie Thun), Spain (main author Adriana Sandu) and the UK (main author Line 
Nyhagen Predelli).  
 
For this cross-country report, Nyhagen Predelli and Halsaa have shared the main 
responsibility for writing, and they have contributed both new material and new 
interpretations of some of the findings reported in the individual country reports. In 
particular, Nyhagen Predelli has authored the new Chapter 1 (Introduction) and new 
summary sections and conclusions in Chapter 7.  Nyhagen Predelli has also written 
Chapter 8, but Halsaa has contributed equally to it in terms of ideas and suggestions 
for the content. Halsaa has written new summary sections and conclusions in 
Chapter 6, and a substantially revised section on Spain in Chapter 6.  Thun has 
been responsible for writing Chapter 2, while Sandu has been responsible for writing 
Chapter 5. 
 
The authors wish to thank all interviewees in Norway, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, including women’s organisation representatives, civil servants and 
politicians, without whom neither the country reports nor this cross-country report 
could have been written.  Beatrice Halsaa also wishes to thank Trine Rogg Korsvik 
and Kristin Aukland for their contributions to the country report from Norway.  
Adriana Sandu wishes to thank Ana Martinez and Esmeranda Manful for their 
contributions to the country report from Spain.  Line Nyhagen Predelli wishes to 
thank Kim Perren and Esmeranda Manful for their contributions to the country report 
from the United Kingdom.  
 
The authors wish to express a big thank you to the Administrative Team at the 
Centre for Research in Social Policy, Loughborough University, with special thanks 
to Office-Coordinator Sharon Walker.  
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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE CROSS-COUNTRY REPORT 
 
1.1 Research on Contemporary Women’s Movements in Norway, Spain and 
the UK 
 
This report summarises findings from three separate country reports that addressed 
the intersection of gender and ethnicity/race as central features of social protest and 
public policy.  Since the 1970s, inequalities linked to gender and ethnicity/race have 
emerged as separate but closely intertwined policy fields in Europe.  The specific 
issues addressed, and the timing of their appearance on the political agenda, have 
differed between countries; however, the topic is highly salient in contemporary 
multicultural Europe.  The focus here is on three countries: Norway, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom (where the main focus is on England)1, and their histories of 
organising along gendered and racialised categories in civil society and the state. 
 
This cross-country report is based on case studies of selected women’s 
organisations in the three countries.  The women’s organisations included in our 
research are mainly based in the capitals (Oslo, Madrid, London), and they are all 
seeking to influence national policy-making processes that in various ways impact 
upon women.  Further research should be conducted to explore minority-majority 
relations in local and regional women’s movements, and relations between local and 
regional women’s movements and political decision-making processes at those 
levels of government.  The case-studies herein concentrated on two major aspects 
of organisational activities: 
 
1) Relations between ethnic ‘majority’ and ethnic ‘minority’ women’s organisations in 
women’s movements, with a special view to representations of co-operation, unity 
and dispute. 
 
2) How women’s organisations use political opportunity structures to influence 
gender policy and anti-racist policy, with a special view to policies on violence 
                                            
1 For a discussion of the UK research context, and the tension between the level of the overall state 
and that of the countries of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, see the separate country 
report from the UK.   
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against women (VAW) and issues of racism and ethnic discrimination related to 
VAW, and the problem-representations and claims-making forwarded by women’s 
organisations in relation to such policies. 
 
Our research focuses on violence against women’s issues including domestic 
violence, forced marriage, honour crimes, female genital mutilation, and racism and 
discrimination related to violence against women.  The issues of rape, prostitution, 
and human trafficking, which are also violence against women issues, have not been 
included in our analysis.  This limitation is not intended to signify that such issues are 
less important, but an in-depth focus has required a focused attention on selected 
issues.2 
 
Part of a work in progress, this cross-country report is the second major outcome of 
Strand 1 of a larger study of ethnic and religious citizenship in Norway, Spain and 
the United Kingdom.  It summarises findings from the three countries, whilst also 
taking a further step in a research process aiming towards a more comprehensive 
comparison between the three case studies.  The first outcome of Strand 1 was the 
three separate country reports on which this cross-country report is based.  The 
project is part of the larger FEMCIT integrated project, and constitutes a contribution 
to one of the six citizenship dimensions of FEMCIT.  The main emphasis in Work 
Package 4 is on women’s ethnic and religious citizenship, while the dimensions 
addressed by other FEMCIT Work Packages include political, social, economic, 
sexual and bodily, and intimate citizenship.  Strand 1 of Work Package 4 is 
especially concerned with ethnic dimensions of citizenship practice within the 
women’s movement itself and within the nation-state contexts of Norway, Spain and 
the UK. 
 
Our research seeks to fill several gaps in the research literature concerning both 
relations between ethnically ‘majoritised’ and ‘minoritised’ (Gunaratnam, 2003) 
women’s movement organisations, and the strategies used and claims-making 
forwarded by them in Norway, Spain, and the UK.  In all three countries, there are 
                                            
2 The issues of prostitution and trafficking have been included in the remit of FEMCIT Work Package 
5 led by Joyce Outshoorn.   
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few empirical studies of contemporary women’s organisations, either at national, 
regional or local levels (for details, see literature reviews in the individual country 
reports).  Moreover, there is an absence of research on the mobilisation of migrant 
women, ethnic minority women, and indigenous women in relation to the mobilisation 
of ethnic majority women.  Through this cross-country report we seek to contribute 
towards a more comprehensive understanding of differences and similarities 
between the trajectories and developments of women’s movement organising in 
different parts of Europe. 
 
1.2 Gender, Migration and Women’s Movements  
 
We have chosen Norway, Spain and the UK as our case studies because they offer 
distinct examples of citizenship and gender regimes (defined as current state policies 
towards immigration/citizenship and gender).  The three countries have different 
emigration and immigration histories, and current and past policies on immigration 
and citizenship are influenced by these varying historical and geographical contexts.   
 
The history of empire and post-colonial immigration has strongly influenced the UK 
and has, among other things, led to the formulation of strong anti-racist and anti-
discrimination laws and policies.  Immigrants with legal residence status are entitled 
to apply for citizenship after five years of residence in the UK,3 but since 2005 
applicants must pass either a “Life in the UK” test requiring English language 
proficiency and substantive knowledge about British history, politics, and culture, or 
an ESOL course (English for Speakers of Other Languages), in order to become 
citizens.  The most recent available figures (from the 2001 Census) show that the 
immigration population in the UK totals 4.9 million individuals or 8.3 per cent of the 
total population.4  The first women’s organisations established by ethnic minority 
women were formed in the 1970s and include the Brixton Black Women’s Group, 
Liverpool Black Sisters, Manchester Black Women’s Co-operative, and the Muslim 
Ladies Circle. 
                                            
3 If an individual is married to or a civil partner of a British citizen, he or she can apply for citizenship 
after three years of residence (http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/britishcitizenship/eligibility/; 
accessed January 15, 2009).   
4 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=1312&Pos=&ColRank=2&Rank=224  
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In the UK, victims of domestic violence with insecure immigration status were given 
the right to remain in the UK through government concessions in 1999 and 2002.  
The concessions were largely given due to pressure from Southall Black Sisters and 
other women’s organisations.  Despite the concessions, however, the ‘no recourse to 
public funds rule’ in effect denies an estimated 600 women per year access to safety 
because women’s refuges cannot access public funding for housing costs on behalf 
of immigrant women with insecure immigration status (Amnesty International UK and 
Southall Black Sisters, 2008). 
 
Post-war immigration to Norway from countries outside Europe took off in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, when an increased supply of unskilled labour (called 
fremmedarbeidere – ‘foreign workers’) was called for by government and 
businesses.  Action was soon taken to restrict immigration, and Norway has 
formulated and discussed anti-racist and anti-discrimination policies since the 1970s 
(Brochmann and Kjeldstadli, 2008: 198).  Migrants living in Norway for three years or 
more have had the right to vote in local elections since 1983.  After seven years of 
residence, immigrants with legal residence status can become citizens, and must 
show proficiency in one of the official languages (Norwegian or Sami).  Since 
September 2008, applicants must pass an official test in either of these two 
languages.  The current immigrant population (as at January 1st, 2008) in Norway is 
estimated at 9.7 per cent of the total population, comprising 381,000 immigrants and 
79,000 Norwegian-born individuals with immigrant parents living in Norway.5  The 
first organisation for ethnic minority women, Foreign Women’s Group, was set up in 
1979. 
 
In Norway, spouses of Norwegian citizens who come to Norway from abroad are 
normally assigned a dependent legal status for a period of three years (commonly 
referred to as ‘the three year rule’).6  After three years, a permanent resident status 
                                            
5 See http://www.ssb.no/innvbef_en/main.html  
6 See http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/NOUer/2003/NOU-2003-31/6/1/3.html?id=372823. 
See also the Immigration Act of 1988 (utlendingsloven) (http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19880624-
064.html) and § 37, 6 in the regulation of the Immigration Act (utlendingsforskriften) 
(http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/ldles?doc=/sf/sf/sf-19901221-1028.html).  A new Immigration Act was 
passed in 2008. 
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can be obtained.  Migrant women have fiercely opposed the three year rule, as those 
who decide to leave a violent partner before the three year period has passed risk 
losing the residence permit.  A legal exception to the three year rule was, however, 
passed in 1990, which gives women who have been subjected to domestic abuse a 
right to apply for independent immigration status.  The three year rule has remained 
a contested issue for the women’s movement, as the burden of proof lies heavily on 
the individual woman who has suffered abuse, and immigrant women often remain in 
violent relationships due to fear of deportation.   
 
Spain has only recently experienced a large inflow of immigrants (see Bruquetas-
Callejo et al., 2008), and the European Commission against racism and intolerance 
noted in 2006 a general lack of awareness in Spanish society regarding racism and 
discrimination (CRI, 2006).  Policy formation and implementation in this area has 
only been seriously addressed at the national level post-2000, and includes a 
recently established (2005) national observatory against racism and xenophobia.  
Legal residents born in another country must reside in Spain for ten years before 
they can seek citizenship.  Although there is no formal citizenship test, the law 
requires basic knowledge of Spanish before citizenship can be conferred (Medrano, 
2005).  In 2007 there were about 4.5 million foreigners living in Spain, amounting to 
about ten per cent of the total population.7  
 
The first ethnic minority women's organisations in Spain were founded in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, and include Romi Serseni, an association of Spanish 
Romani women established in Grenada in 1990 and in Madrid in 1991, and Vomade-
Vencit, an association of immigrant Dominican women established informally in 1989 
and formally in 1992.  Among the first ethnically mixed organisations for women were 
Ca La Dona, established in Barcelona in 1988, and Association Women Opanel, 
established in Madrid in 1991.  In Spain, Organic Law 4/2000 established the right to 
independent residence for immigrant women who are victims of domestic violence or 
sexual exploitation (Protection of Migrants, UN, 2007: 11).  An independent 
residence permit is, however, given for one year only, with access to social benefits 
but no right to work.  According to Amnesty International, immigrant women who 
                                            
7 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/29/41256399.pdf  
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experience domestic violence ‘suffer discrimination in law and practice when trying to 
access justice and essential resources such as financial assistance, psychological 
treatment and access to shelters’ (Amnesty International, 2008). 
 
Both Spain and the UK are EU member states, although with different affiliations to 
the treaty, and may, thus, directly influence, and be influenced by, European gender 
equality policies.8  Norway has chosen to affiliate with the EU as a member of the 
Extended Economic Area, and is, thus, indirectly influenced by EU policies and has 
less direct influence on the formulation and implementation of EU policies. 
 
In relation to policies promoting gender equality, Norway has had a strong national 
and international position of advocating women-friendly policies and gender equality 
as both a legal requirement and a substantive aim.  Norway has been among the 
states with the highest percentage of women in political institutions.9  The UK has a 
strong record of prohibiting discrimination based on gender, but substantive 
measures to reduce gender inequality have largely been absent.  Spain has 
developed gender equality legislation and policies later than both Norway and the 
UK, but recent developments have put Spain at the forefront of gender equality 
measures, be they political or legal (see Bustelo and Ortbals, 2007). 
 
In 1995, Mazur and McBride Stetson classified Norway as a country with a policy 
machinery (the Equal Status Council) that provided a high level of policy access for 
feminist groups and a machinery that had a high level of policy influence on equal 
employment policies (Mazur and McBride Stetson, 1995: 275-277).  Since 1995, the 
Norwegian policy machinery has been reorganised, and new government institutions 
supporting gender equality policies have been created.  A major reform was 
implemented in 2006 when the Equality and Discrimination Ombud was established 
to combat discrimination based on gender, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, religion, 
disability and age.  The gender equality machinery has continued to provide access 
for feminist and women’s groups, and to influence government policies dealing with 
equal employment opportunity issues.  Both access and influence have, however, 
                                            
8 The UK became an EU-member state in 1973, while Spain joined the EU in 1986.   
9 See various UNDP reports, including UNDP (2002), Styrking av demokratiet i en splittet verden.  
Copenhagen: Nordic Office. 
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been unequally distributed between various majoritised and minoritised 
organisations and between various gender policy areas.  For example, minoritised 
women’s organisations have almost exclusively been consulted on “ethnic minority 
women’s issues” related to gender violence (Nyhagen Predelli, 2003).  On the other 
hand, majoritised women’s organisations have rarely been consulted on “ethnic 
minority women’s issues” and have more often been engaged in policies relating to 
private business and the labour market, such as the new law that requires boards of 
private companies to recruit 40 per cent women, and issues such as equal pay for 
women and men, parental leave arrangements, etc.  In Chapter 7 of this cross-
country report we discuss current perceptions and experiences of access and 
influence among women’s movement actors in Norway. 
 
In 1995, both the UK and Spain were classified by Mazur and McBride Stetson as 
countries with policy machineries that enjoyed high influence on equal employment 
policies, but the policy machineries in both countries were considered as giving “low 
access” to feminist groups (ibid.: 275).  In the UK, the relatively strong position of the 
then Equal Opportunities Commission was taken as an indicator of the high influence 
enjoyed by this specific gender policy machinery on equal employment policies.  
Since 1997 and the election of the Labour Government, the gender policy machinery 
in the UK has developed significantly in terms of new institutions and wider access to 
feminist and women’s groups.  Today it could be argued that the various parts of the 
policy machinery in the UK is giving relatively high access to a small and stable 
number of women’s organisations that actively seek to influence government policy  
(see the UK country report and Chapter 7 herein for more details).  The current 
gender machinery is, however, considered relatively weak in terms of government 
influence, and feminist groups do not always think it worthwhile to direct their 
advocacy and lobbying efforts through institutions such as the Gender Equality Unit 
(previously named the Women and Equality Unit).  As in Norway, a significant 
development towards an intersectional approach to inequality by government has 
taken place with the establishment of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
which includes gender, sexual orientation, race, disability, religion and belief, and 
age in its remit.  Moreover, parts of the picture from Norway of an unequal 
distribution of access and influence in relation to types of women’s organisations and 
types of gender policy areas also applies to the UK.  Again, minoritised women’s 
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organisations are almost exclusively being consulted on “ethnic minority women’s 
issues” related to gender violence, and are rarely consulted on other issues such as 
education, the labour market, etc.  In the UK, however, majoritised women’s 
organisations seem to increasingly engage in “ethnic minority women’s issues”, not 
only related to gender violence, but also related to the labour market and political 
participation (the primary example being the Fawcett Society).  In Chapter 7 of this 
cross-country report we discuss current perceptions and experiences of access and 
influence among women’s movement actors in the UK. 
 
Spain, as we have seen, was also classified by Mazur and McBride Stetson as a 
country with a policy machinery (the Women’s Institute, or Instituto de la Mujer; IM) 
that enjoyed high influence on equal employment policies, but it was considered as 
giving “low access” to feminist groups (ibid.: 275).  Indeed, in 1995, Valiente noted 
the close ties between the Instituto de la Mujer and the socialist political party PSOE 
and that “the IM does not favour the mobilization of the feminist movement (or of 
public opinion) as a way of advancing demands that go beyond PSOE gender 
equality compromises” (Valiente, 1995: 234).  The IM has continued to play a 
significant role in Spanish gender equality policies, and both the conservative 
People’s Party government from 1996 until 2004 and the subsequent (and current) 
Socialist party government have continued to support gender equality policies.  
Moreover, the current government has strengthened the gender machinery through 
the recently created Ministry of Equality and its several entities including the ‘Equality 
Policies General Secretariat’, signalling the high value it places on gender equality 
through the appointment of a Cabinet consisting of an equal number of women and 
men and through the creation of an array of new laws to support gender equality 
(Bustelo and Ortbals, 2007:  207).  In terms of political access for feminist and 
women’s organisations, the picture in Spain is more of a division between majoritised 
and minoritised organisations.  While majoritised women’s organisations are being 
consulted on various gender equality issues, minoritised organisations have yet to 
achieve a role in the dialogue, design and implementation of gender equality policies 
broadly conceived.  In Chapter 7 of this cross-country report we discuss current 
perceptions and experiences of access and influence among different women’s 
movement actors in Spain. 
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The United Nations Human Development Index offers comparable data on key 
indicators related to gender development.  In the table below, we show some of the 
relevant statistics for Norway, Spain, and the UK, thus offering a glimpse into some 
of the key characteristics of and differences between the three countries.  Norway is 
a top scorer on both the HDI (Human Development Rank; second place) and the 
GEM (Gender Empowerment; first place) measures.  Neither Spain nor the UK score 
in the top ten on these two measures, with Spain obtaining the 13th and 12th places 
on the two measures, respectively, and the UK obtaining the 16th and 14th places, 
respectively.  In all three countries women received the right to vote before the 
second world war, but women have not gained full parity in any of the three 
parliaments.  In Norway, women hold 38 per cent of the parliamentary seats, while in 
Spain they hold 31 per cent and in the UK only 19 per cent.  At the ministerial level, 
however, Spain is highly advanced with women holding 50 per cent of ministerial 
posts, while in Norway and the UK women hold 44 and 27 per cent, respectively, of 
ministerial posts.  All three countries have some way to go in terms of gender 
equality in earnings, with Norway as the most developed country and women earning 
77 per cent of men’s income, while in Spain and in the UK women earn 50 and 66 
per cent, respectively, of men’s income. 
 
    
 
 
Norway10 Spain11 United 
Kingdom12 
    
    
Population in 2005 4.6 million 43.4 million 60.2 million 
HDI Human Development Rank 2 13 16 
Women obtained right to vote 1913 1931 1918, 1928 
Women seats in parliament 38% 31% 19% 
Women in government at ministerial level 44% 50% 27% 
GEM Gender Empowerment Measure 1 12 14 
Ratio estimated female to male earned 
income 
0.77 0.50 0.66 
    
 
                                            
10 http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_NOR.html  
11 http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_ESP.html  
12 http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_GBR.html  
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1.3 Chapter Overview 
 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the women’s movement in Norway, Spain, and 
the UK (with a particular focus on England) from the late 1960s to the present day.  
It, thus, spans four decades, highlighting the central themes of social and political 
context, women’s activism and institutional engagement across this period.   
 
Chapter 3 introduces theoretical reflections that ground our study in the existing 
research literature on women’s movements, gendered citizenship and 
multiculturalism.  Women’s movements themselves represent the practising of 
gendered citizenship through women’s mobilisation and activism.  Concomitantly, 
women’s movements seek to alter citizenship regimes through challenging, 
renegotiating and changing the ways in which citizenship is gendered in arenas as 
diverse as politics, work, religion, the family, intimate relationships, and so on.  Our 
study seeks to capture both of these dimensions of gendered citizenship: how it is 
practised by women’s organisations through their aims, strategies and claims-
making, and how the dominant citizenship regime and its disadvantaging of women 
is challenged and contested by women’s organisations.  Chapter 3 also offers 
reflections on our own positions as researchers, and our shifting locations as insiders 
and outsiders to the women’s movement. 
 
Chapter 4 brings in further reflections on the positioning of our research within the 
theoretical perspectives of political opportunity structures and framing processes.  
The political opportunity structures approach puts particular emphasis on the specific 
socio-political contexts in which social movements are embedded.  We discuss 
institutional and discursive aspects of political opportunity structures and how they 
give rise to both opportunities and constraints for women’s movements in particular 
contexts.  We also argue for the usefulness of discourse analysis and frame analysis 
in our study of women’s movement actors and their claims-making.  In particular, we 
seek to address the question of women’s movements’ impact on policy by applying 
the concept of ‘resonance’ and highlighting the eventual resonance or dissonance 
between the frames, claims and problem-representations forwarded by women’s 
movement actors and the policy discourses and political decisions (outcomes) made 
by national governments.   
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Chapter 5 describes the research methods used in the three case-studies and the 
empirical material on which the cross-country report is based.  It also lists the 
specific women’s organisations that have been interviewed in Norway, Spain, and 
the UK.  For more detailed information and descriptions of the organisations included 
in our study, please consult Appendix A in each of the three separate country-
reports.  Appendix C in the three country reports include all the interview guides that 
were used in our case-study research. 
 
The next two chapters, 6 and 7, provide summary analyses of the relationship 
between ethnic minority and ethnic majority women’s organisations in Norway, 
Spain, and the UK, as well as their strategic use of political opportunity structures to 
attempt to influence policies on violence against women in the three countries.  The 
starting point for our analysis is the critique of contemporary white, middle-class 
women’s movements as ethnocentric and blind to the importance of ‘race’ and 
ethnicity.  Inspired by Julia Sudbury (1998), we seek to understand whether ‘majority’ 
women’s organisations have embraced and accepted, or resisted and rejected, the 
interests of ‘minority’ women.  We also examine whether ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ 
women’s organisations have formed alliances in order to influence public policy. 
 
Chapter 6 examines how different organisations within contemporary women’s 
movements in Norway, Spain and the UK position themselves in relation to other 
movement actors, and the implications such positioning may have for the building of 
alliances and co-operation through ‘strategic sisterhood’.  In Norway and Spain, 
majority and minority women’s organisations, including Romani and Sami 
organisations, tend to present both themselves and each other in a relationship 
based on distance, difference, and suspicion, or even hostility and opposition.  In 
such climates, it is difficult for majoritised and minoritised women’s organisations to 
co-operate and form alliances.  And yet, we have substantial evidence of issue-
specific integration through conflicts that cross ethnic divides and, thus, mobilise 
both minoritised and majoritised women.  In the UK, despite a history of tension 
between majority and minority feminists in the 70s and 80s, there are several 
empirical examples of formal networking, co-operation and alliances between ethnic 
majority and minority organisations in the women’s movement.  Recent and current 
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co-operation, networks and alliances within the UK’s women’s movement are largely 
issue-based.  The chapter also demonstrates the continued existence of separate 
organisations for majority and minority women in Norway, Spain, and the UK, and 
highlights differences between the three countries.  On the whole, majority and 
minority women’s organisations in Norway and Spain seem to engage less with each 
other and are largely occupied with separate activities, but there are exceptions to 
this pattern (such as a televised charity campaign in Norway with the participation of 
both majority and minority women’s organisations).  In Norway, there are several 
gender and ethnically mixed organisations, and a tendency towards an increasingly 
mixed ethnic constituency in some of the women’s organisations.  In Spain, however, 
the tendency is for ethnic minority women to be embedded within gender-mixed 
immigrant organisations.  In the UK we have also detected a development towards 
more ethnically mixed and integrated organisations that take on intersectional 
approaches to inequalities.  Yet in all three countries, current problem 
representations and claims-making by different women’s movement actors underline 
continued differences between ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ women’s interests, and also 
differences between the interests of various groups of ‘minority’ women.  We suggest 
that the women’s movement is currently faced with potential new divisions related to 
issues of faith and belief, and that the way forward is to accept differences and 
integrate them into feminist analysis, policies, and practice. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the political opportunities and constraints that women’s 
organisations in Norway, Spain, and the UK are faced with in their attempts to 
influence decision-making processes and outcomes.  It also examines claims-
making and problem representations forwarded by both movement (women’s 
organisations) and government (civil servants and politicians) actors in relation to 
policy gaps and policy influence at the state level in all three countries. 
 
Chapter 8 offers some concluding remarks about our findings, highlighting some of 
the differences and similarities between the three countries.  It also seeks to 
describe how Work Package 4 contributes to the overall conceptual development 
within FEMCIT, and it includes a brief section on good practice and policy 
recommendations that have emerged during the course of our study.   
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2 THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN NORWAY, SPAIN AND THE UK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an overview of women’s movements in Norway, Spain, and the 
UK.  It is based on the second chapter of each respective country report from these 
three countries, and provides a summary of the historical outlines from the late 60s 
to the present day, with a main focus on the 1970s and 1980s.13  Chapters 6 and 7 
of this cross-country report provide additional information about contemporary 
women’s movements in Norway, Spain and the UK.   
 
2.2 Norway 
 
A feminist mobilisation took place in Norway in the 1970s.  This was a decade where 
the gender-political landscape changed and an entirely new gender and feminist 
discourse emerged.  New organisations, campaigns and networks were established.  
The mobilisation of women was a part of a general radicalisation in Norway.  It was 
influenced by social movements abroad but also by some distinct Norwegian 
features. 
 
The political system in Norway was destabilised at the time and open to feminist 
demands.  The political opportunity structure created possibilities; economic growth 
depending on increasing labour, new resources for women (contraceptive pill, 
student loans, etc.) and an expansion in higher education.  It was often students who 
mobilised, but the feminist mobilisation also took place outside the universities.  
Norwegian women, in general, were situated in the intersection between housewifery 
and waged labour. 
 
Two early signs of mobilisation were, firstly, The National Council of Women, which 
initiated a campaign in 1967 to increase the representation of women in politics.  
                                            
13 The original second chapter of the UK country report was written by Kim Perren.  The part focusing 
on the UK in this cross-country report chapter is based on the chapter by Perren.  For further 
historical details about the women’s movements in Norway, Spain, and the UK, see the three 
individual country reports. 
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One effect of this was the so-called ‘Women’s Coup’ in 1971 when women won a 
majority of seats in three local councils (Halsaa, 1998; Skjeie, 1992).  Secondly, the 
Norwegian Breast Feeding Mother’s Support Group (Ammehjelpen) was established 
in 1968 to stop the decreasing inclination of women to breastfeed.  This blurred the 
distinction between the private and public spheres. 
 
1970s 
Three major struggles 
The 1970s in Norway was characterised by three major struggles:  1) Abortion on 
demand; 2) The EEC controversy; and 3) The Gender Equality Act. 
 
Abortion on demand was the main issue and the right ‘to control one’s own body’ 
played a vital mobilising role during the 1970s.  The struggles lasted until 1978 when 
the pro-choice campaign won. 
 
The second issue was the EEC (EC, EU) controversy which had been a 
controversial issue since Britain applied for membership in 1961.  Prior to the 
referendum in Norway in 1972 there was a mass mobilisation of protests against the 
political establishment who advocated membership.  Norwegian women argued that 
it was a gender issue.  European women’s organisations had not been granted 
consultative status within the EC, and the EC had not developed a unified policy 
regarding the position of women.  The majority of Norwegian women were against 
membership and there was a Women’s Campaign against Norwegian membership in 
the EEC.  The protesters ‘won’ the referendum in 1972, and from this struggle the 
feminist movement gained confidence, political skills and networks. 
 
The third major struggle was related to the Gender Equality Act (Likestillingsloven).  
In 1972 the Equal Pay Council (Likelønnsrådet) was transformed to the Equal Status 
Council (Likestillingsrådet).  Equality became more broadly defined, and the new 
council was a consultative agency with a broad representation and a mandate to 
pursue gender equality.  One priority was still to diminish the pay gap.  Several 
strikes took place in the early 1970s; nurses, female cleaners, in the fishing industry 
and in forestry.  The Oslo Federation of Trade Unions Women’s Movement was 
established within the male-dominated Norwegian Federation of Trade Union (NFTU, 
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Landsorganisasjonen).  The Gender Equality Act was finally passed in 1978.  The 
aim was to promote gender equality and, in particular, to promote the position of 
women.  The Act did not only cover working life conditions, but all sectors in life, 
even family life.  The only formal exemption was the case of internal conditions in 
religious communities.  The Gender Equality Ombud (Likestillingsombudet) and the 
Appeals Board (Klagenemda) were set up to monitor the Act (for more details, see 
Country Report Norway). 
 
Feminists disagreed on the principal framing of the law.  The radical feminist 
Women’s Law milieu at the University of Oslo was against the gender-neutral, 
moderate, limited and passive framing of the proposal from the Labour Party, 
whereas the liberal Women’s Right Association (WRA) generally welcomed this 
proposal (Lønnå, 1996).  The final result reflected a compromise, but the feminist 
movement managed to broaden the scope of the law (Skjeie, 1992). 
 
Feminist Feuds 
The 1970s were characterised by much feminist activity and different organisations, 
groups and networks joined forces despite different ideological standpoints.  
However, there were also conflicts of interests, values and ideas within the women’s 
movement in this decade.  The New Feminists (Nyfeministene, 1970) and the 
Women’s Front (Kvinnefronten, 1972) were the most influential new groups at the 
outset.  They both distanced themselves from the established Women’s Rights 
Association (WRA; Norsk Kvinnesaksforening, 1884) (Dahlerup and Gulli, 1985).  
The New Feminists and the Women’s Front were both oriented towards women’s 
liberation and socialism, but the New Feminists tended to emphasise patriarchy and 
gender struggle before class struggle, whereas the Women’s Front was a mixture of 
Socialist and Marxist women who were sympathetic to the newly established 
Worker’s Communist Party of Norway (Marxist-Leninist) (AKP-ml) and prioritised 
class struggle (Haukaa, 1982).  A split between the Socialist and the Marxist faction 
lead to the establishment of Bread and Roses (Brød og Roser) in 1975 who was in 
favour of a Socialist Feminist policy. 
 
A Lesbian movement (Lesbisk Bevegelse) was also established in 1975.  This was 
partly a reaction to the heterosexual focus of feminist organisations, but mainly a 
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reaction to the conservative and Marxist-Leninist men in Association – 48 (Det 
norske forbundet av 1948), the only homosexual organisation in Norway (Haukaa 
1982).  In 1972 homosexuality was decriminalised and in 1981 criminal protection 
against the discrimination of gays and lesbians was introduced in Norway - the first 
country in the world to do so. 
 
Violence against women 
The issue of violence against women was revived in the 1970s and the framing of 
the issue was radicalised.  The Crisis Centre Movement brought domestic violence 
to the public’s attention and established hotlines and several women’s shelters.  The 
public funding of these shelters is an example of the close relationship between the 
state and the civil society (Bergman, 1999).   
 
1980s 
The 1980s saw a fragmentation of the feminist movement in Norway.  More women 
channelled their energy outside the feminist organisations.  The work – family 
balance was a crucial theme and the demand for a six hour working day, equal pay, 
day-care services, and expanded parental leave were central issues.  These issues 
inspired a new gender-political agenda for the 1980s – and 90s. 
 
Sami feminism 
Sami women started to voice their discontent as women, in the mid-70s.  They 
addressed the vulnerable position of women in traditional Sami reindeer husbandry.  
Their status as housewives or working women was important regarding social 
security (Wiig, 1984).  Another important issue was that of the new Reindeer Herding 
Regulation in 1978 which affected women in particular (Sàra, 1980; Blom, 1999). 
 
A dramatic protest occurred in February 1981 when 14 Sami women occupied the 
office of the newly appointed Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.  This was part 
of the campaign to save the Alta River (Lindi, 2004; Hjorthol, 2006).  This battle was 
not won, but the Sami people’s struggle for rights and recognition has, otherwise, 
been quite successful.  They have been recognised as an indigenous people and the 
Sami Parliament was established in 1987. 
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In 1988 the Sáráhkka-Sami Women’s Organisation was established to promote Sami 
women’s interests.  This was a transnational organisation with branches in Sweden, 
Finland, Russia, and Norway.  In 1989 Sami women set up a Women’s List for the 
Sami Parliament election.  They almost won a seat in 1989, and successfully set up 
another list for the local elections in 1991.  The Women’s List was a result of a 
heated gender debate in the Sami community.  The Sáráhkka-Sami Women’s 
Organisation’s aim is to improve women’s rights both within and outside the Sami 
institutions, and co-operates also with the Sámi Nisson-Forum (Sami Women’s 
Forum), established in 1993 to promote gender equality.  Sámi Nisson-Forum 
publishes the Norwegian-Sami magazine Gába.   
 
Migrant women 
In 1979 the Foreign Women’s Group (FWG) was formed.  This marked the beginning 
of organised black feminism in Norway.  FWG had an anti-racist, feminist agenda 
and wanted to widen the Norwegian feminist agenda.  It focused specifically on the 
Immigration Act and the requirement for family members to obtain an independent 
residence permit, which caused problems for female migrants.  FWG soon 
confronted the Norwegian feminist organisations and the public authorities with the 
problems of migrant women and criticized them for lack of response, understanding 
and responsibility.14 
 
FWG was replaced by the MiRA Resource Centre for Black, Immigrant and Refugee 
Women in 1989, thanks to grants from a fund-raising campaing run by and for 
women’s organisations (see next section).  MiRA continues to play an important role 
as watchdog in relation to government policies and a support centre for migrant 
women. 
 
Other organisations focusing on migrant women’s interests in Norway, which were 
established in the 1970s, were the ethnic Norwegian Christian Intercultural 
Association (KIA), and, in the 1980s, Self-help for Immigrants and Refugees (SEIF) 
and the Oslo Red Cross International Centre (ORKIS). 
 
                                            
14 See a special issue of the feminist magazine Kjerringråd no.  4 1991 on migrant women. 
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Feminist communities 
The ‘Conservative [political] wave’ (Høyre-bølgen) and the economic recession 
during the 1980s lead feminists to join forces.  It was also a result of various 
initiatives from the new gender equality status machinery which provided political 
opportunities and a cooperative political atmosphere. 
 
A core issue in the 1980s was the struggle against pornography and prostitution 
which was an extension of the struggle against violence against women.  This 
struggle also led to an unlikely alliance between the Norwegian Housewife 
Organisation (Norges Husmorforbund), the Norwegian Society of Rural Women, the 
Centre Party’s Women Caucus and the Women’s Front which started the Women’s 
United Campaign against Pornography (Kvinnenes fellesaksjon mot pornografi) in 
1977.  The campaign was later reorganised into the United Campaign against 
Pornography and Prostitution (Fellesaksjonen mot pornografi og prostitusjon) and 
additional organisations, like the WRA, later joined the campaign. 
 
Two international women’s conferences during the 1980s also revived the women’s 
and feminist movements:  The International Feminist Book Fair (Internasjonal 
Kvinnebokmesse) in 1986 and the Nordic Forum (Nordisk Forum) in 1988.  Peace 
was another uniting issue.  A Nordic Women’s Peace Movement 
(Kvinnefredsbevegelsen) was born, triggered by NATO’s new nuclear strategy. 
 
Another example of successful co-operation was the Norwegian Broadcasting 
Company’s yearly fund-raising campaign, ‘Women in the 3rd world’, in 1989.  Forty 
six women’s organisations were responsible for this campaign.  A result of this was 
FOKUS Forum for women and development (FOKUS Forum for kvinner og utvikling) 
which institutionalised a long-lasting co-operation and, today, more than 70 women’s 
organisations are connected. 
 
Post-1980s  
The landscape of ethnic Norwegian women’s and feminist organisations has 
gradually changed since the 1980s.  Some of the organisations have been abolished 
(The National Council of Women, the Norwegian Federation of Women, The New 
Feminists, Bread and Roses) and new organisations have been established (Ottar 
 19 
and Human Rights Service).  There has been a general decrease in the ethnic 
Norwegian voluntary sector.  However, there have been prominent changes among 
women with an ethnic minority or national minority background.  Many migrant 
women’s organisations, mostly local and regional, have been established.  These 
are mostly ethnic and cultural organisations (Nyhagen Predelli, 2006).  There are 
only a few national organisations of/for migrants and refugees, but there have been 
efforts to include ethnic minorities in the political process.  ‘Ethnic corporatism’ 
(Brochmann and Rogstad, 2007) was institutionalised in 1984 when the Contact 
Committee between migrant organisations and the government (Kontaktutvalget 
mellom innvandrerbefolkningen og myndighetene, KIM) was established. 
 
In general, there has been an increase in professionalized and centralised 
organisations that work politically since the 1980s (Selle, 2000, in Berven and Selle, 
2001).  The same is true among feminist organisations, and there are also more 
informal networks.  Violence against women is still an important issue, and other 
issues are ‘the tyranny of beauty’, equal pay and economic independence. 
 
The feminist discourse in Norway has changed; for example there is less talk about 
the ‘oppression’ of women.  Formal gender equality has been established.  There is 
also less talk about ‘sisterhood’ and ‘solidarity’ in a more diverse feminist landscape.  
The most important change, however, is related to the symbolic merging of gender 
equality and the migration policy fields.  This is a discourse that has set up gender 
equality as a ‘Norwegian value’ in contrast to migrant cultures, specifically Muslim 
culture, which is oppressive to women and connected to issues like female genital 
mutilation and forced marriages. 
 
Mainstreaming and intersectional policies have been central in the 1990s and 2000s.  
Mainstreaming, especially in the 1990s, through efforts to integrate gender 
perspectives into core thinking of public administration and resulting in a 
downscaling of women-oriented projects.  Intersectionality is connected to more 
recent efforts to simultaneously deal with complex patterns of discrimination, and this 
approach has been questioned by ethnic Norwegian women’s organisations due to a 
fear of less focus on women’s and gender issues. 
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2.3 Spain 
 
During the Franco regime (1939-1975) in Spain, women’s emancipation and 
women’s participation in the labour market were seen as antithetical to ‘traditional’ 
conceptions of femininity, and married women were legally subordinated to the 
authorities of their husbands.  The only legal women’s organisation of a political 
nature was The Women’s Section of the Phalanx (Falange) which was an integral 
part of the fascist state apparatus (Mendez, 1983; Marin and Lopez Garcia, 1986).  
Other women’s organisations had to function in a clandestine way (Threlfall, 1996).  
However, women were involved in the resistance movement in the 1940s and 1950s.  
Women also formed new women’s groups in the 1960s and 1970s, and these groups 
represented new forms of female opposition which started to articulate egalitarian 
ideas and rights (Sundman, 1999).  There was a growing interest in exploring gender 
relations from a feminist perspective, and an unofficial celebration of the International 
Women’s Year, in December 1975, is seen as a turning point in the history and 
development of the women’s movement in Spain. 
 
Post-Franco Spain: the years of state feminism 
After Franco’s death on 20th November 1975, women felt that sex discrimination was 
left out.  Issues like democracy and socialism were seen as more important 
(Threlfall, 1996).  There was tension between ‘party women’ and ‘independent 
feminists’.  Newer groups of women and radical feminists felt the need to be 
organised independently of political parties.  They advocated for ‘difference’ 
feminism and personal change (Sundman, 1999).  Several feminist organisations 
began to distance themselves from the political traditions of the Left. 
 
Women-friendly and feminist state institutions were established in the 1980s.  The 
Women’s Institute (WI) (Instituto de la Mujer) in 1983 marks the beginning of state 
feminism (Gill, 1996).  The set-up of WI was influenced by the Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE) along with Socialist party feminists.  WI 
has influenced key legislation concerning gender equality and violence against 
women.  Several Women’s Equality Plans (1988-1990, 1993-1996, 1997-2000, and 
2000-2006) have been launched, and Women’s Agencies with their own Equality 
Plans have been established in all Spanish regions (Bustelo, 2003).  The feminist 
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movement in Spain has supported the introduction of gender-based equality policies 
(Valiente, 2001). 
 
European institutions have impacted on Spanish gender policy in the 1980s and 
1990s.  The EU has provided incentives for mobilisation of the Spanish women’s 
movement (Valiente and Jonson, 2003).  The creation of the European Women’s 
Lobby in 1990 was followed by the establishment of the Spanish European Women’s 
Lobby (Coordinadora Espanola para el Lobby Europeo de Mujeres, CELEM) in 
March 1993.  The CELEM is an umbrella association of nationally-based Spanish 
feminist groups funded mainly with European money. 
 
Muddling Through – the 1990s 
In the period from 1996 to 2004 the conservative party, People’s Party (Partido 
Popular, PP) was in government.  This was a quieter time for the feminist movement.  
The conservative government maintained a certain level of interest in women’s 
issues, but twice rejected the PSOE’s proposed gender violence law (Bustelo and 
Ortbals, 2007). 
 
The PSOE’s return: 2004 onwards 
The socialist administration, lead by Rodriguez Zapatero from 2004 onwards, 
focused on the establishment of a gender-based state machinery and there was a 
substantial increase in gender policies, policy measures and gender legislation.  The 
Gender Violence Act was passed in 2004; legislative measures regarding parity 
government, reform of the Civil Code that allows homosexual marriage in 2005; and 
the National Equality Law in 2007.  The Equality Policies General secretariat was 
established in 2004 and the Special Governmental Delegation against Gender 
Violence created in 2008, was, which belongs to the newly established Ministry of 
Equality.  A National Observatory for Violence against Women, which is an inter-
ministerial entity, was also established.  The mandate is to overview both public and 
private institutions. 
 
Several women’s organisations have been active in lobbying for many of the 
amendments in legislation.  However, their impact is difficult to assess.  There is also 
need for further reforms such as the abortion act and the Foreign Law (including a 
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‘two year’ rule; residency requirement for family reunification before a residency 
permit can be issued, creating a potentially difficult situation for immigrant women 
experiencing domestic violence).  There are also vast variations across regions in 
Spain concerning the implementation of Equality Plans due to the political and 
administrative structure. 
 
In the last 20 years, Spanish feminism has been fragmented between women’s 
policy agencies and women’s movement activists.  However, institutional changes 
during the 1980s and the 1990s created new possibilities for women’s voices at 
different levels. 
 
A few comments post-2008 national election 
The current political environment has provided new political opportunities for the 
Spanish women’s movement to influence gender violence policy.  Gender violence 
issues have recently gained increased political attention, after a series of high-profile 
domestic violence incidents reported in the national media.  Just before the general 
election in March 2008, women’s organisations demanded more involvement from 
the political parties, and they organised meetings and campaigns protesting against 
a judicial system that, allegedly, is not fit for purpose in dealing with women’s 
complaints about violence. 
 
Diversity issues in the Spanish context 
Until recently, Spain has been relatively racially homogenous, and issues of 
diversity, inclusion and representation for minority groups have not been a priority for 
the women’s movement.  This picture of exclusion from the mainstream feminist 
agenda also includes the LGBT (Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender/transsexual) 
movement, which has been relatively small, and has had a problematic relationship 
with the feminist movement (Garcia, 2007).  In academe, mainstream sociological 
gender studies have focused on family, work, education, and politics (Valiente, 
2001), while fewer studies have focused on ethnic minority women. 
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2.4 The United Kingdom 
 
1967 (the Abortion Act) to 1982 (the demise of the Organisation of Women of 
African and Asian Descent) 
In the UK, the late 1960s saw new legislation that directly improved women’s lives: 
the Abortion Act 1967; the NHS (Family Planning) Act 1967; The Divorce Reform Act 
1969; the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1969; the Equal Pay Act 1970; 
and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.  The Race Relation Acts 1968 and 1976 gave 
some protection against racism but, in general legislation, have been restrictive 
regarding migrants.  Some triumphs for women’s rights were, in fact, undermining 
the rights of black women, for example a passage in the 1967 Abortion Act which 
supported fertility control among ‘problem’ social groups. 
 
Women’s activism 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s long-established broadly liberal women’s groups 
existed alongside newly formed women’s collectives.  Groups like the Six Point 
Group and the Fawcett Society co-ordinated the activities of a range of pressure 
groups. 
 
Some of the new feminists rejected a traditional political engagement and pursued 
the ‘personal politics’ of consciousness-raising and life-style changes.  The London 
Women’s Liberation Workshop in 1968 represented the beginnings of a more co-
ordinated movement (Caine, 1997).  However, the small-scale, localised and non-
hierarchical nature of women’s activism continued. 
 
The first National Women’s Liberation Conference (NWLC) was held in 1970.  In the 
second NWLC the year after, delegates agreed on four demands: equal pay; equal 
education and job opportunities; free contraception and abortion on demand; and 
free 24-hour nurseries (Caine, 1997).  Two additional demands were articulated at 
the 1974 Conference: legal and financial independence for all women; and the end 
to discrimination against lesbians.  Yet another demand was added in 1978: freedom 
for all women from intimidation by the threat or use of male violence and an end to 
all laws, assumptions and institutions which perpetuate male dominance and men’s 
aggression towards women.  In 1978 the final NWLC was arranged due to divisions 
 24 
in the mainstream women’s liberation movement (WLM).  Radical feminists insisted 
that masculinity was inherently linked to violence, but socialist and liberal feminists 
rejected this. 
 
The mainstream women’s liberation movement (WLM) attempted to influence public 
opinion by arranging high profile events and campaigns.  The movement received 
media attention and government responses included designating 1975 the Year of 
Women. 
 
Black women’s organisations 
There was a neglect of the intersection of race and gender by white feminists in 
Britain in which period.  The WLM had more focus on social class and issues, such 
as discriminatory immigration practices, were rarely prioritised.  The radical legal 
organisation Rights of Women (ROW, 1975) was engaged with immigration 
problems but, in general, white feminists did not accommodate diversity based on 
ethnicity. 
 
In the early 1970s autonomous black women’s organisations were formed: Brixton 
Black Women’s Group; Liverpool Black Sisters; Manchester Black Women’s Co-
operative; and the Muslim Ladies Circle.  These organisations addressed racism.  
White feminists viewed patriarchy as an over-arching structure that promoted the 
interests of men to be detriment to women.  Black women on the other hand did not 
necessarily share this world view as black men were barley represented within 
institutional power structures, and family could be a source for support (Caine, 
1997).  This was also the case for a white minority, the Irish Catholics, which 
suffered from institutional racism across this period (O’Shea, 1989).  Many black 
women did not consider themselves to be either feminists or political.  However, they 
were involved in women-only activities that sought social justice and challenged, for 
instance, racism faced by their children. 
 
The Brixton Black Women’s Group was established in 1974 and they addressed 
colonialism and other Pan-African issues.  Southall Black Sisters was formed in 1979 
as a campaigning group.  They initially represented Asian and Afro-Caribbean 
women, but increasingly supported South Asian women.  In 1978 an umbrella-group 
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called the Organisation of Women of African and Asian Descent (OWAAD) was 
established.  They co-ordinated responses to issues that affected black communities 
(Brixton Black Women’s Group, 1984).  Forming OWAAD is viewed as a watershed 
in the history of black women’s rights activism.  They held annual conferences from 
1979 to 1982.  The term ‘womanist’ was suggested as an alternative to ‘feminist’, but 
not adopted within OWAAD.  OWAAD folded in 1982 because of differences based 
on class, sexuality and region, in addition to differences in country of origin, religion 
and caste.  There were, for example, conflicts between London–based black 
women’s groups and other groups around the country, and also conflict between 
lesbian groups and other groups. 
 
Both ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities adopted the feminist tenet ‘the personal 
is political’ which evolved into an ideology of identity politics and included the 
merging of personal empowerment and political activism. 
 
Violence against women 
The WLM focused on violence against women, and the home as a site of male 
violence (Lovenduski and Randall, 1993).  The first women’s refuges opened in 1972 
and the refuge movement exposed domestic violence as a previously hidden social 
problem.  Women’s Aid (WA) was formed in 1975 as an umbrella-organisation for 
refuges seeking to incorporate core feminist principles.  Black women’s groups did 
not engage with the refuge movement.  Black women were more often clients than 
workers or volunteers and black women’s groups were reluctant to highlight the 
existence of domestic violence in their communities.  In 1980, however, the Southall 
Black Sisters broke the community’s code of silence by protesting against the killing 
of an Asian woman and her children by her husband. 
 
Women’s groups and the state 
Second wave feminists showed, generally, little interest in engaging in dialogue with 
national government, and the government tended not to listen (Caine, 1997).  
Feminist groups were poorly represented in the Women’s National Commission, 
established in 1969 by the Labour Government. 
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The refuges had limited resources and were based on voluntary activity and 
community fund-raising.  However, they needed protection from state agencies and 
local authorities.  In 1975 the government set up the Commons Select Committee on 
Violence in Marriage with Women’s Aid.  This contributed to a growth in public 
understanding of the issue and also resulted in new legislation to protect women 
from domestic violence. 
 
Groups such as Women Against Rape and Feminists Against Sexual Terrorism 
organised ‘Reclaim the Night’ marches (Lovenduski and Randall, 1993).  This 
however, caused division between white and black women because these marches 
were organised in black areas (Sudbury, 1998).  Rape crisis centres established 
from 1976 and the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act came in 1976. 
 
In 1979 the Conservatives took over government and this led to a reduction in public 
spending.  Many women who had been active in the WLM opposed Tory policies and 
many women opposed state violence by joining the peace movement and the 
Greenham Common protests against Cruise missiles or the miners’ wives campaign. 
 
1982 to 1997 
Margaret Thatcher’s administration showed a lack of interest in gender equality, but 
some progress was made as a result of European Community (EC) directives.  The 
Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) were involved in extending the law relating 
to sex equality and amendments were incorporated in the Sex Discrimination Act 
1986. 
 
The Immigration Act, 1980, included the ‘one year rule’ (foreign spouses must live in 
the UK with their partner for twelve months before applying for settlement status) and 
the ‘no recourse to public funds’ (not claim any state benefits or undertake any paid 
work) which made foreign women in abusive relationships particularly vulnerable. 
 
Women’s activism and the state 
The 18-year period of Tory rule was a testing time for a range of feminist 
endeavours.  Projects that delivered services and received state funding met 
pressure to conform.  For instance, the refuge movement could receive funding, but 
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feminist projects risked eroding.  Women’s groups that were not performing a 
valuable delivery role experienced funding cutbacks and many were forced to fold.  
However, this period saw a growth in ‘municipal feminism’, and an increasing 
number of women’s units and committees. 
 
Some women’s organisations were involved in multi-agency working.  Women’s Aid 
(WA) had access to government agencies and was asked to give advice.  Also 
Southall Black Sisters voiced their opinion on the ‘one year’ and the ‘no recourse to 
public funds’ rules.  However, few of their concerns were reflected in policy (Gupta, 
2003).  In the early 1990s women’s organisations worked for justice for women who 
had killed by abusive family members.  This coalition included Southall Black Sisters, 
Women’s Aid and Justice for Women, and these campaigns were partly successful 
(Gupta, 2003). 
 
The issue of female genital mutilation received increased attention due to 
immigration from the Horn of Africa.  In 1983 the organisation Forward was 
established.  This organisation collaborated with organisations such as Southall 
Black Sisters, The Black Women’s Health and Family Support and Akina Mama Wa 
Africa, and Somali community health groups.  Their aim was to eliminate the practice 
in the UK and Africa and the Female Circumcision Act was passed in 1985. 
 
Women Against Fundamentalism (WAF) was established in 1989, after Salman 
Rushdie’s novel ‘The Satanic Verses’.  WAF wanted to promote secularism and 
oppose religious fundamentalism.  Southall Black Sisters and Brent Asian Women’s 
Refuge were some of the organisations involved in WAF.  They worked against 
divisions based on religion which, in their opinion, eroded the global sisterhood of 
black feminists. 
 
Feminists had minimal success at influencing social policy during the period of 
Conservative rule.  However, from the mid 1980s, women’s groups forged links with 
the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP).  In 1987 the PLP created a post of shadow 
minister for women.  The Labour Party in opposition endorsed the incorporation of 
gender mainstreaming into its policies and collaborated with women’s groups. 
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1997 to the present day 
Labour won the election in 1997 and the first Blair administration established the 
Women’s Unit (WU).  This unit was rebranded in 2001 as the Women and Equality 
Unit (WEU), but was criticised by many feminists who claimed that the equality 
structures were not designed to effect fundamental change (Coote, 2001).  However, 
others argued that the establishment of a minister for women nominally represented 
an expansion in the influence of female politicians (Lovensduski, 2007).  The 
Government Equality Office (GEO) was set up in 2007 and the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) was established due to the amalgamation of separate 
equality bodies. 
 
The New Labour has engaged with the VAW (Violence against women) agenda and 
this has resulted in the Domestic Violence, Crime and Disorder Act 2004 and the 
Domestic Violence National Plan in 2005.  However, shortcomings have occurred 
where violence against women intersects with immigration.  Protective legislation 
against so-called honour-based violence has been made (The Female Genital 
Mutilation Act 2003; the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 plus the Forced 
Marriage Unit), but there has been very different governmental response to violence 
against women experienced by UK citizens and non-citizens.  There has been harsh 
legislation to repel asylum seekers and the ‘no recourse to public funds’ condition for 
those whose claims failed.  Some aspects have been gendered, for instance the 
burden of proof required for a women who is fleeing some form of gender 
persecution.  Also trafficking has been viewed through the prism of immigration.  
There have been firm penalties for trafficking for sexual exploitation, however, few 
measures to aid or protect victims. 
 
Women’s activism 
Almost all the feminist organisations have moved away from the flat, fully democratic 
structure.  This has been a response to the political climate and in order to become 
more efficient.   
 
In 2005 the End Violence Against Women (EVAW) Campaign was arranged by a 
coalition of organisations across the women’s movement which, historically, have 
had different orientations and limited interaction.  The coalition included Women’s 
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Aid Federations from across the UK; Refuge; Rape Crisis; Southall Black Sisters; 
FORWARD; Imkaan; Fawcett Society; the Women’s National Commission; and the 
Women’s Institute. 
 
Women’s groups and the state 
Organisations working against VAW, including Southall Black Sisters, have lobbied 
for the repeal of immigration rules such as the ‘one year’ rule and the ‘no recourse to 
public funds’ rule.  Eventually, some changes were made, namely that women who 
could prove that their relationships had broken down as a result of domestic violence 
could be granted leave to remain; however, they still had no recourse to public funds.  
The government also extended the probationary period to two years in order to 
discourage opportunistic marriages as a mode to entry. 
 
Since 2005, End Violence Against Women (EVAW) has conducted an annual ‘audit’ 
of government departments.  These reports show that the government has failed to 
develop an overarching strategy to bring together the work of the different 
departments and it does not tackle intersectional discrimination (EVAW, 2008).  
Southall Black Sisters, among others, have argued that the government should 
incorporate the issue of forced marriages into its mainstream policies on violence 
against women. 
 
Secular women’s groups, particularly representing black women have also criticised 
Labour’s commitment to multiculturalism because usually there are male 
representatives and representatives from religious communities who determine the 
needs of the community, and they have had little or no interest in promoting women’s 
interests (WAF, 2007). 
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3 WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS, GENDERED CITIZENSHIP, AND 
MULTICULTURALISM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The overall question to be addressed in FEMCIT is the relationship between the 
changing forms and practices of gendered citizenship in a multicultural Europe, and 
the demands and practices which have emerged from ‘second wave’ women’s 
movements from the late 1960s and onwards.  In Work Package 4 (WP4) Strand 1 
we explore the demands and practices of majoritised and minoritised women’s 
movements.  We have selected Spain, Norway and the UK - with very different 
migration histories and different gender regimes - as empirical examples of the 
intersection of feminism and ethnicity.  Our point of departure is the division among 
feminists along racial/ethnic lines, and the dynamic relationships between differently 
situated activists (Roth, 2004).  To what extent have majoritised or ‘white’ women’s 
organisations engaged with minoritised women’s organisations, and have they been 
able to establish a common political platform?  What has been the impact on public 
policy, or the resonance between feminist claims and public policy?  The research is 
inspired by feminist, black and post-colonial theories and whiteness studies (Hill 
Collins, 1991; Crenshaw, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993; Srivastava, 2005; Sudbury, 
1998).  The reflections offered in this chapter concern core concepts that form the 
basis of and links between the individual country studies within WP4.  In the sections 
below we develop our understanding of the concepts of women’s movements, 
gendered citizenship, multiculturalism and intersectionality.  We also present some 
reflections on our own positioning in relation to the research undertaken in our 
country studies. 
 
First, however, two notes on terminology are called for.  Firstly, we have conducted 
interviews and literature studies in three different languages, whereas this report is 
written in English.  This means that everything spoken or written in Norwegian and 
Spanish has been translated to English.  Translating academic, political, 
bureaucratic and everyday language is challenging.  We might not always have 
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succeeded in catching the ‘right’ words, in spite of our efforts to be loyal to the 
research participants.15 
 
Secondly, in our descriptions and discussions of relationships between various 
analytically distinct ethnic or racial groups within the women’s movement, we 
struggle with the selection of concepts.  The effects of language mean that we are in 
danger of embodying the groups as ‘natural’ instead of political, and we try to deal 
with this problem by employing various combinations of seemingly descriptive 
concepts like (ethnic) ‘majority’/(ethnic) ‘minority’ feminism on the one hand, and 
explicitly political concepts like ‘majoritised’/‘minoritised’ feminism and 
‘white’/’black’/Sami feminism on the other.  Our take on concepts is motivated by 
Yasmin Gunaratnam and her book Researching ‘Race’ and Ethnicity (Gunaratnam, 
2003) in which she applies a social constructivist perspective to the usage of terms 
such as ‘minority’ and ‘minority’.  She uses the term ‘ethnic minority’ not in a 
descriptive sense, but sees the label and its connotations as socially constructed and 
therefore uses the term in quotation marks.  Gunaratnam prefers using the term 
‘minoritised’ as it signals ‘the active processes of racialisation that are at work in 
designating certain attributes of groups in particular contexts as being in a ‘minority’’ 
(ibid.: 17).  In our reports, for the sake of readability we do not always use quotation 
marks around the terms ‘majority’ and ‘minority’.  However, we use these terms 
interchangeably with those suggested by Gunaratnam (majoritised and minoritised), 
as we agree that how groups of people are labelled are in large part determined by 
existing power relations and power differentials between different groups.   
 
In our country studies we develop historical and contemporary accounts of the 
collaborations and alliances (or lack thereof) between majoritised and minoritised 
women’s movements in Spain, Norway and the UK.  The contemporary accounts are 
mainly based on interviews with activists - covering the time period from the 1970s 
upwards - from a number of women’s organisations (listed in appendices to each 
country report) and a selection of politicians and civil servants, whereas the historical 
accounts are mainly based on secondary literature of the women’s and feminist 
                                            
15 Moreover, with one exception none of the authors of the reports on Norway, Spain and the UK 
have English as their mother language.   
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movements in the three countries.  We also examine political claims-making and 
problem representations forwarded by both movement and government actors, with 
an emphasis on violence against women issues and racism and discrimination 
issues that are relevant to the violence against women agenda.  The anti-violence 
and anti-racism engagements of the organisations are chosen by the researchers as 
empirical examples of the intersection of feminism and ethnicity.  A selective 
mapping of policy documents and reports, produced by national governments and by 
women’s organisations, has been carried out to supplement the interviews.  In 
various ways, we address the emergence of gender equality and ethnic diversity as 
distinct or intertwined policy fields, and relate our research to the growing concern 
with multiple forms of discrimination (Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2007; 
Squires, 2007). 
 
We apply a historical and process-orientated perspective on claims-making and 
demands forwarded by women’s movements, compared to a more unified measuring 
of impact or effects often used in for instance empirical political science (for our 
approach to the political influence of women’s movement actors, see Chapter 4).  
We are thus not trying to establish degrees of measurable influence, unlike for 
instance the authors of Comparative State Feminism (Stetson and Mazur, 1995).  To 
some extent we also, like Stetson and Mazur, focus on formal politics and the state.  
However, we take a broader approach to politics which encompasses both informal 
politics and the politics that characterise relations between different actors within the 
women’s movement itself.   
 
3.2 Women’s Movements 
 
We use the terms ‘contemporary women’s movements’ to delineate our focus on the 
women’s liberation movement which gained momentum in many European countries 
from the late 1960s and early 1970s.  We are reluctant to using terms like ‘second 
wave women’s movements’ because the wave metaphor is more confusing than 
clarifying in comparative research (Lønnå, 2004).  The number of waves and the 
timing of the waves differ from country to country, i.e., between Norway, Spain and 
Britain, and the term tends to focus on tops and high-points without reflecting on the 
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normal level of mobilisation, activity and visibility of women’s movements that is 
taking place in between the crests (ibid.: 41).   
 
Our research includes different geopolitical regions of Europe - the Western (UK), 
Northern (Norway) and Southern (Spain) regions, a time span of about 40 years, and 
a major concern with demands voiced by minoritised women’s movement actors in 
relation to majoritised women’s movement actors and in relation to the state.  
Although our main emphasis is on women’s movement organisations with explicit 
feminist aims and identities, we have also included non-feminist women’s 
organisations, or even gender-mixed organisations, whenever deemed required or 
desirable.  Empirically speaking, our project includes social movement organisations 
that may not subscribe to feminist identities.  An emphasis on contributions and 
claims-making from ethnic minority women has necessitated such a broad approach.  
In Spain, for instance, ethnic minority women’s groups are often embedded within 
gender-mixed organisations rather than organising independently of these, and in 
the UK many black women’s organisations identify more with the anti-racist 
movement than with the women’s movement (Siddiqui, 2000).  In Norway, 
organisations without feminist aims and gender-mixed organisations have played an 
important role in promoting the interests if migrant women.   
 
In general, any categorisation of organisations is daring, partly because the 
organisational landscape changes rapidly and partly because categories are neither 
empirically nor theoretically self-evident.  Feminism is multidimensional, and the 
organisations ‘are outcome[s] of situationally and historically specific processes’ 
(Ferree and Martin, 1995).  In order to illustrate this problematic, we can look at the 
example of Norway. 
 
A mapping of Norwegian organisations in the early 1980s defined women’s 
organisations as those whose members and leaders were predominantly women 
(Dahlerup and Gulli, 1985), and differentiated between eight categories, one of which 
was ‘the women’s movements’ (women’s rights, feminist) (ibid.: 9).  The selection of 
organisations for our own project, more than 20 years later, is based on a mapping 
of the overall ‘gender political’ organisational landscape which also includes men’s 
organisations as well as gender mixed organisations.  The mapping is focused on 
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gender issues and on the intersection between women’s and migrants’ organisations 
in particular.  We have categorised according to profile/aim, gendered composition of 
membership, organisational activities, and national/local organisational level 
(Eggebø, 2007).16 
 
Such categorisations, however, make organisational distinctions appear more 
unambiguous than they in fact are, concerning gender as well as ethnicity/race.  We 
find West and Blumberg’s ‘continuum of gender integration in social protest’ and the 
differentiation between independent, gender-integrated and gender-parallel 
organisations inspiring (West and Blumberg, 1990: 22).  Their categorisation include 
independent organisations, where separate gender groups operate autonomously 
(women and men have their own gender-specific groups); parallel organisations, 
where auxiliary women’s groups are linked to a single male dominated movement 
with some mutually beneficial movement aspects; and, finally, gender integrated 
organisations, which simultaneously engage both men and women pursuing a single 
objective (ibid.).  Similarly, ethnic minority organisations engaged in social protest 
can be categorised along the same dimensions: whether ethnic minority women 
have their own independent or separate groups, whether they have parallel or 
auxiliary groups, or whether they are integrated into gender-mixed ethnic minority 
organisations. 
 
In our analysis of the relations between minoritised and majoritised women’s 
movement organisations, we have elaborated various ways of mapping the 
organisational landscape and selecting organisations for further research.  So far, 
the categories in Table 3.1 illustrate the intersection of gender and ethnicity in 
voluntary and professional organisations in Norway, Spain and the UK. 
                                            
16 For the mapping by Eggebø see www.femcit.org/files/WP4_WorkingpaperNo1.pdf.  The following 
categories were constructed and used in the mapping: gender political organisations, minority 
organisations, religious organisations, social and humanitarian organisations, women’s committees of 
organisations and political parties, organisations focusing on gender based violence and local 
women’s organisations. 
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Table 3.1 The Intersection of Gender and Race/Ethnicity in Social Movement 
Organisations17 
 
 
FOCUS ON 
RACIALLY/ 
ETHNICALLY 
BASED 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
FOCUS ON GENDER BASED DISCRIMINATION 
 
MAIN FOCUS18 
(Women’s movement organisations) 
PARTIAL 
FOCUS19 
FEMINIST NOT FEMINIST20  
MAIN FOCUS 
(Anti-
racist/indigenous 
people’s movement 
organisations) 
Feminist + anti-
racist/national 
minority/indigenous 
people’s  
 Anti-racist/national 
minority/indigenous 
people’s 
organisations with 
a partial concern 
with women’s 
issues 
PARTIAL FOCUS 
 
Feminist 
organisations with 
some interest in 
ethnic 
discrimination 
Women’s 
organisations with 
a focus on the 
situation of 
women of ethnic 
minority 
backgrounds  
 
WEAK/NO FOCUS 
 
Feminist 
organisations with 
no focus on the 
discrimination of 
ethnic minorities  
Women’s 
organisations with 
no focus on 
ethnic minorities 
 
 
The extent to which a movement or an organisation is feminist is an empirical 
question, but feminism itself can be defined and operationalised in a number of 
different ways (Outshoorn and Kantola, 2007).  Although scholars may use the 
concepts of women’s movement and feminist movement interchangeably, McBride 
and Manzur, 2008) point out that such a usage does not work effectively in 
comparative research, as the concept of feminism is highly contested and may be 
intuitively associated with (negative) images such as bra-burning and man-hating, 
and white Western imperialist feminism. 
 
                                            
17 The table is inspired by West and Blumberg 1990.   
18 These organisations are ‘women’s organisations’, where the members and leaders are 
predominantly women, usually regarded as the ‘women’s movement’.   
19 Organisations where the members and leaders are gender mixed.   
20 See the distinction between feminist and women’s movements elsewhere in this section.   
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Ferree and Tripp define feminism as ‘the broad goal of challenging and changing 
gender relations that subordinate women to men and that thereby also differently 
advantage some women and men relative to others’ (Ferree and Tripp, 2006: vii).  
They also claim that whether or not individuals or groups choose to call themselves 
feminists, ‘their goal of empowering women should be considered feminist’ (ibid.: vii).  
It follows that organisations which do not self-label as feminist may be described as 
feminist by researchers employing the understanding forwarded by Ferree and Tripp.  
Furthermore, Ferree and Tripp distinguish between feminism as a goal for social 
change and women’s movements as organised constituencies.   
 
Such a distinction is in keeping with the work of RNGS,21 the Research Network on 
Gender Politics and the State, where feminist movements are seen as a subset of 
the women’s movement.  While ‘women’s movements’ is used for a broad variety of 
different forms of women’s organising, the term ‘feminist movements’ refers to 
collective activity that explicitly challenges the dominant gendered power relations or 
confronts the gender order.  In our reports we follow the usage of the RNGS 
network, thus taking the broader concept of ‘women’s movements’ to include 
collective action by women presenting gendered identity claims (McBride and Mazur, 
2008).  In the same vein, a women’s movement discourse will emphasise the 
identification with women as a group, the use of explicitly gendered language about 
women, and a demand for representation of women in public life (see ibid.).  The 
concept of ‘the feminist movement’, on the other hand, is in this perspective seen as 
a sub-category of women’s movements, consisting of women’s movement actors 
that present a particular movement discourse (feminism) which involves demands 
towards changing the position of women, including the challenging and changing of 
women’s subordination and the structures of gender based hierarchies (ibid.).   
 
3.3 Gendered Citizenship 
 
A current trend in feminist studies of citizenship is the opening up of the term from a 
narrow political-legal and state-oriented definition to a broader and more inclusive 
cultural-social definition.  Currently, a number of researchers are engaged in 
                                            
21 For information about RNGS, see http://libarts.wsu.edu/polisci/rngs. 
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attempts to analyse the extent to which women in various communities exercise 
citizenship in this broader sense, including Lister, 2003; Tastsoglou and 
Dobrowolsky, 2006; and Siim, 2000.  The classic view of citizenship as delineating 
legal and political rights and duties has been challenged on several fronts, including 
its limitation of citizenship to the public sphere and its narrow view of citizenship as 
‘status’.  Feminist scholarship has thus claimed that citizenship encompasses 
practices within all spheres of life - be they political, economic, social, cultural, 
religious, bodily, domestic or intimate.  Our project follows Siim’s citizenship 
perspective in exploring the ‘interrelation between institutions, women’s 
participations, and identities of agency’ (Siim, 2007: 493), approaching ‘lived culture’ 
as a dynamic process, and including the transnational level as an additional aspect 
of the citizenship frame (ibid.: 493).   
 
An emphasis on citizenship as practice implies that citizenship is not a fixed attribute 
of a particular group of individuals included in a given polity, but that citizenship is 
contested, fluid and dynamic, and involves processes of negotiation and struggle 
(Lister, 2003; Tastsoglou and Dobrowolsky, 2006).  Women’s movement actors are 
involved in struggles over and developments of notions of citizenship when they 
demand women-friendly, gender-fair or gender-equal policies.  Our project includes a 
particular focus on claims forwarded by migrant and ethnic minority women, and their 
resonance with claims forwarded by majority women’s movements.  We also focus 
on claims forwarded by majoritised and minoritised women’s movements and their 
resonance with state authorities.  Theories of citizenship are useful in this context 
because they display tensions ‘between equality and diversity for women and 
minorities that represents a challenge to the universal framework of citizenship to 
include difference and diversity’ (Siim, 2007). 
 
From the feminist type of argument outlined above it follows that if women do not 
enjoy the same rights and opportunities as men to participate in all areas of life, that 
is, if women are not free to choose whether they want to act as full citizens at work, 
in the family, in civil society and in politics, then they are not treated as equal citizens 
and are hence discriminated against.  In so far as rights and the freedom to choose 
do not guarantee equal outcomes for women and men, a radical implication of 
feminist theories of citizenship is that practices should be inclusive of women and 
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men in all aspects of life.  A precondition for inclusive practices, and hence for 
democracy, is agency - ‘[a] conscious capacity to choose and act at a personal and 
political level’ (Lister, 1997:38).  Women’s movement actors are on the one hand 
agents that may put forward citizenship claims and demands in relation to various 
policy areas.  On the other hand, their agency may be constrained or conditioned by 
the particular characteristics of the social and political structures in which they are 
embedded.  In our project we address bonds or links between civil society (in the 
form of women’s movements organisations) and the public arena (in the form of 
government and gender machineries) with a particular focus on women’s 
movements and the emerging voices and claim-making of organised ‘racialised’ and 
minority ethnic women, and the presence or absence of collaboration and alliances 
between ethnic majority and minority women.   
 
3.4 Multiculturalism, Minorities Within Minorities, and Intersectionality 
 
The contested terms ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’, which have been widely 
used in research and in politics and policy for many years, now seem increasingly to 
be replaced by notions such as diversity and community cohesion.  Relating our own 
project to ongoing international debates within feminist theory (May, Modood and 
Squires, 2004; Okin, 1999; Narayan, 2002; Phillips, 2007), we also distinguish 
between the ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’.  We use the term ‘multicultural’ as a 
descriptive concept referring to the realities of cultural pluralism or diversity of 
contemporary societies, and to the cultural mixes and hybridities that result from 
local, regional and global migration.  Multiculturalism is however used as a normative 
concept which includes a range of positions, including the view that cultural and 
ethnic groups should be recognised and possibly given specific group rights.   
 
In Europe usage of the term ‘multiculturalism’ is often related to race and ethnicity, 
signalling ‘the extension of cultural group recognition and rights to ethnic minorities’ 
(Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy, 2005: 7).  Anne Phillips, who focuses 
‘primarily on the multiethnic, multicultural societies formed through the mass 
migrations of the last 50 years’, is opposed to subsuming indigenous minorities 
under the concept (Phillips, 2007: 170).  She relates the notion more directly to anti-
racist policies, defining multiculturalism as a ‘political agenda designed to redress the 
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unequal treatment of cultural groups and the ‘culture-racism’ to which members of 
minority cultural groups are often exposed’ (ibid.: 3). 
 
In line with these authors, our perspective on the multicultural and multiculturalism 
has been delimited to ethnicity/race, also in harmony with the EU 6th framework 
programme priority 7.1.2 Gender and Citizenship in a Multicultural Context which 
focuses on:  ‘(…) how notions of citizenship and multiculturalism incorporate a 
gender perspective, (…) the relations between gender, race, ethnicity, class and 
different notions and practiced of citizenship’ (ibid.: 16).22 
 
Paradoxically, multiculturalism, when understood as giving not only recognition but 
also group rights to ethnic, cultural and religious minorities, might undermine the 
ideal of gender equal citizenship through the production of increased inequalities for 
minoritised women.  Women within a particular minority group might be prescribed a 
subordinated role, or second-class status, in relation to men within their group.  For 
example, women might be denied a role in public life, with no access to an 
independent income or to representation in positions of power.  If such cultural 
groups are given the legal right to continue gender discriminatory practices, conflicts 
inevitably arise between women’s rights to equality and the minority cultural group’s 
rights to possibly override women’s rights.23  In this sense, women come to 
constitute a minority within a minority (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005), 
disadvantaged by the intersection of multiple structures of oppression.  Such power 
differentials between women and men in minority groups is a contested issue in 
countries such as Norway and the UK, where the governments have been accused 
by women’s groups of speaking mainly with self-appointed, male, community 
leaders.   
 
                                            
22 ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp6/docs/wp/sp1/g_wp_200202_en.pdf  
23 Such conflicts might also arise between international human rights conventions and practices 
within member states that are signatories to such conventions.  For example, in the context of Islam 
and human rights, traditional Shari’a law legitimates and even ‘requires legal discrimination of women’ 
(Mayer, 1991: 99), and in effect undermines the protection women in Muslim states have under the 
CEDAW convention (Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women) (Mayer, 1991: 
137; see also Moghadam, 2002 and Nyhagen Predelli, 2008). 
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In this context the various understandings and interpretations of ‘gender equality’ 
forwarded by women’s organisations and movements are important, as they can be 
used in supporting or critiquing policies that purportedly support multiculturalism.  For 
example, a positive view of multiculturalism might engender support for policies that 
seek to reduce generational conflicts related to forced marriage practices through 
mediation between the involved parties.  A more negative view of multiculturalism 
might lead to the insistence that mediation should be abandoned in favour of 
increased support services for individuals who have been subjected to such illegal 
practices.  These are political issues and conflicts that are fought over between 
women’s organisations who seek to influence current government policy.   
 
Women’s organisations that are explicitly feminist, moreover, might either reject 
multiculturalism outright (in line with Okin, 1999), or promote ‘weak’ interpretations of 
multiculturalism that reject some aspects (in particular group rights that conflict with 
women’s rights) and support other aspects (group rights that do not conflict with 
women’s rights) (see Phillips, 2007).  In so far as feminists do not agree about what 
the term ‘gender equality’ entails, the debate about multiculturalism, women’s rights 
and gender equality will continue among academics and activists alike.  While some 
feminists might focus on formal and legal rights, and on equal opportunities for 
women and men, others are bound to focus also on processes and results in the 
form of equal participation and equal outcome.  Different ideological standpoints 
within women’s movements thus promote and support varying versions of 
multiculturalism, women’s rights and gender equal citizenship.   
 
We understand gender, as well as race and ethnicity and other inequalities like 
social class, to be simultaneously subjective and structural concepts, about everyday 
practices, identities and social positioning (Brah and Phoenix, 2004).  Furthermore, 
we emphasise the need for complex approaches to structured inequalities, whether 
they are multiple, compound or intersectional (Danish Institute of Human Rights, 
2007: 16).  It may be insufficient to ‘add on’ race, ethnicity, class and other 
inequalities to that of gender when analyzing the different claims and demands 
coming from differently positioned women’s movement actors.  Intersectional 
approaches acknowledge the inseparable nature of different inequalities, and aims to 
examine how structures of gender, race and ethnicity, class, sexuality, age, and 
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religion are interlocked and produce unique experiences from which legitimate 
political demands might arise (Hill Collins, 1991; Crenshaw, 1997; McCall, 2005; 
Verloo, 2006).  Patterns of privilege and disadvantage are closely related to 
structures of gender, race and ethnicity, and class, but such patterns are not set in 
stone and individuals and groups might move between positions of privilege and 
disadvantage, depending on the social and cultural context in which they are located 
at different times.  Although a fully developed intersectional approach would include 
inequalities based on class, age, sexuality, and disability, WP4 focuses mainly on 
the intersection of gender and race/ethnicity.  Other work packages within FEMCIT 
are dealing with other dimensions of inequality, and our aim is that the integration of 
all the work packages will lead to the development of a comprehensive 
understanding of gendered citizenship and the different types of inequalities that 
intersect with and impact upon gendered practices of citizenship. 
 
3.5 Shifting Between Insider and Outsider: reflecting on our own positions as 
researchers 
 
Based on various groups of women’s experiences of injustices, problems and 
possibilities in actual lived life, our ambition is to analyse women’s collective agency 
- their political mobilisation, problem-representations and claims-making.  In order to 
contribute to new understandings of gender-fair citizenship, we apply a grounded 
approach to justice and rights.  This implies taking the concepts from the level of 
abstract principles and placing them in dialogue with actual problems and practices 
(Hellum, Steward, Ali and Tsanga, 2007), relying mainly on context-sensitive and 
qualitative approaches.   
 
In contrast to more deductive approaches to gender justice which take normative 
feminist theory or theories of human rights as their point of departure (Okin, 2005; 
Fraser, 2003; Nussbaum, 2000; Phillips, 2003), our project relies mainly on an 
inductive approach to gender fair citizenship.  This implies comprehensive empirical 
research in various locations (Spain, Norway and the UK) into changing notions and 
practices, claims and contributions from majoritised and minoritised women’s 
movements. 
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We approach the empirical research from different positions and backgrounds, and 
acknowledge that our research perspectives and analyses are influenced by our own 
experiences and also by how we are perceived by our research participants.  In the 
main, we are white, middle class women researchers, but we have moved in and out 
of shifting positions as insiders and outsiders in relation to our research.   
 
Five of the six researchers engaged in Strand 1 of the WP4 project are white and of 
European origin, while one is black and of African origin.  None of the researchers 
have been activists in ethnic minority women’s movements.  Reflecting on this 
composition, we have made efforts to ensure a responsible feminist research 
practice along the lines suggested by Sherene Razack.  She proposes that an 
awareness of our subject positions implies ‘tracing the hierarchies in which [we are] 
both subordinated and privileged’ (Razack, 2000).  Two of the researchers are from 
and live in Norway, and have completed the project work in Norway.  One of them 
has been active in the majority women’s movement from the 1970s and onwards, 
while the other researcher is an outsider to the women’s movement.  The research 
for the Norwegian report has thus been undertaken by researchers who variously 
find themselves in positions as insiders (activist, feminist, majoritised) and outsiders 
(non-activist, feminist, majoritised).  A third researcher with a background from 
Romania works and lives in the UK and has done the bulk of the fieldwork in Spain.  
She is the main contributor to the report on the Spanish women’s movement to 
which she is an outsider, irrespective of the majority/minority categories.  As a 
feminist she has been in an insider position, but as a non-native and a non-activist 
she has been an outsider.  The fieldwork for the UK report has been conducted by a 
Norwegian-born researcher who lives and works in the UK.  She is a non-activist 
feminist and an outsider to the UK women’s movement.  The UK report also includes 
contributions from an English born feminist who is an outsider to but interested 
observer of the women’s movement, and from a Ghanaian-born woman living and 
working in the UK who is also an outsider to the UK women’s movement. 
 
The gaining of trust and confidence from research participants has been handled in 
different research contexts.  For instance, one of the researchers found it particularly 
useful to refer to Scandinavian examples of gender equality policies and institutions 
in order to highlight specific features of the UK context.  Another researcher thought 
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she had an advantage as an outsider, while the insider position was found to be an 
asset in some situations by a third researcher.   
 
An important feature that impacts on our positions as researchers in various contexts 
is the extent to which the women’s movements in general and the relations between 
majoritised and minoritised women’s actors within them in particular, have been 
researched.  The history and development of such relations within the three 
countries have followed different trajectories.  In Norway, little research has been 
conducted on relations between ethnic majority and ethnic minority women’s 
organisations, and, indeed, such relations have largely been absent in the movement 
itself.  In Spain, the picture is quite similar, in that previous research on the women’s 
movement has largely neglected the claims-making of ethnic minority women, while 
also the majoritised women’s movement itself has overlooked the interests of ethnic 
minority women in formulating policy demands.  In the UK, on the other hand, there 
is much documentation available on the history and development of ethnic minority 
women’s organisations and their critique of the ethnic majority women’s movement.  
Despite a background of tense relations, majoritised and minoritised women in the 
UK women’s movement have managed to work together effectively in putting forward 
policy demands, in particular in the area of violence against women.  There is less 
available research in the UK, however, on relations between ethnic minority and 
majority women’s organisations in today’s women’s movement.  Furthermore, there 
is little empirical research on the current UK women’s movement and its engagement 
with and impact on political decision-making processes at the state level (see 
Mackay, 2008).  Thus our aim is to produce new knowledge about contemporary 
women’s movements in all the three countries.   
 
Realising the importance of our own location as researching subjects, we would like 
to quote Uma Narayan extensively for her approach, emphasising our positions as 
political subjects engaged in critical analysis of women’s movements:  
 
‘There is an important respect in which we all, as feminists, are not outsiders 
and ‘Anthropologists’ within our own cultures, nor “Native Informants” whose 
task is to provide raw materials for the reflections of our ‘Others’, nor 
necessarily those most grievously affected by the institutions and practices we 
criticize.  We are political subjects engaged in critical political analyses about 
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things we consider crucial, and care about, in the variety of contexts that 
constitute our “locations”.  If Western and Third-World feminists are, in crucial 
ways political subjects, we need to see relationships between us as political 
relationships that always involve struggle and contestation, as well as prospects 
for political solidarity and co-operation.’ 
(Narayan, 1997: 152) 
 
As a way of practicing the feminist epistemology of situated knowledge or articulating 
the location we speak from, we have found that memory work (originally developed 
by the German sociologist Frigga Haug; see Haug, 1987) can provide a valuable tool 
in reflecting on our own underlying notions of race, feminism and good practices in 
gender equality politics.  Awareness of our own normativity is important with respect 
to both research design and analysis.  Four of us have engaged in repeated memory 
work in order to reflect on our own whiteness and privileged locations as white, 
middle-class women working in public universities.  This type of memory work has 
been inspired by the Norwegian researcher Anne-Jorunn Berg and her colleagues 
(Berg, 2004; 2008), who took memory work out of its original white feminist context 
and used it in relation to processes of racialisation.  They wanted to look at the 
intersection of gender and ethnicity, and to focus on the silencing of whiteness as a 
majority category.  Instead of looking at the process of silencing women qua women, 
as white women’s studies did in its early years, Berg and her colleagues wanted to 
focus on the silencing of whiteness as a majority category - in an effort to ‘avoid 
reproducing stereotypical images of minority women’ (Berg, 2008: 3).  They chose to 
articulate whiteness based on the realisation that ‘our (lack of) understanding of 
‘race’ was of vital importance for our research’ (Berg, 2008: 6).  Whiteness and 
privilege is something we might take for granted, and as such it will be reproduced 
as long as we do not deconstruct what is taken-for-granted and question our 
privileges.  We sympathise with Ruth Frankenberg’s claim - in her important book 
‘White women, race matters’ - that: 
 
‘White people tend to look at racism as an issue that people of color face, but 
not as an issue that generally involves us (…) racism can, in short, be 
conceived as something external to us rather than as a system that shapes our 
daily experiences and sense of self.’   
(Frankenberg, 1993: 6) 
 
In this project, where relations between minoritised and majoritised women are 
examined, it has been crucial to introduce theories of whiteness not just in relation to 
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the dynamics of racialisation in the women’s movements, but also to address the 
racial/ethnic positioning of the researchers.  We have taken notice of Frankenberg’s 
statement that white women ‘missed’ or did not ‘get’ the significance of their own 
race or of anyone else’s experience, and that this was closely related to the 
‘standpoint’ white women might inhabit.  White women are not in ‘a structural 
position to see the effects of racism on our lives, not the significance of race in the 
shaping of society’, Frankenberg maintains (ibid.: 9).  In order to deal with this 
challenge, memory work has been a tool in linking abstract theory to personal 
experience.  Doing memory work has been a way of recognising that race is not just 
an intellectual issue, but also one that is personal and political.   
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
As discussed above, we follow McBride and Mazur, 2008 in using the broad term 
‘women’s movement’ to delineate any collective action by women which involves the 
presentation of gendered identity claims.  The term ‘feminist movement’ is narrower 
and can be seen as a sub-category of women’s movements.  Feminist movements 
articulate demands that are critical of any patriarchal gender arrangements or 
practices, and argue for the elimination of such arrangements and practices. 
 
Women’s movements and feminist movements are part of contemporary multicultural 
societies in Spain, Norway and the UK.  However, they might take different positions 
in relation to claims that argue for giving specific rights to cultural, ethnic or religious 
groups as such rights might undermine women’s rights and ideals of gender equality.  
Multiculturalism is thus a contested issue for women’s movement actors, which 
highlights the importance of intersectional approaches to inequality.  Looking one-
sidedly at specific structures of inequality (such as only gender, only race or 
ethnicity, or only class), might actually deepen inequalities and threaten ideals of a 
gender equal citizenship.  Patterns of inclusion and exclusion can however never be 
determined once and for all, and individuals and groups might move between 
positions of privilege and disadvantage, depending on their social and cultural 
context.  It is here that women’s movement actors have a particular role to play, in 
combating structures of exclusion and inequality and supporting and mobilizing 
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women’s agency in order to change society towards a more gender equal 
citizenship. 
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4 POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, FRAMING PROCESSES AND RESONANCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom, women’s intensified mobilisation for 
collective action and protest, forming new crests in women’s movements dating from 
the 1970s and onwards, have been shaped by, and in turn have also influenced, the 
particular socio-political context in each country.  As such, women’s movements in 
specific locations have been and continue to be ‘shaped by the broader set of 
political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are 
embedded’ (McAdam et al., 2006: 3).  The different national contexts are highly 
relevant when we examine the complex relationship between majoritised and 
minoritised (Gunaratnam, 2003) parts of the feminist and women’s movements.  Our 
research question is how the relationships of co-operation and conflicts have been 
represented by movement activists, and how movement actors, politicians and civil 
servants perceive and assess the influence of feminist and women’s movements on 
public policies.   
 
In order to grasp differences and similarities, or unique and common features, of 
women’s movements in Norway, Spain and the UK since the 1970s as these have 
emerged and matured, we have been inspired by theoretical approaches that 
emphasise political opportunities, discourses and framing processes. 
 
In this chapter we discuss political opportunity structures in relation to their 
institutional and discursive aspects and how they give rise to both opportunities and 
constraints for women’s movements organisations in particular contexts.  We also 
argue for the usefulness of discourse and frame analysis in our study of women’s 
movements actors and their claims-making.  In relation to the possible impact 
women’s movements have on public policy we are examining the representations of 
such impact by various actors, or how they talk about political impact.  Our analysis 
of influence, then, is based on representations rather than outright measures of 
influence related to ‘objective’ criteria.  Consequently we prefer to use the concept of 
‘resonance’ (Benford and Snow, 2000) to describe the outcome.  Our purpose is to 
highlight the eventual resonance or dissonance between claims forwarded by 
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‘majoritised’ and ‘minoritised women’s movement actors on the one hand, and claims 
forwarded by interviewed civil servants and politicians and in state policy discourse 
and decision-making.   
 
4.2 Political Opportunity Structures: institutional and discursive aspects 
 
Accounts of the mobilisation of collective action and social protest lean on various 
strands of political theory, and recent research literature displays differences in both 
the number and labels of theories deemed useful to the investigation of social 
movements.  Bergman, for example, differentiates between four theories of 
mobilisation: collective behaviour, resource mobilisation (encompassing rational 
choice and political process theories), new social movement theories and 
constructionist theories (Bergman, 2002).  Kjellman, 2007: 12 has however identified 
three main approaches:  mobilising structures approaches that focus on networks 
and organisations as the building blocks of social protest; identity-oriented 
approaches including culture, identity, and framing processes, and political 
opportunities approaches that link the state and social movements (Kjellman, 2007).  
Although researchers label and categorise their approaches differently, the various 
perspectives have mainly been inspired by economic, psycho-social, structuralist, 
post-structuralist and cultural theories. 
 
During the last decade, however, there has been a significant shift from treating 
these various theories and concepts as competing and mutually exclusive, to viewing 
them as supplementary and useful in building a more comprehensive picture of 
social mobilisation and movements.  Efforts to merge such theories have for 
example been made by authors such as McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996), and 
Davis, McAdam, Scott and Zald (2005).  In line with such comprehensive 
approaches, we find it fruitful to apply two sets of core concepts - those of ‘political 
opportunity structure’ and ‘discursive framing’ - from hitherto rather distinct 
theoretical strands.  We regard both these sets of concepts as necessary in order to 
account for different yet decisive features of the mobilization of gendered and 
feminist protest among majoritised and minoritised groups of women from the 1970’s 
and onwards in Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom.   
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4.3 Political Opportunities 
 
In any given social and political context, the mobilisation of women’s groups, 
organisations and movements depends on the social problems of gender inequality 
that are identified as critical and that as such merit the mobilisation of collective 
protest.  Moreover, such protest cannot emerge in a political vacuum, and its 
success or failure depends on a range of contextual factors or on ‘properties of the 
external environment, relevant to the development of social movements’ (della Porta 
and Diani, 2006: 16; see also Koopmans et al., 2005).  In short, success or failure 
depends on what is often labelled as the relevant ‘political opportunity structures’ in a 
given context.  Such structures are defined by Tarrow (2006: 12) as ‘features of 
regimes and institutions (for example, splits in the ruling class, political alignments, 
the presence or absence of influential allies, the threat or lack of repression, and the 
changes in any of these) that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective action’. 
 
A theory of political opportunity structures thus recognises the influence of political 
institutions on the mobilisation, claims-making and outcome of social movements.  In 
other words, any given political context offers a fluid and dynamic set of opportunities 
and constraints that can enable or hinder the success of collective action (Koopmans 
et al., 2005: 16).  Within this view, social structural problems, such as gender 
inequality or inequalities rooted in ethnic difference, are also context-dependent but 
may not have a unitary or direct causal impact on mobilisation.  Rather, the ‘social 
structural tensions, problems and grievances [are] mediated by the available 
opportunities and constraints set by the political environments in which mobilising 
groups … [such as women’s movements] operate’ (Koopmans, 2004: 451; our 
emphasis). 
 
Political opportunity structures are key to understanding the mobilisation, strategies 
and results of social movements because they operate as ‘structuring cues’ for social 
movements (Kjellman, 2007; McAdam, 1996).  Such cues, which include the 
distribution of opportunities and threats, and repression and facilitation, impact 
differently on different groups of citizens in various political contexts.  Because 
political systems vary across nations, regions and other localities, it is of particular 
interest to conduct comparative studies in which the possible effects of different 
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political opportunity structures are taken into account in the analysis of women’s 
movements and the opportunities and constraints they are faced with in trying to 
change a particular gender regime.24  What counts as relevant features of a political 
opportunity structure is, however, a contested issue in the research literature, as 
there is a lack of consensus on relevant dimensions to be included in the concept 
(McAdam, 1996: 24-25).  The adding of new variables has certainly expanded the 
explanatory power of the concept, but at the same time this has led to a lack of 
specificity (della Porta and Diani, 2006: 17).  Koopmans (1999: 101-102) states that 
the concept needs clarification, but given the vast variety in social movements and 
political systems a single conceptualisation might also be unrealistic.  Koopmans 
thus argues that ‘(political) opportunity structure is a context-sensitive analytical tool 
par excellence’ (ibid.: 102).   
 
4.3.1 Limiting the concept of political opportunity 
In an attempt to bring more analytical clarity to the concept, McAdam (1996) has 
argued that political opportunity structures must be limited to institutional features.  
According to McAdam, institutional opportunity structures refer to the following four, 
relatively stable, national dimensions of a polity which either encourage or dissuade 
collective protest:   
 
• ‘the relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system’; 
• ‘the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically 
undergird a polity’; 
• ‘the presence or absence of elite allies’; and 
• ‘the state’s capacity and propensity for repression’ (or its willingness to apply 
power) (McAdam 1996: 27). 
 
We would add a fifth dimension, namely that of a positive will to act politically to 
improve the conditions of particular groups, which may be a characteristic of the 
state itself or of political parties or individual political representatives.  The presence 
or absence of such political will may to some extent determine the opportunities and 
                                            
24 For the concept of ‘gender regime’ see Connell 1987. 
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constraints that non-governmental actors (such as women’s organisations and 
movements) are faced with. 
 
4.3.2 Stable and dynamic, general and field specific structures 
Gamson and Meyer emphasise a further distinction between stable and dynamic or 
volatile aspects of political opportunity structures, where the stable elements are the 
institutional structure and the party system.  Thus, within the context of a given 
nation-state, the stable institutional structures consist of parliamentary and 
governmental institutions and the party system.  The dynamic or volatile aspects of 
political opportunity structures include the openness of a system, elite alignments, 
alliances and public policy changes (Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 278-281).  These 
aspects can include corporatist and network features such as government 
consultations and lobbying, alliances between system representatives (such as 
politicians and civil servants) and non-governmental organisations, and the capability 
and willingness to change public policy.   
 
Koopmans et al., (2005: 20) have pointed to a weakness of the political opportunities 
approach; namely, the use of this concept at a too general level.  They argue (ibid.: 
19-20) that political opportunities are field-specific and that both institutional and 
discursive opportunity structures have general and field-specific dimensions.  In 
other words, a given political system will have general features such as its party 
system, degree of corporatism, power balances, and so on.  The political system will 
also exhibit field-specific features such that each particular political field (for 
example, ‘gender equality’ or ‘racial and ethnic discrimination) will be characterised 
by designated institutions, alliances and ways of working.  In our analysis we will pay 
specific attention to ‘women’s policy machineries’, ‘women’s policy agencies’ or 
‘institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women’ – or those government 
institutions that ‘pursue social and economic policies beneficial to women’ (Kantola 
and Outshoorn, 2007: 3).  Research has shown that different policy fields ‘offer very 
different political opportunity structures from women’s point of view’ (ibid.: 7).25 
 
                                            
25 Kantola and Outshoorn here refer to Mazur, 2002 and Holli, 2006 - worth checking out.   
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4.3.3 The transnational context 
The political context of women’s movements in particular nation states has never 
been confined within or limited to such states the women’s movement, including the 
first general mobilisation of women which started in the late 19th century, has always 
been and continues to be, international and global in its character (Antrobus, 2004; 
Hawkesworth, 2006; Ferree and Tripp, 2006; Rupp, 1994).  The creation and 
sustaining of transnational networks has been a major feature of the international 
women’s movement.  Both the necessity and the usefulness of international links 
between women’s movement actors has been accentuated by recent global 
developments towards supra-national political entities such as the European Union, 
and by the continued focus of the United Nations on the conditions of women 
throughout the world (exemplified by the UN conferences on women and the Beijing 
Platform for Action, and by the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women, CEDAW) (Pietila & Vickers, 1994).  It is therefore necessary to look 
beyond the context of the nation state in order to examine the political opportunities 
available to women’s movement actors and the constraints they face in attempts to 
produce policy changes.  This is in line with McAdam’s critique of political opportunity 
approaches that have ‘missed [...] the critical role of international trends and events 
in shaping domestic institutions and alignments.  In short, movement scholars have, 
to date, grossly undervalued the impact of global political and economic processes in 
structuring the domestic possibilities for successful collective action’ (McAdam, 1996: 
34). 
 
In our project, both the United Nations and the European context will be taken into 
consideration when we discuss particular features of women’s movements in 
Norway, Spain, and the UK.  The role of the United Nations in the development of 
national gender machineries in various nation-states, as well as the impact of 
transnational networks on the formation of domestic policies, have been recognised 
by scholars (Kantola and Outshoorn, 2007: 9).  Moreover, the Council of Europe and 
the European Union has led individual member states to initiate and effect more 
radical gender equality legislation, thus also providing women’s movement actors 
with opportunity structures they can take advantage of in their particular locations 
within nation states or international contexts (ibid.: 10; see also Roth, 2007).  The 
European Women’s Lobby (founded in 1990), for example, has carved out a 
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significant role as representing more than four thousand women’s organisations from 
all the EU member states and advocating policy innovation and change towards the 
European Union.  On the other hand, the European Union itself has been criticised 
by women’s movement actors for being slow in recognising both the interrelatedness 
of gender, ‘race’, ethnicity, class and sexuality and a lack of concern for the 
discriminatory practices faced by immigrant women (EWL, 2007; European 
Parliament, 1995). 
 
4.3.4 Explaining change 
The critical part of any structural or institutional theory is, of course, to explain how 
change - the mobilisation of protest - can take place.  Political opportunity theorists 
refer to ‘changes in either the institutional feature or informal political alignments of a 
given political system’ because such changes significantly may ‘reduce the power 
disparity between a given challenging group and the state’ (McAdam, 1995: 224, as 
cited in Kjellman, 2007: 18).  Kjellman (2007), however, emphasises that the notion 
of a political opportunity structure is inherently contradictory:  On the one hand it is a 
structural concept, and as such refers to the ‘relatively permanent features of a 
society that cannot be easily altered by actors’ (ibid.: 22).  On the other hand, the 
concept refers to actions related to the opening and closing of opportunities in the 
system, and ‘essentially contradicts the very definition of structure within the social 
sciences’ (ibid.: 21).  Gamson and Meyer have suggested solving this problem 
through the above-mentioned distinction between the stable and the dynamic 
aspects of political institutions (Gamson and Meyer: 278-281).  McAdam has also 
suggested that the political opportunity structure is imbued with a potential for 
change (McAdam in Kjellman, 2007: 23), and that a distinction can be made 
between objective and subjective or imagined opportunities.  For this potential to be 
realized, however, political agents (such as women’s movements) must interpret the 
political opportunity structure to actually include or present such potential.  In other 
words, an opportunity which is not comprehended by movement actors is not an 
actual opportunity.  Thus, even if structural features make certain courses of action 
more or less likely, we still have to differentiate between objectively given political 
opportunity structures and the structures which are comprehended and interpreted 
as presenting either opportunities or constraints (Kjellman, 2007: 23). 
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In conjunction with the dynamic aspects of opportunities, McAdam and Scott (2005) 
have been concerned with clarifying ‘transforming mechanisms’; the very features 
which trigger the mobilisation of protest.  In this regard we find McAdam and Scott’s 
concept of ‘destabilizing events’ to be promising.  In the context of women’s 
movements, such events could include the eruption of socio-political issues of 
particular relevance to women due to for example media attention (gender pay gap, 
violence against women issues, and so on).  According to McAdam and Scott, a set 
of questions should be asked in relation to a particular destabilizing event: Has the 
event been framed or interpreted as a challenge or as an opportunity by movement 
actors?  How has the event been appropriated?  Did the event originate new or 
innovative actions and agents?  And lastly, are there any signs of new institutional 
alignments in the aftermath of the event (McAdam and Scott, 2005: 18-19)?  
 
The notion of ‘timing’ is closely related to the concept of destabilising events, and 
timing is often essential.  In order to make institutions change, it may be critical to 
grasp and take advantage of ‘the right moment’ or a ‘window of opportunity’ 
(Gamson and Meyer, 1996: 280).  Sometimes ‘Big Opportunities’ or ‘open moments’ 
might arise, but more often opportunities are ‘small’ and issue-specific.  A particular 
‘policy window’ might ‘temporarily open [ ] ‘an opportunity for advocates of proposals 
to push their pet solutions, or to put attention to their special problems …’’ (Kingdon, 
1984) as cited in Gamson & Meyer, 1996: 280).  Policy windows can change in a 
matter of weeks or months, and the challenge is how to recognise them - the framing 
aspect - and to act appropriately.  This brings us to the concept of discursive 
opportunities. 
 
4.4 Discursive Opportunity Structures and Framing 
 
Koopmans et al., (2005: 17) have pointed to the ‘one-sided emphasis on institutional 
opportunities’ in theories of political opportunity structures, and have suggested the 
addition of discursive opportunities to such theories.  While the institutional side 
consists of ‘the structure of the political system and the composition of power in the 
party system’, the discursive side consists of ‘established notions of who and what 
are considered reasonable, sensible, and legitimate’ (Koopmans, 2004: 451).  As 
such, discursive opportunities may determine which claims that gain policy and 
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media attention, which claims that resonate with claims by other actors, and which 
claims that gain legitimacy in public discourse (Koopmans et al., 2005: 19). 
 
In our research context, that of the women’s movement, it is thus relevant to 
consider which actors are discursively established, either by the state (government 
actors) or by movement actors themselves as ‘reasonable, sensible and legitimate’.  
One way of studying this is to examine who is talked about as ‘natural’ to invite to 
particular events (such as hearings, committee meetings, consultations, etc.), or who 
is perceived as a legitimate representative of a particular group or issue.  Another 
way is to ask organisations who they have made alliances with or co-operated with, 
or who they view as central actors alongside themselves in policy areas such as 
gender equality and violence against women. 
 
Many European states have longstanding historical traditions of contact and co-
operation between civil society, in the form of voluntary associations, and the welfare 
state (Hernes, 1982; Grant, 1985 and 1990; Berven and Selle, 2001; Jones, 2004).  
Often, voluntary associations, including women’s organisations, have been decisive 
in the formation and delivery of welfare state policies.  An important example from 
our research context is the provision of refuge services for women who suffer from 
domestic violence.  Indeed, co-operation between the state and voluntary 
organisations, including women’s organisations, may be seen as an important part of 
political citizenship (Raaum, 1999: 28), and as a vital aspect of the political 
opportunity structure available to such organisations.  Contemporary governments in 
Norway, Spain, and the UK all take an active approach to women’s organisations 
and recognise their contributions, by inviting them to participate in political processes 
and the delivery of public services, and by providing public funding for various parts 
of their operations. 
 
What constitutes institutional versus discursive sides of the political opportunity 
structure might sometimes be blurred.  For example, we would view a state or 
government’s provision of financial resources to women’s organisations, which 
facilitates both the formation and mobilisation of such groups, as part of the 
institutional opportunity structure.  On the other hand, relations between the state 
and women’s organisations that are nurtured through formal and informal dialogue 
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and co-operation might be seen as part of both the institutional and the discursive 
side of the political opportunity structure.  The practical inclusion of women’s 
organisations in government consultations is, nevertheless, a clear example of an 
available political opportunity structure - be it institutional or discursive.  The strictly 
discursive side of the political opportunity structure is perhaps more clearly 
demonstrated by the state’s policy documents (such as white papers and 
consultation papers) relating to the preferred role and legitimacy of women’s 
organisations as part of the voluntary sector.  Such documents provide the 
ideological framework within which the voluntary sector in general and women’s 
organisations in particular must navigate and negotiate.  In ideological terms, the 
state may for example support women’s organisations in order to promote such 
values as democracy, participation, trust, social capital and belonging, learning, and 
diversity.26  On the other hand, women’s movement actors themselves produce 
discourse, and their policy documents might give us an intake into how they present 
themselves, other movement actors and the state, and how they view the available 
discursive political opportunities.  We have mapped comments that women’s 
organisations have made in relation to a selected number of national and 
international reports (see Appendix B in the Country Reports), and the findings are to 
some extent included in the analysis of resonance in Chapter 7. 
 
A criticism that had been made against the political opportunity structure approach is 
its alleged ‘insufficient appreciation of the fact that contentious politics is 
fundamentally interactive and dynamic’ (Koopmans et al., 2005: 21).  For example, 
collective actors or movements may engage with more established actors and create 
competition, alliances, or opposition.  In the same vein, the political opportunity 
approach has been critiqued for an alleged structural bias and deterministic 
perspective (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; cited in Kjellman, 2007: 21).  According to 
this criticism, social movements are not seen as dynamic by political opportunity 
theorists, but as responding in a mechanical fashion to given opportunities 
(McAdam, et al., 2001; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; both cited in Kjellman, 2007: 21).  
In a general sense, structure often refers to ‘those relatively permanent features of 
                                            
26 An example of this can be found in the Norwegian government’s white paper on the relationship 
between the Norwegian state and voluntary organisations (St.meld.nr. 27 (1996-1997): 10-11). 
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society that cannot be easily altered by actors’, and a ‘true’ structural approach thus 
cannot grasp the dynamic interaction between social movement actors and their 
political environment (Kjellman, 2007: 22).  Following this critique of the concept of 
structure as stable, fixed or unmoveable, the concept ‘political opportunity structure’ 
is now more often referred to as simply ‘political opportunities’ (Kjellman, 2007: 22).  
We recognise this conceptual development in relation to Koopman’s distinction 
between institutional and discursive political opportunity structures, and whenever 
we use the full term ‘political opportunity structures’ it is implied that such structures 
are changeable.  Thus, political opportunities can be seen as fixed and permanent or 
as fleeting and changing.  An example of changing political opportunities would be 
regime changes, including changes in the governmental gender machinery and in 
gender equality policies.  For example, while the 1970s and 1980s saw a rights-
approach by government institutions to gender discrimination with concomitant 
action plans for gender equality, both at national and international levels, recent 
years have seen developments towards multiple discrimination or intersectional 
approaches to inequalities (see European Commission, 2007).  To some extent, 
such changes are also being reflected in gender machineries which previously were 
primarily concerned with gender inequalities and today are implementing more multi-
faceted approaches to inequalities by including race and ethnicity, faith and belief, 
and other dimensions, to their inequalities remit.  Moreover, social movements do 
not only act or react in relation to opportunities they are presented with; they are also 
agents of change and can create new opportunities in their own right.  Political 
opportunities are thus not necessarily static or given, but may be relational or 
dynamic (Kjellman, 2007: 18 and 36). 
 
Different social movements may actually be able or unable to take advantage of 
political opportunities.  Favourable political opportunities, be they stable or dynamic, 
are no guarantee for the mobilisation of protest.  Protest requires the recognition and 
framing of opportunities.  Generally, people need to feel both aggrieved by some or 
most aspects of their lives, as well as optimistic that collective action can produce 
change.  Snow originally defined framing as ‘the conscious strategic efforts by 
groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves 
that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (Snow, as cited in McAdam, McCarthy 
and Zald, 1996: 6).  Claims-making, on the other hand, is defined in the literature as 
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‘the collective and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, 
criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or 
integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors’ (Koopmans, 2004: 454).  
There are thus similarities between the concepts of framing and claims-making, but 
we are treating claims-making as the prognostic framing of an issue and thus as an 
essential part of the more general framing process (see below). 
 
Importantly, movements exist in a wider societal context and draw on the cultural 
stock - or, in the words of Charles Tilly (Tilly in Zald, 1996: 266), on repertoires of 
action and contention - in how they decide to protest and to organize.  Such cultural 
stocks are not static, and are not equally available to every social movement and 
their leaders.  Tilly recognized the importance of innovation and learning by social 
movements - the constructive and empowering aspect of the discursive 
opportunities.  The power of discursive opportunities to subject the members of a 
society, to discipline them, is the opposite aspect (the governmentality) - indicating 
that framing is a notion with a Janus face.   
 
4.5 Framing Processes 
 
By combining institutional and discursive opportunities, Koopmans and his 
colleagues (2005) aim to connect elements from the theory of political opportunity 
structure with that of the framing approach as originally established by Goffman 
(1974) and later developed by Snow et al., (1986) and by Snow and Benford (1992) 
in their analysis of the dynamics of social movement theory.  The concept of ‘frame’ 
refers to ‘an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ 
by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment’ (Snow and Benford, 
1992: 137).  Social movement actors produce collective action frames that ‘are 
action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities 
and campaigns of a social movement organisation’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 614).  
Benford and Snow list a range of framing tasks, including ‘diagnostic framing’, 
‘prognostic framing’ and ‘motivational framing’.  Diagnostic framing involves the 
identification of an injustice or a problematic issue, while prognostic framing ‘involves 
the articulation of a proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and 
 59 
the strategies for carrying out the plan’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: 616).  The 
motivational framing provides the rationale for collective action and a call to mobilise 
for action (ibid.: 617).  When women’s movement actors participate in lobbying and 
advocacy work, they engage intentionally and strategically in such framing tasks.  In 
our analysis we will examine how women’s movement actors in Norway, Spain and 
the UK frame violence against women issues in their attempts to influence public 
policy. 
 
In her book ‘Women, policy and politics: The construction of policy problems’ (1999), 
Bacchi argues that governments, and indeed all of us, give a particular shape to 
social ‘problems’ through the ways in which we speak about them and the proposals 
we advance to address them.  It is not the ‘problem’ itself that requires exploring, but 
rather how the problem is represented.  In Bacchi’s view we are all active in the 
creation of particular ways of understanding issues.  Competing understandings of 
social issues are, in Bacchi’s terminology, called ‘problem representations’ (Bacchi 
1999: 2), and she argues that it is crucial to identify competing problem 
representations because they constitute a form of political intervention with a range 
of possible and tangible effects.  Furthermore, Bacchi argues that the processes of 
problem representation actually go deeper than intentionality.  In other words, we are 
all to some extent embedded in a pre-existing discourse which may limit the 
intentionality of our problem representations.   
 
Crucial here is the issue of agency: are we as subjects primarily the users of 
discourse, or are we (only) constituted in discourse (Bacchi, 2005)?  Although this 
tension characterises the relationship between the (psychological) tradition of 
discourse analysis and the (political) tradition of analysis of discourse, Bacchi argues 
that the two approaches should be combined in order to explore both constraints and 
opportunities in relation to subject agency (Bacchi, 2005).  In our research context, it 
is thus important to consider not only how women’s movement actors are embedded 
within ‘naturalised’ or dominant discourses, but also how they intentionally use 
discourse to construct particular problem representations (and possible solutions).  
In particular, we examine how women’s movement actors represent the issue of co-
operation and alliance within the women’s movement. 
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According to Bacchi (1999: 40) it can be ‘useful to think of discourses as frames, 
since they provide frameworks or ways of viewing issues’.  However, when we start 
to talk about the ability to choose among competing frames, we have left the 
discourse theory for framework theory (Bacchi, 2005: 203).  Strategic framing27 of 
political claims is within the tradition of framework theory (Verloo, 2005).  Frame 
theorists see discourse as outside the subject, as cultural constraints, within which 
intentional subjects can shape useful political collective action frames.  A discourse 
analysis approach sees no subject outside the discourse and the subject therefore 
has work to do on her or himself to avoid falling into discursive positions which may 
be exploitative of others (Bacchi, 2005: 206). 
 
What Bacchi seeks to accomplish is ‘a dual-focus research agenda that would 
identify the ways in which interpretative and conceptual schemas delimit 
understandings, and the politics involved in the intentional deployment of concepts 
and categories to achieve specific goals’ (Bacchi 2005: 207).  In other words, Bacchi 
is concerned with both structure and agency, or with both constraints and 
opportunities.  She draws attention to the fact that we are all situated in discourses, 
understood as ‘intentionally supported and culturally influenced interpretive and 
conceptual schemas and signs’, while at the same time paying attention to ‘the 
active deployment of language, including concepts and categories, for political 
purposes’ (Bacchi, 2005: 207). 
 
The first part of this agenda thus involves paying attention to the discourses within 
which we operate.  This requires ‘committed attempts to draw in a wide variety of 
women’s voices in order to lessen the chances of adopting taken-for-granted cultural 
and class-based presumptions in one’s analysis’ (Bacchi, 2005: 207).  By 
interviewing representatives of both majoritised and minoritised groups of women 
and their organisations, our study of different types of women’s movement actors 
aims to include a wide variety of voices.  The second part of Bacchi’s agenda 
addresses the deliberate deployment of concepts and categories both by those with 
greater and those with lesser institutional power in their advancement of specific 
                                            
27 Strategical framing as a concept refers to ‘strategical efforts to link frames of social movements to 
those of prospective constituents or adversaries’ (Verloo, 2005: 17). 
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political projects.  According to Bacchi (ibid.), framework theory can here examine 
‘how social movement actors manoeuvre within discursive limits to shape issues in 
ways that advance their political projects’.  Her thinking is echoed by Kjellman (2007: 
28), who suggests that ‘the framing of political events may be better seen as part of 
the way in which a movement quite deliberately goes about constructing the 
motivational frames necessary to sensitise and mobilise constituents, or plot courses 
of action’.  Likewise, Benford and Snow underline the importance of the ‘conscious 
shaping of frames that act to convert others to your cause and that advance desired 
political goals’ (Benford and Snow, 2000; cited in Bacchi, 2005:203).  The question 
of who is speaking a given discourse is of central importance to us (Clifford, 2001 
cited in Bacchi, 2005: 207).  Both majoritised and minoritised women’s movement 
actors can actively deploy concepts for political purposes.  By asking representatives 
of women’s organisations about the strategies they employ to build alliances, 
promote issues on the political agenda, and influence public policies, we seek to 
address how majoritised and minoritised women actively frame their agendas and 
claims. 
 
The main goal of Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ approach is to 
bring silences in problem representations into the open for discussion and debate.  
According to Bacchi, this approach to policy is therefore a method of exposing the 
meaning-creation involved in policy analysis and policy design.  The point is that 
particular ways of talking about a ‘problem’ and particular policy ‘responses’ will 
determine which issues get raised and which issues will not be discussed.  Bacchi is 
also concerned with the effects of problem representations and discourses, and 
identifies three general categories of such effects: firstly, the ways in which subjects 
and subjectivities are constituted in the discourse (for instance groups assigned 
labels such as ‘needy’ or ‘disadvantaged’), secondly, the effects which follow from 
the limits imposed on what can be said or uttered, and thirdly, what she calls ‘lived 
effects’ of discourse (Bacchi, 1999: 45).   
 
Our analysis, based mainly on interviews with activists but also supplemented with a 
mapping of selected policy documents, is inspired by Bacchi.  ‘What’s the Problem?’ 
approach is usually applied to analyse policy documents in order to highlight 
competing constructions of issues addressed in a policy process.  However, the 
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approach can also been used to analyse interviews (see for instance Rönnblom, 
2002).   
 
When we focus on 1) the representation of co-operation and alliances between 
majoritised and minoritised women’s organisations, and 2) the resonance or 
dissonance between policy-claims made by women’s movement actors and actual 
government policy in the area of violence and racism/discrimination against women, 
we seek to address the following questions:  How is the issue of co-operation and 
alliance between majoritised and minoritised women’s organisations represented in 
our interviews?  Is it at all represented as problematic?  If so, are there specific 
issues which are presented as problematic?  If not, why is that?  What is the 
‘problem’ represented to be in relation to the government’s development and 
implementation of policies in relation to violence against women?  Is there at all a 
problem?  If so, what are the specific issues which are being presented as 
problematic?  If not, why is that?  Are any solutions presented in relation to the 
problem representations, and can any effects produced by the problem 
representations be identified?  How are subjects constituted within these problem 
representations?  Finally, who is held responsible for the ‘problem’?  and what 
effects follow from this attribution of responsibility? 
 
4.6 Political Impact or Resonance 
 
It is a widely held notion that democracy implies the ability of citizens to influence 
political decision-making.  The capacity to exercise influence depends, however, on 
the extent to which citizens actually participate in governing structures.  Women can 
achieve political influence through their mobilisation in elections as well as by 
engaging in lobbying efforts and involvement in organisations and social movements.  
In the words of political scientist Helga Hernes (1987), such mobilisation of women 
constitutes ‘feminism from below’.  Moreover, political influence can be achieved if 
and when a government opens up for, and invites the participation and 
representation of, women.  Such a strategy amounts to a ‘feminism from above’, 
where the state actively implements women-friendly gender and social policies (see 
Hernes, 1987: 136 and 153; see also Skjeie and Siim, 2000).  State feminism is a 
contested term, and a term that has various meanings.  Kantola and Outshoorn 
 63 
(2007: 3), for example, state feminism as ‘the efforts by women’s policy machineries 
to pursue social and economic policies beneficial to women’.  In our context, such 
efforts count as feminist if they are embedded in a discourse that challenges 
women’s subordination and the structures of gender based hierarchies (McBride and 
Mazur, 2008; see also Annesley et al., 2007).  If they are not embedded in such 
feminist discourse, then ‘efforts by women’s policy machineries to pursue social and 
economic policies beneficial to women’ would in our usage count as ‘women-friendly’ 
efforts.  If the state is to be an instrument for women-friendly or feminist policies, 
then there are, from the viewpoint of women, many aspects that may potentially 
complicate what is, at any point in time, considered as women-friendly.  Social 
structures related to class, ethnicity, and sexuality are some of the complicating 
factors operating in this field, leading many theorists to argue the necessity of 
intersectional analyses of women’s positions and roles in society (e.g. Hill Collins 
1991, Crenshaw, 1998; Denis, 2008) . 
 
In corporatist systems, interest groups have established formal relations with the 
state through consultations and representation in committees and advisory bodies 
(Raaum, 1999: 38).  Traditionally, women have not had prominent roles in corporatist 
systems.  Although women’s organisations have been influential in shaping and 
implementing parts of the welfare state, they have largely done so through more 
informal channels (Raaum, 1999; see also Hernes, 1987; Berven and Selle, 2001; 
Nyhagen Predelli, 2003).  Relations between the state and civil society were 
previously understood in much of the research literature in terms of the concept of 
corporatism, while terms such as ‘governance’ and ‘network’ are preferred by 
contemporary researchers.  Scharpf emphasizes that the concept of policy networks 
does not relate to formal decision-making structures, but to ‘informal patterns of 
interaction preceding or accompanying formal decisions taken by parliaments under 
the majority rule, or by negotiated agreement among governments, or in other 
formally legitimised modes of interaction’ (Scharpf, 1999: 20).  A network is relatively 
stable, and the participants will be specialists in a certain policy field (Scharpf, 1999).  
Moreover, within a policy network, ‘policy agendas are defined and policy options 
introduced, clarified, and criticized, in open-ended and largely informal processes in 
which private individuals, interest groups, public interest organisations, and 
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governmental actors are able to make contributions to policy formation and policy 
implementation’ (ibid.: 19). 
 
Lobbying can be seen as a form of networking with the aim of influencing political 
decisions.  In the Norwegian context, for example, lobbying has recently become 
increasingly important in political processes, while corporatism has lost clout as a 
plausible mode of policy-making (Klausen and Rommetvedt, 1996; Raaum, 1999; for 
the UK context see Grant, 1985 and 1995; Jones, 2004; Lovenduski, 2007).  While 
formal relations and contacts are central to corporatist systems, informal relations 
are at the core of lobbying tactics.  When the patterns of co-operation between the 
state and voluntary organisations are fluid, it is possible to talk about a ‘pluralistic 
situation’, where different actors choose to co-operate with each other on a case-by-
case basis.  The organisations do not exercise formal decision-making power but 
participate in decision-making processes in alternative ways and by exercising ‘the 
power to present ideas or define an issue’ (Berven and Selle, 1001: 16) or a 
‘normative power and the power to define’ (Raaum, 1999: 43). 
 
The power to present ideas or define an issue can be viewed in relation to the 
notions of problem representation and production of collective action frames.  As 
discussed above, different problem representations may compete, and whether or 
not a problem representation resonates with those in power (politicians and civil 
servants) and thus gains influence and legitimacy depends, to some extent, on the 
available institutional and discursive political opportunities.  Another way of 
expressing this resonance is to look at ‘the compatibility of the framing of women’s 
movement demands with the dominant discourse in the policy area’ (Kantola and 
Outshoorn, 2007: 7; our emphasis).  Women’s movement actors wanting to 
introduce new policies or reform established policies will seek to negotiate frames 
that work politically and through such frames convince powerful actors that their 
frames, including their claims-making, is actually the right political move to make.  In 
order to achieve this, they might form what Benford and Snow terms as bridging 
frames that fit with existing political discourse and thinking (Benford and Snow, 2000: 
624).  Rather than talking about any direct political impact or influence women’s 
movement actors might have, we are interested in the representation of such 
influence by movement actors themselves and by government officials and 
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politicians, and whether we can detect any resonance between statements uttered 
by these different actors.  The concept of ‘resonance’ has been specified by Benford 
and Snow (2000) to include several dimensions related to the credibility of a 
particular framing and also its ‘salience to targets of mobilisation’ (ibid.: 621).  In our 
context, we are particularly concerned with the ‘perceived credibility of frame 
articulators’ and also with the centrality of movement frames defined as ‘how 
essential the beliefs, values and ideas associated with movement frames are to the 
[practice] of the targets of mobilisation’ (ibid.: 620-621). 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In our study of women’s organisations and women’s movements in Norway, Spain 
and the UK, we will pay attention to the context in which these organisations and 
movements are situated.  In order to gain an understanding of the specific 
dimensions of each locality, we will examine both institutional and discursive aspects 
of political opportunities.  In particular, we will identify whether and how issues are 
presented as problems, and the types of representations or collective 
understandings forwarded by different women’s movement actors in relation to 
whether or not they co-operate and form alliance with each other.  In this regard we 
ask whether minoritised feminism has been rejected and resisted, or embraced and 
accepted by the majoritised feminist movements (Sudbury, 1998).  We are also 
inspired by Narayan’s writings on the positioning of minoritised feminists as 
emissaries, mirrors or authentic witnesses (Narayan, 1997) and ask how minoritised 
feminists themselves frame their own collective activism and how they are framed by 
majoritised feminists.  Furthermore, we aim to discuss the eventual resonance or 
lack of resonance between the strategic frames forwarded by women’s movement 
actors in relation to gender equality issues and the frames applied by the respective 
governments in these three countries.  Through the application of this multi-
dimensional theoretical apparatus we aim to advance knowledge about majoritised 
and minoritised women’s movement actors, their relations (or lack of relations) in the 
form of alliance and co-operation, and the extent of resonance (or lack thereof) 
between their claims and claims forwarded by state actors.   
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5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This report is based on case studies in three countries, Norway, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, and focuses on two major aspects of the activities of selected 
women’s organisations in the women’s movements of these countries:  
 
1) Relations between ethnic ‘majority’ and ethnic ‘minority’ women’s organisations in 
the women’s movements in Norway, Spain, and the UK, with a special view to 
representations of co-operation, unity and dispute. 
2) How women’s organisations in Norway, Spain, and the UK use political 
opportunity structures to influence gender policy and anti-racist policy, and 
policies on violence against women in particular, and their problem-
representations and claims-making in relation to such policies.  The violence 
against women issues included, herein, are those of domestic violence, forced 
marriage, honour crimes, female genital mutilation, and racism and discrimination 
related to violence against women.28 
 
The main data that form the basis of the three country case studies consist of in-
depth interviews conducted in parallel in each of the three countries.  We have 
conducted 21 interviews in the UK (14 with women’s organisations and seven with 
civil servants and politicians); 21 interviews in Spain (16 with women’s organisations 
and five with high level civil servants); and 36 interviews in Norway (31 with women’s 
organisations29 and five with civil servants and politicians) (see the end of this 
Chapter for the names of the organisations that participated in our case studies). 
 
                                            
28 The issues of rape, prostitution, and human trafficking, which are also violence against women 
issues, have not been included in this analysis.  This limitation is not intended to signify that such 
issues are less important, but an in-depth focus has required a focused attention on selected issues.  
The issues of prostitution and trafficking have been included in the remit of FEMCIT Work Package 5 
led by Joyce Outshoorn. 
29 We have been able to interview two activists from some of the organisations.  These second 
interviews are meant for Strand 3 of Work Package 4, and are not about the organisations per se, 
however, some of the interviewees provided information relevant to the organisations’ work in general 
and some of this information has been used in this report. 
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The interviewed high level civil servants and politicians in the three countries are all 
engaged in work either on gender equality issues in general, or on violence against 
women issues in particular.  In order to protect the anonymity of these interviewees, 
their institutional affiliations and background are not revealed in our report.  The civil 
servants and politicians are all working at high level in government departments or in 
positions of national political power in Oslo, Madrid, or London. 
 
The three individual country reports also include selective mappings of documents, 
intended to complement the findings from interviews with women’s organisations, 
civil servants, and politicians.  The select mapping of documents focused on 
contemporary claims, issues and outcomes made by women’s organisations in 
Norway, Spain, and the UK, and the degree of resonance between these claims and 
those forwarded by the three states in key policy documents, including national plans 
on gender equality and on violence against women, and government reports to the 
United Nations Committee overseeing the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  Specifically, the mapping sought to 
identify the issues women’s organisations from the three countries have engaged 
with, focusing on the two main areas of interest of WP 4 Strand 1 as mentioned 
before: 1) Violence against women, including domestic violence, honour killings, 
forced marriage, and female genital mutilation; and 2) Racism and discrimination 
related to violence against women.  The full selective mappings of documents and 
the results obtained for each country can be found in the individual country reports.  
Only parts of the mappings have been used in this cross-country report.   
 
The three case studies also build on documentary evidence from women’s 
organisations and government institutions.  Documents from women’s organisations 
include annual reports, written consultation responses, organisational reports on 
specific policy issues, and campaign information.  Government documents include 
consultation documents, national plans and strategies, policy statements and 
summaries, and other public information.  Most of these documents are available 
through government websites, and references to the location of specific documents 
included in our study are made throughout the report.  In our analysis we have also 
used academic texts produced by feminists, such as articles in Feminist Review and 
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other journals, in addition to scholarly book chapters and books on the women’s 
movements in the three countries.   
 
5.2 Research Ethics 
 
Ethical approval for this research has been obtained from Loughborough University’s 
research ethics committee as well as from the Norwegian Social Science Data 
Services.  Research participants have received a general letter of information 
explaining the research scope and objectives, along with a written consent form 
which stated the respondents’ right to withdraw from the study at any time during the 
research.  The respondents were assured confidentiality, and throughout the report 
they are referred to as ‘interviewee’, ‘respondent’, or ‘research participant’.  We have 
tried to avoid linking direct quotes from individuals with the organisations they are 
from.  However, the inclusion in our study of some small organisations with a 
particular profile, such as organisations working against FGM in Spain, makes 
respondents easier to recognise even if they are not named.  Also in Norway, where 
the feminist activist milieu is small, the issue of anonymity proved to be challenging.  
In this case, contextualising the analysis in order to keep the interviewee 
anonymous, may have led to situations where relevant information could be lost.  
However, we have tried our very best to prioritise the anonymity of individuals 
throughout the presentation of our research findings.  A few interviewees wanted to 
read the entire interview transcript or their quoted statements, and were, thus, given 
the opportunity to do so towards the end of our report writing. 
 
5.3 Organisational Mapping, Selection and Recruitment 
 
In all three countries, organisations were selected in order to provide a mix of ethnic 
‘minority’ and ‘majority’ women’s organisations.  To cover women’s claims that have 
been put forward over the past 30 years or so, the organisations were selected from 
traditional and historical women’s organisations to more contemporary and recently 
formed women’s organisations.  The organisations included in our research have 
been identified and selected via various routes, including existing academic literature 
and websites that offer comprehensive listings of current women’s organisations.  
The selection of organisations from such lists has been used in parallel with snow-
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ball sampling, using the knowledge and expertise of activists to further refer us to 
relevant organisations.   
 
One of the main criteria for the selection of women’s organisations was whether they 
include advocacy work and lobbying as part of their organisational activities and 
strategies and, thus, aim to achieve political influence.  With a few exceptions, most 
of the selected organisations are based in the capital of each of the three countries. 
 
The second main criteria was that roughly half of the organisations should be what 
we tentatively called ‘ethnic majority women’s organisations’, while the other half 
should be ‘ethnic minority women’s organisations’.  However, the organisational 
landscape is not so clearly divided between ethnic majority and minority women’s 
organisations in any of the three countries, and adjustments had to be made.  There 
is a ‘mixture’ of separate organisations for ethnic minority women and for ethnic 
majority women, and mixed organisations that cater to both ethnic minority and 
ethnic majority women; or only to minorities, both men and women, such as in Spain; 
or mixed ethnic majority/minority and/or mixed-gender organisations, such as in 
Norway.  Indeed, several organisations present a mixed picture, whether in terms of 
policy-orientation, organisational leadership, or membership.   
 
Our main emphasis is on women’s organisations with explicit feminist aims and 
identities, but we have also included women’s organisations that do not necessarily 
describe themselves as ‘feminist’.  They do, however, define themselves as part of 
the women’s movement.  Our emphasis on contributions and claims-making from 
both ethnic majority and ethnic minority women’s organisations has necessitated 
such an approach.   
 
5.4 Data Collection: interviewing and researcher’s positionality 
 
The interviews have been based on a qualitative approach to research, where in-
depth personal interviews have been conducted with the aid of topic guides.  Such 
an approach offers the opportunity to focus on a limited number of cases whilst 
exploring topics and meaning in depth, resulting in the production of ‘thick 
description’ data (Geertz, 1973).   
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The interviews typically lasted between one and two hours.  Four sets of topic guides 
were developed and used for different categories of interviewees.  One guide 
focused on representatives of ethnic majority organisations, while the second 
focused on ethnic minority women’s organisations.  The third guide was addressed 
to civil servants working on gender issues in various government departments, while 
the fourth covered research questions for national-level politicians.  These guides 
have been used as flexible research tools, providing the key topics and issues to be 
discussed in each interview (see Appendix C of each country report for the topic 
guides30). 
 
In the UK, of the 21 interviews, 19 took place in the offices of the relevant 
interviewee, while two interviews were conducted via the telephone.  All interviews 
were transcribed verbatim by a professional transcription agency.  In Spain, all 21 
interviews were done face-to face; most of them took place in the offices of the 
relevant interviewee, with a few taking place in a different public space, depending 
on the interviewee’s time and availability.  All interviews in Spain were transcribed by 
a native Spanish speaker, and excerpts from the transcripts have been translated 
into English by a tri-lingual (Romanian, Spanish, English) researcher.  In Norway, 
most interviews have taken place in the offices of the relevant interviewee, some 
have taken place in the researchers’ offices, and a few have been conducted at 
cafes or at places where the organisations had their meetings.  The interviews 
conducted in Norway were transcribed by native Norwegian speaking research 
assistants, and excerpts have been translated into English by bi-lingual (Norwegian, 
English) researchers with the assistance of a native English speaker. 
 
The interviews were conducted within the period May 2007 - July 2008.  The 
response rate to our requests for interviews was very good.  Only in a few cases did 
invited participants decline to participate, mainly due to previous commitments and 
busy schedules.   
 
                                            
30 English versions of the topic guides can be found in Appendix C of the UK country report; some 
sections have been slightly adapted to the Spanish context. 
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Our analysis has been based on an inductive approach and has, thus, been 
grounded in the data.  Following Rubin and Rubin (2005: 30), we define our 
approach to interviewing within the tradition of interpretive constructionist thinking, in 
which ‘responsive interviewing’ (ibid.) entails the understanding that both the 
researcher and the interviewee come to the research situation with their own 
feelings, personality, interests, and experience.  Moreover, a dynamic relationship is 
created in the interview situation which might challenge both the researcher and the 
interviewee in terms of his or her understanding, and the interview setting thus 
provides an arena for dialogue and conversation which aims at ‘depth of 
understanding, rather than breadth’ (ibid.).  A strategy of engagement in the research 
interview, rather than disengagement and distance, is a valued aspect of feminist 
methodology and research, and emphasises connections between knowledge, 
theory and language, and experience (Ramazanoğlu, 2002; see also Kitzinger, 
2007).   
 
In the report, the different types of research participants (organisational 
representatives, civil servants and politicians) are presented and represented 
through different ‘voices’ (Baklien and Solberg, 1997: 22).  These voices are 
sometimes expressed through direct quotations from the interview transcripts, while 
at other times they are expressed through statements produced by the researchers – 
statements which summarise and interpret what the research participants have said 
(ibid.).  Moreover, our own ‘researchers’ voices’ are expressed through the 
evaluations and interpretations that are made by us on the basis of interviews and 
document-based data.  While our aim is to keep as much distinction between these 
different voices as possible, we might not always have succeeded in achieving clear 
distinctions recognisable by our readers.  Again, based on the view that research 
data are produced through interaction between the researcher and research 
participants (Kvale, 1997), we acknowledge that it is unrealistic to succinctly 
separate all the different voices that speak through the discourse produced in our 
report. 
 
We acknowledge that our own backgrounds and experiences have influenced our 
research.  In applying a discourse analysis approach, the role of the researcher is 
not to get ‘behind’ the discourse and find out what people really mean and how the 
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world is like in reality (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 31).  The point of departure is 
that we experience the world through the way we understand it, i.e.  through 
discourse.  Therefore, the researcher’s role is to look for patterns in the utterances, 
and to explore social consequences of various discursive representations of the 
world.  The aim is not to say which understandings are ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, even if you 
can critically evaluate these understandings at a later stage (ibid.).  Jørgensen and 
Phillips (2002: 31) emphasise that it can be difficult to see discourses as ‘socially 
constructed systems of meaning’, especially when you, as a researcher, are part of 
the culture you are researching.  Then it can be difficult to probe the underlying 
assumptions and the taken-for-granted.  Memory work as a methodological tool has 
been useful for us, as researchers, in this project to enhance our self-reflectiveness  
(Berg, 2007; Widerberg, 2008). 
 
According to Rönnblom (2002), dominating discourses are established by 
constructions of the ‘normal’ and the ‘true’ and this is done by excluding or degrading 
‘the false’ and ‘the other’ as abnormal and untrue (Rönnblom, 2002: 26).  A 
researcher, as any other member of society, is familiar with the discourses he or she 
aims to bring to light.  One proposed solution is to try to alienate oneself and try to 
view different understandings of the world as unfamiliar (Jørgensen and Phillips, 
2002: 32).  One angle of approach can be to see competing problem representations 
in the interview material in light of each other and, thereby, explore silences. 
 
However, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 32) address ‘the reflexivity problematic’ in 
regard to the researcher’s role, and they argue that from a social-constructivist point 
of view, the researcher’s representations of the world cannot be seen as ‘better’ than 
any other representation of the world.  The researcher always has a position in 
relation to the field she is studying and that position will be part of her way of seeing 
the field.  Our initial research questions were influenced by the criticism of the 
western feminist movement.  One of the initial questions for our research project was 
whether minority women’s demands have been rejected or accepted by majority 
women (see for instance Sudbury, 1998).  We have also been influenced by various 
intersectional approaches, and here the marginalisation of non-white women has 
been a central issue (see for instance Crenshaw, 2006).   
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It is also crucial to reflect on the researcher’s role and the interaction between the 
interviewee and the researcher in interview situation.  During the interview, the 
interviewee does not simply ‘supply data material’; it is, rather, a situation where the 
researcher and the interviewee create meaning together.  This makes interviews 
different from documents as data material.  The concepts we, as researchers, use in 
the interview situation, the types of questions we ask and the way meaning is 
created in the dialogue between researcher and the interviewee, are contributing 
factors in the discourses that are constructed in the interview setting.   
 
In the next step of the research process, however, it is us, as researchers, who are 
responsible for analysing the interview transcript as text, selecting quotes, 
interpreting them and writing about the results of the analysis.  Therefore, it is 
important for us, as researchers, to discuss the position from which we construct the 
analysis and to be self-reflexive about our role as researchers.   
 
The empirical research has been approached from different positions and 
backgrounds, and we acknowledge that this has influenced, to some extent, various 
research perspectives and analyses in this work.  Individual backgrounds and 
positions have also influenced how the researchers have been perceived by our 
research participants.  In the main, we are white, middle class European women 
researchers, but we have moved in and out of shifting positions as insiders and 
outsiders in relation to our research.  None of the researchers have been activists in 
ethnic minority women’s movements.  Reflecting on this composition, we have made 
efforts to ensure a responsible feminist research practice along the lines suggested 
by Sherene Razack.  She proposes that an awareness of our subject positions 
implies ‘tracing the hierarchies in which [we are] both subordinated and privileged’ 
(Razack, 2000).   
 
Two of the researchers are from and live in Norway, and have completed the project 
work in Norway.  One of them has been active in the majority women’s movement 
from the 1970s onwards, while the other researcher is an outsider to the women’s 
movement.  The research for the Norwegian case study has, thus, been undertaken 
by researchers who variously find themselves in positions as insiders (activist, 
feminist, majoritised) and outsiders (non-activist, feminist, majoritised).  Most of the 
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research for the Spanish case study has been conducted by a Romanian-born 
researcher with educational background from US, who now works and lives in the 
UK.  She is an outsider to the Spanish women’s movement, irrespective of the 
majority/minority categories.  The research for the UK case study has been 
conducted by a Norwegian-born researcher who lives and works in the UK.  She is a 
non-activist feminist and an outsider to the UK women’s movement.  The UK country 
report also includes contributions from an English born feminist who is an outsider to, 
but interested observer of, the women’s movement, and from a Ghanaian-born 
woman living and working in the UK who is also an outsider to the UK women’s 
movement. 
 
The researchers’ majoritised position created often a ‘reversed-biased’ situation, 
where we potentially had an increased tendency to be more ‘critical’ in the analysis 
of majority women’s interviews.  In Spain, and in the UK, due to the fact that non-
Spanish and non-British researchers conducted the interviews, this was less of an 
issue.  Being a ‘foreigner’ and an ‘outsider’ to the Spanish-led women’s movement, 
for example, created a dynamic situation were both majority and minority 
interviewees talked openly about internal conflicts and tensions.  The majority 
Spanish-born respondents, thus, presented historical developments of the Spanish 
women’s movement, discussing openly various types of divisions within the women’s 
movements:  liberal versus radical and socialist feminists; ethnic minority vs. ethnic 
majority, but seemingly placing themselves in a ‘superior’ position in relation to ‘the 
others’.  Minority women in Spain were also very open and keen to offer their 
reflections about feeling subordinate to the Spanish majority movement when trying 
to put forward claims that pertain to ‘their own culture’.  In the interview context, they 
freely voiced their experience of racism and discrimination, arguing that they did not 
have many opportunities to do so in other forums, as these issues have not yet been 
fully embraced by the Spanish mainstream feminist movement.   
 
As a critical feature of our case study approach, we have attempted to pay particular 
attention to the context in which women’s organisations and movements are 
situated, considering the historical, political and socio-cultural differences between 
Norway, Spain and the UK.  As we have employed a qualitative approach which may 
offer comparable data (across individual cases), the findings are situated in each 
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country context and are not generalised.  Strictly speaking, our findings are limited to 
the organisations included in our study.  The findings could highlight issues and 
problems that are probably indicative of a broader set of women’s organisations than 
those included in our study, and which could be further explored in future studies.   
 
5.5 A Work in Progress 
 
As stated above, the topic guides used by the interviewers in Norway, Spain and the 
UK were worded the same, and a lot of the time was used to discuss the design of 
the topic guides in the WP4 project team.  We also decided that a select mapping of 
documents produced by governments and by women’s movement actors in each 
country would add significant data to our analysis of the resonance of women’s 
movements’ claims.  We have also devoted time to developing new historical 
accounts of the women’s movements in Norway, Spain and the UK, and to 
identifying relevant theoretical approaches to our studies.  For the writing up of the 
individual country reports, we applied the same analytical perspectives, including a 
political opportunities approach inspired by, among others, Mc Adam (1996), 
Koopmans (2004), Koopmans et al., (2005), and Tarrow (2006), the discourse 
analysis approach of ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ as developed by 
Bacchi (1999; 2005), and a framing analysis approach as developed by Benford and 
Snow (2000), Verloo (2005), and others.  In hindsight, we believe we should have 
set aside more time to discussion of the actual writing up of the country reports, as 
their content could have been more co-ordinated.  Likewise, we had not set aside 
resources for the translation of all interviews to English, which made it difficult for all 
project team members to read transcripts across the three countries included in our 
study.   
 
This cross-country report is a work in progress which summarises findings from the 
three countries and improves the analysis of parts of the national reports.  The cross-
country report also takes a further step in a research process aiming towards a more 
explicit comparison between the three case studies.  In the writing process for this 
cross-country report, all four main members of the project team have been able to 
work across the three countries on one of four topics.  While Halsaa and Nyhagen 
Predelli have each worked through one of the main empirical chapters (dealing with 
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relations between minority and majority women’s organisations, and with women’s 
movements’ political claims-making, respectively), Thun and Sandu have worked 
through the historical outline of the women’s movements in the three countries and 
the research methods applied in the three countries, respectively.  Unfortunately 
Thun has not been able to contribute to chapters six and seven due to maternity 
leave.  In particular, the new summaries provided in chapters 6 and 7, and the new 
introductory and concluding chapters, are steps towards a more integrated analysis 
of our findings in the three countries. 
 
5.6 List of Interviewed Organisations in Each Country 
 
In Norway, women representatives of the following organisations have been 
interviewed:  
 
Foreign Women’s Group/MiRA Senteret;  
Juridisk Rådgivning for Kvinner; 
Krisesentersekretariatet; 
Kristent Interkulturelt Arbeid; 
Kvinnefronten; 
Kvinnegruppa Ottar; 
Kurdisk Kvinneforening; 
Nett BK - Nettverk for Bosniske kvinner i Norge; 
Norske Kvinners Sanitetsforening; 
Norsk Kvinnesaksforening; 
Organisasjon mot offentlig diskriminering; 
Pan African Women’s Association; 
Philippine Community Norway; 
Sami NissonForum; 
Selvhjelp for innvandrere og flyktninger; 
Somalisk Kvinneforening; 
Støttekampanje for Kvinners rettigheter i Irak. 
 
In Spain, representatives from the following organisations have been interviewed: 
 
Commission for Investigating the Bad Treatment Against Women (Comisión para la 
Investigación de Malos Tratos a Mujeres - CIMTM); 
Women Foundation (Fundacion Mujeres, FM); 
Progressive Women’s Foundation (Fundación Mujeres Progresistas, FMP); 
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Centre for Assisting Victims of Sexual Aggressions (Centro de Asistencia a Víctimas 
de Agresiones Sexuales- CAVAS); 
Spanish Co-ordinator of the European Women’s Lobby (Coordinadora Espanola del 
Lobby Europeo de Mujeres – CELEM); 
Themis, Association of Women’s Lawyers (Asociación de  Mujeres Juristas); 
Federation of Associations of Separated and Divorced Women (Federación de 
Asociaciones de Mujeres Separadas y Divorciadas); 
Association Women Opañel; 
CaLadona – Barecelona; 
Association Rumiñahui (Ecuadorian Association for immigrants/ women section); 
Vomade-Vencit  (Madres Dominicanas- Vomade); 
Association Barró (Asociación Barró); 
Romi Serseni (Madrid); 
Roma Association- Drom Kotar Mastipen;  
AMAM – Anti Female Genital Mutilation;  
Equis – FGM (Equipo de sensibilización sobre Mutilación Genital Femenina). 
 
In the UK representatives from the following women’s organisations have been 
interviewed:  
 
End Violence Against Women Campaign (EVAW); 
European Women’s Lobby (EWL); 
Fawcett Society; 
Foundation for Women’s Health, Research and Development (FORWARD); 
Imkaan; 
Justice for Women; 
National Alliance of Women’s Organisations (NAWO); 
Newham Asian Women’s Project (NAWP); 
Refugee Women’s Resource Project (RWRP) at Asylum Aid; 
Rights of Women; 
Southall Black Sisters (SBS); 
Women Acting in Today’s Society (W.A.I.T.S.); 
Women’s Aid; and 
Women’s Resource Centre (WRC). 
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Further information about each of these organisations can be found in Annex C of 
each country report. 
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6 CONTESTED RELATIONS WITHIN WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN NORWAY, 
SPAIN AND THE UK 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the intersection of gender and ‘race’/ethnicity in civil society, 
acknowledging the gender dimension within migratory processes and the voices of 
migrant women.  To be more specific, we examine the relations between ethnic 
majoritised and ethnic minoritised women’s organisations in the women’s 
movements, based on case studies of selected organisations in Norway, Spain and 
the UK.  The intersection of gender and race/ethnicity has become urgent during the 
last decades due to a number of inter- and trans-national changes:  Increasing 
migration combined with new patterns of migration flows into and within Europe is 
one element, fresh approaches to combat multiple discrimination and to implement 
international conventions like ICERD and CEDAW, is another.  Visible and 
outspoken local, national and transnational social movements of various kinds 
claiming justice by redistribution of resources, recognition of cultural diversity and 
political voice is a third aspect.   
 
Women’s issues, as they have been articulated by women’s movements, are 
encompassing because they are intertwined with most, if not all, policy areas.  At the 
same time, women’s issues are specific and different according to real women’s 
positioning along other basic social dimensions than gender.  The framing of feminist 
policies has to balance between general demands and the interests of particular 
groups of women, and to consider the limits of sisterhood in relation to ‘the context of 
multiple differences and inequalities that exist among women’ (Verloo, 2007: 25).   
 
The point of departure for our case studies is the general critique from black and 
ethnic minority women and postcolonial feminism of white women’s movements as 
ethnocentric and blind to the importance of race and ethnicity.  Inspired by Julia 
Sudbury’s research, we explore whether ‘majority’ women’s organisations have 
embraced and accepted or resisted and rejected the interests of ‘minority’ women.  
We address the feminism-multiculturalism problem by displaying the claims and 
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critique articulated by ethnic ‘minority’ women towards the ethnic ‘majority’ women’s 
movement.   
 
The chapter examines how different actors position themselves in relation to other 
movement actors, and how they frame the relations.  As stated in Chapter 4, we 
have been inspired both by Carol Bacchi’s concept of ‘problem representations’, 
which seeks to bring out silences in discourse (Bacchi, 2005), and Mieke Verloo’s 
approach to framing processes which seeks to illuminate how relations, issues, and 
events are strategically ‘framed’ by women’s movement actors (Verloo, 2005).  In 
this chapter, we examine some of the historical discourse about relations between 
ethnic majority and minority women in the women’s movement in Norway, Spain and 
the UK as well as the actual networks and alliances that majority and minority 
movement actors have built around particular issues and events.  Drawing on Carol 
Bacchi, we explore how the selected actors represent the relations between ethnic 
majority and minority women’s organisations as more or less problematic, how the 
actors make sense of problematic relations, whom or what they blame and how they 
imagine steps to solve problems.  In so doing, we ask whether minoritised feminisms 
have been rejected and resisted, or embraced and accepted, by majoritised feminist 
movements (Sudbury, 1998).  We are also influenced by Narayan’s writings on the 
positioning of minoritised feminists as ‘emissaries’, ‘mirrors’ or ‘authentic witnesses’ 
(Narayan, 1997), and ask how ethnic minority movement actors represent their own 
collective activism and how they are represented by majority feminists. 
 
The chapter summarises new empirical evidence from interviews with women’s 
movement activists in Norway, Spain and the UK, and also draws on organisational 
documents, academic publications and movement journals.  The chapter aims at 
understanding how gender and ethnicity, and to some extent class, intersect, 
providing an examination of the ‘whiteness’ of the women’s movement and notions of 
racism or ethnic discrimination.   
 
The women’s movements has always been characterised by diverging interests, 
claims and organisational strategies.  Disunity is not likely to disappear within an 
increasingly multiplex European constituency.  Despite diverging opinions, however, 
there has always been a strong strategic urge within the feminist and women’s 
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movements to establish a broad, inclusive agenda in order to make an impact.  
Sometimes the various groups and factions succeed in mobilising for a common 
platform, but often they fail.  In addition to outlining the framing of relations, our 
concern in this chapter is to explore traces of formal networking, co-operation and 
strategic alliances between ethnic minority and the ethnic majority women’s 
organisations.  To what extent is the postcolonial feminist critique of white feminism 
addressed by ‘majority’ feminists?  Are the women’s movements in Norway, Spain 
and the UK distinctly polarised along the ‘black’ and ‘white’ divide, or according to 
race and ethnic identities?  How have majority women’s organisations dealt with the 
critique of false sisterhood, and how have women with an ethnic minority background 
been integrated in the various women’s movements?  These issues of framing, co-
operation and conflicts have been dealt with in the three individual country reports.   
 
This chapter is organised in three main sections; one section for each of the 
countries included in our study, each with a country-specific summary at the end.  A 
fourth and final section draws attention to some of the differences and similarities 
observed across the three case-studies.   
 
6.2 The Case of Norway 
 
This chapter discusses the contested relations between minoritised and majoritised 
women in Norway.  The first part of the chapter outlines interactions of the 1970s 
and 80s between various majority and minority women’s organisations as they are 
represented by the activists themselves.  Some of the interviewees are still activists, 
and also comment on the present situation.  Then there is a section on the 
mobilisation of Sami feminism and its relation to the women’s movement at large.  
This section covers the period from the 1970s until today.   
 
The encounters between ethnic Norwegian feminist activists and black feminists are 
represented as conflict-ridden and stressful.31  The discourses of anger and irritation 
                                            
31 A note on the concepts is necessary: Organised migrant women introduced and applied the label 
’black feminism during the late 1970s and we have put the label to use.  Sometimes we have 
contrasted it to ‘white feminism, which has never been used by women from majority feminist 
organisations. 
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characterise the relations between the two feminist groups, and contrast the types of 
encounters between non-feminist activists and migrant women activists, discussed in 
the subsequent sections of the chapter; discourses of charity, of dignity and of a 
minority within a minority.  The potential for a common political agenda is discussed 
at the end of the chapter.  We suggest that despite a number of controversies during 
the 70s and 80s, there are indications of improved relations between and within the 
ethnic minority and ethnic majority feminists in Norway.  The relations are still 
complex and controversial, however, and the second half of the section on Norway 
elaborates the contemporary relations between majority and minority women’s 
organisations.  The focus is on the interviewed activist’s representations of ‘the 
problem’ of co-operation related to a selection of contested conception; ‘women’s 
issues’, ‘violence against women’, ‘feminism and man’ and religion. 
 
6.2.1 Anger and Irritation: the Intersection of Majority Feminism and Anti-racist 
Feminism in the 1970s and 80s 
 
Black Feminists: Rejected and Angry 
 
When migrant feminists organised themselves in Norway during the late 1970s, 
racism soon became the uniting issue.  Black feminists in Foreign Women’s Group 
were an ‘organic’ part of the anti-racist movement, and addressed racism as a 
feminist issue. 
 
The intersection of feminism and anti-racism is illustrated in their basic slogans:  ‘The 
struggle against racism is also a struggle against the oppression of women’, and 
‘Independent status for immigrant women’.  These slogans introduced a new 
dimension into Norwegian feminist thinking and expanded the existing feminist 
agenda.  The reception and priority of the black feminist agenda were highly 
contested, however, to the frustration of black feminists:  
 
‘We thought that racism was a women’s struggle.  We thought, of course, that 
we were a part of the women’s movement, but that we were also very much 
more.  The movement was just a part of us.  But we were, naturally, a part of 
the women’s movement, but, well, there wasn’t much of a women’s movement 
to feel at home in.’  
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The interviews with the early black feminist activists display frustration, provocation, 
anger and disappointment at the reception of their demands by white feminists.  
According to the black feminist respondents, they witnessed an outright rejection of 
their agenda.  Majority feminists were represented as having a lack of awareness of 
the complicity of racism, and of showing an unfriendly, cold shoulder.  The problems 
of minority feminists in relation to the majority feminist movement were represented 
as homelessness and misrecognition.   
 
The Norwegian black feminism was part of a trans-national mobilisation of migrant 
women, and their thinking evolved in a dynamic interplay with women in the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and third world feminists.  Still, the black feminist activist 
respondents underline the development of a unique theorising; a particular 
‘Norwegian’ blend of Black feminism.  This theorising was related to Norwegian 
history and deeply intertwined with the Norwegian self-image, according to one 
interviewee:  
 
‘Because United Kingdom and the US both were explicitly part of an 
imperialistic world, while we in Norway lived in, let’s say, a social and political 
self-image of being sort of global underdogs, and not a part of the racism 
going on in the US which one looked at in consternation.  So, one needed a 
gaze from the outside, a strong gaze from the outside to tell how Norway had 
been a part of Western imperialism or have been a part of Western history … 
So I mean, I feel that some of the particularly Norwegian was to fight against 
this Norwegian self-image.  An image of what it means, of Norwegian-ness 
and generousness [storsinnethet] and simply a form of well this egalitarian 
self-image was massive, and still is.  That is the best and the worst about 
Norway, sometimes, isn’t it.  So, this is part of the Norwegian particularities, in 
addition to this being a tiny country, and one … The first times we talked 
about racism in Norway, I experienced, well we used very much time to ease 
the shock we witnessed in the audience.’  
 
This representation of Norway and Norwegians as having an unjustified self-image, 
was not exceptional.  When presented to ethnic Norwegians, the effect was surprise 
and even shock.  Racism talk bewildered most Norwegians, including majority 
feminists.  According to the black feminist interviewee, black feminists had to spend 
time and effort to reduce the damage inflicted on the Norwegian self-image by their 
claims.   
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Beyond the Pale  
Ethnic minority feminists utilised the political opportunity related to the United 
Nation’s International Women’s Decade for Equality, Peace and Development 1975-
85 and brought their claims to Copenhagen in 1980, to the NGO-Forum.  Here they 
presented not only their own organisation, but also their general critique of 
Norwegian immigration and equality policies.   
 
When asked about Copenhagen, the representations illustrate gaps in the interests 
and interpretations of majority and minority feminist activists.  One black feminist 
interviewee talked quite vividly about their Forum workshops and the frustrated 
encounters with white Norwegian feminists.   
 
The first time we met the Norwegian women’s movement [was in 
Copenhagen], and this meeting politicised us, you know.  … because we had 
been, you know, more like as a social network.  (…) But the reaction we 
received was, like this is not true, this is not Norway like we know it, and a bit 
like ‘shame on you, because there are international guests here, and how can 
you say these things about Norway?’ (…) This made us sharpen our minds, 
and want more knowledge about systematic discrimination of black women.  
And then we all went, you know, collectively seeking knowledge else where.  
And we were quite simply politicised.’ 
 
A respondent from a majority feminist organisation, also present in Copenhagen, 
hardly remembered the presence of migrant women at all.  Contrary to the black 
feminist respondents, she had absolutely no recollections of conflicts or unpleasant 
discussions.  Her blindness to the presence of migrant women is consistent with the 
general situation in Norway at that time: The majority hardly ‘saw’ migrant people nor 
‘heard’ their voices. 
 
The black feminist activists who went to the NGO-Forum in Copenhagen were 
recently established as a group, and not yet acquainted with the white Norwegian 
self-image.  They soon realised, however, that their critique of Norwegian gender 
equality policy came as a big surprise, and was not warmly received by the majority 
feminists.  There are several ways to interpret this unfriendly response.  One is 
related to ethnic Norwegian feminist activists being weary of internal conflicts.  They 
had been through a decade of intense political struggle related to abortion on 
demand, the gender equality legislation as well as bitter, internal conflicts between 
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and within the new feminist organisations linked to the influence of the Marxist-
Leninist (AKP-ml) affiliated parts of the women’s movement.  Also, the crest of 
feminist mobilisation was decreasing, and many activists were tired or they had been 
absorbed into various institutions.  The sharp, outright critique from black feminist 
activists of the feminist movement was hardly presented at the best time.  Justified or 
not, majority feminists did not like what they heard.  To them, the critique was 
beyond the pale.   
 
Women abroad and at home  
 
Black feminist respondents represented the lack of support from white feminists with 
a reference to black and white feminist’s different interests and priorities, but also to 
a hierarchy of priorities; ‘Our issues were totally subordinated by these enormous 
issues of the feminist gang, sexual rights and the third world,’ one of them said.  This 
interviewee represented black feminist issues as ‘totally subordinated’ to white 
feminist issues. 
 
Black feminists also mocked at the majority feminist’s preoccupation with sexual 
issues and with third world women.  Quite rightly, prostitution and pornography were 
prioritised issues during the 80s, and the NGO-FORUM had stimulated international 
co-operation and transnational networks, for instance related to the sex industry.  
The UN Decade for Women - Equality, Development and Peace 1975-1985 (Pietilä 
and Vickers, 1994), entailed new opportunities, and the Norwegian National Council 
of Women successfully lobbied for public funding for international development 
projects (Likestillingsrådet, 1980).  Solidarity campaigns were initiated by left-
oriented feminist groups, such as campaigns to improve the lives of women in Iran 
after the revolution in 1979, in Palestine after Sabra and Shatilla massacres in 1982, 
in the Philippines related to trafficking and mail order brides, for example. 
 
There was a strong ethnic Norwegian interest in women and development, but the 
representations of this engagement differ between white and black feminists.  White 
feminists describe their third world projects proudly, in wholeheartedly positive ways.  
Reflections or hints at the issue of migrant women at home are absent, however, 
racism likewise.  Black feminists had a rather critical take on the third world focus of 
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majority women’s organisations because it was completely isolated from race 
awareness in Norway. 
  
When asked explicitly about their relations to black feminists in Norway, interviewees 
from majority feminist organisations don’t remember racism as a feminist issue 
during the early years.  One respondent who had no memories of racism as a 
structural challenge for her organisation during the late 1970s and early 80s, referred 
to ‘racism, in the way we are conscious about it today that is.’ Then she made an 
interesting differentiation between discrimination of individual migrant women and 
discrimination as a structural problem:  
 
‘I mean, our [mentions her organisation] strength was that if somebody tried to 
sack an immigrant women, we would be there with support and name it 
racism and oppression of women and all kinds of things.  But if one insisted 
on discussing these structural conditions, well … (…) I don’t really know if we 
disagreed, or whether it was rather a matter of style - or if it was simply that ...  
We had similar goals, I gather, but we were very far.  (...) I did not always 
understand what she [a black feminist] talked about.’ 
 
The citation illustrates on the one hand, a belief that her majority organisation and 
black feminists had a similar agenda to a certain extent, and that it was style rather 
than content which was problematic.  At the same time, reservations like ‘I don’t 
know’, ‘I gather’, and finally: ‘I did not always understand’, notify something more, 
and troubling about the relations between majority and minority feminist 
organisations.  Norwegian feminists were deeply influenced by socialist ideas during 
the 70s, and concerned with oppression as a structural issue.  On a theoretical level, 
we would presume that they were equipped to address and talk about racism at 
home.  In practice, however, their representations rather demonstrated a neglect 
resembling an ‘epistemology of ignorance’ (Taylor, 2007), and a national self-image 
of tolerance and innocence (Gullestad, 2006; Hagelund, 2003).   
 
The majority feminist euphoria of the early 1980s - of imagined feminist communities 
of mutual understanding, respect and support - contributed to narrowing down the 
perspective of white feminists.  To paraphrase Srivastava, feminism was not ‘a place 
of just practices, egalitarian relations, revolutionary goals and good individuals’ 
(Srivastava, 2005: 36).   
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Mutual Accusations  
When representing their encounters during the first years of black feminism in 
Norway, activists from majority and minority feminist organisations alike demonstrate 
a high level of frustration and disappointment.  ‘Anger and irritation’ was a common 
ground, and yet the representations contradict each other fundamentally.  Black 
feminists were angry; white feminist were irritated.  Interviewees from majority 
organisations represent black feminists as too negative and too critical.  White 
feminists don’t accept the verbal attacks; they don’t see themselves as ‘that bad’.  
There is a rather unison white feminist discourse of irritation and frustration. 
 
Organised minority feminists argue that their claims of discrimination and racism in 
the labour market and elsewhere were accurate and well-founded.  They maintain 
descriptions of discrimination of migrants within the Norwegian state and society, 
and they uphold charges against white feminists for neglecting and ignoring their 
difficult situation.  They were angry, and they represented the justification of their 
anger as unrecognised. 
 
The effects of the different representations of black and white feminists were, 
obviously, detrimental to co-operation and alliances.  When struggling to understand 
the failure of Norwegian white feminists to take the black feminist critique inwards, 
Ruth Frankenberg’s observations related to white feminists in the US seem relevant:  
 
‘(…) my sisters and I struggled to comprehend a situation we did not 
understand and had not meant to create, critical questions for me were: How 
did this happen?  How did we get into this mess?’  
Frankenberg asks (1993: 4). 
 
This is a reminder of the global prevalence of whiteness as an unmarked category, 
and the ‘multiple ways in which the racism of the wider culture were simply being 
replayed in feminist locations.’ (ibid.: 3)  The present discussion is limited to the 
situation during the 1970s and relates colour blindness to the internal history of white 
feminism in Norway and to the hegemonic discourses on race and ethnicity.  The 
already mentioned issue of timing seems important: Majority feminists had begun the 
process of reconciliation, according to one interviewee, at the time when migrant 
feminist activists started to mobilise.  Several majority respondents indicate that a 
number of activists from the 70s were tired and in no mood for further internal 
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disputes at the turn of the decade.  Confronted with angry descriptions from migrant 
feminists of their own shortcomings and of the state and society in general as racist, 
they responded with surprise and partial dismissal.  Continuous claims from 
organised black feminists that majority white feminists should take personal and 
political responsibility for racism in Norway were received half-heartedly.   
 
White feminists were, according to one majority activist, supportive of the demand for 
autonomous status for migrant women, and they were ready to support any 
campaign against direct racist discrimination, but they did not grasp the black 
feminist discourse of structural, permeating racism.   
 
We interpret the representations of white feminist activists of claims of racism to 
imply a refusal to recognise that anti-racist struggle was intersecting with feminism.  
In short, majority feminists, despite benevolence, were totally unprepared for the 
basic critique of racism ingrained in the black feminist discourse, and they fumbled to 
find ways of responding.  In addition to unfortunate timing of the rise of black 
feminism, then, the claims collided with the hegemonic feminist discourse.  This 
discourse recognised class and regional differences between women within a rather 
friendly state-civil society context.  The anti-racist discourse did not stand a chance 
against it, and was not welcomed among white feminists.  They had to deal with it, 
however, and they tried to negotiate the claims of racism within their majority feminist 
discourse.  The representations indicate, however, that regardless of how white 
feminists managed to accommodate the anti-racist feminist discourse, they failed to 
fulfil the needs and demands of migrant women and black feminists.   
 
Black feminists were not prepared to accept a partial acceptance of their claims of 
racism.  They did not limit themselves to personal ethnicity based discrimination, but 
addressed all kinds of structural racism within and outside the (white) feminist 
movement in Norway.  They were deeply disappointed with the lack of sincere 
support for their anti-racist feminist agenda.  The interview with black feminists 
displayed representations of stubborn and consistent claims-making; and of 
persistent anger.  Their efforts to educate white feminists were represented as 
unsuccessful, are strikingly different compared to white feminist’s representations of 
sympathy with the claims of migrant women.  The lukewarm reception of the efforts 
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of black feminists to prove the intersections of anti-racism and feminism fortified their 
conviction of structural racism within the (white) women’s movement, and sustained 
their anger. 
 
White feminists’ reluctant attitude to charges of racism reflects Frankenberg’s claim 
that ‘White women had a limited repertoire of responses when charged with racism’ 
(Frankenberg, 1993: 2).  When accused of racism, the response was a mix of 
rejection, irritation and reference to the anger of black feminists as excessive.  The 
effects of white feminist responses was that migrant women activists never 
fundamentally disturbed the ‘business as usual’ for majority feminists during this 
period.  Despite the partial response to specific claims relating to migrant and 
refugee women, majority feminists’ overarching analysis of gender injustice was not 
changed. 
 
Hierarchies of Citizenship 
The level of conflicts between white and black feminists should, however, be seen 
within the larger context of the women’s movement.  The feminist divisions during 
the 1970s were deeply ingrained within the exceptional political antagonism of this 
period, represented in numerous testimonies (Grenness, 1975; Haukaa, 1982).  The 
changed context of feminism during the 1980s along with a certain burn-out among 
activists, had contributed to more peaceful relations among activists from majority 
women’s organisations.  The political and personal conflicts of the 70s were not 
easily wiped out, however, and majority feminist co-operative efforts of the 1980s 
across previous divides, were fragile.  The wounds caused by previous disputes 
continued to make an impact, indicated in this representation:  
 
‘This woman, I didn’t know her, but she knew who I was.  This was during a 
break in a meeting where we discussed 8th March banners, and she bawled 
me out for something my organisation did during the 1970s.  I didn’t 
understand why she was so angry, and I didn’t know what she was talking 
about, but she was extremely angry.’ 
 
The struggle against pornography and prostitution brought refreshing ideas and new 
activists to the majority feminist movement at the turn of the 1970s.  Peace soon 
followed as another mobilising issue.  But neither issue was of core concern among 
black feminist activists, and did little to bridge the gap between majority and minority 
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feminists.  On the contrary, black feminists complained about the white feminist’s 
focus on sexuality.   
 
The general lack of recognition of the black feminist agenda is represented in various 
ways by the respondents from minority women’s organisations.  They ranged from 
disappointment and mild resignation to anger and sorrow, but the respondents were 
always quite explicit, like this representation:  
 
‘They [the majority feminists] did not give a shit about us [black feminists] (…) 
the relationship was not lukewarm and indifferent.  Antagonist, I don’t know if 
that’s the correct word, but the relation was very aggressive.  Maybe not 
antagonist, but aggressive it was.  (…) it was very sad, that’s how I 
experienced the large meeting where we invited influential women, who ...  
No, I experienced it as extremely sad and like one felt like crying afterwards, 
yes.  Oh Lord!’  
 
This interviewee demonstrated a striking level of emotion and frustration.  In addition 
to straight political disagreements between majority and minority feminists, she 
displayed the feeling of being totally overlooked; an experience of degradation.   
 
The effects of representations like this might have been a ban on further contact with 
majority feminist organisations.  But no, despite the unhappy efforts to establish co-
operation with ethnic Norwegian feminists, black feminists never withdrew from direct 
confrontations with white feminists, and never stopped trying to have an impact on 
the dominant feminist discourse.  And vice versa, majority feminists continued to 
meet and argue with migrant and black feminists. 
 
One way of interpreting the continued but strained relations is that conflicts and 
struggles were ‘business as usual’, since they have always been ingredients of the 
women’s movements (see Country Report Norway, Chapter 2).  The clashes 
between white and black feminisms from the end of the 1970s were hardly worse or 
more uncompromising than the usual ones among white feminists themselves.  The 
‘white’ representations of the disputes with minority feminist indicate the ‘normalcy’ of 
feminist disagreements, although the anger and stubbornness of black feminists 
were highlighted.  In some ways, however, this dispute was different.  This is 
because the black - white feminist debate introduced a political divide between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’.  In this perspective, this was not simply a split based on different 
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approaches to ‘race’ as a foundational feminist category.  Rather, it was a gap based 
on the different, hierarchical positioning of the majority and minority feminists in 
relation to citizenship status, and this ‘othering’ fuelled the dispute.  ‘[White] women’s 
organisations are unable to mobilise.  It’s us and them, in a way,’ one respondent 
said.  We suggest, then, that the new feature in Norwegian feminism introduced by 
black feminism was not the level of disagreements and accusations as such, 
because ‘(…) fighting and quarrelling, that’s life, yes’, as one of the black feminist 
informant maintained.  Rather, it was the introduction of race and ethnicity as salient 
political and theoretical markers.  The material conditions between women were 
unequal along completely new dimensions, and white feminists did not really 
understand this.   
 
Lack of Respect and Recognition 
Black feminist respondents described the problem of relating to white feminists 
during the 1970s and - 80s as painful and humiliating.  They describe derogatory 
ways of being approached, in explicit, detailed and concrete ways.  There are no 
representations of encounters based on peer relations expressed by black feminist 
interviewees.  Black feminist respondents also sometimes described white women 
activists as motivated by charity, particularly when it came to some of the non-
feminist women’s organisations.  These organisations were among the first to invite 
migrant women, but were suspected of doing so out of benevolence.   
 
What then, about black feminist’s potential complicity in the shaping of constrained 
relations to majority feminism?  We have hardly noticed indications of reflexions 
along the lines of remorse among black feminists during our interviews.  They may 
have questioned their potential contributions indirectly by referring to their anger.  
Blame for the difficult relations, however, was laid squarely on the shoulders of the 
white feminists.  One way of interpreting this is linked to the position of the 
researcher; an ‘outsider’ to black feminism, and a ‘white feminist’ activist.  The 
respondents may have taken the opportunity of the interviews to display how hard it 
had been for black feminists to be silenced and misrecognised, and - consciously or 
not - focused on this aspect rather than on other aspects of their relations to white 
feminists. 
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Ethnic Norwegian feminists described their encounters with minority feminists in 
strikingly different ways.  Patronising attitudes and motives of charity were absent 
from their representations, and when majority feminists recalled their uncomfortable 
relationships with minority women, their approach was quite reflexive.  Their 
representations were comprehensive of the anger demonstrated by migrant women, 
despite acknowledging their irritation at the time.  In general, majority feminists 
presented their dislikes of the rhetoric of minority feminists, but definitely granted 
them some justification.  Their mixing of being frustrated by the recriminations on the 
one hand, and of admitting their own shortcomings on the other, was quite different 
from the representation of non-feminist women activists.  These representations may 
also be attributed to the position of the researcher, but this time as an ‘insider’ and a 
majority feminist: White feminist activists may have used the interview as a 
‘testimonial’, within which they appear reflexive and sympathetic.  Also, their 
representations may be coloured by hindsight, for instance when the accusations 
from black feminists were described.   
 
The absence of modesty and of pluralism in the representations of migrant feminists 
by white feminists - and vice versa - probably contributed to the production of 
stereotypes and unilateral perceptions which had the effect of complicating co-
operation and alliances.   
 
6.2.2 Charity or Dignity: non-feminist majority women’s organisations   
Respondents from non-feminist women’s organisations described their relations to 
ethnic minority women differently compared to the white feminists.  The divergence 
was due partly to the fact that the context of relations actually was quite dissimilar; 
the aims of the majority organisations differed from majority feminist organisations, 
and their localisation was partly in geographical areas without ethnic/national 
minority feminist organisations.  Minority feminist organisations were neither ‘natural’ 
allies nor ‘obvious’ adversary groups for one interviewee from a non-feminist 
organisation.  Also, the non-feminist majority women’s organisations had not been 
involved in the political and personal conflicts between majority feminist groups 
within the political left during the 1970s. 
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‘Poor Migrant Women’ 
One interviewee from a majority women’s organisation explained that it was difficult 
to tell us about her relations to minority women’s organisations because they were 
absent where she lived.  Also, she said, there were almost no migrant women at all 
in her local environment.  Living in a scarcely populated area, without a significant 
migrant population, her representation was a reminder of the uneven percentage of 
migrants in Norwegian local communities, and the different contexts for developing 
contact and co-operation between women’s organisations across ethnic divides.   
 
This interviewee represented her tiny personal experience with migrant women as an 
effect of their physical absence.  Her representations contained close to no traces of 
organisational ties to or moments of co-operation or conflict with minority women’s 
organisations.  The respondent’s descriptions were mostly focused on isolated 
encounters with individual migrant women or families in her local community. 
 
At the national level, however, the interviewee’s organisation has included a focus on 
the situation of migrant women since the mid 1980s, and she mentioned a few 
relevant projects at the national level.  Various initiatives by the respondent’s 
municipality to address issues relating to migrant people were also described.  Yet, 
the absence of migrant women’s organisations in the community precluded direct 
contact with migrant women activists on an organisational basis.  This was 
represented as an explanation of the marginal focus on migrant women in her local 
unit. 
 
Despite the lack of relations with ethnic minority organisations, the representations of 
personal ‘ethnic encounters were interesting, however.  They seemed familiar in the 
sense that they echoed the public discourse on migrants.  Migrants were 
represented as if they were a homogeneous group.  Differences between them were 
rarely addressed, and the interviewee also represented migrants as ‘poor or 
miserable things’ [stakkars]; as people needing help in various ways, but also as a 
group that ‘can enrich us’.  There was an inclination to translate our research 
questions about her organisations ‘relations to migrant women’ as synonymous with 
‘aid to women in developing countries’, or to women in Eastern Europe.  Lastly, in 
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this interviewee’s representations, a ‘migrant’ woman was almost synonymous with 
‘a Muslim’ woman.   
 
The representations of this women’s movement activist were quite different from the 
majority feminist activists ‘irritation’.  We have analysed this interview as 
representing a ‘discourse of charity’, which is quite in line with the traditional profile 
of a number of non-feminist women’s organisations.  Non-feminist women’s 
organisations are not similar, however, as the next section indicates.   
 
Wake Up and Listen!  
 
During the 1970s and 80s, ethnic Norwegians established a few gender-mixed 
organisations to support migrants and refugees, some of them professional 
organisations with paid staff.  One of the activists interviewed belonged to this kind of 
non-feminist gender-mixed organisation, with a purpose to promote the integration of 
migrants and their networking.   
 
The most striking aspect of this interviewee was the humble and prudent 
representations of her relations with ethnic minorities.  This non-feminist activist 
resonated somewhat with the black feminist critique of majority feminists for not 
listening to migrant women.  For instance, the respondent described herself as a 
person who eventually had ‘woke up from hibernation’.  Here she referred to a time 
during which she was unable to see and listen to the messages from migrant people.  
After years of working with migrant people, she had finally been capable of 
comprehending, and she finally ‘heard’ what migrant people had tried to tell her for 
years.  Thus, she revealed her own blindness to ordinary, daily problems of 
exclusion and inclusion:  
 
‘Still, it is difficult for them to be included, and this is something I have been 
looking critically at for a while, this issue of what we Norwegians talk about, I 
mean what the majority talk about and how we behave together.  There are 
lots of “arrangements” blowing in the wind and hints about things one has 
done earlier and “thanks for the last time we were together” and “yes, we’ll 
meet” here and there.  There are lots of these small things which daily 
excludes a person who belongs to a minority, you know, and even parents 
who greet people during parent-teacher meetings whom once were in the 
same choir, or even attended the same primary school, or went to the same 
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university.  A migrant mother will never, or at least very rarely, encounter 
somebody who is this natural, if not another migrant from her own country.’  
 
This interviewee recognised that migrant people are excluded by the majority, often 
unintentionally, from common daily events and situations.  Adding up, their 
systematic occurrence made processes of integration very hard, she said.  Her 
explicit representations of mechanisms of exclusion were hardly reflected in the 
interviews with white feminist activists.  Their silence was consistent with hegemonic 
discourse of colour blindness and a misrecognition of the challenges facing migrants, 
contrary to the discourse of this non-feminist activist.   
 
This respondent also talked unstrained about deficiencies in the majority population, 
such as the tendency to overlook differences within groups of migrants and refugees, 
or to talk on behalf of migrant women.  ‘But I have become increasingly more careful 
about it, and I am more and more pleased to have other people to bring with me or 
instead of me’, she said: 
 
The representations of this majority non-feminist activist resembled the black 
feminist discourse, but they differed in their inclusion of a critical stance towards 
migrants.  This interview portrayed migrant women with dignity but also with defects.  
Embodied, nuanced representations of ethnic minority and majority women were not 
in abundance elsewhere among the respondents.   
 
This interviewee also represented a concern with migrant men - husbands and 
fathers - which was quite unique among the respondents.  Related to violence 
against women, a topic she had dealt with for many years, she expressed the 
dangers connected with not paying attention to the different meaning marriage and 
family has among groups of migrants and refugees.  Without ever forgetting 
women’s need for support and empowerment, she addressed the despair of male 
violators.  She kept a sustained focus on the shortcomings of the majority population 
with respect to the complex situation of migrants, and an awareness of the problems 
and pain ingrained in the position of migrants as aliens.  ‘The majority isn’t aware of 
how it behaves, really.  That’s the way it is,’ she bluntly maintained. 
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6.2.3 Absent Allies: Sami Feminism 
When the black and white feminist movements emerged during the late 1960s, they 
were brought about by the internal dynamics of the civil rights and liberation 
movements (Roth, 2004).  In a parallel way, Sami feminism did not appear out of the 
blue, but grew out of the dynamics of and conflicts within the Sami liberation 
movement:  
 
‘I think that most of the Sami feminists have a background as Sami politicians.  
That we have been, we were engaged in the Sami political awakening, 
connected to the Alta-river affair, I think.  (…) we were very, you know, 
vulnerable to being Sami and ending up in a Norwegian dominated milieu like 
in X [the interviewee mentions a city], and all the time you have to defend 
yourself against this, this ‘what is it with you Sami?’ 
 
A ‘Minority within a Minority’: Mobilising Sami feminists 
 
Sami feminists formally began to organise about ten years later (in 1988) than 
migrant women in Norway, and about ten years after the Sami movement itself 
gradually emerged.  Contrary to the organising of black feminism in Norway, Sami 
feminism already had a foothold within the institutions: One of the activists was 
employed at the Sami Council and actively made use of her position for feminist 
purposes also before 1988.  The Sami Council had established a Women’s 
Committee in 1986, and activists were eager to push women and gender equality 
issues from the margin to the centre.  This was partly due to new political 
opportunities in the wake of the UN International Decade for Women (1975-1985), 
and partly related to the particularities of the Sami’s political situation:  Feminist 
activists and femocrats all over Norway were busy preparing for the conference 
Nordic Forum in the summer 1988, and the Sami community was preparing for the 
upcoming election for the very first Sami Parliament in 1989.  The time was ripe for a 
feminist Sami organisation.   
 
The idea of a separate organisation for Sami feminists grew out of a long process, 
according to the interviewee.  Inspired by the dissemination of feminist ideas 
internationally and the UN International Women’s Decade in particular, a series of 
seminars addressing Sami women’s issues started in 1975 (see Country Report 
Norway).  The most urgent issue was the situation of female reindeer herders, but 
social changes in Sami communities, in general, were also contributing to the 
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establishment of Sáráhkká - Sami Women’s Organisation in 1988.  According to the 
interviewed Sami feminist activist, Sáráhkká has played an important role with 
respect to the interests of women in the reindeer herding industry (see more in the 
Norwegian country report), not just in Norway but in the whole Sami area.   
 
According to one interviewee, relations between Sami feminists and feminists from 
majority organisations played a less prominent role compared to the relations to the 
Sami community.  This was represented to be related to conflicts in the nomination 
of candidates for the upcoming elections for the Sami Parliament: The first annual 
meeting of Sáráhkká in 1989 took place during the preparation for the election, and 
the meeting was concerned with various forms of discrimination against Sami 
women related to the election process and in general.  The fear of discrimination was 
soon justified when a Sami feminist woman was excluded from the top position of 
one of the candidate lists.  Feminist activists were deeply frustrated, according to the 
respondent, and their protests resulted in a separate Women’s List for the election.  
The List did not win any seats, but Sami feminists established new lists in the 
succeeding elections, not without rewards.   
 
The Women’s List was, according to the interviewee, a protest directed against the 
Sami community itself.  As such, this initiative was contrary to the collective action in 
1981, when Sami women occupied the Prime Minister’s office in support of Sami 
men on hunger strike.  The Women’s List was too much for the Sami community 
however, and caused a storm of reactions.  The feminist activists were called 
‘traitors’, the interviewee said, which was an extreme and highly unusual 
characteristic within the, generally, low-key Norwegian political context.   
 
According to the respondent, anti-feminist attitudes were quite widespread in the 
Sami population.  Her representations of anti-feminist attitudes are striking, 
compared to the silence of this issue in the interviews with black feminist activists.  
This difference may be related to various concerns in the interviews; the interviews 
with black feminists explicit, addressed their relations to ethnic Norwegian feminists, 
whereas this topic was less salient in the interview with the Sami feminist activist.  
Anyway, the Sami feminist activist was exceptional in light of the inclination of a 
minority within a minority to silence critique levelled against its community, captured 
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by Crenshaw’s concept of ‘political intersectionality’ (Crenshaw, 1997).  The concept 
refers to the difficulties of being situated within two or more subordinated groups that 
frequently pursue conflicting political agendas.   
 
The Sami feminist, focus on institutional politics and election campaigns during the 
1980s is worth commenting.  It resembles the ethnic Norwegian feminist movements 
concern with women, power and politics from the late 1960s onwards, quite unlike 
the priorities of migrant feminists.  The time and energy expended on the Women’s 
List in 1989 and the succeeding election campaigns (until ’95), however, drained 
Sáráhkká of resources, according to the interviewee.  As a consequence, in 1993, 
women from four municipalities established another organisation, the SNF-Sámi 
NissonForum.  The informal network was intended to be a platform to continue the 
work of the Women’s List, and was formally established as an organisation in 1998.  
The new organisation was represented to be complementary to Sáráhkká, rather 
than a competitor, and demonstrates that the impetus for initiating a social 
movement organisation is not always to defeat existing organisations.   
 
Disappointing relations to majority feminism  
Allies are important in all kinds of social and political struggle.  When asked about 
co-operation with women’s organisations, the interviewee was a bit reluctant and 
said that co-operation only took place on exceptional occasions.  Then she added 
that ‘there are no women’s organisations in Northern Norway at all’, and displayed 
the Oslo/southern dominance in Norwegian politics, feminism being no exception.   
 
Sáráhkká and Sami NissonForum have (had) branches in four countries (Russia, 
Finland, Sweden and Norway).  These countries all have Sami populations, and 
belong to the Sami nation.  Close ties to women’s and feminist groups in these 
countries have been self-evident for Sami feminists, the respondent said, despite the 
high costs of travel, interpretation service and bad funding.  Beside trans-national co-
operation projects, various Sami women’s organisations and networks were 
represented to be most important allies of Sami NissonForum.   
 
Sami organisations are also members of FOKUS, the umbrella organisation for 
Norwegian women’s organisations involved in foreign aid.  A disappointment with 
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FOKUS was articulated by one interviewee, however, due to a rejected application 
for financial support when FOKUS adjusted its guidelines to the Norwegian Aid 
Directorate.  Project support from FOKUS is now limited to projects in the ‘South’, 
which has quite negative effects for the interviewee’s organisation, with a West-
East/Arctic axis and not a North-South axis.   
 
The respondent also underlined insufficient communication with public authorities, be 
they Norwegian or Sami.  She deplored the absence of Sami women in the Nordic 
gender equality work, and the lack of recognition and representation.  She pointed to 
institutional barriers to being recognised as a people/nation with inherent rights to be 
represented.  She represented a claim that recognition and presence are 
preconditions for decent gender equality efforts: As long as the Sami are not properly 
recognised, organisations of and for Sami women will have to compete for a seat in 
Norwegian delegations on the same conditions as all Norwegian women’s 
organisations.  This is unfair, according to this respondent, since Sami organisations 
are, in fact, representing an indigenous people and should be allowed particular 
citizenship rights as such.  The present funding and representation policy of the 
Ministry and FOKUS were clearly represented to be against the interest of Sami 
women.   
 
With respect to institutionalization, Sami women always fall between the cracks, 
according to the interviewee:  
 
‘We were never able to establish a firm foundation in any Ministry related to 
discussions of Sami issues.  We tried to lobby, but we were always brushed 
aside by the claim that this was not their table.  We have been in dialogue, but 
every time there is a change [in the political position] we have to start all over 
again.  (…) Our mission [sak] relates to several ministries, which is far from 
easy.’  
 
Potential allies within the formal political institutions were hard to find, according to 
this respondent, and the formal recognition of the Sami as an indigenous people had 
not solved Sami women’s claim to be present in their own right.   
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We Are at War up North, Really 
Relations between the majority and minority population in Finnmark county were 
described as racist and beyond the concern of the Norwegian authorities by one 
interviewee.  In particular, the writings in some of the newspapers in northern parts 
of Norway were represented as the ‘worst examples of racism’.  They publish 
anything without demanding any kind of documentary proof according to the 
respondent.  Referring to reforms in the Sami legislation, the newspapers accused 
the Sami population of having exclusive rights to land at the expense of the 
Norwegian population: 
 
‘It is a full-time job to respond to the charges.  I don’t know, it’s kind of 
hopeless to respond all the time, because the reader’s letters are historically 
wrong, based on incorrect information, rendering the Sami suspect.  (…) In a 
way, you always have to - several times a week - confront attacks of being 
Sami, and actually we are at war in the north.  In reality that’s what we are.’   
 
This claim ‘actually, we are at war’ is by far the gravest representation of minority-
majority relations in this investigation.  It speaks about present conditions, but the 
majority population in the South seems to be unaware of the situation.  The gravity of 
allegations like these against the majority population, and the silencing, resemble the 
reception of black feminist critique previously discussed.  The claim that the gender 
equality authorities do next to nothing, not even read the newspapers, is also parallel 
to the black feminists’ representations of the state.  The privilege of ‘whiteness’ is yet 
to be fully addressed in the majority population.   
 
6.2.4 Co-operation during the ‘70s and’80s 
When the interviewees were asked if they had been able to develop a joint feminist 
agenda, a number of political initiatives were mentioned, in line with the 
documentation of co-operation presented in Chapter 2 in the Norway Country 
Report.   
 
The total amount of organizations, campaigns, action groups and networks 
mentioned by the respondents as allies in various campaigns and actions, indicate 
that feminist activism continued to have an extensive register after the 1970s.   
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One interviewee emphasised that there was an increasing number of meeting 
places, united actions and demands throughout the 1980s.  Despite various 
disagreements in their relations, specific issues of mutual concern emerged among 
feminist groups such as campaigns against violence against women, prostitution and 
pornography and issues related to equal pay and a six hour working day.  Joint 
actions mostly took place among majority feminists, but there were also some 
references to co-operation across the ethnic divide.   
 
Probably the most important united action during this period, with respect to the 
minority-majority interactions, was the TV campaign ‘Women in the Third World’ in 
1989.  This was mentioned by several informants, not because the campaign 
process was without disputes between majority and minority women, but because it 
represented the breakthrough for feminist ethnic minority voices within the feminist 
and women’s movement in Norway: a decision to fund the Mira Centre.  This was 
decisive for the transformation of the fragile Foreign Women’s Group into the robust, 
viable Mira Centre.  Co-operation between minority and majority feminists were 
mainly based on pragmatic assessments and strategic framing, however and did not 
bridge the gap between black and white feminists concerning racism as a feminist 
issue and hierarchies of citizenship.   
 
The interviews illustrate pronounced differences in the profile of networks and 
relations of the various types of feminist and non-feminist organizations.  Different, 
but not distinct, fields of feminist/women-oriented activities appeared and display the 
origins of feminist and women’s activism within the broader social movements.  
Women’s organizations were set up as acts of protest against the neglect of 
women’s issues within gender mixed movements.   
 
Attachments to their movements of origin, whether mainly national in the case of 
majority women, or trans-national in the case of migrant and Sami women, are 
described as diverse and as changing over time in the interviews.  The main 
networks of the 1970s and ‘80s identified in the interviews were as follows:  The 
Foreign Women’s Group, the Philippine Community Norway and the Kurdish 
Women’s Association had a firm foundation in the trans-national anti-racist 
movement, and in organisations of/for their specific national or ethnic groups.  Sami 
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feminists related basically to the Sami movement organisations and institutions, in 
the northern parts of Norway and in the whole trans-national Sami area, and had few 
relations with ethnic Norwegian majority women’s organisations.  The Christian 
Intercultural Association had close ties to a range of religious movement 
organisations, national and trans-national, and to various State Church institutions.  
The Women’s National Health Organisation related mainly to a number of non-
feminist women’s organisations, and national institutions within the health field.   
 
The ethnic Norwegian feminist organisations had different affiliations outside the 
women’s movement, and reflect their origin and their present profile: the Norwegian 
Association for Women’s Rights was attached to the liberal left from the 1880s, and 
developed strong ties to the public gender equality institutions from the 1970s.  The 
Legal Advice for Women was linked to various legal institutions, whereas the 
Women’s Front had close, but contested, connections to the AKP/ml party and to 
various trans/national solidarity movements and campaigns..   
 
The different aims and profiles of the Foreign Women’s Group, the Women’s Front, 
the Sami feminists and the Norwegian Association for Women’s Rights indicate the 
complexities of the feminist organisational landscape.   
 
Foreign Women’s Group/the MiRA Centre for Migrant and Refugee Women was, 
undoubtedly, the spider in the web of social movement organisations focusing on 
migrant women’s citizenship during the 1970s and ‘80s and had a crucial role in 
politicising the situation of migrant women.  As the first formal organisation for this 
constituency, and the dominant one throughout the 1980s, the contribution to 
broaden the feminist agenda and combat the misrepresentations of migrant and 
refugee women was formidable.   
 
The Women’s Front was the ethnic majority feminist organisation with most focus on 
and relations to ethnic minority feminist groups during this period.  This was, in part, 
an effect of the organisation’s focus on international solidarity work, since this was a 
bridge to recognising the difficulties of third world women in Norway.   
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In contrast to Foreign Women’s Group and the Women’s Front, the Norwegian 
Association for Women’s Rights (NAWR) and the Sami feminists were more 
concerned with institutional politics and relations to public authorities.  In the case of 
the NAWR, this was clearly related to the dual roles of many members as activists 
and as state feminists during the period.  The Sami feminists directed a substantial 
part of their resources towards the general Sami liberation struggle from the 1970s, 
and towards political elections during the 1980s.  Geographically distant from the 
headquarters of the women’s movements organisations, they sought to make a claim 
for representation in the newly established Sami institutions. 
 
Despite the various affiliation profiles, the organisations also related closely to each 
other, for better for worse.  As feminists or as promoters of women’s interests they 
belonged to the same policy field.  They had ideological disagreements and 
supported different specific strategies and claims, but they were all concerned with 
the situation of women in general, with the emerging public gender equality policy, 
and with women’s issues internationally.  They established a number of influential 
meeting places, more or less institutionalised, during the 1970s and ‘80s: 8th March 
celebrations; election campaigns; Women’s Houses and women’s cultural festivals; 
research conferences and seminars; the TV fundraising campaign; events related to 
the UN International Women’s Decade; and the Nordic Forum etc.  Here, their 
priorities were outlined and negotiated, their arguments were sharpened and 
disagreements were amplified.  Several respondents mentioned the symbolic and 
material common spaces as crucial for the development of personal and 
organisational ties and trust.  Common spaces seemed to disappear during the next 
decades, however. 
 
6.2.5 Contested Relations in Contemporary Women’s Movement: the 1990s and 
2000s 
 
‘When you think about minority women, it is not one group.  It is a huge 
variation of people.  There are some cultural differences.  And then there is the 
individual person, how active you are as a person.  And also other things; like 
what kind of education you have, what experiences you have had in your life.  
All this matters … (…)  The majority also has its differences; whether you’re 
from the north or the south, the city or the country-side and all that.’ 
(Interviewee from a minority women’s organisation) 
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The organisational landscape changed during the 1990s and 2000s (see Chapter 2).  
A number of new organisations of and for migrant women were set up, and new 
issues appeared.  Co-operation and conflicts between majority and minority women’s 
organisations took place in a different political context, when problems related to the 
integration of migrants became prominent in the public debate.  Gender-related 
issues such as arranged and forced marriage, female genital mutilation and honour 
killings contributed to a new discourse of what it meant to be Norwegian, with the 
effect of reinforcing the ‘us’ as gender equal and the ‘them’ (migrants) as 
‘patriarchal’.  What happened to the relations between majority and minority 
women’s organisations? 
 
This part of Chapter 6 focus as on problem representations of majority/minority co-
operation and alliances, departing from the question of ‘sister solidarity’ across 
ethnic and religious backgrounds.  The main focus here is on how the ‘problem’ of 
co-operation/non co-operation is represented; how movement activists speak about 
this issue, in particular, elaborate the intersection between ‘gender’ and ‘ethnicity’, 
and the categories ‘women’ and ‘women’s issues’.32  The initial quote emphasises 
the differences within the categories minority and majority women and illustrates one 
obvious, yet important, finding in this study, namely the vast variation of women’s 
organisations within these two categories.   
 
Our aim is to explore the complexity in the organisational landscape, the various 
representations, understandings and the meaning implied in the 19 qualitative 
interviews with activists from the 1990s and 2000s.  The aim has been to probe the 
underlying assumptions of various problem representations, rather than strategic 
framing for political purposes (see Chapter 4 and 7), to bring silences in 
problematisations into the open for discussion.   
 
                                            
32 The quotes in this chapter are mainly from interviews with the member-based women’s 
organisations in our study.  However, the findings are also based on the interviews with the more 
professionalised NGOs which work with issues related to women’s rights, violence against women 
and ethnic and/or religious discrimination. 
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In our analysis of how activists from women’s organisations talk about 
majority/minority co-operation, their general representations of ‘women’s issues’ 
have become relevant; which issues are included and excluded?  The inclusion of 
ethnic discrimination as a ‘women’s issue’ proved to be controversial and seems to 
divide majority and minority women’s organisations.  The representations of 
feminism and of men also turned out to be relevant and lastly, religion was a cause 
of disagreement and confusion.   
 
6.2.6 Current Problem Representations in Norway: Minority Women’s 
organisations 
 
Exclusion of minority women 
 
‘There is a huge distance between Norwegian women in women’s organisations 
[and minority women].  (…) I don’t think Norwegian women in women’s 
organisations care that much about minority women.  I don’t think so.  Because 
… very few care about what’s happening to migrants and minority women.  
They don’t think it is important.  (…) I don’t think Norwegian women’s 
organisations are familiar with the problems minority women are dealing with.’ 
 
Interviewees from some of the minority women’s organisations emphasise the lack of 
co-operation with majority women’s organisations.  One respondent stresses the lack 
of support regarding international women’s rights and minority women’s rights in 
Norway.  Norwegian feminists are only focusing on ethnic Norwegian women, and 
they are not interested in problems women are facing in other parts of the world.  In 
her view, ethnic majority women’s organisations do not care about minority women, 
and there is a huge gap between majority and minority women.   
 
‘(…) When I first came to Norway I had expectations in regards to Norwegian 
women’s organisations.  But they are not as I thought.  I thought; ‘oh, maybe I 
can co-operate with them’ and ‘they will take me seriously and talk about the 
issues I’m concerned with’.  But it didn’t turn out like that.  But the issue I’m 
working with now [honour-related violence] is very important to me.  So this time 
I had my hopes up.’ 
 
This interviewee tells a story of great hopes for sister solidarity with Norwegian 
majority women’s organisations when she first came to Norway and established the 
organisation ten years ago.  However, the expectations were not met, and she also 
tells a story of disappointment; of voices not taken seriously and of claims towards 
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the majority feminist organisations being excluded.  Her view is echoed by an 
interviewee from another minority women’s organisation: 
 
‘(…) women’s organisations were not including [minority women] because 
minority women were not seen as belonging to the Norwegian society.  
Besides, the issues on the agenda of Norwegian women’s organisations were 
not very relevant for minority women.  Racism in Norway, for example, was not 
on the agenda.’ 
 
This organisation has been active for quite some time.  Back in the 1980s migrants 
were not seen as part of the Norwegian society, and minority women were being 
objectified and exotified, also within Norwegian women’s organisations, according to 
this interview.  Black women were seen as receivers of Norwegian aid and they did 
not see minority women as equal partners.  Still today there is exoticification of 
minority women, she claims, however not as extreme as before.  There is recognition 
of gender and racism as interacting factors, but majority women’s organisations and 
others have started to show an interest for these issues because there is money in it:   
 
‘The difference is that [our organisation] is a women’s movement.  We existed 
before there was money involved in issues like forced marriages and so on.  
We discussed these issues long before they became ‘popular’ issues.  (…) but 
other organisations became interested because there was money in it.  They 
are a result of the state’s immigration and integration politics which are based 
on short lived measures and projects.  But these issues [forced marriages and 
so on] are complicated issues (…).’ 
 
According to the interviewee, there are two pillars; the first one is minority 
organisations with an anti-racist feminist agenda which promotes women’s rights 
with arguments based on fundamental human rights.  They see minority women as 
part of the Norwegian society and work for fundamental change.  Racism and sexism 
are viewed as structural problems, not only cultural problems, and they want to 
integrates for instance, forced marriages within the field of violence against women, 
and they work for empowerment of minority women.  The second pillar consists of 
ethnic Norwegian charity actors which see minorities in the ‘victim role’ and minority 
women as victims of cultures that oppress women.  The interviewee mentions, for 
instance, majority women’s organisations, Women’s Shelters and Red Cross within 
this second category. 
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‘Our point of departure is that we [women] have to get a residence permit on an 
independent ground when we come to Norway through family reunion.  We 
must have gender equality in Norway no matter which culture we are from.  (…) 
Another point of departure is to see women as victims of barbaric traditions and 
you feel sorry for them and give them a residence permit out of charity.  (…) 
What minority women in Norway fought for, was basic human and women’s 
rights.’   
 
In this interviewee’s opinion, minority women’s critical voices have been 
marginalised and suppressed, while the others (‘charity actors’) have confirmed the 
dominant discourse of migration in society which supports prejudices and 
stereotypes.  The interviewee refers to the ‘three year rule;33 spouses of Norwegian 
citizens who come to Norway from abroad are usually given a dependent legal status 
for a period of three years.  A migrant woman who leaves a violent husband before 
three years can lose her residence permit unless she can ‘prove’ that she has been 
subject to domestic abuse, which is very difficult (Eggebø, 2007).  The situation 
resembles problems of immigrant women to meet the requirements for evidence of 
domestic violence in the US (Crenshaw, 1991). 
 
Organising on one’s own 
 
Not all the respondents from minority women’s organisations talk about the lack of 
co-operation with majority women’s organisations as a problem.  Several of them 
also emphasise the need to ‘organise on their own’.  One interviewee says that her 
minority women’s organisation has been preoccupied with its ‘own’ issues until now 
and it has not tried to initiate co-operation with majority women’s organisation.  This 
organisation was established ten years ago because the initiators needed a network, 
somebody to talk to and they wanted to help each other figure out the Norwegian 
society.  The organisation was concerned with violence against women during the 
war in their home country, and gender equality and integration into the Norwegian 
society.  Today most of these women are established and well integrated in 
Norwegian society, the interviewee says, but they still need to meet and keep in 
                                            
33 (…) Women who come to Norway through family reunification do not get a residence permit until 
three years after arrival (‘the three year rule’).  This means that if a woman gets divorced before three 
years have passed, she will normally not get a residence permit.  For these women the three year rule 
can seem like an extra punishment sanctioned by society, and a form of structural violence (…).  
However, the exception from the three year rule is when the woman has been subject to domestic 
abuse (…). 
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touch with their own people, their culture and their tradition, otherwise they would 
lose a part of themselves.  Now the interviewee thinks it is time to make an effort to 
co-operate with majority women’s organisations, but there is a lack of meeting 
places.  In the beginning the organisation had an office at a ‘women’s house’, and 
got help from a well-established minority women’s organisation and one majority 
feminist organisation among others.  This house does not exist anymore, the 
organisation does not have a permanent place to meet, and they have lost this 
network.   
 
The need to establish their own minority women’s organisation is also expressed by 
interviewees from other minority women’s organisations:  
 
‘You arrive in a new country where you don’t have a network.  And you miss a 
network.  (…)  So we also have the same problems and therefore we get 
together.  Language is a problem for us, job is a problem, network is a problem, 
and the social life is very different from where we come from.’  
 
An organisation specifically for women was founded because migrant women with a 
background from the same continent have similar problems in Norwegian society 
(language barrier, difficult to get integrated and to get a job, lack of network), 
according to this respondent.  The organisation provides a social network and the 
women can motivate and help each other.  Women from [this region] take care of the 
family, but raising children with two cultures is a challenge (‘kulturkræsj”) and women 
have to support these young people:   
 
‘Now we live in Norway, a country which is very concerned with women’s 
development, gender equality, and children’s rights.  I looked at these 
possibilities and I thought; ‘Ok’.  And then I noticed that Norway is a very much 
organised society.  So to move on, you can’t be alone, you have to be 
organised, to be a team.  So I thought about that, and I figured that it is better to 
be organised in stead of feeling lonely and sitting alone with one’s problems 
thinking that it’s only me who’s struggling.  So maybe it’s better to get together.  
First of all; the social part is important to us.  And then; to exchange 
experiences with people who have come here before we came here and who 
know more about the society (…)’ 
 
The interviewee emphasises gender equality and women’s rights, which is 
mentioned by several of the interviewees from minority women’s organisations.   
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‘Empowerment’ is also a concept which has been mentioned by several of the 
minority activists.  One interviewee says that ‘empowerment’ is to help each other to 
understand the Norwegian ‘system’, the language and simply to listen to each other 
and be there for each other.  To be part of a women’s organisation will enable these 
minority women to handle problems in their daily lives and to face challenges in a 
new country.  ‘Empowerment’ is also emphasised by another interviewee:  
 
‘The work we do in our organisation is based on rights.  It is based on women’s 
independent right to decide in her life.  (…).  We work for empowerment.’ 
 
‘Empowerment’, for this activist, means to raise women’s consciousness about 
women’s rights and women’s independence, and is also a political strategy; the need 
to strengthen minority women’s own voices.   
 
A common issue in the interviews with minority women’s activists is the need to 
create a ‘safe space’ and a place where women can meet women who face the 
same challenges.  Several interviewees also expressed a wish to co-operate more 
with majority women’s organisations after the minority organisation had existed for a 
while.  The different organisations have had various experiences regarding co-
operating and alliances, and whether their assessments of the lack of co-operation 
with majority women’s organisations is a problem or not. 
 
Representation of ethnic discrimination and racism within ‘women’s issues’ 
A general theme among women from the minority organisations is a wish to include 
the fight against racism and ethnic discrimination within the definition of ‘women’s 
issues’.  In their view, the majority women’s organisations are opposed to racism, but 
racism is not an integrated part of their work.  According to one interviewee, there 
are minority women who have the same needs and interests as majority women.  
However, there are some problems that only minority women face which need extra 
attention, for instance racism in their everyday life.  Norwegian feminist organisations 
should focus both on ‘regular’ women’s issues like a six hour work day, and also 
open up and include an anti-racist agenda.   
 
‘(…) Norwegian women are very concerned with that [gender equality].  She got 
that through her mother’s milk.  So that’s the main thing.  But anti-racism, that 
is… That is a recent concept due to increased immigration.’   
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According to this respondent, gender equality is very important to Norwegian 
majority women, but anti-racism has not been so much a focus for majority women’s 
organisations.  Several interviewees from minority women’s organisations mention 
FOKUS as an exception.  Organisations like the Institution against Public 
Discrimination (Organisasjon Mot Offentlig Diskriminering, OMOD) and The Anti 
Racist Centre in Norway (Antirasistisk senter) do anti-racist work.  These are mixed 
gender organisations with an explicit anti-racist agenda. 
 
‘There are many migrant women with a lot of experience and competence 
which the Norwegian society needs.  If they get to know us they can use that 
competence.  But we are seen as one person.  “We” and “Them”, you know.  
That’s how it is.  (…) Many unemployed migrants have studied here, but they 
don’t get a job.  They experience discrimination when they apply for jobs.  If 
they see a name that is non-Norwegian, you’re disqualified, instantly, without 
even seeing who the person really is.’ 
 
Minority women are facing discrimination in the labour market (disqualified because 
of a foreign name and so on), and according to the interviewee, they are 
experiencing ‘double discrimination’; both as women and immigrants. 
 
The minority activists say that they have to work for equality, both between women 
and men and majority and minority.  The organisations are concerned with equality 
both understood as ‘gender equality’ and ‘ethnic equality’.  Some of the interviewees 
from minority women’s organisations have the impression that majority organisations 
mainly focus on female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriages related to 
minority women, rather than ethnic discrimination in the labour market.  These 
interviewees do not identify with what is often considered to be ‘minority women’s 
issues’ like FGM and forced marriages.  One interviewee thinks it is good that 
majority women raise some of these issues, but these issues are far from what her 
minority organisation is concerned with.  This view is opposed to the claim forwarded 
earlier in this section, namely that so-called ‘honour-related’ violence has not been a 
priority for majority women’s organisations.  These opposite views illustrate the vast 
variety within the category minority women’s organisations, and their different claims. 
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6.2.7 Representations of co-operation and alliances by majority women’s 
organisations 
 
Minority women’s issues as difficult issues - ‘afraid of doing something wrong’ 
Interviewees from some of the majority feminist women’s organisations problematise 
the lack of co-operation with minority women’s organisations: 
 
‘I think we have been a bit afraid of putting violence against migrant women on 
the agenda because one is afraid of doing something wrong and contributing to 
further stigmatisation and discrimination (…)’ 
 
This interviewee is addressing issues like honour killings and forced marriages, 
which in her opinion are very difficult issues which the majority women’s movement 
has not been able to deal with.  There has been some co-operation with minority 
women regarding work against female genital mutilation (FGM), but mainly there has 
been little co-operation.  In her opinion it is a shame that the feminist organisations 
have been unable to address the problems that minority women are facing:   
 
‘(…) In relation to honour killing and forced marriages, the political Right has 
been more attentive, rather than the political left and the women’s movement.  I 
think that’s a pity, both for the women’s movement and those who are victims of 
forced marriages.  I think these are extremely difficult issues, of course.  (…) I 
don’t think that [my organisation] has a well-developed policy on these issues.  
But I think we have to realise that forced marriages can be a problem for those 
who are affected by it.  That there are oppressive patriarchal structures in 
migrant communities that are maybe even strengthened by being in Norway 
because you feel defensive by being a minority who are being discriminated in 
the first place (…).  To say that it is a real problem without saying that migrants 
themselves are a problem.  (...) I wish the political Left and women’s 
organisations and feminists [would deal with these issues] even if it’s very 
difficult.’ 
 
The quote illustrates a fear of being perceived as intolerant, racist and to contribute 
to further stigmatisation of migrants in Norway.  The interviewee says it is difficult to 
state that forced marriages (and so on) are actual problems among ethnic ‘minorities’ 
without saying that migrants themselves are a problem.  It is hard to say that racism 
is a bad thing and, at the same time, criticise migrants because it can lead to further 
stigmatising of migrants, especially Muslims.  In her view, this fits better with the 
alleged Frp’s Fremskrittspartiet, the progressive party ‘enemy image’ of Islam.   
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The concerns voiced by this respondent reflect in many ways the debate about 
feminism and multiculturalism and the dilemma between the recognition of religion 
and culture and the concern about women’s subordination in minority cultures.  In 
her opinion this dilemma makes is complicated to co-operate with organisations 
representing minority women.  There seems to be an underlying ‘black or white 
picture’; either you are tolerant regarding other religions and cultures - and do not 
really know how to handle violence against ethnic minority women - or you are 
intolerant, see other cultures and religions as threats to Western democracy and ‘our 
values’, support the Progress Party and speak out about violence against women 
within minority cultures (but the aim is really to restrict immigration and assimilate 
ethnic minorities who live in Norway).  The interviewee talks about many ‘ditches’ to 
fall into and she talks about her own standpoint as ‘balancing on a line’.  There 
seems to be a lack of an appropriate language to talk about these intertwined issues. 
 
An interviewee from another majority organisation says that the problem of little co-
operation with minority women’s organisations is due to failure in communication and 
concern with different issues:  
 
‘It is a lot of focus [on minority women’s interests].  We have had discussions, 
but we have not yet concluded.  But of course it is a lot that needs to be done, 
there is no doubt about that.  But maybe it’s difficult; at least I think it’s difficult 
to find a way to communicate with them.  Migrant women are a very diverse 
group.  There is not one right answer.  (...) we [the local branch of the 
organisation] have tried to make contact with some minority women’s groups, 
but we haven’t really succeeded.  Of course, things could have been done 
differently … to have a good dialogue is hard, I think.’ 
 
The organisation she is a member of has tried to make contact, but the attempts 
have not yet been successful.   
 
‘They [minority women’s organisations] might perceive us as dominating; that 
we want to be in charge and so forth.  We haven’t been able to present 
ourselves as open-minded.  And then you have all these different organisations 
which mean very different things.  In general there are few organisations only 
for women.  And they have some issues that they are very concerned with.  So 
we have a very different point of departure.  They have other problems.  (…) 
They might think that our problems are ‘luxury problems’.  Because they have a 
different background and a different reality (…)’ 
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The interviewee has felt that the organisation has been misunderstood and 
perceived as dominating, and the earlier attempts to make contact have been 
rejected.  There has not been a dialogue.  Both the majority women’s organisation 
and different minority women’s organisations are responsible for not cooperating.  
The interviewee emphasises their different points of departure; her organisation is a 
pure women’s organisation and works from a women’s perspective.  In her view 
there are few minority organisations which are only for women.  She also focuses on 
different problems and points of view; minority women have to deal with other 
problems like housing and employment in a different way than majority women.  
Minority women may view majority women’s issues as ‘luxury problems’. 
 
The highlighting of ‘difference’, is pointed out by Uma Narayan (1997).  She writes 
that phenomena that seem ‘Different’, ‘Alien’, and ‘Other’, like female genital 
mutilation, cross borders more easily than problems that seem more ‘familiar’ in an 
Western context.  These issues then become ‘Third World gender issues’ and 
receive a lot of attention (ibid.: 100).   
 
‘Solidarity is to lead the way’ 
An interviewee from another majority women’s organisation does not consider the 
lack of co-operation with minority women’s organisations to be a problem.  What is 
considered to be a problem though, is the criticism from minority women’s 
organisations that Norwegian feminist organisations do not include ‘black women’: 
 
‘Solidarity is to lead the way, to show that structural change is possible.  (…) So 
don’t say that we [Norwegian women] have to stop demanding more because 
Somali or Pakistani women are victims of repression by the family or by imams.  
(…) The reason why they [migrant women] are disadvantaged is that they have 
a different family culture, a different suppression and cultural expectations to 
how they should live their lives and what choices they can take.  So yes, I am in 
favour of them making their own [organisations].  But not in order to criticise us.’ 
 
According to this respondent, her organisation does not co-operate with minority 
women’s organisations because there are no relevant co-operation partners.  In her 
view, most minority women’s organisations are not political organisations, and the 
minority culture is the problem.  She argues that minority women have to fight their 
own battle against cultures in which women are oppressed.  In her view, ‘sister 
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solidarity’ is to lead the way and show other women that it is possible to make 
change in society. 
 
In general this organisation wants structural change in society, and the interviewee 
mentions several important issues the feminist movement has fought for; for instance 
the right to abortion, paid maternity leave, criminalising the buyers of sex acts, equal 
pay and pensions, and Women’s Shelters.  The respondent politically disagrees with 
minority women who claim that racism has to be included in a feminist agenda: 
 
‘In my opinion class is more important than for example race.  (…) there are 
only two universal bases of discrimination; one is class, the other is gender.’ 
 
According to this interviewee, to be a woman justifies a separate organisation; 
regardless of class, ethnicity and sexual orientation.  ‘Women’ as a category is 
overall a more important category than being an ethnic minority.  An underlying 
assumption in this interview is that structural problems are the main problem for 
women’s liberation and gender equality in Norway, while oppression of ethnic 
minority women is due to a different family culture and different expectations of girls 
within their ethnic community.  Violence against minority women is explained by 
‘cultural’ factors, while violence against majority women is explained by ‘structural’ 
factors.  The assumption that minority women are not oppressed by the Norwegian 
society at large, but by the culture within their ethnic community, is taken for granted. 
 
This understanding illustrates what Narayan (1997: 51) calls ‘blaming culture’ for 
problems in Third-World contexts and communities.  Narayan (ibid.: 60) claims that 
the concepts of ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, and ‘religion’ are often unproblematised and 
understandings of them are often simplistic, ahistorical, and apolitical.  She also 
points to the fact that ‘cultural explanations’ are used to explain violence against 
Third-World women, but such explanations are not used in order to understand 
violence against Western women.  There is a tendency to use ‘culture’ to explain 
problems in minority communities, but that is seldom used as explanation for similar 
problems within majority communities (ibid. 84-87). 
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6.2.8 Representation of feminism and of men in minority women’s 
organisations  
 
‘I’m not a feminist.  I’m not against men.’ 
 
One of the interviewees from a minority woman’s organisation said this about 
feminism: 
 
‘I am not a feminist.  I am not against men, for example.  I don’t think that all 
women and men are alike.  There are women and men who are modern, and 
there are women and men who are very conservative.  (…) feminists, they think 
that women have to do it [fight for women’s rights], women and only women.  I 
don’t think that is a good idea.  It’s not.  Women and men have to fight together.  
Otherwise there will not be gender equality, and that is what I’m concerned 
with.’ 
 
This interviewee clearly states that she herself and the organisation are not 
‘feminist’. 
 
She also emphasises that there is a big difference between the Norwegian feminist 
organisations she is referring to and the minority organisation she is a member of in 
the way that they see men’s role.  Norwegian feminists are ‘against men’ and think 
that only women can work together to improve women’s situation.  This resembles 
the welcoming of men by black women’s organisations in Britain (Sudbury, 1998).  
The exclusion of men was seen as an aspect of white women’s organisations from 
which black women wanted to distance themselves.  Distancing themselves from the 
label ‘feminist’ can also be interpreted as a kind of resistance against majority 
feminist organisations, and an expression of the experience they have had with a 
lack of interest from feminist organisations.   
 
One of the interviewees from another minority women’s organisation says that there 
is still not 100 per cent gender equality in the Norwegian society, and her wish is that 
both majority and minority women’s organisation could work together to accomplish 
that.  She mentions equal pay and equal representation in politics.  The minority 
organisation usually participates on March 8 every year (“it’s a tradition”).  This 
interviewee states that they support the same claims as majority women’s 
organisations.  However, she emphasises that the organisation is not feminist.   
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Some members may call themselves feminists, while others do not, but the 
organisation, as such, is not feminist.  Then she goes on by saying ‘we do have 
families’.  This implies that a feminist is a single woman, maybe a lesbian, and 
‘feminist’ in this view seems to be a negative label.  A similar view is expressed by a 
respondent from another minority women’s organisation: 
 
C: ‘But what do you think the concept ‘feminist’ means?’ 
Interviewee: ‘It’s a bit difficult to say.  The way I see it is to be independent, to 
have the same opportunities.  But to go around and saying I’m a ‘feminist’ … I 
don’t want to be a ‘macho woman’, if you see what I mean?  I don’t want to be 
a ‘macho woman’ like that.  That’s why I’m thinking ...  the concept ‘feminist’ 
has gotten a label; if you’re a ‘feminist’ you want to be the boss and so on.  
But it’s not like that; it is to have the same opportunities.  We are human 
beings first and foremost.  God created a man and a woman and we have 
different roles actually.’ 
 
This interviewee does not call herself a feminist.  She thinks it’s important for men 
and women to have the same rights and opportunities to get an education, a job and 
to share the domestic work.  The interviewee understands black feminism in the US 
and UK as different from black feminism in Norway.  She can relate to black 
feminism in the US where black women also fought for their men because they were 
repressed.  In her opinion black feminism is not visible in Norway, and she thinks the 
time is not ripe. 
 
Black feminism marginalised in the women’s movement 
According to an interviewee from another minority women’s organisation, black 
feminism and desi34-feminism are marginalised by the white women’s movement and 
exist in the periphery.  Black feminism is a political consciousness and leads to a 
political engagement with an anti-racist feminist perspective in the fight for women’s 
rights: 
 
‘(…) we’ve had some immense discussions here [in our organisation] among 
minority women about definitions.  One of the reasons why we most often use 
minority women instead of “Black” women are because it is sort of a 
consensus concept.  (…) “Black” is a political concept, it’s a political 
consciousness.  (…) When an Anti Racist movement was established in 
Norway that definition was used clearly political.  Today however, things are 
different; there are no movements.  Today you work for “integration” or 
                                            
34 ‘Desi’ is concept used about south Asians living outside Asia. 
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“inclusion” or whatever you call it, these concepts change.  When you work as 
a professional it is your job and you don’t have these clear political definitions.  
(…) [In our organisation] we discuss these things all the time.  Lately it’s been 
desi-feminism.    
 
In her view, the norm for being a feminist in Norway is an ethnic white Norwegian 
woman.  She thinks it is important to acknowledge minority women’s work against, 
for instance, forced marriages and the three year rule.  After these issues are put on 
the agenda, all women should include these issues in their fight for women’s rights: 
 
‘(…) For us it is important to put these issues on the agenda.  However, when 
we have put it on the agenda, others have to take responsibility because 
minority women’s battle is not only minority women’s battle.  Gender 
discrimination is every woman’s battle and responsibility.  So in our opinion 
Norwegian women’s organisations have the same responsibility in fighting 
against the Immigration Act [utlendingsloven] which discriminates women or 
minority women.’ 
 
A major problem today, according to this interviewee, is the lack of a strong women’s 
movement which could have put pressure on these issues.  Today, work with ‘ethnic 
minority women’s issues’ is done by an ‘ethnic industry’ and it is based on short-term 
and project-based work.  She claims that the main actors in the field of ‘ethnic 
industry’ are professional organisations working for ‘integration’ or ‘inclusion’.   
 
According to the interviewee, majority women are not only discriminated in the work 
place because they are women, but also because they are minorities and black.  She 
claims that both racism and sexism are structural phenomena, not only cultural 
phenomena.  This interviewee wants to widen the way violence against women is 
understood in Norwegian society, and include for instance forced marriages.  She 
wants to include ‘minority women’s issues’ in the larger definition of ‘women’s 
issues’, and to include the fight against racism within the definition of women’s 
issues and make a connection between racism and feminism. 
 
6.2.9 Representation of feminism and of men by majority women’s 
organisations 
Majority feminists have different responses to the claims of widening the feminist 
agenda and include work against honour-related violence, ethnic discrimination and 
racism.  Racism and ethnic discrimination are not women’s issues, is one 
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assumption voiced by a majority activist.  Other organisations work with issues which 
are relevant for minority women and the interviewee mentions, for instance, the 
Women’s Shelter movement and SOS Racism (SOS Rasisme).  The respondent’s 
organisation does not work with issues related to ethnic and religious discrimination, 
and considers these to be different issues.  Women’s issues are represented as 
different issues than anti-racism.   
 
Feminist issues represented as ‘political’ versus ethnic minority issues represented 
as ‘cultural’. 
 
Yet another view on feminism in relation to minority women’s issues is illustrated by 
an interviewee from another majority women’s organisation.  She emphasises the 
importance of opening up the space for various feminisms in plural, to enable 
different kinds of activism.  However, this interviewee argues that most minority 
women’s organisations in Norway - with a few exceptions - do not have a feminist 
agenda: 
 
‘It’s fine [to open up different kinds of feminism].  (…) but they [most migrant 
women] have special issues connected to their own ethnicity, being ethnic 
minorities.  It is not connected to society at large.  If you are a Pakistani or an 
Indian migrant girl it is probably harder than being Norwegian.  But for the most 
part that is not because of how the society at large is treating them, it is mainly 
due to how they are treated by their families.’   
 
The underlying assumption here seems to be that ‘cultural issues’ which minority 
women have to deal with are not considered to be feminist issues.  In this quote 
‘cultural issues’ are represented differently than ‘feminist issues’.  The framing of 
minority violence as ‘cultural violence’ and violence against majority women as 
‘domestic violence’ has been addressed by Bredal (2007).  She argues that more 
general, societal explanations are used to explain majority violence, whereas 
minority violence is simply explained by ‘culture’. 
 
The interviewee also thinks that minority women themselves have to fight against 
minority culture which discriminates women: 
 
‘Liberation has to be your own doing.  We are a feminist organisation in 
Norway.  Yes, we have become a more or less homogeneous society, and I 
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don’t mind that.  But I still live in Norway and we are a Norwegian organisation, 
not for Norwegians, but for all sorts of feminists.  They [some migrant women] 
are not feminists of our kind, and we cannot make organisations for them.’ 
 
What seems to be unproblematised in this representation of ‘feminist issues’ versus 
‘cultural issues’ is that the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’ does not seem to 
apply to minority women who deal with gender discrimination due to ‘a different 
family culture’.  However, oppression of women in ethnic minority families, is within 
this representation, not considered to be structural oppression.  According to the 
interviewee, there is a sharp division between the politically engaged minority 
women and those minority women who are more into ‘culture’ and cooking ‘ethnic’ 
food.  This distinction is probably a bit exaggerated by the interviewee in order to 
stress the point that the former category has a feminist political agenda regardless of 
ethnic background or colour, whereas the latter category does not have a feminist 
political agenda.  However, this representation of ethnic Norwegian feminists and a 
few minority feminist women as politically engaged and other minority women as 
merely interested in cooking, constitute the former category as politically conscious 
women and the latter category as unconscious housewives.  To be a feminist is in 
this view similar to acting politically in a certain way (‘we go out aggressively and 
tough and that is how we open up room for others (...)’, ‘we are often furious, but we 
never whine’).   
 
Norwegian feminist (and some minority feminists) are constituted as active in this 
way of representation ‘feminism’, whereas minority women with a different agenda 
are constituted as passive.  However, minority women are responsible for putting 
themselves in that victim position since that is part of their political strategy.  The 
interviewee is also making a distinction between volunteer and democratic grass-
roots activism on one side, and actors who are paid by the state on the other.  
Organisations who receive a lot of money from the state and people who are paid to 
work for these organisations are seen as less nuanced and less independent, 
compared to grass-roots organisations based on volunteer work and democratic 
principles.   
 
The interviewee also thinks black feminism is dividing the feminist movement in 
Norway. 
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‘In my opinion, feminism is feminism.  It is on the basis of gender.  It is the same 
discussion we had in relation to middle class feminism and working class 
feminism.  (…) it is dividing and it is wrong.  I mean that in regard to class and 
in regard to ethnicity.  (…) to be a woman is more important than to be black.’ 
 
Black feminism is considered to be academic and American/British, in contrast to this 
‘grass-roots’ organisation.  However, in her view, Norway has a different history to 
the US, and there is no structural racial discrimination in Norway. 
 
To sum up: Norwegian ‘grass-roots’ feminism is described as tough and aggressive 
and as open for different forms of feminist activism and identity.  However, a line 
seems to be drawn in regard to ethnicity; discrimination because of ethnicity/race 
seems to be excluded as a part of the feminist agenda within this representation of 
feminism.  Racism and ethnic discrimination is viewed as ‘special interests’, and 
‘black feminism’ is considered dividing in a Norwegian context. 
 
6.2.10 Representations of religion 
 
Minority women’s organisations and religion 
The link between religion and women’s rights was brought up by several of the 
interviewee’s in relation to minority/majority relations and the representation of 
‘women’s issues’.  However, the view of religion in relation to women’s rights differed 
significantly among the interviewees.   
 
Gender equality and recognition of religion as competing or compatible claims: 
 
‘I think we have a lot of discrimination because of that religion [Islam].  We 
fight against that.  We don’t tell a woman that she can’t be religious, but in my 
opinion a women can’t be equal within that religion because it is oppressing 
women.  Men have the power, women don’t (…).  So I am totally against 
religion - not only Islam, but all religions because they don’t promote women’s 
rights.’ 
 
This interviewee from a minority women’s organisation considers women’s rights 
more important than the recognition of religion and regards the struggle for women’s 
liberation as also a struggle against religion.  She’s addressing the tension between 
claims of minority cultures or religions and the norm of gender equality which Susan 
Moller Okin (1999) refers to, and like Okin, she sees gender equality and recognition 
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of religion as competing claims.  Her organisation is especially focusing on honour-
related violence both in her country of origin and in Norway; problems that women 
are facing as a ‘minority within a minority’ in a Norwegian context.  In her view 
‘modern’ women have to ally with ‘modern’ men within the minority community 
against the ‘conservative’ men and women within the same community.  This 
perspective can be interpreted within what is called minorities within minorities 
problem in normative political theory; the way groups can oppress internal minorities, 
in this case women, and the risk that policies of multiculturalism will reinforce power 
inequalities within groups (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005).   
 
A very different view is voiced by an interviewee from another minority organisation: 
 
‘(…) we’ve had a Quran group where the women have learned about rights.  
(...) we had this woman here who is highly educated in the Quran and she 
taught them about health and general knowledge, and about women’s rights.  
And the women also learned Norwegian, and they evolved, and they started to 
apply for jobs and different projects (…)’ 
 
This interviewee emphasises the connection between Islam and women’s rights, and 
does not consider religion and women’s rights to be contradictory.  On the contrary, 
she argues that increased knowledge about the Quran will make women aware of 
their rights and, subsequently, empower minority women.  The minority women’s 
organisation, of which she is a member, works against female genital mutilation 
(FGM), and they make a distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ by arguing that 
FGM is a cultural tradition, and it is not required by Islam. 
 
The different quotes above illustrate different views among minority women 
regarding religion and women’s rights, and underscore that the category minority 
women’s organisations is a very diverse category.   
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Majority women’s organisations: Religion as a difficult issue 
Several of the interviewees from majority organisations mentioned ‘religion’ as one 
aspect that makes co-operation between majority and minority’ organisations 
difficult: 
 
‘We [majority and minority women] sort of have different point of views; what 
are ‘women’s issues’?  What is important?  (…) both in regard to kindergartens 
and work, and in regard to religion and religious garments.  I think there can be 
different points of view regarding those kinds of things, both among Norwegians 
and internally in the migrant associations.  So … that makes it difficult.  (…)’ 
 
Religion is regarded as a ‘difficult’ issue, and some of the interviewees also found 
this issue difficult to talk about.  Another interviewee addressed the difficult balance 
between religion and oppression of women: 
 
‘There is a balance between religion and oppression of women.  (…) Some of 
the minority women’s organisations who have contacted us are very strongly 
against Islam.  They argued against hijab and wanted to forbid hijab.  This view 
was hard to accept for many in my organisation.  (…) [Some in my organisation] 
view Islam as anti-imperialistic (…)’ 
 
This interviewee expresses a difficult balance between respecting religion and the 
concern about women’s subordination in ethnic minority communities.  However, 
here the problem is not that the minority women are religious, but rather that they are 
very anti-religious.   
 
Different views on religion in relation to women’s issues among minority women’s 
organisations seem to make religion a cause for confusion and disagreement for 
some of the majority women’s organisations.  There are also different views within 
the majority organisations.   
 
6.2.11 Different representations of ‘women’s issues’  
Our analysis of the interviews indicate a major difference - despite differences within 
both categories on how they talk about co-operation or the lack thereof - between 
majority and minority women’s organisations in their representations of ‘women’s 
issues’.  Minority organisations emphasise ethnic discrimination, especially in the 
labour market, as an issue within the definition of ‘women’s issues’ (some call it 
‘double discrimination’).  This representation addresses the intersection of racism 
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and sexism in minoritised women’s lives (Crenshaw, 1991).  The similarities between 
majoritised and minoritised women - the common challenges they face as ‘women’ - 
are emphasised.  However, minoritised women also have to face discrimination in 
the workplace and in other parts of society because they are women and minoritised.   
 
A common theme in the minority interviews was the wish to widen the agenda of the 
women’s movement, and include issues like ethnic discrimination in the labour 
market and issues related to violence against ‘minority’ women.  These 
representations of ‘women’s issues’ challenged an ‘either/or’ rhetoric, where racism 
is viewed against sexism.  The majority women’s organisations on the other hand, 
regard ethnic discrimination and racism as ‘different’ issues from ‘women’s issues’ - 
and they are not included in the way they represent ‘women’s issues’.  Racism and 
ethnic discrimination is not included in the way ‘women’s issues’ are understood.   
 
Some majority interviewees claimed that there is a division of labour among the 
voluntary organisations.  This can be interpreted as a practical concern due to lack of 
resources, but it can also be interpreted as an exclusion of ethnic discrimination as a 
‘women’s issue’.  In some of the interviews with majority activists, there is a 
representation of categories such as ‘gender’, ‘race’ and ‘class’ as different, and 
even competing categories.  These categories are also ranked, and ‘gender’ is 
viewed as a more basic category than both ‘class’ and ‘race’.  One assumption 
among some of the majority respondents is that minority women are not interested in 
‘women’s issues’, meaning issues particularly from a women’s perspective.  This 
implies that ‘women’ is defined as ethnic Norwegian women, and here whiteness is 
treated as an ‘unmarked category’ (Ferree and Meuller, 2007: 580 with reference to 
Hull et al., 1982; Spelman, 1988; Collins, 1990).  In the interviews with majority 
respondents, ethnicity is silenced, and when asked specifically about ethnic 
discrimination, for instance, there was a tendency to exclude this issue in relation to 
women’s issues.  The representations illustrate an ‘either/or’ logic where ‘gender’ 
and ‘ethnicity’ are seen as mutually exclusive. 
 
6.2.12 ‘Minority Violence’ - ‘Cultural’ or ‘Structural’ Violence? 
There are divergent representations of ‘minority violence’ in the interviews.  One 
representation is that minority violence is ‘special’ and explained by ‘minority culture’.  
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An underlying assumption here is that structural problems are the main problem for 
women’s liberation in a Norwegian context, while oppression of migrant women is 
due to a different family culture and different expectations of girls within their ethnic 
community.  Another assumption in this representation is that minority women are 
not oppressed by Norwegian society at large, but by the culture of their ethnic 
community.  The fight against racism and ethnic discrimination is not included in the 
way ‘women’s issues’ are represented.  One of the discursive effects of this 
representation is that violence against minority women is not included in the feminist 
struggle.   
 
This representation is in line with much of the media coverage of ‘honour killings’, 
where this violence is described as ‘cultural’, whereas cases where ethnic 
Norwegian men kill their wives are called ‘family tragedies’.  In this representation, 
majority violence against women is linked to gender, power and ‘structure’, while 
minority violence against women is linked to ‘culture’ (Bredal, 2007).  Issues like 
female genital mutilation lose their contextual nuance, and become some form of 
violence against women ‘caused by culture’, rather than linked to domestic violence 
as such (Narayan, 1997: 103).  It is a tendency to use ‘culture’ to explain problems in 
minority communities, but that is seldom used as explanation for similar problems 
within majority communities (Narayan, 1997: 84-87). 
 
Other representations in our data material challenge this ‘culturalisation’ of minority 
violence, and claim that both racism and sexism are structural phenomena, not only 
cultural phenomena.  In this representation ‘violence against women’ in Norwegian 
society can include forced marriages, for instance.  There is a divergence between 
the way interviewees from majority and minority women’s organisations represent 
this issue.  However, the different problem representations do not follow this majority 
- minority divide in all the interviews.  In some of the interviews with respondents 
from majority women’s organisations, honour killing and forced marriages-so-called 
‘minority violence’ - is represented to be a ‘structural’ problem due to ‘oppressive 
patriarchal structures in migrant communities’.  Here violence by minority men is also 
connected to ‘structural discrimination’ by the majority society. 
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The categories ‘gender’ and majority/minority intersect, and different meanings of the 
category ‘men’ are produced, with different effects.  Hence, when women are victims 
of violence by majority men, this is viewed as a traditional feminist issue where 
patriarchal structures, are to blame.  However, when women are victims of violence 
by minority men, this complicates the issue.  Patriarchal structures are still to blame, 
but by criticising migrant men, who themselves are victims of ethnic discrimination, 
this criticism can lead to further discrimination against ethnic minorities.  The effect of 
this problem representation is that minority violence is labelled as ‘difficult’, and this 
may lead to passivity and a fear of dealing with these issues. 
 
6.2.13 Feminism as a contested concept 
Several of the minority interviewees were reluctant or even opposed to calling 
themselves or their organisation ‘feminist’.  They were very much in favour of gender 
equality, and emphasised the great opportunities for women in Norway.  Some also 
wanted more collaboration with majority women’s organisations with regards to 
achieving a gender equal society and a widening of the feminist agenda.  However, 
many distanced themselves from the label ‘feminist’ because the concept in their 
opinion, has a negative connotation.  ‘Feminist’ was viewed as being ‘against men’ 
and ‘anti-family’; a negative kind of femaleness.  Some of the minority interviewees 
also emphasised that even if men and women should have the same rights and 
opportunities, men and women also have different roles in the family in their country 
of origin, for instance in relation to the upbringing of children.  This can be interpreted 
as a different view on gender roles and a more complimentary family model.  
However, as pointed to earlier in the chapter, the public understanding of feminists 
as “man-haters” has not been unusual among the majority population in Europe, and 
also found in countries like Finland and West Germany (Bergman, 2004: 28).  In 
several European countries, many of those who are in favour of gender equality 
resist the label ‘feminist’ (Lovenduski, 1997, in Bergman, 2004: 28).   
 
Another representation in the interviews with minority women’s organisations is of 
black feminism as marginalised in the Norwegian women’s movement.  The concept 
of ‘black feminism’ is linked to an anti-racist feminist perspective and the 
intersections of racism and sexism (see Crenshaw, 1991).  ‘Black feminism’ and 
‘desi-feminism’ are represented to be in the periphery, whereas ‘white feminism’ is in 
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the centre.  This centre-periphery metaphor represents a picture of majoritised 
women as the norm for being feminist and also for being a woman in a Norwegian 
context. 
 
Some of the interviews with majority women’s organisations illustrate a 
representation of Norwegian feminism as inclusive to a certain extent, but there is a 
divide between ‘feminists of our kind’ and ‘most migrant women’.  In this 
representation there is an underlying understanding of feminist issues as ‘political’ 
and minority women’s issue as ‘cultural’.  One of the interviewees argued that there 
is no relevant co-operation between majority and minority partners because most 
minority women’s organisations are not feminist but they are political organisations. 
 
The feminist struggle to expand the definition of the ‘political’ in order to include all 
the so-called ‘private’ and ‘personal’ issues, such as violence against women (Verloo 
and Lombardo, 2007: 28), is left out of this representation.  The discursive effect is 
that there seems to be a line drawn with regards to ethnicity; discrimination because 
of ethnicity/‘race’ seems to be excluded from the feminist agenda within this 
representation of feminism.  Racism and ethnic discrimination are viewed as ‘special 
interests’, and ‘black feminism’ is considered divisive in a Norwegian context. 
 
As we have seen in this chapter, the response from majority feminists to the claim of 
widening the feminist agenda differs.  Some interviewees from majority women’s 
organisations were positive about this claim, but found it very difficult to address 
minority women’s issues. 
 
6.2.14 ‘Different’ and ‘Difficult’ issues 
A common assumption by the majority interviewees was that minority women have 
‘different interests’.  This emphasis on ‘difference’ is very evident in the interview 
material, and this ‘difference’ is used either to explain the lack of co-operation or it is 
a sort of underlying assumption throughout the interviews.  The many different 
representations in the data material clearly indicate that there are a lot of different 
views among minority women, but the important thing here is that this ‘difference’ 
seems to be understood as ‘difficult’ and confusing.  Maybe the ‘hypervisibility’ in the 
media of issues like forced marriages and female genital mutilation linked to ethnic 
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‘minorities’ (Bredal, 2007: 60) have exaggerated the image of minority women as 
‘different’.   
 
The majority respondents also express a fear of being perceived as in-tolerant, racist 
and contributing further to the stigmatisation of migrants in Norway.  It was argued 
that it is ‘difficult’ to state that forced marriages (and so on) are actual problems 
among ethnic ‘minorities’ without saying that migrants themselves are a problem.  
There seems to be a lack of an appropriate language to talk about these intertwined 
complex issues:  either you are tolerant regarding other religions and cultures, or you 
are in-tolerant, see other cultures and religions as threats to Western democracy and 
‘our values’.  The lived effects that are produced by this representation of minority 
women’s issues as ‘different’ and ‘difficult’ suggest that there probably won’t be any 
alliances with certain ethnic minority women’s organisations.  The assumptions that 
underlie the identified problem representation are firstly, that the view on Islam is too 
different and secondly, the fear of being perceived as intolerant and racist.  We see 
the link here to the discourse of being ‘decent’ in a Norwegian context (see 
Hagelund, 2003, and Chapter 2 and 6A). 
 
6.2.15 Summary remarks about the Norwegian case 
 
Improved relations 
Four decades have passed since migrant feminists began to formally organise in 
Norway, and three decades since Sami feminists organised.  Obviously, the political 
institutions and discourses related to feminism and anti-racism/gender and ethnic 
discrimination have changed considerably since then.  The effects of women’s social 
protest are difficult to assess, but there is a definite message about improved 
relationships between majority and minority feminists within the interviews with 
activists from the 1970s and ‘80s.  The representations of majority and migrant 
feminists alike emphasise a general trend from misrecognition,35 anger and irritation  
 
 
                                            
35 The concept ’misrecognition’ is used by Nancy Fraser, for example Fraser 2003. 
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towards more respect, understanding and trust.  One minority feminists put it this 
way: 
 
‘Yes, well, everything is positive.  Everything is much more open, there are 
more kinds of discussions and all this fuss about the women’s movement is 
over, you know.  Now, I don’t know what is going on in the movement now, 
but there are more kinds of expressions.  There are no more struggles, but 
there are many different voices articulated by various groups at different 
times, a plurality of standpoints and voices.  Even now with the trafficking and 
all, well, it is acceptable to have different opinions.  And one may think from 
different perspectives.  Then there is this totally new generation of young 
women, if we talk about this group which is in the media and everywhere … 
There are other dynamics, and they create a different society in the context 
and forms the different struggles take.  Maybe this weakens in a way, but I 
don’t think so.’ 
 
There has been a growing concern with issues related to migrant women within a 
number of majority women’s organisations, in particular the claim for independent 
status for migrant women, and also a more inclusive approach to gender violence. 
 
The basic question of racism and feminism as intersecting issues has not been 
appropriated by majority organisations in general. However, including issues related 
to discrimination in the labour market, the white feminist movement is, from time to 
time, publicly accused of neglecting migrant women’s issues.   
 
The interactions between majority and minority women’s organisations have 
necessarily increased in number and frequency since more organisations of and for 
ethnic minority women have been established.  FOKUS constitutes an important 
meeting place, but several interviewees claimed that there are fewer institutionalized 
meeting places now compared to the 1980s.  The interactions have been more 
constructive and productive, in the eyes of these informants, on both sides of the 
ethnic divide. 
 
Several issues contribute to improved relations, indicated by this interviewee quoted 
above: a more open atmosphere and the plurality of voices today compared to the 
previous policing of understandings; a new generation of women and a new context.  
We have identified strategic framings which have allowed for joint actions across 
ethic divides, such as the TV campaigns in 1989 and 2005 (see Country Report 
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Norway Chapter 2), and the NGO comments to Norway’s reports to the CEDAW 
committee (see Country Report Norway Appendix B).  The three NGO’s commenting 
on Norway’s 1994-97 CEDAW report (one minority and two majority women’s 
organisations) all addressed the problem of migrant women’s dependent status on 
their husbands (the three year rule).  In 1997, moreover, women NGO’s were able, 
for the first time, to make a proper shadow report.36  The authors were FOKUS, the 
Norwegian Women’s Rights Association, the Women’s Front and Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom.  Matters concerning violence against 
women constituted important parts of the NGOs’ critique of the Norwegian CEDAW 
report.  They called for:  
 
“A holistic strategy and a nation-wide competence and action centre are 
required to address gender based violence in all its forms (physical and 
physiological abuse, forced marriage, sexual harassment, rape, forced marriage 
(sic) and femicide).  The purchase of sexual services should be banned by law 
(…).  Programmes are needed to educate young men about gender 
stereotypes, gender roles, violence against women and prostitution as a means 
of preventing men from buying sex and becoming perpetrators of sexual 
violence.” 
 
There are exceptions from this discourse of improvements, however.  Most 
importantly with respect to the representation of the relations of Sami feminism to 
majority feminism, in which even a setback is37 outlined concerning FOKUS and the 
funding guidelines.  The seeds of co-operation between Sami and migrant feminist 
organisations mentioned by the interviewee compensates for this to some extent, 
however.  We also want to draw attention to the ‘absent relations’ between majority 
and minority women’s organisations in certain local contexts with a very small or 
non/existent ethnic minority population.   
 
The growing migrant population has had an impact on the organisational landscape, 
with a large number of new migrant organisations, gender mixed or women’s only.  
The constituency - if not the leadership - of previous ‘ethnic Norwegian only’ 
organisations has gradually become more ethnically mixed, and so have their aims.  
The general picture is rather mixed, however.  On the one hand, the migration 
                                            
36 Shadow report to CEDAW 7/2007.   
http://www.fokuskvinner.no/484/Norwegian_NGO_Shadow_report_to_CEDAW.pdf 
37 http://www.ldo.no/en-gb/TopMenu/Current/Forside/The-Equality-and-Anti-discrimination-Ombud-/ 
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policies from the late 1980s, contributed to a certain upgrading of gender equality 
when ‘democracy, gender equality and the rights of children’ were claimed to be 
fundamental Norwegian values (see Chapter 2 in Country Report Norway).  The 
attacks on the Twin Towers in New York 2001 reinforced the embrace of gender 
equality, but also supported a new equality discourse: patriarchy and the oppression 
of women mainly relates to ‘the others’, to the migrants, while the ethnic Norwegian 
society is perceived to be quite equal in gender terms.  The adoption of separate 
legal regulations in areas directly related to migrant people, such as the 1995 ban on 
female genital mutilation, and forced marriages in 2006, also reinforce discourses of 
separate gender cultures according to ethnicity (see Country Report Norway, 
Appendix B).  The majority feminist organisations were not invited to comment on the 
three proposals particularly addressing ‘immigrant women’s issues’ included in our 
mapping.  This indicates a divided consultation structure which may increase rather 
than decrease the probability of co-operation between women’s organisations across 
the ethnic divide (see also Skjeie and Teigen, 2007).  The majority women’s 
organisations are conspicuous by their absence also among those who actually 
provide comments, with the important exceptions of The Administration of Women’s 
Shelters and Legal Advice for Women.  These two women’s organisations obviously 
contribute to bridging the gaps, but neither of them are ordinary member-based 
voluntary organisations. 
 
On the other hand, a broad intersectional approach to equality was formally 
introduced in 2006 when the Gender Equality Ombud was replaced by the Equality 
and Anti-Discrimination Ombud (see Chapter 2).  It is too early to know if this new 
opportunity structure will impact the extent of co-operation between majority and 
minority women and their organisations.  Interviews with contemporary activists do 
indicate, however, a number of discursive obstacles; the talk about majority/minority 
co-operation or alliances, as we will elaborate in the final section. 
 
One possible effect of the representations of ‘women’s issues’, ‘minority violence’, 
‘feminism and men’ and ‘religion’ is that co-operation and strategic alliances between 
majority and minority women’s organisations are not likely to take place more often 
than hitherto.  Unless the discourse is challenged and a new ‘language’ is adopted, 
the discursive opportunity structure is unfavourable.  A number of majority women’s 
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organisations do not know how to handle the difficult balance between the 
recognition of religion and the concern about women’s subordination, so they end up 
doing nothing.  This passivity and dilemma is addressed by Phillips (2007) when she 
writes that feminism has ‘become prone to paralysis by cultural difference, with 
anxieties about cultural imperialism engendering a kind of relativism that made it 
difficult to represent any belief or practice as oppressive to women or at odds with 
gender equality’ (Phillips, 2007: 1).   
 
6.3 The Case of Spain 
 
In this section we focus on how selected women’s organisations in Spain have 
framed their struggle, particularly in relation to gender violence.  The chapter is 
based on qualitative interviews with 16 women activists in Madrid and Barcelona, 
and five civil servants.  We explore how the ethnic majority, mixed and minority 
women’s organisations38 relate to each other, with a particular focus on their struggle 
against violence against women.  How do majoritised and minoritised women’s 
organisations assess each other; how do they design, develop and implement 
policies against violence against women; and how do they position themselves in 
relation to various ethnic groups of women who use their services?  Also, the 
Spanish case study explores the question of integration of migrant and ethnic 
minority women’s issues within the Spanish women’s movement.  The report is 
based on interviews with selected minority women groups from Latin America, Africa 
as well as groups representing Spanish Romani39 women.  The interviewed 
organisations are located in Madrid and Barcelona. 
 
Before elaborating the interviews, we want to mention that the term ‘ethnic minority 
woman’ - a framing introduced by the research team - was not well received by the 
interviewees.  Our respondents argued that it did not capture the variety between 
                                            
38 The categorisation of selected organisations is described in the Spanish country report, Appendix 
A. 
39 In relation to the Romani people, our interviewees used the term ‘Gypsy’.  We have retained this 
usage when interviewees’ statements are quoted or when government institutions or voluntary 
organisations using the term ‘Gypsy’ in their names are referred to in our report, but otherwise we use 
the term ‘Romani’ (see Hancock 2002: xviii).  See Country Report Spain for more discussion about 
the terms used. 
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minorities living in Spain for generations and the new immigrants.  Neither did it 
distinguish between migrants who are native Spanish-speakers and those who are 
not, nor different legal categories of migrants such as refugees, legal residents and 
undocumented migrants; economically independent women or women dependent on 
their husbands after family reunification.  Also worth noting is that the interviewees 
always referred to Romani people as ‘gypsy’, a term widely used in Spain even by 
the Romani themselves. 
 
6.3.1 Ethnic minority women’s organising 
Immigration to Spain changed dramatically between 1980 and 2007.  There was a 
ten-fold rise in the foreign born population legally residing in Spain from 180,000 in 
1980 to about 4,5 million in 2007 (www.oecd.org).  During the same period, the 
national background of the migrants also changed.  Moroccans, traditionally the 
largest migrant community, were overtaken by migrant groups from Latin America 
and more recently from Eastern Europe (Romanians and Bulgarians).  The Romani 
population in Spain was affected, with the arrival of other Romani groups such as 
those from East European countries.  Generally, a new dynamic of 
inclusion/exclusion occurred, and citizenship issues related to integration, 
recognition and participation became urgent - in the women’s movement too.   
 
The women’s movement in Spain had a fresh start after the fall of the Franco regime 
in 1975 and the reintroduction of freedom of associations.  A number of autonomous 
feminist groups (colectivos) (Lafuente, 2002: 664) and feminist groups affiliated with 
political parties on the left were established in the years immediately after 1975. 
 
When ethnic minority women began to organise, they were attached to various 
ethnic minority organisations, and then they began to form women’s sections in order 
to have their own voice inside the organisations.  The first independent ethnic 
minority women’s organisations were set up in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and 
include Romi Serseni, an association of Spanish Romani women established in 
Grenada in 1990 and in Madrid in 1991, and Vomade-Vencit, an association of 
immigrant Dominican women established informally in 1989 and formally in 1992.  
Among the first ethnically mixed organisations for women were Ca La Dona, 
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established in Barcelona in 1988, and Association Women Opanel, established in 
Madrid in 1991. 
 
Ethnic minority women of various backgrounds have also been known to gather on a 
more informal basis, often through activities apparently not connected to feminist 
issues.  Such gatherings are not explored in this report, but they need to be taken 
into consideration for a more comprehensive inclusion of minority women’s issues 
within the broader feminist debate.   
 
The Women’s Institute (1983) provided financial support for voluntary organisations.  
According to a publication from the Women’s Institute, there were 1300 diverse 
women's associations and groups at the beginning of the 1990s in Spain.  Sixty 
described themselves as national, 20 as professional (Lafuente, 2002: 668).  
Unfortunately, we have not been able to identify a similar overview of women’s 
organisations in Spain to-day.40   
 
State support for establishing women’s organisations was also introduced by the 
socialist government in the Third National Equality Plan (1997-2000).41  The general 
trend during the previous conservative government (1996-2004), however, was to 
cut substantially - in particular for developing new organisations - and to grant more 
substantial funds to fewer organisations.  Under the current socialist government 
(Zapatero, Socialist Party) women’s organisations, including ethnic minority women’s 
organisations, receive more public funding:  
 
‘Other ethnic minority respondents also recognised that the current socialist 
government has taken a more active approach to women’s organisations, by 
inviting them to participate in political processes and the delivery of public 
services, and by providing public funding for various parts of their operations.’  
 
6.3.2 Framing ‘the problem’ – majority perspectives 
Contrary to migrant and ethnic minority women’s efforts to organise and the actual 
existence of a number of ethnic minority women’s organisations, ethnic majority 
                                            
40 The most comprehensive list we found, and based our selection of organisations on, was the list 
provided by the Spanish Co-ordinator of the EWLobby http://www.celem.org/conoce_quien.asp 
41 The National Action Plan followed the UN Beijing Women’s Conference recommendations, see our 
Country report from Spain, Appendix B: 11. 
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respondents focused the ‘un-readiness’ of migrant, ethnic and Romani women to 
participate and form voluntary associations.  They stressed minority women’s 
‘inability to organise, associate or protest’, and there was a common view held by 
majority women respondents that ‘It’s not easy to find organised immigrant women’:  
 
‘I personally do not know that there was any serious, authentic movement in 
favour of the rights of the immigrant women’  
 
This view was certified also by one of the civil servants, and indicates the failure of 
the ethnic majority population to ‘see’ the minorities: 
 
‘(…) The problem also lies in knowing who are their representatives.  (…) but 
the immigrant women are not yet organised in Spain.’  
 
In order to explain the (alleged) lack of organising among ethnic minority women, 
majority women pointed at the migrant culture, as well as the time factor:  
 
‘You can see they bring along the culture of associations, especially the Latin-
American women, but when they arrive to a new country they go through 
phases, or degrees [of maturity] in order to get to the point of forming 
associations.  The immigration problem in Spain is not of so many years, and 
therefore it will get better or the moment will arrive when immigrant women will 
form associations.’  
 
The citation implicitly claims that migrant women, in this case from Latin America, do 
not have a ‘culture of associations’ that is (claimed to be) existing in Spain.  This 
framing, hardly based on actual facts about vital women’s movements in Latin 
America, (re)produces an image of migrant women as apolitical and passive. 
 
Other respondents, however, framed the problem to be insufficient resources and 
various constraints faced by immigrant women:  
 
‘They don’t have time, they work long hours and have no childcare, they take 
their own children with them … how can they be feminists?’  
 
In this framing, the alleged lack of organisations of and by ethnic minority women 
was explained in a slightly different way, but the outcome pointed to a more or less 
similar representation of ethnic minority women.  References to constraints could 
substantiate the opposite conclusion from the one expressed above, however: How 
can women working long hours with no childcare etc not be feminists?  Also, this 
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perception of migrant women’s realities could have resulted in additional claims on 
the majority feminist agenda, addressing these problems.  Ethnic majority 
respondents did, however, acknowledge the existence of informal networks of 
migrant women, and assumed they would mature and then facilitate formal 
organisations which could empower women.   
 
The alleged inability of ethnic minority women to organise, associate or protest was 
clearly stressed only by majority respondents.  The additional ‘excuse’ they made on 
behalf of migrant women mostly referred to migrant women’s double workload, but 
sometimes also to the situation of living without documents and being subjected to 
men’s strict supervision.  The legal situation of undocumented migrant women was 
not framed as a major concern, however, and neither were solutions to related 
problems.  The implication of such a framing, underlining the ‘them’ versus ‘us’ 
divide, has been meagre recognition, by both feminist majority women and 
government representatives, of the fact that minority women groups may hold 
different types of priorities and positions in advancing their agenda.   
 
The ethnic majority women’s way of framing the ‘problem of (non-)organising’ for 
ethnic minority women follows a wider trend in Spanish (Campani, Salimbeni, 
Cabral, 2006) and international mainstream literature: Migrant and ethnic women 
tend to be vicitimised, and a cultural divide between ‘them’ and ‘us’ is established or 
reproduced as a result (ibid.: 18).  Studies discussing how ethnic minorities, 
especially Muslim women, are perceived in the wider society often point to their 
different cultural and religious background (UGT, 2001).  Migrant women are often 
framed as submissive, accepting and silent to the point where they are made out as 
being unable to recognise their own need of ‘liberation’.   
 
In the eyes of ethnic majority women, minority women’s organisations are not 
believed to have had a significant influence on the legislation on gender equality and 
violence against women.  Rather, there is a dominant view held by many majority 
women interviewed of how ‘they’ learn from ‘us’, and through informal networks.  
Although such claims shed light on the lack of integration of minority issues on the 
majority agenda, they also indicate recognition of majority women’s privileged 
position and their better political opportunities to advance change or introduce new 
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items - also pertaining to minority groups.  Contrary to this, one majority respondent 
also claimed that ethnic majority women demonstrate little intention to influence the 
government on issues pertaining to immigrant women: 
 
‘I personally do not know that there was any serious, authentic movement in 
favour of the rights of the immigrant women.’ 
 
Some respondents explained the disconnection between ethnic majority and minority 
women’s organisations in light of the government’s non-comprehensive immigration 
policy, while continuing to place the ‘blame’ on the migrant women’s lack of 
organisation.  Majority women respondents’ framing of their relations with ethnic 
minority women were complex, however, and there was evidence of concern:  
 
‘The immigration policies are a bit paralysed and this affects directly the way 
[migrant] women are attended.  You can see an intention to take them into 
consideration [by the government], but it is not altogether developed nor 
attended to.  The problem also lies in knowing who are their representatives.  
We are now part of Spanish women’s associations who are going to defend 
the rights of the immigrant women, but the immigrant women are not yet 
organised in Spain.’ 
 
Framing the problem – minority perspectives 
Minoritised women’s framing of the ‘problem’ of their organising differs significantly 
from ethnic minoritised women’s framing.  There is a ‘more silent type of division’ 
between majority and minority groups, not always acknowledged.’  This division 
deals less with collaboration to advance feminist ideals than with the barriers that 
immigrant women have to overcome in order to participate or to be included in the 
majority women’s movement.  Most importantly, minority women’s organisations 
placed a bigger emphasis in their debate on the legal disadvantages of Romani and 
migrant women, and framed their situation as doubly vulnerable compared to 
majority women.   
 
Undocumented women exposed to gender violence are often unable to approach 
existing services directed at victims of violence due to their difficult legal 
circumstances.  In addition to not being formally recognised, these women often do 
not possess the relevant knowledge and information, they do not have support 
options after initial assistance in a shelter, and they live with the inherent fears of 
expulsion.  These were among the most critical factors minority women stressed 
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when explaining the disadvantaged position of these groups of migrant women.  
According to one interviewee ‘We cannot talk about equality to participate alongside 
other women, while such a large number of migrant women do not have their legal 
status arranged.’  The consequence of this framing of the problem, explicitly 
described as inequality compared to ‘other women’, is evident and obvious: legal 
reforms. 
 
In relation to gender violence, migrant women respondents also stressed how the 
gender violence law fails to protect migrant women victims.  One respondent said: 
 
‘[…] vulnerability […] accompanies the people who have no documents and 
this makes them denounce less; the majority of women come from countries 
where you are less able to make charges against the person who maltreated 
them, because they will be killed and their death won’t even be announced in 
the newspapers.’ 
 
Along the same lines, discussing the dependency and vulnerability of immigrant 
women, another respondent said:  
 
‘The woman in general is vulnerable but the immigrant woman is doubly so, 
for being a foreigner, for not knowing her rights, the social norms, (...) this 
disorientation is what prompts the vulnerability.  The dependency that a 
woman has on her husband, the lack of economic independence, the lack of 
liberty when her permanent residency is conditioned to that of her husband, 
so really the [immigrant] woman is conditioned.’ 
 
Explaining how the gender violence legislation fails to impact African women, one 
respondent said: 
 
‘The African women don’t have the same voice [as the Spanish women].  
Denouncing is a problem [for them], as well as receiving some sort of 
response.  I have seen women that had problems in the marriage and they 
denounced and now they are suffering more because they don’t have a 
house, they don’t have work, they don’ t have food for themselves and for 
their children; they are suffering.’   
 
She then added an explanation as to why making a complaint/denouncing the 
perpetrator is not an option for these women:  
 
‘In Barcelona, the women who have problems go to these centres [for abused 
women]; they explain their problem, in principle there is a little bit of a 
movement, but after one year, they are told that they have to find a job, 
because “we can’t maintain you here for life” [...] So then the women are 
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afraid, even if the husbands step on them, they have to endure it, because 
otherwise they will suffer more because they have no papers, no work permit.  
Before they arrive in Spain they get a paper that says: “NO right to work in 
Spain”.  I also got it when I came here with my children, and I still keep it.  But 
the husband has the residency and the work.’ 
 
The implications of the different perspectives on violence against migrant women are 
twofold.  On one hand it is critical to recognize the additional needs and burdens of 
migrant women.  The barriers and challenges created by their vulnerable legal and 
social status must be addressed accordingly.  On the other hand, attention needs to 
be paid in order not to victimise migrant women further, and not to aggravate their 
exclusion. 
 
6.3.3 Dissonance and dilemmas 
On a few occasions, majority respondents talked about gender violence within 
specific ethnic groups, such as Muslim or Romani women, as being accepted and 
culture-specific.  One respondent described it almost as a separate issue, almost not 
pertaining to the overall debate on gender violence.   
 
‘The Gypsies … that is a different story … they are different, they operate at a 
different level, they have their world, their own laws … and the women have a 
different position there.’ 
 
This framing - claiming that violence against minority women has other forms of 
manifesting itself and that it is dealt with in different ways within ethnic minority 
communities, has the effect of (re)producing racialised stereotypes and the ‘we’ 
versus ‘them’ divide.   
 
This is quite different from ethnic minority women’s efforts to bring up issues of 
racism and discrimination.  Ethnic minority respondents recognised increased 
support from the government during the recent, socialist years, but stressed the 
barriers they encounter when they bring up issues of racism and discrimination on 
the majority feminist agenda.   
 
Related to this, ethnic minority women respondents acknowledged the influence of 
the mainstream women’s movement in terms of impacting gender policy in Spain, 
but also claimed that locally formed immigrant groups are influencing legislation 
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regarding racism and discrimination more than majority women feminist 
organisations.  The division of gender equality and ethnic discrimination in different 
policy fields indicates the difficult positioning of ethic minority women at the edge of 
both fields, trying to communicate with both. 
 
The different meanings of ‘integration’ among ethnic majority and minority groups 
further illustrates this problematic: For instance, ethnic Spanish women mentioned 
the integration of migrant women only in relation to the services their organisation 
delivered to migrant women.  Minority women respondents, however, focused 
extensively on ‘the lack of involvement, representation and opportunity for voice that 
various groups of minority women experience when interacting with majority 
women’s movement.  Such claims, while critical towards majority feminism, indicate 
interaction between the majoritised and the minoritised women’s organisations, 
rather than disconnection. 
 
6.3.4 Solidarity or benevolence 
Majority women concerned with the situation of migrant women sometimes pointed 
at minoritised women’s lack of voice.  They also expressed their intention to ‘give 
them voice.’  One respondent said, speaking of Spanish Roma women:  
 
‘I think that fundamentally the problem is in their dialogue.  Now, what we [the 
Spanish women] are doing is to give them voice, that is to speak out about 
what is happening to them.’ 
 
There is a power asymmetry inscribed in the citation.  The representation is 
ambiguous, and can be read rather paternalistically as if ‘voice’ is something majority 
women can ‘give’ to ethnic minority women.  Alternatively, ‘voice’ can be seen as a 
right, and something which ought to materialise when and if majority women are 
willing to step aside and allow space for various groups of women.   
 
Minority respondents, while recognising the importance of having their own voice 
and presence, implicitly framed the issue of voice as a matter of rights, underlining 
the lack of ‘solidarity’ shown by majority feminist activists.  For instance, one of the 
interviewees claimed that migrant and ethnic minority women were invited to 
participate only when required by a third party, such as a government forum, 
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European or international forum, and less so on a more regular basis.  They were 
not often asked to participate through more ad-hoc consultation groups, in which 
migrant women have a marginal role.   
 
‘Some things [pertaining to immigrant women issues] have been integrated 
[by the majority organisations] but only in quotation marks “...” [meaning 
symbolically].  What I want to say is that the immigrant women can talk for 
themselves, but they are not always in the position to be the voices of their 
own problems, which would be the just thing.’  
 
Barriers to participation and voice appear both internally within gender mixed ethnic 
minority groups and externally when ethnic minority women approach majority 
women’s organisations:  
 
‘The Gypsy women have a problem with associative Gypsy movement and so 
we had to make ourselves invited in order to participate in the equality plans, 
because they were not counting on us.  When they were drafting a law or law 
guideline that they were about to start working on, they did not count with the 
women’s group, it was us who had to demand that they involve us in the 
government changes (…) They have the perception that we are a step behind 
them, so they give us things already done, they don’t let us participate from 
the first moment when an initiative is being created.  We have to ask to be 
allowed to participate from the beginning.’  
 
As discussed earlier by other minority respondents, dependency is one of the most 
critical aspects mentioned in relation to gender violence for African women living in 
Spain.  This affects how women perceive their legal status.  The respondents 
claimed that their dependency on the husband, lack of resources and general 
knowledge about how to operate in Spanish society, increase their inability to 
integrate but also to receive help and support on gender violence related issues.   
 
‘All the [African] women we have [at the organisation] here are illiterate.  Only 
two can read and write but not in Spanish, I am the only one who can manage 
in Spanish.  This is our problem, and we don’t know where to go to ask for 
money, how to write […] We, African women, are very poor and we suffer a 
lot.  [In most cases] the husbands took [these] women from the ‘field’, they 
don’t know how to read or write…and they brought them here […], but at 
least, comparing with their situation [in Africa]… [now] they are 50 per cent 
better off.  But the residency depends on that of the husband, if he rejects her, 
she is left without residency; the police gets her on the streets and they deport 
her.’ 
 
These women, one respondent claimed, lack the knowledge and education to seek 
support or other opportunities.  They are three times constrained in terms of making 
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choices, first for being immigrants, second for being illiterate and third for living in a 
closed patriarchal system.  Older women in the community have an important role, 
as it is they who arrange female circumcision procedures (FGM), usually performed 
by a traditional birth attendant, a midwife, or a professional circumciser.  
Respondents further argued that in certain communities there is literally no place for 
a woman who has not undergone such procedures to be fully accepted.   
 
Issues pertaining to African women are not included by ‘western feminist’ according 
to ethnic minority respondent.  One of them framed this as African women being 
‘disconnected’ from the fight of the majority women:  
 
‘There is too much violence in general, and this is bad, but it is worse for 
African women [living in Spain].  We see that the western women have a 
voice now, they can talk, they make demonstrations about their rights, the 
government supports them, but we, the African women don’t have anything’.   
 
Early and child marriages were also claimed to be ‘largely untouched by the 
international community’, in spite of the fact that they apply to 60 million women 
(http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_earlymarriage.html). 
 
Majority women respondents presented these issues as not being representative 
enough for ‘them’ to prioritise.  They specifically stressed that forced marriage and 
FGM are topics pertaining to certain groups (‘a minority’) and therefore not part of 
the typical gender violence other women are confronted with in Spain.  At the same 
time, minority women involved in fighting such practices in Spain, claim that the lack 
of involvement by majority women in this area was mirrored by a lack of available 
funds from key government entities to pursue this task.   
 
Migrant women’s problems in their ‘internal’ ethnic communities are connected to 
their problems within the external society.  This internal/external problematic is a 
fundamental problem, also highlighted in the debate concerning feminism and 
multiculturalism.  It is a reminder of the necessity to always keep a doubly critical 
perspective; on the potential discrimination within a minority group (‘minorities within 
minorities’; Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005) as well as on discrimination against 
minority groups as such. 
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6.3.5 Falling between the cracks 
Ethnic minority women are situated at the intersection of the mainstream female-
dominated Spanish feminist discourse and the mainstream male- and migrant-
dominated anti-discrimination discourse.  The result is that issues pertaining to 
migrant women’s integration in social, cultural and political life easily fall between the 
cracks.  Issues related to gender and cultural complexities/ethnic minorities have not 
been prioritised on the agenda of mainstream immigrant organisations, and also not 
on the agenda of various feminist organisations run by native Spanish women.  This 
also includes organisations focusing on gender equality and gender violence issues.  
Only a few organisations, such as Vomade-Vencit and Rominahui (see Appendix A 
in the country report from Spain), are actively engaged with gender issues (including 
gender violence) from an ethnic minority perspective.   
 
Several respondents from majority women’s organisations explained that working 
with violence-related issues pertaining to immigrant groups or following anti-
discrimination debates regarding minority women is not the focus of their 
organisations, despite the fact that fighting violence against women was among their 
core objectives.  One respondent stressed why that was especially the case for 
them:  
 
‘Until now they [the immigrant women] did not reach us, these are difficult 
cases where making a police complaint is very rare.  Maybe there are other 
organisations that work more specifically with immigrant groups and detect 
this conflict, because we in this respect do not have the means to reach them.  
But we do know that there are no such complaints, such as with the 
prostitution and [female] circumcisions.’  
 
One of the interviewed civil servants confirmed this:  
 
‘We have seen during this time the process of the associative movement of 
the foreigners, which went through a bit of everything.  Not always the 
Spanish groups have known to defend well the interests of women in this 
case.  It depended on if the groups of women primarily consist of men or of 
women, if the original society of the group was accepting violence […] For 
example, in groups that represent Moroccan foreigners it is not so easy, 
immediately you realise the contradictions they have as a group.  It’s very 
complicated.’  
 
The complexities of approaching the problems of migrant women are explicitly 
noticed, and contribute to clarify the reluctant engagement of Spanish majority 
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women’s associations.  On the one hand, violence against women is violence 
irrespective of the ethnicity of the victim and should be included in any struggle 
against gendered violence.  On the other hand, cultural differences - and prejudices - 
and structural asymmetry disturb a universal approach to violence.  This is not a 
Spanish problem alone; Kimberle Crenshaw coined the problem as the "strategic 
silences of anti-racism and feminism" (1997: 183), and addressed intersectionality as 
a way of dealing with the silencing of black women’s problems in feminist as well as 
in anti-racist contexts.   
 
6.3.6 Romani women: a minority within a minority 
The feminist discourse in Spain has been shaped and influenced by trans-national 
factors such as the development of the European Union.  Several minority 
respondents argued that international players have impacted the minority women’s 
movements in their quests for recognition.  Also, they mentioned that they had 
received critical support during the initial set up of their NGO by organisations such 
as Amnesty International, Movement for Peace, Disarming and Liberty, Euro Net –
FGM and European Network for Gypsy Women.   
 
The increased political activity of Romani in Spain is related to such developments, 
for instance the recent focus on the situation of Roma by the Council of Europe,42 
and the development of governmental efforts to implement specific policies.  
Examples of measures to facilitate the social integration of Romani in Spain and to 
promote Romani heritage are the National Gypsy Secretary (Secretariado National 
Gitano), the National Council of Gypsy People (Consejo Estatal del Publo Gitano) 
and the Gypsy Cultural Institute (Instituto de Cultura Gitana).  These new entities 
further promote the development of national associations for Romani people involved 
with social and political issues.  Despite evidence of political and social recognition 
and inclusion of Romani within the Spanish society, however, the arrival of new 
migrant Romani groups has increased the complexity of their representation, 
affiliation and cultural identity. 
                                            
42 The setting up by the Committee of Ministers of a Committee of Experts on Roma and Travellers 
(MG-S-ROM) was decided in September 1995.  In 2007 European Council acknowledged for the first 
time ever that the Roma face very specific situation across the EU, and EU leaders called upon 
Member States and the Union to use all means to improve their inclusion.   
 144 
 
The Gypsy Cultural Institute has supported various campaigns for women, such as 
the recently developed Petition for Gypsy Women (Manifiesto Gitano).  The 
campaign demands more recognition of the rights and influence of Romani women 
within the Roma community and in the wider society.  Their organising makes them 
visible as a ‘minority within the minority’ (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005), and 
their vulnerability to both ethnocentric and cultural relativistic claims.  In the words of 
Uma Narayan, feminists should be careful not to replace universal essentialist 
generalisations about ‘all women’ by culture-specific essentialist generalisations that 
depend on totalising categories.  ‘Attempts to avoid the Scylla of “sameness” often 
results in moves that leave one foundering on the Charybdis of “Difference” 
(Narayan, 2000: 83).   
 
One interviewee claimed that the integration of Roma was improved.  Recent 
programmes and policies initiated by Roma groups and by other non-governmental 
women’s organisations have facilitated their inclusion within the larger feminist 
discourse and within the society as a whole, she claimed.   
 
Another interviewee argued that programmes aimed to reduce gender violence 
among the Romani community have to be ‘culturally sensitive’.  She referred to the 
alleged fact that ‘violence’ is accepted and almost internalised by women in these 
communities, where ‘going against your partner’ by means of making a police 
complaint (as required by law for action to take place) automatically outcasts and 
socially excludes a woman from that community.  She further argued that this is the 
reason why the gender violence law in its current form may not be able to reach 
Romani women.  However, she considered that in the long run the legislation is a 
positive development, by influencing the overall perception of gender violence within 
these communities:  
 
‘I can assure you that if this law [gender violence law of 2007] does not reach 
somebody, it would be the gypsies, this law is absolutely not reaching them.  
The Gypsy women will never denounce, so all the benefits after the 
denouncing, they will not be able to enjoy [them].  That means all the protection 
that the law brings.  The only thing that could be affecting the Gypsy is the 
educational part the law could have, that if the law is applied you become a 
delinquent, so through the authorities the mentality can change.’ 
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Respondents working for Romani organisations mentioned that statistically gender 
violence related death is almost never registered within Romani communities.  They 
further outlined cultural factors, such as different types of ‘internal’ laws based on 
extended family relations and internal social networks, and better ‘control’ of the 
more ‘extreme’ cases of abuse and gender violence.  One respondent particularly 
described an incident where an elderly Romani woman intervened and stopped an 
act of violence against a woman, when this was happening: 
 
‘(…) outside the home and in the public domain, by telling the perpetrator 
“doing this is a crime (‘delicto’) in this country.  Such an acknowledgement by 
an elderly Gypsy woman means progress in itself.’  
 
She further argued: 
 
‘The times have changed, the people themselves begin to recognise violence 
as a crime, so it’s a good step to have the new Gender Violence Law, it raises 
the consciousness of people even if they don’t use the law in a formal way.’ 
 
Working on gender issues with and for the Romani community is a very complex 
task.  Besides the tensions with the ‘outside’ Romani, there are also inter-group 
conflicts and tensions which often reinforce the weak and vulnerable position in 
which Romani women often are located.  Thus, collaborations with other non-
governmental organisations are critical for changes to occur, according to 
respondents.  Unfortunately, opportunities for such co-operations are claimed to be 
limited.   
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6.3.7 Veil and violence 
Pertaining to the issue of violence, the cultural argument related to ethnic minority 
women was often articulated by majority women.  One respondent, acknowledging 
the ‘dependency’ situation of Muslim women, maintained that this was mostly 
explained by the cultural isolation they live in: 
 
‘The capacity to denounce, comes in direct reference to the isolation, for 
example the Moroccan women, sub-Saharan, or those from Niger (…)  are 
generally women for whom it is very difficult to learn the language, as it is to be 
involved in the [Spanish/local] customs.’ 
 
She further argued that the ‘cultural isolation’ of Muslim women makes them a very 
hard to reach group, with little information known to the outside world (including the 
feminist groups) about the gender violence they might experience. 
 
‘We have very few data about Muslim maltreated women, who besides [the 
language barrier], have a greater acceptance of violence.  The Ecuadorian or 
the Romanian woman, even if they’d have a greater acceptance of violence, for 
example because of her couple relations or because maybe she suffered from it 
in Ecuador or in Romania, but they perceive immediately that in Spain things 
are not like this.  So then there is another perception of reality that the others 
are not perceiving it because they are not going out [of the house].’   
 
The underlying assumption of this statement is that cultural barriers are hard to 
break, because these women do not go out on the streets.  This may be a realistic 
assessment of problems related to violence against some Muslim women.  And yet, 
the framing resembles the culture-specific essentialist argument Narayan has 
warned against.   
 
Muslim women are on uncertain grounds in Spain after the veil debate.  Most 
respondents perceive religion as a patriarchal form of oppression of women, and 
argue that the veil is a symbolic act of accepting oppression on the part of the 
Muslim women.   
 
One majority woman respondent said: 
 
‘I can’t tell people to take the veil off.  The people have to take the veil off out 
of their own will.  The way we do it here is that we don’t tell a woman anything 
about the way she is dressed.  We have some seminars about “women and 
religions”, but not about the Catholic religion, about all religions.  The women 
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began to see the traps that a religion creates for them.  One woman started 
by taking her veil off inside, while there were men around.  When she was out 
of the centre, she ended up dressed like a “European”, with a short skirt [too 
short for my liking]…  But nobody ever told her “take the veil off”.’ 
 
This statement also brings up the underlying assumption of white/European 
hegemony previously mentioned.  First, the respondent explains how the imposition 
of certain (European) norms was avoided.  Then, when describing how a Muslim 
woman assimilated to the European dress code, she implied that this offered her 
liberation from her oppressed world.  Such practice of making people change their 
views and habits by getting them to think about the wider social context and then 
focus it onto their own lives, is one subtle way of expressing the hegemony.  This 
further contributes to the representation of a dissonance within the feminist 
movement in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’.   
 
This respondent argued that the negative symbolic value attributed to the use of the 
veil stemmed from the fact that, historically, the use of the veil has been interpreted 
as oppressive in relation to generations of majority (Catholic) Spanish women.  Other 
majority respondents also confirmed that religious symbolism is greatly controversial 
in the current feminist discourse, due to the notion that it represents male oppression 
of women. 
 
6.3.8 Dissonance and distance 
Several respondents from majority organisations said that gender violence pertaining 
to immigrant groups or following anti-discrimination debates regarding minority 
women was not their focus.   
 
‘Until now they [the immigrant women] did not reach us, these are difficult 
cases where making a police complaint is very rare.  Maybe there are other 
organisations that work more specifically with immigrant groups and detect 
this conflict, because we in this respect do not have the means to reach them.  
But we do know that there are no such complaints, such as with the 
prostitution and [female] circumcisions.’ 
 
Most organisations interviewed in this study provide gender violence programmes, 
ranging from preventative and educational programmes (in schools, universities, 
hospitals) to direct services to victims of abuse and maltreatment.  Interesting issues 
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arose in relation to who the victims are; their ethnic and religious background, 
cultural and educational levels.   
 
Several majority women argued that all women experience the same oppression in 
terms of gender violence simply because they are women.  According to these 
respondents, universal services currently available to ‘all women’ regardless of their 
nationality, ethnicity or social class were good practices; non-discriminatory and 
inclusive.  Majority women respondents framed the solution as ‘equal opportunity 
service provision’, addressed to all women in need.  The effect of such policies, 
however, may be insufficient consideration of the diverse needs of migrant and 
ethnic minority women.  Viewed in light of Bachhi’s discourse analysis approach of 
‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ (Bacchi, 1999) this may limit alternative 
options to address the problem.  One respondent said:  
 
‘[Gender violence] affects all social classes and here we have women of all 
social classes.  It affects all cultural levels, and we attend to women of all 
cultural levels […] I receive here a woman politician and then I receive Arabic 
women or Romanian women […].  The women can be an academic, 
professional, journalist, lawyer, medic, engineer or she can be a woman with no 
education at all.  I think we have to do it like this, when we talk of women, we 
talk of all women and therefore, the representation has to be there.’ 
 
The benefits of having gender violence services were stressed by another 
respondent who emphasised that they are provided to all women without distinction:  
 
‘This is not an organisation for immigrant women; it is not pro-immigrants, it is 
pro-women; it doesn’t matter that they come from one place or another’. 
 
Free service provision available to ‘all women’ regardless of their legal status or 
nationality is in itself a positive development.43  The concern arises if such provisions 
preclude diverse experiences of violence and needs among women with dissimilar 
ethnic backgrounds.  A nuanced approach is required in order to identify the types of 
issues that different groups of women may bring along when accessing these 
services.  The interviewed majority women prioritised actions and claims against 
                                            
43 Since 2005, after a few organisations campaigned for a change in legislation with the 
administration of Madrid, to provide free gender violence-related services for all women who live in 
Spain (regardless of their legal status); before 2003, immigrant women victims of abuse would loose 
their resident status (obtained through the husband) if the separation happened before the two year 
limit of family reunion, placing them in illegal circumstances.   
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gender violence but gave less consideration to the additional barriers which minority 
women may encounter when trying to access these services.  The same approach 
as noted above was reiterated by one of the respondents when asked to describe if 
government policy should address women’s issues differently depending on their 
ethnic background: 
 
‘I think that the policies carried out currently by the government do not 
distinguish.  For example in our centre […] the immigrant women can come in 
the same manner as the Spanish women.  They don’t have to fulfil more 
requirements, or less, with veil or without veil.’ 
 
One majority respondent, however, suggested that immigrant women may face 
different types of challenges compared to Spanish women, thus demonstrating that 
issues related to racial and ethnic diversity are slowly being recognised by majority 
women’s organisations:   
 
‘So then the issue of immigrant women is another phenomenon that we are 
faced with, like in other countries and we are thinking a lot about it.  The 
immigrant women have a different profile than Spanish women in many cases, 
in others they don’t.  As with the violence against women, (psychological, 
physical, sexual, economic abuse); all these are the same, but in other aspects 
they are not.  […] they [the immigrant women] are now the most needy.  This is 
because the Spanish women (for better or for worse) always have the family 
resources, friends, work.  Moreover for being in a country where they can 
manage […] because of the language and with the social workers.  But the 
immigrant woman … the first she has is fear, that if she denounces her 
husband, she will be thrown out [of the country].’ 
 
The expression ‘we are thinking a lot about it’ is a reminder of the complexities of 
dealing with politics in a multicultural society.  Good intentions may result in quite 
bad policy measures if a careful consideration of ‘culture’, including the 
majority/white culture, is omitted.  African women in particular argued that the lack of 
engagement with these gender violence issues within the feminist movement make 
any other types of ‘cultural barriers’ even more difficult to break.  The concern with 
violence against women among majority and minority women activists may, 
potentially, be a useful site for learning about cultural complexities and mutual 
respect. 
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6.3.9 Co-operation and resonance 
However, the interviews with majority and minority activists did not only display 
disagreements and lack of co-operation.  In the broad field of violence against 
women, the interviews also show that diverse feminist majority organisations have 
joined forces on several occasions to change Spanish legislation, including with 
minority organisations on a few occasions.  For example, women’s organisations 
called for a comprehensive law against violence against women (VAW) since the 
early 1990s.  A number of campaigns were carried out until 1998, when the Socialist 
Party took up the challenge and invited women’s organisations to prepare the first 
draft law against gender violence (filed in Parliament by the Socialist Parliamentary 
Group on December 16, 2001).  In 1992, there were numerous campaigns and 
lobbying by the majority feminist movement when, in particular, the ‘Anti-Aggressions 
Committee’ organised several demonstrations in Madrid to change the legislation 
against gender violence (Organic Law, 3/1989).   
 
Protests and campaigns also took place when the revision of the First Plan of Action 
against Gender Violence was revised and the focus was narrowed down to domestic 
violence.  The action plan for 2001-2004 was not considered comprehensive by most 
women’s NGOs, and changes were demanded by organisations such as Zero 
Tolerance to Gender Violence in 2002 (Tolerancia cero con la violencia de género) 
(Red feminista, 2008). 
 
FGM is an area of competing claims and dissonances, but also of efforts to co-
operate.  In Spain, FGM is still practiced among immigrant groups, primarily from 
Gambia, Mali and Senegal, of whom a higher percentage reside in Cataluña 
(www.ine.es).  Majority women’s organisations’ representatives, although 
recognising this practice as violence against women and as a human rights abuse, 
only do limited work to prevent or eliminate the practice in the community, or to 
include it as a top priority on the feminist agenda.  However, since the early 1990s, 
feminist majority organisations have fought to introduce the anti-FGM law in Spain.  
(Legislation which initially made the practice of FGM illegal was passed in 1995).  
Later they fought to modify the law to include extra-jurisdiction prosecution, which 
means that it is now possible to prosecute the offenders on foreign territory (Ley 
Orgánica, 3/2005).   
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The two organisations interviewed in Barcelona are among the very few 
organisations in Spain fighting against the practice of FGM and to implement the law.  
Both organisations are currently led by Gambian-born women who engage with the 
African communities residing in Barcelona/Cataluña.  The respondents highlighted 
the barriers they encounter in trying to prevent the perpetuation of this practice, and 
stressed critical issues such as early marriage and dependency in connection with 
the practice of FGM.  Also, they argued that these issues have not been picked up 
by the government or by the feminist movement in Spain.  These claims illustrate 
opposite representations of the majority women’s movements concern about FGM.  
A project assessing the FGM situation in Spain prior to 2005, conducted by 
Fundación Mujeres, (Women’s Foundation), listed a few non-governmental 
organisations involved in disseminating information about combating FGM: CEAR, 
ACNUR, Amnesty International, Amam España and the Women Lawyers Themis.   
 
Most of those interviewed regarded political involvement as a critical element in 
developing their political opportunities, in contrast to the rejection of institutional 
channels during the early stage of the feminist movement (see Chapter 2).  At that 
time, 'Say no to power; feminism is autonomous' was the most popular slogan of the 
feminist movement in Spain (Mendez, 1994: 665).  Also, activists today claim their 
co-operation and alliances with both government entities and partner women’s 
organisations to be generally good.   
 
The importance of common spaces for feminist debate and struggle is recognized by 
most respondents.  They argue that inter-organisational collaborations are critical, 
both with respect to influencing government, and also to create informal networks, or 
to organise events and campaigns.   
 
Some respondents argued that collaboration across the ethnic divide was mostly 
initiated during various types of feminist encounters.  They range from formal 
spaces, such as forums, round tables, seminars and workshops, where different 
women’s groups come together for legislative proposals, initiatives or changes, white 
papers or ad-hoc committees, to more informal spaces such as organising events, 
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campaigns, lobbying and celebrations on November 25th and on the International 
Women’s Day on March 8th.   
 
The organising of these events, however, displayed divisions and controversies.  
There has been a more open type of division between the radical feminist and 
lesbian groups, the former extreme left party members and more liberal feminists 
groups.  These historical divisions are, however, presented in positive terms by most 
respondents, for example, a long time activist who identifies herself as such:  
 
‘There is another point of encounter, where there is the more radical feminism 
with which we have contact, these are necessary people and it is very 
important that they exist.  We meet in Barquillo 48, there are some buildings 
there (…) Some of them [radical feminists, the majority of whom are not 
connected to any political party], at some point had some connection with the 
NP movement, the communist extra-parliamentary party which disappeared, 
from the extreme left.  They are reticent, [but] they are necessary because 
they know the utopia and beyond, and are almost without any other ties.’ 
 
In Spain, the 8th of March is regarded not only as an important feminist symbol, a day 
of protest against male dominance and a celebration of the struggle for women’s 
liberation and equality with men.  It is also a symbol of progress and modernisation 
of Spain.  A variety of collective actors like government agencies and other public 
institutions, political parties and labour unions are invited along to various groups of 
feminist activists and women’s groups and associations (Sundman, 1999). 
 
6.3.10 Summary remarks about the Spanish case 
This study has offered a critical perspective on the relationship among key actors 
involved in the contemporary women’s movement in an increasingly multicultural 
Spain.  By looking at claims, demands and achievements in relation to gender 
violence policy, the study has highlighted emerging contradictions and tensions.  The 
key finding relates to how women’s agency is framed and especially by whom.  
Based on data from twenty-one qualitative interviews and observations conducted 
over the course of one year (from 2007 until 2008) with selected members of 
women’s organisations and public administration officials in Spain, this study argues 
that, depending on how immigrant women’s positions are represented or framed, a 
woman can either be victimised or empowered; represented or not represented in 
the feminist discourse; with or without a real political opportunity.   
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One pattern clearly emerged during the interviews in relation to representation, 
integration and common or dissonant claims made by majority and minority women’s 
organisations in Spain: Majority women do, at least to some extent, recognise the 
additional barriers encountered by migrant and minority women in their struggle for 
recognition, participation and voice.  Still, they have not been able to include and 
internalise issues pertaining to ‘other’ groups of women in a way and on a scale 
which meets ethnic minority women’s demands.  Based on our empirical fieldwork, it 
appears justified to state that there is no common women’s rights agenda in Spain 
across the ethnic divides.   
 
Ethnic minority women stand at a focal point between ethnicity/race and gender as 
two powerful systems of oppression.  Spain is no exception to the critique forwarded 
by Black and postcolonial feminists of activism and scholarship within the women’s 
movement as dominated by privileged and ethnocentric white women.  Currently 
there is little progress towards an intersectional approach to inequality that 
recognises the importance of race and ethnicity as voiced by various minority and 
migrant women’s groups in our study.  ‘Majority’ (autóctonas) and ‘minority’ women 
seem to take different approaches to gender oppression, patriarchy, and ethnicity 
and race.  Discourses on gender, class, race and ethnicity continue to be mostly 
shaped by majority movement actors that represent an allegedly universalistic white 
feminism in Spain.  Although the mainstream feminist debate recognises women’s 
diversity, it largely falls short of including or prioritising critical constraints and 
limitations faced by minority women.   
 
Moreover, issues related to the integration of migrant women have been given low 
priority on the agenda of mainstream immigrant organisations, but also on that of 
various feminist organisations run by native Spanish women.  Only a very few 
organisations are actively engaged with gender issues, including gender violence, 
from an ethnic minority perspective. 
 
Our empirical field work supports the conclusion that the majority led women’s 
organisations have not yet engaged seriously with intersectional approaches to 
gender and ethnicity.   
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Postcolonial feminists object to portrayals of women of non-Western societies as 
passive and voiceless victims and the portrayal of Western women as modern, 
educated and empowered (see Nayaran, 1997; Mohanty, 1994).  However, such 
images have been prominent during the interviews conducted for this study.  Despite 
progress in social, legal and political areas, racial and ethnic divisions continue to 
marginalise certain groups of women in the modern democracy of Spain, and this 
situation has hardly been picked up and addressed by majority feminist women. 
 
Findings from this research demonstrate that the types of barriers encountered by 
migrant women in both feminist activism and political life, highlight the unspoken 
divides and reproduce certain patriarchal stereotypes within the current feminist 
discourse in Spain.  Ethnicity, class and race, and in particular whiteness 
(Frankenberg, 1993), are still silent categories within the women’s movement and 
will remain so unless these silences are problematised and brought into the open for 
discussion and debate (Bacchi, 1999, 2005).  This is congruent with the promises of 
Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ approach; to bring silences in 
problem representations into the open.   
 
Moreover, Bacchi’s concern with the effects of problem representations on 
discourses can be understood in the light of minority women’s claims not being fully 
embraced within the current feminist majority-led discourse.  This increasingly 
important debate on the possibility of alliance and co-operation between ethnic 
minority women’s and ethnic majority women’s organisations is still limited in Spain.  
The claims described in this study, put forward by ‘the native Spanish feminists’ or 
‘autoctonas’ (in Spanish) and ‘the other’ migrant and ethnic minority women, often 
referred to as ‘more vulnerable groups of women’, have the potential to create and 
sustain divisions within the women’s movement.  However, they could also help 
create new understandings and new forms of co-operation and alliance if political 
opportunity structures open the space for both groups to participate and put forward 
their claims.   
 
The gender-ethnic debate transcends the Spanish feminist movement in several 
ways.  One key question that emerges is whether conceptual clarification points at 
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injustices and inequalities or helps reinforce them (Stolz, 2004).  This was a 
recurrent theme during the interviews, where both majority and minority respondents 
moved between empowering and victimising positions, from feeling empowered to 
feeling ‘silenced’ by the perceived lack of real opportunities to express their voice.   
 
On the other hand, some majority women talking about minority women, showed 
sympathy and understanding for the unequal position of migrant/minority women in 
Spanish society, and they discussed additional forms of support these women might 
need to improve their overall condition.  However, this type of support seemed to be 
influenced by an ethnocentric feminist stand, overlooking the solutions that some 
minority women’s organisations or groups would have.  Several minority women 
respondents repeatedly said they were willing to be included in the broader feminist 
discourse on a more consistent and equal basis (author’s field notes, Madrid and 
Barcelona, 2007).   
 
The recognition and framing of minority women’s issues needs to be initiated and 
moved forward by ethnic minority women’s organisations themselves, and could 
profit from more joint efforts by ethnic minority and majority women’s actors.  This is 
also necessary in order to compensate for lack of attention to minority women’s 
needs by various male dominated migrant movements.   
 
6.4 The Case of United Kingdom 
 
6.4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how different actors within the contemporary UK women’s 
movement position themselves in relation to other movement actors, and the 
implications such positioning may have for building alliances and acting 
cooperatively.  It also presents empirical examples of formal networking, co-
operation and alliances between ethnic majority and minority organisations in the 
women’s movement, thus illustrating how problem representations may be 
strategically shared by different movement actors.  The chapter is based on 
empirical evidence from different types of text: interview transcripts, organisational 
documents, and academic publications (see Chapter 5). 
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The diminished ‘polarization between white feminism and a black women’s 
movement’ observed by Lovenduski and Randall (1993: 84) at the start of the 1990s 
remains a fair description of today’s women’s movement, but there are still problem 
representations that reflect disunity between white and black women.  Meanwhile 
other problem representations continue to emphasise discord between women from 
different ethnic minority backgrounds.  Furthermore, other differences between 
women which cut across the majority/minority distinction have taken on a new 
significance. 
 
A note on terminology is required.  We use the terms ‘white’, ‘majority’ or 
‘majoritised’ to refer to privileged individuals and groups of European and North 
American origin.  Usage of the term ‘black’ is more complex and has a contentious 
history.  Our usage of the term ‘black’ follows the convention suggested by Mama 
(1984), and thus includes people of African and Asian descent.  Although we use the 
term ‘black women’ interchangeably with ‘ethnic minority women’ or ‘minoritised 
women’, we prefer the last two terms as these are more inclusive of a range of 
groups of minority women (see also Chapter 3).  Different actors, moreover, be they 
located within the women’s movement, government or academia, often use different 
terms to denote ethnic minority women.  Furthermore, most of our interviewees use 
the term ‘Black and Minority Ethnic Women’ (BME), and we have chosen to follow 
their usage. 
 
The section immediately below presents some examples of how majority and 
minority women’s movement actors have positioned themselves and others through 
movement discourse from the 1970s onwards.  The sections following on from this 
discuss current problem representations, positioning and framing in relation to actual 
and possible co-operation and alliance between different movement actors.  
 
6.4.2 Historical discourse and problem representations concerning majority-
minority relations in the second wave UK women’s movement: Some examples 
In the 1970s, the notion of sisterhood was used both as an ideology and a strategy, 
that is, as both a means to unite women through an emphasis on common 
experiences, and a device to argue politically for the need to change society by 
promoting gender equality.  From the outset, however, it was clear that different 
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groups of women found it difficult to ‘unite in sisterhood’, as increasingly their 
differences, rather than commonalities, were highlighted through what later came to 
be labelled as ‘identity politics’.   
 
The notion of a golden age of feminism is challenged by the simple fact that the 
women’s movement was divided into those who adhered to a socialist analysis of 
women’s oppression, those who subscribed to a radical feminism, and those who 
aligned themselves with a liberal feminist agenda (see Lovenduski and Randall, 
1993: 65-67; see also Segal, 1987).  Caine (1997: 267) describes conflicts between 
feminists in terms of ‘the bitter differences and divisions of the 1970s’.  Separate 
organising became a feature not only among white women adhering to different 
ideological standpoints, but also among black women, women with disabilities, 
Jewish women, lesbian women, and other groups (Harriss, 1989).  The alleged 
golden age might actually have more to do with the radical methods employed by 
women’s movement actors at the time.  The idealisation of such methods was 
expressed by one of our interviewees who identified the direct action, campaigning, 
lobbying and protests of the early years as ‘really cool radical stuff going on’, while 
today ‘all that stuff has almost died off apart from the lobbying and the advocacy 
work’.  A possible connection was suggested by interviewees between the current 
system of funding for women’s organisations and a focus on service delivery rather 
than on advocacy and direct action. 
 
Some of the interviewees in our study were active in the women’s movement from its 
beginnings and emphasised an early acknowledgment of difference:  ‘I don’t think 
there is a homogenous picture ...  because I know that some of the organisations I 
was involved with in London were actually very much [engaged with the realities of 
black women’s lives] (…).’  This interviewee, however, also stressed that although 
the women’s movement from the beginning had a commitment to promoting equal 
opportunities and challenging discrimination, including racism, anti-racism was not 
necessarily embedded in movement practices.  Importantly, although exceptions 
could be found in inner-city communities, on the whole the women’s movement itself 
was not receptive to black women, despite its early solidarity with anti-racist and anti-
imperialist struggles (Caine, 1997: 268): ‘Actually it wasn’t engaging with the realities 
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of black women’s lives, also with the kind of practice that you needed to include 
women from diverse communities’, said an interviewee.   
 
Another interviewee who perceived the 1970s women’s movement as dominated by 
white women identified two responses by black women like herself: ‘...  black groups 
were arguing that actually our interests would be better put in black groups rather 
than in women’s groups, but you try to do both.  I think the women’s movement did 
suffer as a consequence of not taking into account different perspectives.  Even now 
you can accuse it of not taking into account [the interests of BME women]’.  The 
claim that BME women’s voices are not being heard by the majority women’s 
movement continues to reverberate today.  As one interviewee put it, unless she is 
present at meetings or policy forums, ‘then the voices of the black, Asian and 
Chinese women are not heard.  So when they form their policies it is basically about 
who is there forming those policies’.  According to the interviewee, issues like forced 
marriage and female genital mutilation, which constitute different types of violence 
against women, ‘will get picked up as long as there is a [BME woman] representative 
to highlight it’.   
 
Another interviewee claimed that the 1970s women’s movement was ‘very involved 
with anti-racist struggles as well as supporting strikes, which was a big thing in the 
British women’s movement’.  Moreover, she was critical of what she labelled ‘post-
modern’ representations of 1970s feminists as believing that ‘all women thought alike 
or all black women thought alike, and that is nonsense.  What I would say against 
post-modernism is that all women have things in common, all women experience 
violence from men ...  Black women have got things in common, mainly racism and 
not being treated as equal by white society, [...], but that does not mean that all black 
women think the same or all women think the same’.  Although differences were 
acknowledged, there was, thus, an attempted focus on commonalities which 
underpinned the overarching idealistic notion of a universal sisterhood.  Despite an 
ideological commitment to difference and to anti-racism, however, the interviewee 
saw the women’s movement at the time as dominated by white women: ‘really in the 
early 1970s it was a white movement but a lot of those women were in groups like 
Women Against Racism and Fascism, any groups really.  According to this 
interviewee, there were not many black feminists around in the 1970s, and  ‘the 
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grassroots black women coming into the movement came in with the 1980s and 
were very critical about how white the movement was’. 
 
Although identity politics can to some extent be attributed to consciousness-raising 
and social mobilisation among different groups of women, the call for a universal 
sisterhood was quickly exposed as a fairly white-dominated affair.  While white 
women’s movement participants like some of our interviewees realised from the start 
that not all women were the same or shared the same experiences, in a drive to 
formulate a mobilising politics for women the movement as a whole failed to consider 
the experiences of black women and the impact racial and ethnic differences would 
have on the formulation of a women’s movement politics.  Reclaim the night marches 
in black and deprived neighbourhoods with banners calling for an increased 
presence of police to protect women were understandably not well received by black 
women who had experienced the racist and discriminatory practices of the police in 
their own communities.  Importantly, black women felt a sense of solidarity with black 
men and refused to categorically define all men as oppressors of women (see Bryan 
et al., 1985).   
 
Despite differences being acknowledged by white participants in the women’s 
movement, a lack of reflection by white women on their own comparatively privileged 
positions put a strain on relations between majority and minority actors in the 
movement.  Indeed, the notion that white women were to some extent complicit in 
the racism and discrimination suffered by black women was justifiably highlighted by 
black feminists (see, for example, Amos and Parmar, 1984).  White women actors 
described the world as if issues of ‘race’ and ethnicity did not pertain to themselves, 
highlighting instead their own internal stratification by class, and the discrimination 
they faced by their white male peers (e.g.  Barrett, 1980).  Despite the presence of 
mixed black and white groups, including mixed editorial collectives behind Spare Rib 
Sheba Feminist Publishers, the 1980s were also characterised by separation 
between the majoritised and minoritised parts of the women’s movement.   
 
Tensions between majoritised and minoritised positions in the women’s movement at 
the time can be illustrated by the formative article ‘Challenging imperial feminism’ 
(Amos and Parmar, 1984).  Their framing of the broader women’s movement as 
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‘white Eurocentric and Western’ can be read as an angry response to white women’s 
rejection of black women’s claims of racism and discrimination not only within society 
but within the women’s movement itself.  In describing the women’s movement as 
oppressive we refer to the experiences of black and working class women of the 
movement and the inability of feminist theory to speak to their experience in any 
meaningful way’ (Amos and Parmar, 1984: 4).  The likelihood or even possibility of 
universal sisterhood was thus dealt a blow by Amos and Parmar, who deemed it 
almost impossible for white women to move beyond a limited analysis: ‘The historical 
and cultural traditions from which they write are qualitatively and in essence so 
different that their analysis, interpretations and conclusions are of necessity going to 
produce ‘naive and perverse’ accounts steeped in white chauvinism’ (ibid.: 8).   
 
There were of course reactions by white women to such critiques, and Sudbury 
(1998) has differentiated between four broad types of responses found among white 
British feminists in the 80s and early 90s.  She associates the first approach with an 
article by Michéle Barrett and Mary McIntosh’s (1985) in which they accepted that 
the women’s movement could be accused of ethnocentrism, but (by Sudbury’s 
interpretation) rejected the claim that white feminist thought in Britain had been racist 
(Barrett and McIntosh, 1985, 2005; Sudbury, 1998: 207).  In a critical reply to Barrett 
and McIntosh, however, Bhavnani and Coulson (1985; also reprinted 2005) 
demonstrated that racism was a major feature of the state’s immigration laws, and 
argued that as long as the claims-making and activism of the white women’s 
movement ignored state racism, it was reasonable to state that white women had 
ignored racism and its impact on women’s lived experience.44 
 
The second type of response among white feminists identified by Sudbury is that of 
liberal feminists and their alleged interpretation of black women’s oppression as a 
matter of ‘double oppression’ arising from a subjugated status as both woman and 
black (Sudbury, 1998: 209).  Racism was thus simply ‘added on’ as another factor.  
The importance of racism was thus accepted by liberal feminists, but the impact of 
race on all women (including white women) was still to be theorised and politicised.  
                                            
44 For further replies to Barrett and McIntosh, see Feminist Review 22 (Spring 1986) which includes 
critical articles by Mirza (1986), Lees (1986), Ramazanoglou (1986) and Kazi (1986).   
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Some of our interviewees highlighted the ‘double discrimination’ view as still 
problematic within the women’s movement:  
 
The third type of reaction identified by Sudbury is that of a radical feminist approach 
which accepts the importance of racism but seeks to deal with it on a personal level, 
through white women feminists undergoing ‘consciousness-raising’ in order to 
enable themselves to confront and deal with their own implication in racist practices 
(ibid.: 212).  Although such an approach can be useful, especially in combination 
with other approaches,45 it risks leaving the issue of racist practices by the state 
entirely by the wayside (see Bourne, 1983: 15).  Lastly, the fourth type of response 
to black feminist critiques identified by Sudbury is that of ‘an anti-racist socialist 
feminism which could link black and white women in a holistic struggle against 
racism, sexism and class exploitation’ (ibid.: 213).  Although Sudbury is optimistic 
about this type of response, she is pessimistic about its development and claims that 
‘barriers of fear, defensiveness and antagonism prevented the fundamental 
transformation of feminist theory implied in this agenda’ (ibid.).  This problem 
representation implies that barriers to co-operation and alliance building between 
black and white feminists are still to be overcome.   
 
Sudbury remains pessimistic about the possibility of a universal sisterhood of 
minoritised and majoritised women, and concludes that the claim to sisterhood 
should be abandoned: ‘In the context of a recent and painful history between black 
and white women in Britain, the goal of creating sisterhood between all women is at 
best unrealistic and at worst arrogant.  [...] it is a goal promoted primarily by white 
feminists, which is not embraced with as much enthusiasm by black women’ (ibid.: 
218).  But opinions and practices within the women’s movement are divided: ‘We 
cannot afford wholly to abandon a sense of sisterhood.  Without it there can be no 
basis for feminist politics’, argues Ramazanoglu (1989: 174).  In the end, however, 
Sudbury and Ramazanoglu counsel that the way forward is through majority and 
minority women making connections and aspiring to form alliances where they share 
concerns. 
                                            
45 In FEMCIT we have used memory work on whiteness and privilege in order to reflect on our own 
positioning as researchers (see Chapter 3).   
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6.4.3 Together and apart: minority women’s organisations as accepted and 
legitimated but not fully embraced 
The political scientist Stein Rokkan formulated four barriers to political participation 
as a descriptive means of understanding the degree to which various interest groups 
are integrated in political life (Rokkan, 1970).  The four barriers to participation are 
legitimation, incorporation, representation and executive power (Rokkan, in 
Christensen and Raaum, 1999).  Importantly, the barriers do not necessarily appear 
one after the other in a linear fashion; rather, they can co-exist or be challenged at 
various points in time. 
 
The legitimation barrier in terms of women’s interests is generally overcome through 
the establishment of women’s organisations and the acceptance of women’s 
organisations as political actors.  In the UK, white women’s organisations can be 
said to have achieved political legitimation with the suffragette movement of the early 
20th century as they were accepted as political actors (see Pugh, 2000) black 
women’s organisations achieved legitimation through the founding of organisations 
during the 1970s. 
 
Ethnic minority women’s organisations in the UK have achieved legitimacy and been 
accepted as political actors in their own right, and to some extent their interests are 
now being incorporated into, or embraced by, mainstream or white-dominated 
women’s organisations.  For example, the Fawcett Society has recently (in 2005) 
started to engage with ethnic minority women’s issues.  An organisation like the 
National Council of Women of Great Britain, however, has only sporadically engaged 
with such issues, be it in the form of consultation responses or organisational 
resolutions.46  Moreover, ethnic minority women have yet to achieve significant 
representation and executive power in white-dominated or mixed organisations (one 
notable exception in this regard is Rights of Women, which for the past seven years 
has been led by Ranjit Kaur who is of Asian minority ethnic background).  We do not 
intend to advocate that black women’s organisations should be subsumed within 
majority women’s organisations; rather, we would argue that majority women’s 
                                            
46 See http://fp.ncwgb.f9.co.uk/index.html (accessed October 22, 2008).   
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organisations should engage seriously with intersectional approaches (Crenshaw, 
2006; Denis, 2008) by developing policies and organisational structures that account 
for intersections between different structures of inequality, such as gender, race, 
class, sexuality, and faith.  In our fieldwork we have seen evidence that this is 
actually taking place in some women’s movement organisations, including the 
Fawcett Society.  Recent developments at the level of government also highlight a 
more general move towards intersectional approaches.47  Furthermore, it could be 
argued that by taking on intersectional approaches, women’s movement 
organisations would position themselves to build increased opportunities for alliance 
and co-operation across the majority/minority divide within the women’s movement. 
 
An acceptance by government and majority women’s organisations of minority 
women’s organisations as political actors in their own right is clearly manifest in the 
formal and informal alliances, networks, coalitions, and umbrella organisations that 
have developed between and among organisations representing ethnic majority and 
minority women in the UK.  To a large extent, however, this acceptance seems to 
both presume and perpetuate the existence of separate organisations for ethnic 
majority and ethnic minority women.  Furthermore, networks and alliances are 
largely based on and limited to specific issues.  In the main, organisations that at the 
time of their founding represented either ethnic majority or ethnic minority women 
have not, it seems, taken significant steps to become more integrated entities.  
Among the organisations interviewed for this project, the Fawcett Society and the 
Refugee Women’s Resource Project at Asylum Aid stand out as possible exceptions, 
as race and gender are currently being mainstreamed throughout these 
organisations.  Again, our position is not that BME organisations should be 
integrated into majoritised organisations.   
 
One interviewee pointed to traditional or mainstream organisations as experiencing 
difficulties in attracting ethnic minority women.  Indeed, as Grant argues, ‘most 
traditional organisations remain overwhelmingly white and middle-aged (or older)’ 
and experience difficulties in relation to recruitment, renewal and relevance (Grant, 
                                            
47 The Equality and Human Rights Commission (established in 2007) has subsumed the Equal 
Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality, and the Disability Commission.   
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2002: 31).  Some of the women’s movement organisations coming out of the 1970s 
on the other hand, ‘may be specific to a particular ethnic group or black specific, or 
certainly find it easier to attract a more diverse range of women’, said the 
interviewee.  On the whole, the women’s movement can thus still be characterised 
by separate organisations that mainly cater to either majority or minority women.  
The claim that many black women’s organisations are located within the anti-racist 
movement, rather than within the women’s movement, further underscores the 
separate spheres of activism (Siddiqui, 2000: 84). 
 
However, not all black women have rejected feminism, and some have chosen to 
unite under the concept of ‘Black feminism’ (Lovenduski and Randall, 1993: 82; 
Bryan et al., 1985: 175-176; Mirza, 1997).  Our interviewees confirmed that the term 
‘feminism’ is still contested among white and black women’s movement actors.  ‘If 
you start talking about things like feminism for example, and understanding and 
calling ourselves a feminist organisation, that is perhaps where the tension is most 
[visible]’.  Calling oneself or labelling an organisation as feminist is, thus, still a 
contentious issue in the women’s movement.  The respondent confirmed that it is 
easier to embrace the term ‘womanist’ even though she does not advocate one 
specific definition of feminism but sees it as a concept that allows for ‘a diversity of 
opinions’.  She claimed that the women’s sector, particularly BME organisations, 
have not fully understood that the term ‘feminism’ is not a static, one-dimensional 
term but one that allows for complex and even contradictory opinions on issues such 
as prostitution.  Another interviewee imparted that she was most comfortable with 
the term ‘African feminist’.  There can, thus, be a variety of reasons why women’s 
movement actors do not want to label themselves as feminist, and the rejection of 
the term ‘feminist’ may cut across the ethnic minority-majority distinction.   
 
There are important exceptions to the tendency to organise separately and these 
include umbrella organisations like the Women’s Resource Centre and the National 
Alliance of Women’s Organisations (NAWO), which have been founded with the 
explicit aim of representing a variety of women’s organisations.  Although both can 
be said to have been predominantly white (on NAWO as a white organisation, see 
Sudbury, 1998: 210), their membership has developed to the extent that today it is 
fair to say that they represent both minority and majority women’s organisations.  In 
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terms of representation, moreover, many ‘separate’ organisations have board 
members or members of staff that represent various ethnic backgrounds.48  In terms 
of executive power, however, ethnic minority women within predominantly ethnic 
majority organisations are often constrained by their under-representation (or non-
representation) on management committees.  Decision-making opportunities can 
first and foremost be found in the organisations established and maintained by ethnic 
minority women themselves, and secondly in majority and mixed organisations 
where ethnic minority women may be represented on the boards or management 
committees, sometimes in ‘tokenist’ ways. 
 
In the next section we discuss some examples of alliance and co-operation within 
the UK women’s movement with a particular emphasis on the policy area of violence 
against women.  The emergence of discord linked to feminism, culture, religion and 
belief is discussed in the last section.   
 
6.4.4 Towards a common ground: majority and minority women’s movement 
actors come together in strategic co-operation and alliance 
This section will focus on what we deem to be some significant events and 
processes that contribute to the building of common ground between various 
women’s movement actors.  These are specific campaigns and alliances, largely 
formed from the late 1980s, early 1990s, and onwards, where majority and minority 
women have strategically rallied together and thus paved the way for stronger and 
more long-lasting alliances in the future.   
 
In general, the interviewed movement actors do not represent networking, co-
operation and alliance-building between ethnic minority and ethnic majority women’s 
organisations to be a problem.  Rather, such interaction is represented as a ‘natural 
fact’.  For example, one interviewee stated that ‘one thing the women’s movement is 
quite good at is forming alliances and forming partnerships, and trying not to 
duplicate’.  This was followed up by the question of whether there is a good division 
                                            
48 This information is hard to come by, as it is not readily available on organisational websites.  When 
organisations are working within the area of violence against women, it might be a measure of 
protection of staff when organisations decide not to publish the names and profiles of members of 
management.   
 166 
of labour between different groups, to which the respondent replied ‘and a strong 
progression of coming together around a particular thing’. 
 
This representation contrasts sharply with the historical discourse examined above, 
which highlighted the tension, if not outright hostility, between white and black 
women’s movement actors in the 1980s.  Several factors can be pulled together in 
an attempt to explain this development.  Crucially, British society is not the same 
today as it was in the 70s and 80s.  In 2007, ten per cent of the UK’s population were 
from an ethnic minority background49; this contrasts with just 2.5 per cent in 197150.  
In other words, ethnic diversity has become a fact of life, and no serious 
organisation, be it in the voluntary, public or private sector, can avoid engaging in the 
development of non-discriminatory practices towards immigrant and minoritised 
groups and individuals.  In this regard it could be argued that societal changes have 
prompted changes in the way women’s organisations operate.   
 
Although identity politics continues to be salient for many individuals and 
organisations, there seems to be a willingness among women’s movement actors to 
look beyond this in an attempt to strengthen the mobilisation of collective social 
protest and achieve political impact.  As we will argue below, such willingness is 
particularly visible in the broad policy area of violence against women.  Another 
factor which may at one and the same time put on hold identity politics and 
strengthen divisions within the women’s movement is that of the current contract 
culture in relation to voluntary sector funding.  Most women’s organisations are 
obliged to deal with the state and/or local councils in bids to achieve funding for 
service provision.51  As such, it might be strategically important to carve out a niche 
practice while at the same time developing and maintaining contact with competing 
organisations. 
 
Against this backdrop, we want to suggest that majority and minority women’s 
organisations have slowly but steadily been finding common ground in the area of 
violence against women and are increasingly interacting in networks and alliances 
                                            
49 ‘Diversity and different experiences in the UK’, www.statistics.gov.uk (accessed August 27, 2008).   
50 ‘People and Migration’, www.statistics.gov.uk (accessed August 27, 2008).   
51 For a report on funding issues in relation to the women’s sector, see WRC 2006.   
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with the aim of maximising policy impact.  Below we present and discuss some 
examples that illustrate the establishment of such common ground.   
 
The first example of a joint political campaign, established in the 1990s, involves an 
alliance between Southall Black Sisters and Justice for Women.  The campaign 
sought to redress the injustice meted out to women who kill men who have been 
violently abusing them.  The second example is the campaign by minority and 
majority women’s organisations to abolish the ‘no recourse to public funds’ rule for 
immigrants subject to the two-year rule in cases where women experience violence 
within their marriages.  Following lobbying efforts by Southall Black Sisters and other 
women’s organisations, in 1999 and 2002 the government made concessions to the 
immigration law which allowed victims of domestic violence with insecure 
immigration status (those subject to the two-year rule) the right to remain in the UK.  
These examples demonstrate the willingness and capability of ethnic majority and 
minority women’s organisations to join forces in an attempt to influence the political 
agenda and formulate new policy ideas in the area of violence against women.  
These are not mere ‘paper campaigns’ but alliances that work hard, through lobbying 
and high-profile events, to gather political support for their causes.   
 
A third example of black and white women working side by side is the Women 
Against Rape (WAR) group formed in 1976, and the Black Women’s Rape Project 
(BWRAP) formed in 1991.  At the Women’s Centre, black and white women have 
worked closely together within and across these separate organisations for rape 
victims, and also within and across organisations such as Housewives in Dialogue, 
Black Women for Wages for Housework, and lesbian, prostitution and peace 
organisations (Sudbury, 1998: 215).  This example illustrates, according to Sudbury, 
a ‘pragmatic approach to creating coalitions between black women and white 
feminists’ which is based on white women’s acceptance of black women’s autonomy 
and a broad and international conception of women’s struggles (ibid.: 216-217). 
 
A fourth example is the high profile, broad-ranging and unprecedented national 
coalition of organisations and individuals in the End Violence Against Women 
Campaign (EVAW; founded 2005).  This coalition includes feminist movement 
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actors, women’s movement actors, and other voluntary organisations and committed 
individuals.52 
 
These examples of alliance and co-operation illustrate the pragmatic and strategic 
ways in which ethnic majority and minority women’s organisations in the UK join 
forces.  All are concerned, in one way or another, with the issue of violence against 
women.53  Indeed, the policy area of violence against women seems to stand out as 
the arena where majority and minority women’s organisations manage to consolidate 
their interests and argue with a collective voice, in particular through the high-profile 
and influential End Violence Against Women Campaign.   
 
The first two campaigns (in support of women who kill their abusers and those who 
are trapped by the ‘no recourse to public funds’ legislation) provide examples of 
closely focused actions which highlight the plight of a relatively small number of 
women.54  The fourth example (EVAW) has a much broader remit and seeks to 
combat domestic violence, female genital mutilation, ‘honour crimes’ and forced 
marriage, rape and sexual violence, stalking, trafficking and prostitution (Coy et al., 
2008; End Violence Against Women, 2007).  Alliance members have agreed to a 
broad definition of violence against women, and have endorsed the demand that 
‘violence against women be understood as a cause and consequence of women's 
inequality’.55  The broad alliance of EVAW member organisations has thus rejected a 
representation of forced marriage and female genital mutilation as cultural or 
religious practices associated with particular groups.  Instead, such practices are 
represented as related to gender inequality and the subordination of women by men, 
thus signalling that they form part of a more universal pattern of violence against 
women.   
                                            
52 For the full list of coalition members see 
(http://www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk/pages/about_us.html accessed July 15, 2008.   
53 A campaign issue not related to VAW is that of the gender pay gap, or supporting equal pay for 
women and men.  A high-profile alliance on equal pay is that between the Fawcett Society, several 
trade unions, anti-poverty organisations and One Parent Families/Gingerbread (for a joint campaign 
letter by these organisations, see Katherine Rake et al., ‘Time for bold action on equal pay’, The 
Guardian June 10, 2008).  This specific campaign only includes one women’s organisation and thus 
does not constitute an example of collaboration between different organisations within the women’s 
movement.   
54 The number of women who fall victim to the ‘no recourse’ rule in the UK has been estimated at 600 
per year (Amnesty International UK and Southall Black Sisters 2008).   
55 http://www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk/pages/about_us.html  Accessed July 15, 2008.   
 169 
 
There are also examples of significant events and processes where black and white 
women have been working together on issues that are not directly or explicitly 
related to violence against women.  One example is the organisation Women 
Against Fundamentalism (WAF), which Southall Black Sisters was instrumental in 
forming in May 1989 (Connolly, 1991).  WAF is dedicated to campaigning against 
any type of religious fundamentalism, or any ‘mobilization of religious affiliation for 
political ends’ (ibid.: 69).  A particular incident, the religious fatwa against the novelist 
Salman Rushdie, spurred the establishment of WAF.  WAF quickly achieved an anti-
Islamic image (ibid.: 74), but insisted it was neither anti-religious nor interested only 
in Islamic fundamentalism.  Religious observance was thus defined as a matter of 
personal choice, and it was also acknowledged that ‘religion can play a progressive, 
political role’ (WAF, 1996: 1).  WAF highlighted the features of religion that were 
oppressive to women, and argued that feminist politics should be informed by 
secularism and not by religion (see Siddiqui, 1991).  The organisation managed to 
mobilise a variety of women’s movement actors, including both black and white 
women.   
 
The last example we will present of a collective alliance of women’s movement 
actors is that of the Why Women? campaign led by the Women’s Resource Centre.  
This current campaign is focused on the alleged funding crisis facing the women’s 
voluntary and community sector, and seeks to gain the attention of policy - and 
decision-makers in an effort to highlight the issue and to lobby for increased funding 
for women’s sector organisations.  The WRC is in itself an umbrella organisation 
encompassing both majority and minority feminist and women’s movement actors, 
and the Why Women? campaign has sought and gained independent support from 
all these types of actors.56 
 
In addition to such campaigns and alliances around particular issues, there are well-
established (national) umbrella organisations counting both majority and minority 
women’s organisations among their members.  One such organisation is the above-
                                            
56 For a full list of organisations supporting the Why Women?  Campaign, see 
http://www.whywomen.org.uk/supporterslist.htm  (accessed July 15, 2008).  The list of WRC’s member 
organisations can be found at http://www.wrc.org.uk/membership/members_listing/default.aspx.   
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mentioned Women’s Resource Centre (WRC), which in 2008 counts a total of 186 
organisations among its members (www.wrc.org.uk; listed members counted 
15/07/2008).  The WRC provides training, resources and support for its member 
organisations, in addition to campaigning and lobbying on various issues including 
financial resources for the women’s sector and ‘no recourse to public funds’ for 
immigrant women in violent marriages.57  Another example is the previously 
mentioned National Alliance of Women’s Organisations (NAWO), an umbrella 
organisation with 103 members (www.nawo.org.uk; listed members counted 
15/07/2008) that advocates ‘women’s voices’ at the levels of national, European and 
international politics, and promotes gender mainstreaming in government policies 
and their implementation.58   
 
The existence of formal alliances and coalitions, in the form of both temporary 
campaigns and more permanent organisations, strongly indicates that minoritised 
women’s organisations have been accepted as legitimate political actors in their own 
right by majority women’s groups.  While the interests forwarded by minoritised 
women’s organisations might have been overlooked or resisted throughout the 
1970s, 80s and 90s, today it is justified to say that they have been accepted, 
although perhaps not fully embraced, by the majoritised feminist movement.  
‘Accepted’ is here taken to mean that ethnic minority women’s organisations are 
viewed as both legitimate and valued actors in the women’s sector, as they are taken 
to represent the (varied) interests of ethnic minority women and provide viewpoints 
and services that reflect the needs of ethnic minority women.  We would argue, 
however, that ethnic minority women’s interests will not be sufficiently embraced until 
intersectional approaches to gender, race, class and other structures of inequality 
have been adopted and mainstreamed by white women’s organisations.  By 
‘sufficiently embraced’ we mean that at least gender and race/ethnicity should be 
integrated in the concerns and politics of women’s organisations.   
 
                                            
57 See http://www.wrc.org.uk/membership/members_listing/default.aspx for a full list of members of 
the Women’s Resource Centre.   
58 For a full list of NAWO’s member organisations, see http://www.nawo.org.uk/Member (accessed 
July 15, 2008).   
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One organisation which has started to mainstream an intersectional approach to 
inequalities experienced by women is the Fawcett Society.  Their report ‘Black and 
Minority Ethnic Women in the UK’, published in February 2005 (Fawcett, 2005a), 
marks the start of a serious engagement by a mainstream women’s organisation with 
the structural inequalities experienced by black and ethnic minority women in the UK.  
Following on from the report, in 2007, Fawcett initiated its three-year ‘Seeing Double’ 
project (see www.fawcettsociety.org.uk).  ‘Seeing Double’ follows three streams of 
work that Fawcett engages in: Power, Money and Justice, and aims ‘to make ethnic 
minority women’s persistent disadvantage visible to policymakers’ (ibid.) The project 
also includes mainstreaming work on race equality within the organisation itself.  We 
would like to suggest that Fawcett’s ‘Seeing Double’ project is a highly significant 
event, and perhaps even a turning point, both in symbolic and in real terms.  
Symbolically, it signals that a mainstream and previously white-dominated feminist 
women’s organisation has taken on board criticism which has been voiced by black 
feminists and black women’s movement actors for more than 25 years.  In real 
terms, it actually changes Fawcett itself as it broadens its focus and gives legitimacy 
to intersectional approaches to inequality.  In addition, Fawcett may also be able to 
effect political change through its evidence-based advocacy work and lobbying on 
the persistent inequalities experienced by ethnic minority women.   
 
Furthermore, we would like to suggest that Fawcett’s ‘Seeing Double’ project 
denotes that minoritised women’s organisations and their representatives have been 
assigned a status as ‘authentic insiders’ (Narayan, 1997: 142).  According to a 
Fawcett publication, ‘Seeing Double’ aims to enhance the capacity of ethnic minority 
women’s organisations to influence policy, and to ‘increase the voice of ethnic 
minority women so that debates that are about them learn from their perspectives 
and experiences’ (Moosa, 2008: 3).  What Fawcett has done is to provide resources 
and a platform from which ethnic minority women can speak directly and indirectly to 
the audience that normally listens to Fawcett.  Narayan suggests that the ‘authentic 
insider’ role can be a positive one, in as much as it is inhabited strategically, rather 
than as a reified and fixed discursive identity (Narayan, 1997: 155).   
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6.4.5 Current problem representations of co-operation and alliance in the 
women’s movement 
In this section we are taking a closer look at how women’s movement actors present 
the issue of co-operation and alliance as problematic along various dimensions.  The 
topics addressed include women’s movement actors’ framing of men as potential 
allies (or not), the representation and framing of white and black women’s 
organisations and issues, and the representation and framing of disagreements 
among ethnic minority women’s organisations in relation to forced marriage.  
Moreover, the section includes a discussion of religion as a site of disagreement, 
conflict and contestation for the women’s movement. 
 
6.4.6 Framing of men as anti-female or pro-feminist 
The disparity between radical and other feminists in the ‘second wave’ women’s 
movement (see Segal, 1987) on their view of men’s roles still exists, but it is not as 
ideological or divisive as it used to be in the 70s and 80s.  One of the interviewees 
pointed out that her organisation includes both black and white women participants, 
but the organisation is exclusively for women: ‘We wanted to keep the men out, they 
do not understand violence against women, very few men do and if they do it is 
because they have been educated by women’.  She continued: ‘Some men are able 
to learn, but on the whole they do not understand what it is like to live in the world as 
a woman, to be afraid to walk down the street at night’.  Where women’s 
organisations adhere to this view, there is little scope for establishing alliances with 
men. 
 
Most of the interviewed organisations, however, presented a more positive framing 
of men.  Both self-identified socialist and liberal feminists came forward with the view 
that men can be potential allies in the feminist cause.  One interviewee 
acknowledged that a focus on women might have been politically necessary in the 
1970s.  However, she saw limits to how far the gender equality agenda can proceed 
without having men on board.  According to this interviewee, men have a role to play 
in the feminist movement:  
 
‘(…) but now I think what is very important is that people who feel part of the 
political women’s movement recognise that in the last 30 years the dramatic 
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changes in women’s rights have not been met by dramatic changes in men’s 
lives and we cannot achieve equality separately from men.’  
 
Describing her own organisation as feminist and interested in reaching both women 
and men, she also identified other organisations in the women’s movement as 
feminist but focusing exclusively on women.  An exclusive focus on women is thus 
partly presented to be a problem in that it does not secure men’s participation in 
advancing a feminist agenda.  The inclusion of men may encourage their 
participation in the gender equality project and thereby enhance the situation of 
women.  This last perspective proposes that it is fruitful to engage with men when 
they are seen to be promoting politics that support feminism and gender equality.  
One organisation, the Fawcett Society, has recently called publicly for men to be part 
of a broad-based feminist movement.59   
 
6.4.7 Framing of white and black women’s organisations and issues 
Black women’s voice and representation is still an important issue in the women’s 
movement, and different movement actors represent different views and practices in 
relation to the question of who can speak with a legitimate voice for whose interests.  
Some organisations claim that their voice is more authentic and legitimate than 
others, because they represent ethnic minority women’s experiences.  The direct 
representation of their experience is what gives legitimacy to the engagement of 
these organisations in black women’s issues.  One of the interviewees, for example, 
defined her own organisation and its work on ethnic minority women’s issues as 
differently motivated to other (white) organisations.  While her organisation has 
engaged in such issues due to women members’ own experiences, other 
organisations are perceived as being engaged in ethnic minority issues due to 
‘political correctness’ or ‘cynical political thinking’.  Through this type of framing, a 
division is, thus, created between those organisations that are seen to have a 
legitimate, authentic and deep interest in ethnic minority women’s issues, and those 
organisations that are seen to have jumped on the political bandwagon in an attempt 
to gain credibility whilst not actually being deeply engaged with the issues per se. 
 
                                            
59 Katherine Rake, ‘The new mass women’s lobby must include men’, The Guardian February 2, 
2006.   
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Reflecting on the work of her own organisation on BME women, the interviewee 
stated that: 
 
‘what we have done is also given prominence to those kinds of issues like 
forced marriage, asylum seeking women and immigration [...].  But that has 
not been a cynical change of political thinking, because this is like political 
correctness, ‘we need to now look at black women because we haven’t’; ...  it 
is not like that.  What has happened is [that] the people involved in the 
organisation and the management committee has changed over that time, 
and they have brought their own perspectives as women would do.’  
 
Again, within this type of framing some actors are clearly seen as more legitimate 
than others, and a focus on BME women is seen as a rather exclusive concern for a 
particular type of organisation, namely those that represent ethnic minority women 
directly through their membership.   
 
Other feminist voices, including ethnic minority women, would disagree with the 
epistemological position embodied in this view.  Indeed, as shown earlier in this 
chapter, much of the criticism of the women’s movement by black feminists has been 
concerned with the alleged lack of engagement with the intersectional structures of 
race, gender and class by white feminists.  One of the interviewees who supported 
this perspective stated that although some ethnic minority women’s organisations 
are being listened to by the state, they are not necessarily being listened to by white 
women’s movement organisations.  She claimed that black women’s voices have 
had little influence on the practice of many white-dominated organisations: ‘if you 
look at [...] most of the white women’s organisations, they are not willing to look at 
the issues.  They simply pass them on to BME women’s organisations’.  She further 
emphasised that: 
 
‘feminism is for all women, regardless of their race or class or even religion.  
But I think white feminists generally are not really taking that fully on board, 
not in the methods of work.  For example the levels of racism in white refuges.  
I know that it isn’t the fault of those who run the refuges, it is not about fault, it 
is about what is mobilised for change, how we mobilise for change.’   
 
Similar concerns about the lack of attention on the part of white women to the 
interests of ethnic minority women were voiced by other interviewees as well.  She 
also pointed to the ‘no recourse to public funds’ campaign as an issue that 
demonstrates ‘considerable solidarity’ between white and black women’s 
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organisations as it is backed by many women’s organisations.  In this type of 
framing, it is viewed as a problem that white women’s organisations do not engage 
with BME women’s interests, but the possibility of feminist sisterhood among women, 
across racial, class or religious boundaries, is kept open.   
 
However, some women might be more likely to become ‘sisters’ than others, while 
some alliances are more precarious than others.  An explicit recognition of the 
intersection of race, gender and class may be the platform that makes alliance more 
likely:  
 
‘I would say that radical feminists are probably less worried about immigration, 
whereas socialist feminists are more in support of the kind of demands that 
we are making.  Because there is a better kind of understanding of the 
dynamics of race and gender there.  But I think the kind of groups that we felt 
were not necessarily feminist, but we also felt let down by some that are part 
of a wider women’s movement, who are not necessarily always feminists but 
also ...  developed services....  And some of them are white women who [...] 
take on kind of a very patronising approach to minority women, or just 
downright racist.  So ...  alliances can sometimes feel very kind of temporary, 
but sometimes they can be kind of well founded.  But it depends on the issue 
in many cases.’   
 
This interviewee agreed, however, with the observation of an increased level of 
solidarity and support from white women’s organisations:  
 
‘Yes, I think it is increasing.  I think with some women’s groups and not others.  
There is still – there is the patronising [attitude] in the more conservative 
women’s groups who are not, you know, that we have problems with.  And a 
lot of them will be mainstream groups, but I do think there is obviously a 
section that is supportive and are increasingly supportive.’ 
 
Thus this interviewee frames it as a responsibility also on the part of ethnic minority 
women’s organisations to show leadership and take initiatives in building 
connections with other movement actors: ‘Of course we have less power and less 
say and may not be listened to, but it is also about us organising and being ...  
vociferous and arguing our point and demanding leadership and support’.   
 
An interesting academic question is whether only organisations that have been 
primarily representing white women should actively seek the participation of ethnic 
minority women and engage in issues relevant to ethnic minority women, or whether 
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organisations that have primarily represented black women should encourage the 
participation of white women.  When a majority ethnic interviewee was asked why 
she did not get involved in a black women’s organisation, she replied ‘because they 
are a black organisation, they don’t have white women’.  The same interviewee, 
however, was involved in a mixed organisation that represented both majority and 
minority women.  On the other hand, a minority ethnic interviewee recounted how 
she was advised against becoming engaged in an organisation that was perceived 
by some ethnic minority women as white.  These experiences and problem-
representations demonstrate how organisations are perceived as either majority 
women’s organisations, minority women’s organisations, or mixed organisations that 
are open to majoritised and minoritised women.   
 
One of the traditionally white women’s organisations that might have been referred to 
indirectly by one of the interviewees above has in recent years managed to develop 
a more diverse membership base.  According to an interviewee, the organisation 
was perceived as ‘not just a white woman’s but white, able-bodied, middle-class....’, 
but its current membership reflects a more diverse society.  Lately it has taken on 
political issues perceived to be more relevant to BME women, including their lack of 
political representation.  According to one representative, the organisation does not 
claim to have had a long-standing interest in BME women: ‘I think we would be quite 
honest about the fact that until relatively recently [we] have not in any particularly co-
ordinated way addressed the specific needs of black and minority ethnic women’.  
The factor she singled out as most important for the organisation’s recent evidence 
gathering and advocacy work related to BME women was a change in leadership, 
with a new leader having been able to change the focus of the organisation.  The 
addressing of multiple identities in relation to discrimination and oppression, and the 
intersections of structures like race, gender and class and their effect on policy 
development was perceived as something the new leader has taken on.  Contrary to 
the perception that it is political expediency that has moved the organisation to take 
on ethnic minority women’s interests, the two interviewees from this organisation 
both express a strong, although recent, organisational commitment to women’s 
diverse interests.     
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According to this framing, the organisation took advantage of both the alleged 
absence of other players and the political room that this presented.  Clearly there are 
other organisations in the UK women’s movement that act on a national level to 
promote the interests of ethnic minority women (e.g., FORWARD, Imkaan, and 
Southall Black Sisters), but these might have been perceived to be mostly engaged 
in specific issues such as violence against women, and not in broader issues 
involving labour market participation, education, political engagement and so on that 
are also relevant to the lives of ethnic minority women.  This might explain the 
framing of a ‘gap’ and an opportunity for the organisation to take on such broader 
issues.  In this framing, it is seen as legitimate for any organisation, whether it 
directly represents BME women or not, to engage in discussing and making visible 
issues that concern ethnic minority women.   
 
6.4.8 Problem representations of disagreements among ethnic minority 
women’s organisations  
Much attention has been paid in this chapter to alliances (and the lack of alliances) 
between ethnic majority and minority women in the women’s movement.  In this 
section, however, the focus is on different problem representations forwarded by 
ethnic minority women’s organisations in relation to a specific issue, that of forced 
marriage.  No category of women, however it is constructed, could be said to 
represent all the views and interests of women within that category, and all ‘ethnic 
minority women’ do not share the same interests and views.  The issue of 
prostitution, for example, has divided white feminists.  However, as our study is 
designed with a focus on violence against women (including domestic abuse, forced 
marriage, honour killings and female genital mutilation) and racism and 
discrimination in relation to violence against women issues, disagreements among 
white feminists have not emerged as central to our analysis (prostitution, and also 
human trafficking, remain outside the remit of our analysis although it can be argued 
that these are also violence against women issues).  The focus in this section is, 
thus, on disunity among minoritised women’s organisations. 
 
The issue of forced marriage and whether or not its commission should be 
criminalised has recently been high on the political agenda in the UK.  The proposal 
to criminalise the practice has, however, been highly contested among ethnic 
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minority women’s organisations, while ethnic majority women’s organisations seem 
to have been largely silent on the issue, with exceptions including Fawcett and 
Women’s Aid.60  Disagreements have not been concerned with the protection of 
potential or actual victims of forced marriage.  The organisations are united in 
supporting the government’s Forced Marriage Unit, FMU, (established in January 
2005 as a joint unit between the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office) and in calling for government funding of service provision such as help-lines 
and refuges for victims.  The disagreements have been related to the political 
framing of the issue of forced marriage, or how the issue of forced marriage is 
represented as a problem by different actors within the women’s movement. 
 
The recent proposal to criminalise the commission of a forced marriage originated in the 
government consultation entitled ‘Forced marriage: A wrong not a right’ (Home Office, 
2005).  Some ethnic minority women’s organisations advocated that forced marriage 
should become an explicitly criminal offence in the law.  They argued that such a 
criminalisation would ‘send a strong message’ to possible and actual perpetrators.   
 
Other ethnic minority women’s organisations argued vehemently against 
criminalisation, claiming that criminalisation would not work, partly because victims 
are not likely to prosecute their own parents: ‘We do not think that young women 
would be keen to take their parents to court and see them in prison.  What they do 
want is to escape violence’, said one interviewee.  Furthermore, forced marriage is 
already unlawful (through existing legal mechanisms), and a separate law on forced 
marriage, outside a more general legal framework of violence against women, was 
seen as singling out particular ethnic minority communities.  Furthermore, said the 
same interviewee, ‘in the end [a] law will not be effective and then relying on 
stereotypes it will serve only to demonise whole communities further’.  This type of 
problem representation is, however, not accepted by all those who opposed 
criminalisation:  
 
‘For us there were some groups who opposed it [....] on the grounds that it 
would demonise communities.  That is not an argument that we would use, 
                                            
60 For a full list of respondents to the government consultation on the criminalisation of forced 
marriage, see Home Office 2006:  46-48.   
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primarily because we have always talked about domestic violence and we 
have always been accused of demonising communities by the anti-racist 
movement and creating a backlash and being told not to wash our dirty linen 
in public and so forth.’   
 
After its consultation round, the government shelved the proposal to criminalise 
forced marriage.  Later developments include the private members bill proposed by 
Lord Lester for a Civil Protection Act on forced marriage (Lord Hansard, 2007).61  
This bill was drafted in close consultation with Southall Black Sisters.  Again, ethnic 
minority women’s organisations were not united in their response to the proposed 
Civil Protection Act.  Imkaan, the umbrella organisation for BME women’s refuges, 
was one of the dissenting organisations both in relation to the criminalisation of 
forced marriage and the civil protection law.  Imkaan consulted with its own refuges, 
and these responded that a law would not be very useful (Lmkaan, 2005).  Instead, 
they argued for more places of safety and alternative routes to safety through 
increased funding and resources for women’s refuges that deal with victims of forced 
marriage (see also Wilson, 2007). 
 
Another difference in the framing of the problem of forced marriage is found between 
those who argue that the practice is patriarchal and rooted in gender inequality, and 
those who argue that it is a cultural problem.  A representative of one of the 
organisations that campaigned against criminalisation emphasised that the 
disagreements did not express ‘a split’ between the different organisations, but 
rather ‘a very subtle difference’, as they are all in agreement on the overall goal of 
protecting victims of forced marriage.  The organisation has built alliances with other 
black minority women’s groups that work on the issue of forced marriage.   
 
‘I mean that is where the kind of solid base support is.  But then we have 
differences with some of them.  I mean with [organisation x], for instance, we 
have a difference around the whole approach, because ...  they don’t 
recognise patriarchy [...].  There isn’t an acknowledgment of power and 
gender inequalities and structural inequalities.  There is a kind of overt racism 
and it is mainly, they would argue, that the causes of honour-based violence 
are rooted in culture rather than patriarchy.  And our argument is that it is 
rooted in patriarchy and the culture can be used for an excuse for control of 
women.  That is our analysis whereas not all women’s groups have that 
analysis and that is where the differences come in.’   
                                            
61 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/index/070613.html#contents 
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The quote illustrates the framing of forced marriage as either a form of gender-based 
violence or as a cultural problem, which in turn frames some organisations as 
feminist and others as non-feminist. 
 
This framing is also linked to a broader strategy of many women’s organisations, 
including the End Violence Against Women Campaign (EVAW), which seeks to 
make the government address the issues of forced marriage, honour-based violence 
and female genital mutilation within a national strategy on violence against women.  
Indeed, at the national level, current government websites illustrate the government’s 
non-responsive attitude towards the proposal to integrate issues of forced marriage, 
honour-based violence and female genital mutilation into a broader strategy on 
violence against women.  Again, the decision to list these organisations frames 
forced marriage as an issue which is of exclusive concern to ethnic minorities, and 
not as part of a broader societal problem of violence against women.  One of the 
interviewees highlighted the limitations of the current governmental approach to 
violence against women:  
 
‘...  historically domestic violence was framed in a rather limited way, it didn’t 
recognise the range of abuses that women experience [...].  What we have 
found is that the narrow focus on domestic violence excludes other forms of 
harm against women [...] The wider [UN] definition of violence against women 
is absolutely essential.62  So if you think about things like forced marriages 
and honour crimes and FGM, often they are actually not recognised within 
that theoretical framework by policy makers, by agencies.  And actually, 
unfortunately, by some women’s groups as well.’   
 
These women’s groups are seen to include both white women’s organisations and 
‘ethnic minority women’s groups who have just not engaged with the politics of the 
sector, who have recently emerged ...’ 
 
                                            
62 For the UN definition of violence against women, see UN 1993.   
 181 
A representative of another organisation that applies the UN definition of violence 
against women in its work emphasised that all types of violence against women 
should be framed as originating in gender inequality and not as related to specific 
cultures or groups of people:  
 
‘[We must] recognise that violence against women occurs universally, across 
cultures, across religion and ethnicity, class, and [...] whilst it occurs 
universally there are specific forms or specific manifestations that do affect 
specific women or specific groups of women.  But what we are talking about is 
placing that in the context of violence against women and not taking that out 
of the context and treating it as an individual [and] isolated situation, 
particularly with BME women, if you are thinking about black and ethnic 
women it is too easy to fall into the trap of using cultural analysis or focussing 
on race and religion, when actually what you are talking about is violence and 
it is gender, and it is gender driven.  In the same way that domestic violence 
in a majority community is driven by all those notions of patriarchy and control 
and it is the same issue ....  And the problem that we have had is trying to get 
government, and also the women’s sector as well, to recognise that it is an 
issue of violence against women, it is an issue of gender.  And that it is not 
about race or culture ...’   
 
The problem representation forwarded by this organisation includes a need to lobby 
the women’s movement as well as the government, for example on the issue of 
forced marriage:  
 
‘There was a lot of resistance, or significant resistance, in the women’s sector 
to be looking at forced marriage as a form of violence against women.  It was 
seen as something that only happens to certain women in certain 
communities and it was looked at in that way.  But what we were arguing or 
trying to persuade women’s organisations to do was to take their experience 
of domestic violence and to apply that, because domestic violence is a form of 
violence against women, in the same way that forced marriage is.  So 
organisations have 30 years of history of domestic violence and you need to 
use the domestic violence experience in terms of forced marriage.’   
 
Another interviewee who described the women’s sector as ‘divided’ on the issue of 
criminalisation of forced marriage, frames the lack of unity as a problem for the 
sector vis-à-vis the government: In this view it is framed as a problem that not all 
ethnic minority women’s organisations agree.  Other interviewees, however, 
suggested that this was not a problem in so far as organisations agreed on the need 
for service provision for victims, and that the government itself is more interested in 
providing effective services than in discussing the political framing of the issue of 
forced marriage.  In other words, it might only be a problem for the women’s sector 
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itself that it is divided on whether to frame forced marriage as a problem rooted in 
patriarchy or in culture, and in framing it as part of a broader violence against women 
agenda or as a stand-alone issue.   
 
6.4.9 Religion as a site of disagreement, conflict and contestation for the 
women’s movement 
Women’s place within religious belief and practice has been a contested issue for 
feminists since the early beginnings of the ‘second wave’ women’s movement, and, 
indeed, since the ‘first wave’ women’s movement of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century (see Morgan, 2002).  Far from being alienated from the women’s 
movement, religious women have identified with and sought to influence the 
women’s movement in directions compatible with their faith.  Some feminists have 
rejected religion outright, while others have started a process of reinterpreting their 
religious faith in an attempt to reconcile it with their feminist beliefs.  Such 
reinterpretations have taken place across a variety of religious beliefs, including 
Christianity and Islam (e.g. Daly, 1994; Mernissi, 1991; Wadud, 1999).  In the 
context of British feminism, Christianity, Judaism and Islam have also been 
scrutinised by religious and non-religious women alike, and the question of whether 
religious belief can co-exist with feminist values has been vigorously debated  
 
Today, Christian, Muslim and Jewish feminists, together with feminists from other 
religious faiths, continue to grapple with questions of faith and gender justice, but 
Islam has become singled out as the most contested religion of the day due to links 
between the Islamic faith and religious extremism.  Moreover, Islam has become a 
symbol of women’s oppression.  As argued above, it is likely that increased diversity, 
or the development of an increasingly multicultural society, has had an impact on the 
willingness of the women’s movement to take on intersectional perspectives on 
gender, race, and class.  Rather than dismissing or ignoring the voices of religious 
women as irrelevant or non-conducive to feminism, the women’s movement needs to 
engage with religious women and build alliances with feminist religious women.  One 
example of such engagement is that of the Women’s National Commission which 
has been instrumental in developing and supporting the creation of the Muslim 
Women’s Network in 2002 (see below).  Moreover, the women’s movement needs to 
voice a clear demand to be heard when the government engages with women’s faith 
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groups, and continue to demand the protection of established women’s rights from 
erosion caused by pressure from conservative religious groups.63  On some issues, 
faith-based organisations may actually erode or undermine gender equality and 
women’s rights ‘by creating pockets in society where ‘religious freedoms’ justify the 
marginalisation of women’ (Ghodsee, 2007).   
 
Two women’s organisations that have voiced public concern about the government’s 
engagement of faith groups through closed forums are Southall Black Sisters and 
Women Against Fundamentalism.  In a submission to the Commission on Integration 
and Cohesion, these two organisations are critical of what they frame as the 
government’s ‘construction of faith communities’ and its closed consultations with 
Muslim women on ‘issues such as violence against women, immigration difficulties, 
community pressures, racism and the lack of political presentation – none of which 
are specific to Muslim women only’ (WAF, 2007: 36).   
 
Although largely silent on the issue of religious faith and women’s rights, the 
women’s movement is, nevertheless, caught up in the current political climate in 
which the UK government has taken a new-found interest in Muslim women.  
Several of our interviewees claimed that this interest has been on the rise since the 
terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, and perceived it as problematic that the 
government has made a link between the attacks and its dialogue with Muslim 
women.  This meeting followed a previous consultation process involving Muslim 
women around the country organised by the government funded Muslim Women’s 
Network and the Women’s National Commission which aimed to ‘responsibly record 
the authentic views of women from the Muslim community’ and feed these views into 
a report (MWN, 2006: 65).  The consultation agenda was, thus, initially open to the 
issues that Muslim women themselves would put forward.  However, due to 
government pressure, some details in the final consultation report were censored 
and removed.  These examples are illustrative of the government’s use of a selection 
of Muslim women as ‘authentic insiders’ (Narayan, 1997) who are seen as providing 
                                            
63 In 2008, women’s organisations mobilised outside the UK Parliament to protest against proposed 
changes in abortion laws.   
 184 
the government with representative and legitimate views from a community 
coherently defined as ‘the Muslim community’. 
 
Such consultation processes have generated much debate.  They have given 
women who are rarely heard in the public domain an opportunity to express their 
voices, and they have allowed women to come forward with different and contrasting 
viewpoints.  The importance of listening to women, and not only to male community 
leaders, was highlighted by many participants in the consultation process led by the 
Muslim Women’s Network and the Women’s National Commission (MWN, 2006).   
 
Several of the participants in our research expressed critical attitudes towards the 
engagement of religious groups in political dialogue.  They framed it as a problem 
that the government is choosing to listen to religious groups, and argued that instead 
it should listen to secular groups like themselves.  A problem representation is thus 
created where religious groups are constructed as being located outside the 
women’s movement and in opposition to the interests of feminist women.  For 
example, one interviewee claimed that there is a ‘whole movement towards a faith 
agenda’.  She saw this agenda as highly problematic, and perceived the government 
to be consulting community and faith leaders, rather than ethnic minority women’s 
organisation, due to an alleged focus on ‘the faith agenda’.  Both her organisation 
and other ethnic minority women’s groups can be said to be engaged in a battle for 
legitimacy and representation in terms of whose voices should be heard.  Her 
concerns were echoed by several other interviewees who all claimed that race and 
faith issues are much higher on the political agenda today than are gender issues, 
and who are concerned that women are the losers when it comes to political change.   
 
Concerns about the increasing role of religion in the public domain, and specifically 
the link between religion and the rights and status of women, were voiced by both 
ethnic majority and minority women in our research.  A white interviewee, for 
example, stated that she is ‘extremely worried by the possible clash between no 
discrimination on the grounds of religion, belief and women’s equality.  I am 
extremely concerned about that’.  This interviewee also emphasised that women’s 
individual faith is not a problem; rather, conflicts arise when ‘faith practices and rules 
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followed by men or women […] interfere with women’s access to their human rights, 
their freedoms and their equality […].  We are always against it […]’. 
 
While on the one hand there are conflicts between women’s organisations and faith 
groups on issues such as sexuality, abortion, and child adoption, there are also 
conflicts within women’s organisations that draw on a multi-faith membership.  
Issues like abortion and prostitution are, thus, contentious issues within women’s 
movement organisations, be they national or international.  ‘Sexual reproductive 
rights and health and abortion, that will come and haunt us.  There is no doubt about 
that.  We are seeing a growing conservatism here, I think we will see coalitions of 
religious groups here, we have a revival of the Catholic church, partly because of 
migration [….]’.  Echoing calls from WAF and SBS, this interviewee also highlighted 
the need for women’s organisations to become visible and engage directly with 
claims from faith groups:  
 
‘The women’s organisations should be looking at this and saying […] this is not 
about religion, it is not about faith, it is about belief, we should be lobbying the 
government saying this is about belief, therefore secular women, we, can be 
involved in this.  We need to be involved.’  
 
Above we described the framing of the issue of forced marriage as a dispute 
between those who adopt a feminist and gender-based perspective and those who 
adhere to a cultural view.  This tension is also found in the framing of religious 
groups as anti-feminist or against the empowerment of women: ‘We have really got 
to be supporting secular feminist anti-racist organisations, if we really want the liberal 
policy that is needed to tackle violence against women.  Because these other groups 
[Muslim groups, faith groups, community groups] are not working in our interest.  If 
you really want to empower women this is not what you should be doing’, said one 
interviewee.  According to this interviewee, the state has a new-found interest in 
consulting Muslim women due to terrorist events.  ‘This is all now about fighting 
extremism and terrorism.  So there are vast amounts of money available, particularly 
for Muslim groups and initiatives around Muslim communities.  So ...  now everything 
has been redefined along religious lines and secularism is under threat and feminism 
is under threat, because a lot of the demands these groups make are very 
conservative’.   
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The category ‘Muslim women’ is thus not only a contested one but also a limited one 
that sets Muslim women apart from non-Muslim women, which in turn reinforces the 
perception of ‘Muslim women’ as a unified category of women who share the same 
interests.  The interviewee further underlined the importance of listening to a plurality 
of voices:  
 
‘...  we need to be looking at the heterogeneous nature of women’s experiences 
across race, class, gender, and all those perceptions.  And the emphasis on 
Muslim women itself, it sets them out as ‘the other’ and that in itself is 
problematic because there is a reinforcement that somehow they need to have 
different treatment to everyone else.’  
 
Another interviewee thought that despite the government’s consultation with Muslim 
women, such women are not being taken as seriously as male community leaders: 
‘Women ...  remain very much on the margins, very much excluded from that 
process of determining what are the issues in their community, what needs to be 
raised and how that should be done.  It is often not heard, or just doesn’t seem 
important compared to somebody from the Muslim Council of Britain really saying 
what we need.  So that is really frustrating’.  Despite an alleged lack of serious 
government attention to women’s voices, however, the interviewee remains sceptical 
about the engagement of any religious groups.  In such problem representations, 
religion and women’s rights are framed as non-compatible, and the notion that 
‘religion can play a progressive, political role’ (WAF, 1996: 1) has been largely 
abandoned.   
 
Some of the viewpoints expressed by participants in our research are echoed by 
Hannana Siddiqui of Southall Black Sisters.  Siddiqui points to the lack of agreement 
among women’s movement actors and between women’s movement actors and 
other voluntary sector actors, and argues that there are ‘key internal divisions’ within 
the ethnic minority women’s movement (Siddiqui, 2008: 49).  She identifies it as a 
problem that faith-based women’s groups and their calls for ‘specific services and 
initiatives for Muslim women’ are given political attention by the government (ibid.).  
Such initiatives are perceived to ‘undermine the secular, feminist demands of ethnic 
minority women’s groups that recognise common experiences between ethnic 
minority women across religious divides ...’ (ibid.).  According to Siddiqui, faith-based 
groups have not offered escape routes to victims of domestic violence, but have 
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argued for mediation and reconciliation which allegedly puts women at further risk.  
She frames it as problematic that the state ‘continues to give priority to the views and 
interests of community leaders and/or faith-based organisations, some of which are 
led by women’ (ibid.: 48).  Secular ethnic minority women’s groups, on the other 
hand, ‘have an expertise and a long history of promoting the rights of minority 
women challenging gender-based violence’ (ibid.).  In this view, the solution to the 
perceived problem is that the state should first and foremost listen to secular ethnic 
minority women’s groups, as these are more rightful bearers of what we might call 
‘authentic’ ethnic minority women’s voices.  Furthermore, Siddiqui calls for ‘[a] united 
feminist ethnic minority women’s movement’ that builds alliances ‘with white 
feminists as well as anti-racists and other social equality and human rights 
movements’ (ibid.: 56), thus opening up for strategic joint campaigns between 
women’s organisations and other actors.   
 
As discussed above, religious communities are framed by secular women’s 
organisations as arenas where women’s voices are silenced or rarely heard even 
though they need to be heard.  At the same time some groups within the women’s 
movement adhere to the view that religious belief and faith-based groups should be 
kept out of political discourse, some of whom may identify with feminism or with the 
broader women’s movement.  Again, from an outsider perspective, it would seem 
that religion is such a symbolic marker of identity and belonging in today’s society 
that it would be difficult if not impossible to ignore religious voices, including the 
voices of religious women.  Perhaps a legitimate action for non-religious or secular 
women’s organisations would, thus, be to demand a voice alongside religious 
women and their organisations when the government engages in consultations with 
local communities, rather than rejecting outright the government’s consultation with 
faith-based women’s organisations.  That way, the government would hear not only 
religiously informed views about women’s roles in family and society but also secular 
views which might challenge and contest them. 
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One particularly visible and contested issue in multicultural Britain is the use of the 
veil among some Muslim women.64  The Fawcett Society, which has recently 
engaged with inequalities experienced by ethnic minority women, has also entered 
the religious arena of debate by facilitating a roundtable discussion on the use of the 
veil and women’s rights (see www.fawcettsociety.org.uk).  The organisation itself 
has, however, chosen not to take a stand on whether to support or condone the use 
of the veil.  An interviewee perceived it as ‘inappropriate and disproportionate’ for the 
organisation to ‘wade in on this one’.  We suggested that it might be a good strategic 
position to take because the issue is a ‘minefield’ of differing opinions, to which the 
interviewee replied that: 
 
‘...  the overwhelming feeling from us at the moment towards debates like that is 
that women’s voices are rarely heard.  So for us to wade in there with a 
professional voice is completely unhelpful because the women that we are 
talking about have so little voice themselves, not only right now, immediately, in 
the media, you know it is usually white politicians talking about this issue, but 
also long-term in terms of their representation in public life.  In politics there are 
not mechanisms in place for them to have that voice at the moment.’   
 
The interviewee was thus concerned that the organisation should facilitate 
discussion, rather than dictate any outcomes and thus reinforce the lack of 
‘authentic’ women’s voices.   
 
Because the issue of veiling is so fraught with conflict among minoritised women, it is 
difficult for both minority and majority women’s organisations to take sides and, thus, 
be associated with a particular type of ethnic minority woman – be it one that rejects 
or accepts the veil.  Other issues, such as the lack of political representation among 
ethnic minority women, are far easier to take a stand on.  The issue of political 
representation is not as ‘dangerous’ and not as fraught with conflict among women 
as are issues related to religion, including the use of the veil.  The issue of political 
representation can easily be interpreted as a question of fairness and justice: it is not 
fair and it is undemocratic that some women’s voices are not represented and thus 
not heard (how to achieve gender parity in politics, such as through quotas or 
women’s lists, is of course still controversial).   
                                            
64 For example, Cabinet Minister Jack Straw has called on Muslim women to remove veils that cover 
the face (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5411954.stm).   
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Furthermore, the white women’s movement has previously been charged with 
‘patronising attitudes’ if and when they are ‘tell[ing] them what their reality is, as if 
black women were incapable of understanding and judging their own reality’ (Kazi, 
1986: 87).  The charge of displaying patronising attitudes is still relevant, and one 
interviewee who is open to forming alliances with white women’s organisations 
emphasised that ethnic minority women’s struggles should be led by themselves:  
 
‘... groups like us [....] well we have always asked for solidarity and support 
[from the white women’s movement].  So we have said, look, of course we want 
support from you.  [But] we don’t want you to lead our struggles because we are 
here, we are leading it ourselves, and we don’t want a patronising approach 
here, and unfortunately some white women tend to be patronising and that is 
where we have our arguments over race, so where the feminist movement has 
been supportive and said “we support”....  “Support our demands and we will 
support yours”; that is the alliance building.  But we don’t expect them to take 
leadership.  I only expect them to take leadership if nobody else is talking about 
it and nobody else is trying to address it.’   
 
6.5 Summary remarks about the UK case 
 
Above we have discussed some examples of alliance and co-operation within the UK 
women’s movement  We have illustrated some of the diversity and disagreements 
that have characterised the ‘second wave’ women’s movement in the UK from its 
inception in the late 1960s and early 1970s through to today.  Moreover, we have 
demonstrated some significant examples of co-operation and alliance, in particular 
between white and black women’s movement actors and with an emphasis on the 
policy area of violence against women.  We have also discussed the emergence of 
discord linked to feminism, culture, religion and belief.   
 
Divisions among feminists linked to different types of feminism (radical, socialist and 
liberal) still exist in today’s women’s movement, but their significance has declined 
and do not form barriers to working together.  Furthermore, there is still disunity 
between white and black women in the women’s movement.  The explicit feminist 
demands from white women have, to some extent, alienated black women from the 
women’s movement and made the anti-racist movement a more inclusive arena for 
black women’s activism (Bryan et al., 1985: 173; see also Lovenduski and Randall, 
1993: 82).   
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There remains a clear need for autonomous black women’s organisations alongside 
other women’s organisations.  Separate organisations for a variety of women and 
interests are needed and should continue to exist.  Our main point is that majoritised 
women’s organisations should seek to develop more intersectional approaches to 
gender inequality; approaches that acknowledge the importance of minoritised 
positions and locations.   
 
We do not intend to advocate that black women’s organisations should be subsumed 
within majority women’s organisations; rather, we would argue that majority women’s 
organisations should engage seriously with intersectional approaches (Crenshaw, 
2006; Denis, 2008) by developing policies and organisational structures that account 
for intersections between different structures of inequality, such as gender, race, 
class, sexuality, and faith.  In our fieldwork we have seen evidence that this is 
actually taking place in some women’s movement organisations, including the 
Fawcett Society.  Recent developments at the level of government also highlight a 
more general move towards intersectional approaches.65  Furthermore, it could be 
argued that by taking on intersectional approaches, women’s movement 
organisations would position themselves to build increased opportunities for alliance 
and co-operation across the majority/minority divide within the women’s movement. 
 
Today, we find examples of organisations that are more ethnically mixed than they 
once were, which in turn is promising in terms of such organisations becoming 
seriously engaged in more complex and multidimensional analyses of inequalities 
experienced by women.  Such engagement is crucial for the continued formation of 
strategic alliances in various policy areas between women’s movement actors.  In all 
the current calls for intersectional analysis, it is important not to lose sight of gender 
inequalities and women’s experience of oppression.  It is these experiences that 
offer common ground for women and future possibilities for a strategic sisterhood 
between women who also represent a variety of experiences and interests that 
cannot easily be accumulated under the terms ‘gender’ or ‘women’. 
                                            
65 The Equality and Human Rights Commission (established in 2007) has subsumed the Equal 
Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality, and the Disability Commission.   
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We have described some of the different problem representations, especially in 
relation to violence against women, that exist within and across ethnic minority 
women’s organisations.  Whilst agreeing on the importance of a victim-centred 
approach, some of these organisations express problem representations that are of 
significance to the way in which the women’s movement should argue for increased 
resources for victims.  Although politicians might not take on board the importance of 
differences in how issues are framed and problematised, such differences may have 
a bearing on whether or not certain politics can claim to be feminist. 
 
We have tried to show that disputes around feminism, culture, religion and faith are 
located within and across majority and minority women’s organisations.  A 
multicultural society where faith-based groups demand to be heard is a ‘fact of life’ 
that women’s movement actors have paid too little attention to.  The women’s 
movement as a whole must take the so-called ‘faith-agenda’ seriously by starting to 
voice more loudly their feminist concerns and opinions, and by demanding 
representation when government attempts exclusively to consult with faith-based 
organisations.  The women’s movement will continue to grapple with issues of 
religion and feminism, but rather than assuming an opposition between them it could 
extend its demonstrated willingness to forge strategic alliances on particular issues 
and investigate whether or not alliances to promote feminist politics can be built 
between secular and religious women.   
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have discussed the relations between majoritised and minoritised 
women’s organisations in Norway, Spain and the UK since the 1970s.  The chapter 
is based on new empirical material – interviews with movement activists but also with 
some public administrators – as well as research literature, public documents and 
movement texts.  Inspired by Bacchi’s (1999) discourse approach and Verloo’s 
(2005) frame analysis, we have explored the representations of co-operation, 
alliances and conflicts between and within majority and minority women’s 
organisations.  We have identified and elaborated some of the major themes that 
appeared in the interviews related to the ways in which the interviewees talked about 
their relations to other movement organisations; and we have analysed various 
possible effects of the identified frames and discourses.   
 
The interviews with activists have displayed a number of differences between 
Norway, Spain and the UK related to the mobilisation of migrant and ethnic minority 
women and their relations to the majority women’s organisations: We have noticed 
that ethnic minority women in Norway and the UK began to organise during the 
1970s - women in the UK some years earlier than in Norway - whereas this took 
place at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s in Spain.  The 
institutionalisation of public funding of women’s organisations also started much later 
in Spain compared to Norway and the UK.  Ethnic minority women’s organisations 
include indigenous (Sami) women, national minority (Roman) women in Spain and 
migrant women.  The main ethnic communities of migrant women vary because of 
the different impact of the waves of immigration to Europe from the late 1960s due to 
dissimilar political and economic histories.  Our analysis also indicates different 
degrees of co-operation and intersectionality; the UK has the most promising 
example of a majority feminist organisation addressing ethnic discrimination and 
racism within an intersectional approach.  Norway comes second with regard to 
majority women’s organisations’ concern with issues related to ethnic minority 
women while Spain displays the least indications of co-operation and a common 
political platform across ethnic divides. 
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The interviews have displayed a number of similar tendencies in Norway, Spain and 
the UK concerning the mobilisation of migrant and ethnic minority women and their 
relations to the majority women’s organisations: Women’s organisations are 
embedded within the larger social movement industry, and minority women have 
tended to affiliate with ‘their’ ethnic group, community or movement before 
establishing separate women’s or feminist organisations.  Feminist organising has 
been an effect of disappointment with various male organisations and gender-mixed 
movements, across ethnic differences. 
 
The mobilisation of feminism and women’s organisations has been deeply influenced 
by inter- and trans-national trends.  The UN Women’s International Decade 1975-
1995 (Pietilä and Vickers, 1994) opened new policy windows for all kinds of women’s 
organisations and prompted trans-national networking.  The European Women’s 
Lobby was set up to influence the EU’s gender equality agenda, and has national 
units in Spain and the UK.  Trans-national movements, such as the Sami Movement, 
the Romani Movement and the Black Liberation Movement, have inspired ethnic 
minorities to organise at national and local levels.   
 
One major conclusion based on the interviews is that there is a vast variety within 
and between the categories of ethnic majority and minority women’s organisations.  
Nevertheless, we argue that ethnic minority women’s organisations, in general, have 
become legitimate actors and have been incorporated in majority women’s 
movements within the three countries.  Referring to Rokkan’s concept of barriers to 
political participation (Rokkan, 1970), we maintain that they are accepted as political 
actors in their own right by majority women’s organisations.  Their interests are more 
embraced by and better incorporated into majority women’s organisations today 
compared to the 1970s and 1980s.  In general, however, ethnic minority women 
have yet to achieve significant representation and executive power within majority 
women’s organisations.   
 
We have tried to identify broad types of representations of the relations between 
minority and majority women’s organisations: For instance, we suggest two 
competing discourses among majority and minority feminists during the 1970s and -
80s in Norway; one discourse of anger among minority feminists and one of irritation 
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among majority feminist.  Among the non-feminist women’s organisations we noticed 
one discourse of charity and one of solidarity.  Inspired by Julia Sudbury (1998), we 
have analysed responses to the claims forwarded by minority feminist activists 
among majority feminist activists.  There is a general agreement among the minority 
activists that the majority women’s organisations have been ethnocentric in Norway, 
Spain and the UK.  There is little evidence to the contrary in the interviews with 
majority activists.  Intersectional approaches are hard to find.  To what extent 
majority activists have also been racist, is more controversial.  Respondents from 
majority feminist organisations would hardly admit racist attitudes or practices, 
whereas feminist activists from ethnic minority organisations claim that racism is 
characteristic not just of public policies but also of feminist organisations as long as 
they do not include anti-racism in their feminist agenda.   
 
The relations between ethnic minority and majority women’s organisations were 
strained from the outset, indicated by minority women interviewees’ talk about being 
overlooked and misrecognised within the larger women’s movements.  Discourses of 
women’s liberation and gender equality have not easily been merged with discourses 
of ethnic discrimination and racism among majority organisations.  Feminism is a 
contested concept, and so are ‘women’s issues’, the relations of men to feminist and 
women’s organisations, and the meaning of religion.   
  
There are important instances of co-operation and strategic framing of claims across 
ethnic differences in all three countries, however.  These are generally linked to 
issues of gender violence, and to the growing feminist demand for a holistic and 
integrated public policy against all kinds of gender violence, be it domestic violence, 
violence in close relations, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and so on.  In 
Norway, Spain and the UK, the feminist divisions of the 1970s between liberal, 
radical and socialist feminism seem less salient, whereas religion and ethnicity has 
become eye-catching.  Gender violence, which is the issue we have chosen to focus, 
upon, in this research project, seems to be a feminist issue with a considerable 
potential for co-operation and strategic framing across ethnic differences.  Migrant 
women’s concern with the discrimination of migrant women in the labour market is 
less salient among the interviewed majority activists.  This may reflect the focus of 
our research question, but it is also likely to mirror different political priorities.   
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A systematic finding across the countries is that religion has become an urgent 
issue, and also an issue which seems more likely to divide than to unite feminist and 
women’s organisations.  The relationship between feminism and multiculturalism is 
prominent in all three countries, with religion in the sense of Islam, and ethnicity in 
the sense of everything but whiteness, as the most visible issues.  Majority women’s 
organisations are generally not addressing ‘whiteness’ or their own ethnicity and 
privilege, although anti-racism and issues related to migrant women have become 
legitimate issue, within women’s movements.  Religion seems to be more disuniting, 
and an incendiary question within and among majority and minority feminist 
organisations. 
 
The interviews have underlined the enormous variations within our main categories 
‘majority’ and ‘minority’ women’s organisations concerning the question of co-
operation and conflict between women’s organisations.  Several interviewees 
resisted employing these categories and claimed that they hid more than they 
revealed.  We also notice that changes in the organisational landscapes – with some 
development towards more ethnically mixed constituencies within what used to be 
majority women’s organisations, and an increased focus on issues related to migrant 
women among ethnic gender-mixed majority organisations.  Today, we find 
examples of organisations that are more ethnically mixed than they once were.  This 
is promising in terms of a broader engagement with intersectional approaches to 
women’s issues.  Our findings of more ethnically mixed organisations further 
complicate the labelling of categories of women’s organisations as majority or 
minority organisations.  They should stimulate a continued debate on how to talk 
about ethnicity in the organisational landscape and elsewhere.   
 
The presumption that co-operation and the framing of a common platform across 
ethnic differences would empower the feminist movement has gained some support: 
We have seen evidence of movement impact when women’s organisations co-
ordinate their claims and are able to sustain public pressure.  This does not imply, 
however, that we find organising on the basis of ethnicity – white or otherwise – to be 
politically wrong.  Quite the contrary, there is a clear need for autonomous ethnic 
minority/indigenous women’s organisations to articulate the particular interests and 
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concerns of minority women within and beyond the women’s movement, and to 
pressure the majority women’s organisations to address whiteness and privilege. 
We also believe that majority feminist organisations would profit from elaborating 
broader, intersectional analyses of women’s rights and addressing their own 
privileges.   
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7 CLAIMS-MAKING AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
FOR CONTEMPORARY WOMEN’S MOVEMENT ORGANISATIONS IN NORWAY, 
SPAIN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
7.1 Introduction and Background 
 
In this chapter we examine some of the opportunities and constraints that 
organisations within women’s movements in Norway, Spain and the UK have 
highlighted during interviews when asked about the possible influence or lack of 
influence they perceive themselves to have on the formation of the state’s gender 
equality policies and policies aimed towards reducing and alleviating various forms of 
violence against women.  We present and analyse claims-making and problem 
representations forwarded by both organisational and government representatives 
(civil servants and politicians) in relation to policy gaps and political influence at the 
state level.  The issue of international work and influence, including the perceived 
importance of such work among various research participants in Norway, Spain, and 
the UK, has been dealt with in the three individual country reports.   
 
This chapter is organised in three main sections; one section for each of the 
countries included in our study, each with a country-specific summary at the end.  A 
fourth and final section draws attention to some of the differences and similarities 
observed across the three case-studies.   
 
7.2 The Case of Norway 
 
In this section we examine some of the opportunities and constraints that women’s 
organisations in Norway have highlighted during interviews about their possible 
influence on policy-making.  The examination focuses mainly on themes related to 
violence against women and ethnic discrimination/racism.  However, ‘women’s 
issues’ in general and, especially, issues concerning the intersection between 
‘gender’ and ‘ethnicity’ have been addressed.  The focal point is on the 
organisational actors’ strategies and their experiences in relation to the 
organisations’ political influence.  Moreover, we have interviewed key actors among 
civil servants and parliamentary politicians about their view of the organisations’ 
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political influence.  We also refer to the selective mapping of documents which was 
included in the country report from Norway (Appendix B) and intended to 
complement findings from our interviews. 
 
The analysis is mainly concerned with contemporary policy processes in Norway.  
The initial focus was on the 1990s and 2000s.  However, some of the interviewees 
have been active in the women’s movement since the 1970s and 1980s and could 
provide a longer time perspective, whereas most of the small membership-based 
minority women’s organisations in our study are about ten years old or less.  Thus, 
the primary focus has been the 2000s.  The longer time perspective provided by 
some of the respondents, however, includes perspectives on change. 
 
The next part of this section outlines the main features of the national political 
opportunity structures that provide opportunities and create constraints for women’s 
organisations in their attempts to influence policy.  The focus is on opportunity 
structures on the Norwegian state level, however some of the small local 
organisations also relate to their local municipality. 
 
7.2.1 Selective inclusion: institutional and discursive political opportunities in 
Norway 
The Norwegian political system can be described as accommodating, all-inclusive, 
unitary and relatively de-centralised.  It has a factionalised party system and a 
multiple cleavage structure, with neo-corporatism and an emphasis on consensus 
politics.  The “Norwegian way” of influencing social protests is through selective 
inclusion or incorporation; and the inclusion of a few selected groups (Kjellman, 
2007). 
 
As we shall see, political opportunities have changed considerably since the 1970s 
for Norwegian women, independent of their construction as majority or minority 
women.  Generally, however, women’s political mobilisation during the 1970s and 
onwards took place within a political system generally characterised by favorable 
institutional structures.  There was a tradition for public funding of non-governmental 
organizations; hearings and consultations with established groups through a wide 
system of permanent or ad hoc committees and councils; a legitimate tradition of 
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lobbying based on a short distance - symbolically - from those affected by policy 
changes to the decision-makers; and a multiparty political system in majority 
constituencies - which makes it easier for diverse groups to be represented than in a 
different political system.   
 
Kjellman (2007: 9) argues that ‘protest and mobilisation in Norway have evolved in 
relation to specific types of political opportunities’.  He further claims that ‘while a 
singular focus on political opportunities, on their own, does not tell the entire story, a 
focus on the role of selective inclusion into the political process by certain groups, 
and the manner in which other groups have been excluded, is fundamental to 
understanding patterns over time in the Norwegian case’ (ibid.: 9, our italics). 
 
In the article “Inclusion or Exclusion?  The Norwegian State, Social Movements, and 
Political Opportunities”, Kjellman operationalises political opportunities as the formal 
institutional structure, the informal procedures of authorities, the parliamentary 
arena, policy implementation capacity, and the extent of democratic rights (Kjellman, 
2007: 141).  As to the first dimension, the formal institutional structure, the number of 
meaningful access points for mobilising groups gives an indication of the 
centralisation of the state.  The Norwegian unitary system provides significantly 
fewer access points compared to federalist systems (Lijphart 1999, in Kjellman 2007: 
144).  Another feature of the formal institutional structure in Norway is the 
established pattern of neo-corporatist interest mediation.  Since the mid-80s there 
has been an increased role for parliament in decision-making, but the corporative 
channel remains important (Nordby, 1994; Heidar og Bertnzen, 1995; Bortne et al., 
2001, in Kjellman 2007: 144). 
 
The second dimension of political opportunities, namely informal procedures, is 
defined as ‘the shared implicit or explicit understandings of the political process and 
movement groups that guide the actions of authorities’ (ibid.: 148).  Kjellman (2007: 
149-150) emphasises the tradition of consensus politics in Norway, which is based 
on compromise and negotiation.  The Norwegian state is inclusive towards new 
societal interests.  However, this inclusion comes at a price and groups are expected 
to be moderate and possess skills that are of use to the authorities (Kjellman 2000, 
in ibid.: 159).  In general, states have the power to define the terms of the debate 
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and inclusion of challenging groups can be a way for states to pacify them and to 
preserve their own interests (Kriesi et al., 1995, in Kjellman, 2007: 149). 
 
The third dimension, the parliamentary arena, ‘serves to temper the degree of 
centralisation in the Norwegian political system’ (Kjellman, 2007: 150).  Compared to 
a two-party system, the Norwegian parliament is factionalised and contains several 
small and medium size parties.  This creates more openings and access for social 
movement groups (Aardal, 1993: 90, in Kjellman, 2007: 151).  However, not all 
movement groups will be included in the same way, and the parliamentary arena is 
also selectively inclusive (Kjellman 2007:151-152).   
 
Policy implementation capacity, the state’s ability to formulate and implement public 
policy, is a fourth dimension of political opportunities.  In Norway the state is seen as 
strong on policy output.  This dimension is viewed as an incentive for social 
movement actors.  However, this may vary over time and from area to area (ibid.: 
153).   
 
The last dimension is democratic rights.  Norway is ‘generally described as having 
one of the world’s most advanced and flourishing democracies’ (see Kjellman, 2007: 
155).  However, general descriptions are sometimes not accurate for all groups, for 
instance immigrant groups.  Another point made by Kjellman (2007: 156) is that 
identities of social movement actors ‘based on inclusion or exclusion will in part be 
constructed around perceptions of, or actual lack of democratic rights; [and] these 
identities (…) will in turn influence the strategy choices by movement groups’. 
 
In line with Kjellman we conclude that the Norwegian state is ‘selectively inclusive’: 
 
‘It is, one the one hand, inclusive in that its formal structure allows movement 
groups access to decision-making processes through the neo-corporate 
channel, the administrative bureaucracy, and the parliamentary arena.  (…) 
on the other hand, the Norwegian state is also one that can be described as 
exclusive.  Its level of centralization - as compared to federalist states - 
provides fewer access points for movement groups (…), and by virtue of its 
lack of an independent judicial branch.  It is further exclusive because, while 
authorities may grant concessions to protesters, they also have the 
discretionary capacity to keep them outside decision-making processes, grant 
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access but not influence, or they can attempt to stifle extra-parliamentary 
challenges through direct repression.’ (ibid.: 79-80). 
 
Integration into the political process is, however, like a double-edged sword.  It can 
lead to co-optation and institutionalisation of movements and the price to pay can be 
‘moderation and bureaucratization, as well as alienation from grassroots elements’ 
(Dryer et al 2003:193, in Kjellman, 2007:82).  Another effect of inclusion can be ‘a 
shift towards hierarchical and professionalised organisational forms’ (Kjellman 2007: 
89-90).  Selective inclusion also means that certain interests and movements 
organisations are excluded and there is a risk of creating dissatisfaction among 
groups not represented (ibid.: 146). 
 
Selective inclusion of women and ethnic minorities 
According to Siim and Skjeie (2004) there is an emphasis on active citizenship in 
Scandinavia.  The social democratic conception of citizenship is ‘an active, 
participatory and egalitarian ideal’ (Hernes, 1987: 139, in Siim and Skjeie, 2004: 
150).  This social democratic model of the citizen is closer to the republican than the 
liberal tradition of citizenship.66  However, it has been interpreted as a third model of 
citizenship with a specific gender profile (Hernes, 1987, Siim, 2000, in Siim and 
Skjeie, 2004: 149).  The Norwegian political scientist Helga Hernes has used the 
term ‘state feminism’ to describe the Norwegian political system (Hernes, 1987).  
‘State feminism’ is defined as ‘a combination of women’s political mobilisation “from 
below”, in social movements and voluntary organisations, and the political integration 
“from above”, in political parties and institutions’ (Siim and Skjeie, 2004: 149).67   
 
The claims of active citizenship are consistent with the conclusions made by Stetson 
and Mazur in Comparative State Feminism (Stetson and Mazur, 1995).  Norway was 
ranked among the “high state feminist countries”, where women participated actively 
                                            
66 The republican citizenship model focuses on participation and the development of joint ethical 
community, but not so much on redistribution and protection of privacy.  The liberal citizenship model 
emphasises ‘the part-time citizen’ and personal autonomy, rather than participation rights.  This social 
democratic conception of citizenship focuses on participation, the political unity is a cultural and ethnic 
community, and there is no sharp divide between state and society.  But in contrast to the republican 
ideal, the social democratic model emphasises social equality and economic security (Holst, 2006: 9-
10). 
67 The ideal of ‘state feminism’ has been criticised, however, for having some ‘blind spots’, such as 
under-emphasising other dimensions than gender, and the reduction of citizenship to representation 
at the expense of public deliberation (Holst, 2006).   
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outside feminist groups as well as in established trade unions and political parties, 
and women were equally attracted to newer autonomous liberation movements and 
to the mainstream political and moderate reform-oriented groups.  Radical feminist 
groups concentrated on consciousness-raising and moderate feminist groups put 
pressure on political party elites and politicians to establish a feminist women’s policy 
machinery. 
 
Stein Rokkan (1987) describes two channels for political influence in the Norwegian 
political system; the numerical-democratic channel and the corporate-pluralist 
channel.  Skjeie and Teigen (2004: 23) write that these two main political structures 
represent ideal types at each end of a scale.  Participation in the parliamentary 
democracy is based on individuals, whereas participation in the corporate channel is 
group based.  Participation in the formal corporative channel includes: 1) tri-partite 
bargaining between unions, the private sector (capital), and government; 2) publicly 
appointed boards and commissions that prepare policy initiatives; and 3) 
participation in hearings (consultations on proposals that a government ministry or 
department sends to affected parties; public and private institutions, organisations 
and other government ministries).  Informal participation includes lobbying and 
dialogue.   
 
The corporate channel is part of the structure of the political system in Norway which 
gives collective actors like women’s organisations an institutional opportunity to 
influence policy-making.  The corporate channel also has a discursive side, since the 
invitation structure to public hearings and the composition of publicly appointed 
boards and commissions will tell us which actors are seen as reasonable, sensible, 
and legitimate (Koopmans, 2004: 451). 
 
In an article from 2007, Skjeie and Teigen ask whether the term ‘state feminism’ is 
an accurate description of the actual decision-making system.  They conclude that 
‘state feminism’ is ‘limping’, and they elaborate this statement by claiming that the 
politics of inclusion has prioritised individual and gender-balanced representation in 
decision-making arenas (in the election channel).  The inclusion of gender-based 
political organisations in the corporate channel, on the other hand, has not been 
implemented on equal terms with other organised interests (Skjeie and Teigen, 
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2007: 35).  Skjeie and Teigen point to exceptions in this overall picture, where 
organisational interests based on gender and ethnic minority have been included, 
which are reforms in the gender equality law and legal regulations to reduce forced 
marriages.  However, this suggests a selective inclusion which contributes to 
isolation and segmentation of gender equality policy (ibid.: 35).   
 
Skjeie and Teigen (2007: 25) identify two different tracks in the way of including 
ethnic minorities and women as affected parties.  Minorities’ participation and 
inclusion, aside from participation in elections, are limited to organisations and the 
corporative channel, while women’s participation is based on an individual and 
gender-balanced inclusion in the election channel.  Women’s organisations in civil 
society do not have a central role in the corporative channel.  Ethnic minority 
organisations are, however, included in the corporate channel, but their inclusion is 
limited and ad hoc, and controlled by the government.  The collective inclusion of 
ethnic minorities, which Skjeie and Teigen (2007: 25) call a multicultural approach to 
inclusion, have been criticised by feminists because group-based claims can violate 
women’s rights (ibid.: 26). 
 
Skjeie and Teigen (2007) refer to Nyhagen Predelli’s (2003) study of minority 
women’s organisations in Norway about their participation in decision-making 
processes.  Their inclusion is limited, and mainly in connection to ‘crisis policies’ 
(Skjeie and Teigen, 2007: 35), namely violence against women; honour-related 
violence, female genital mutilation and forced marriages.   
 
Most of the organisations in our study receive money from the state.  Some, primarily 
the membership-based majority women’s organisations, receive a general operating 
grant and/or project money for voluntary organisations that work politically with 
family- or gender-equality issues.68  Some of the ‘professionalised’ non-
governmental organisation (NGOs) receive financial support in the form of a general 
operating grant as nationwide organisations in support of immigrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees.  Some of the membership-based minority women’s 
                                            
68 Managed by the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs (Bufdir).  For further 
details about the funding system and women’s organisations perceptions of it, see our country report 
from Norway. 
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organisations receive a general operating grant and/or activity/project support as 
local immigrant or minority organisations.69  There are also a few organisations in 
our study that do not receive money from the state.  The Norwegian state’s financial 
support schemes illustrate the separate spheres of ‘gender equality issues’ and 
‘immigrant/minority’ issues.  These institutional opportunity structures also indicate a 
discursive understanding of majority women’s organisations as working politically 
with ‘gender equality issues’, whereas minority women’s organisations mainly work 
with ‘immigrant/migrant issues’. 
 
Field-specific opportunities: violence against women 
According to one of the interviewed civil servants, the gender dimension was brought 
into immigrant issues in the mid-90s.  The white paper No. 17 (1996-1997) about 
immigration and multicultural Norway70 specifically addressed issues relating to 
women, whereas previously immigrants had been dealt with as one group regardless 
of gender.  Forced marriages were put on the political agenda, which was also 
helped by the media and the publishing of the book ‘Izzat’ written by Nasim Karim.  
The first Action Plan against forced marriages was introduced in 1998.  A cross-
ministerial working group was set up which included BFD (The Ministry of Children 
and Family, now the Ministry of Children and Equality), KRD (The Ministry of Local 
Government and Regional Development)71, and the Ministry of Justice and Police.  A 
parallel process happened with the issue of female genital mutilation (FGM), and the 
first Action Plan against FGM was introduced in 2000.  The Ministry of Children and 
Equality now bears the main responsibility for working against forced marriages and 
FGM. 
 
The year 2000 was also the year of the first Action Plan against domestic violence.  
A cross-ministerial working group also prepared this Action Plan; however, the 
Ministry of Justice and Police had, and still has, the co-ordination responsibility for 
the first Action Plan and the subsequent two plans against domestic violence.  
According to one of the civil servants, the decision to place the co-ordination function 
                                            
69 Both managed by the Directorate for Immigration and Diversity, IMDi. 
70 St. Meld. Nr. 17 (1996-1997) Om innvandring og det flerkulturelle Norge. 
71 KRD was responsible for immigration and integration at the time, now the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Inclusion. 
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with the Ministry of Justice and Police was a strategic effort to place the 
responsibility with a strong Ministry with many resources.  It would have been much 
less of a tactical choice had the responsibility been placed with the Ministry of 
Children and Family at the time, a weaker ministry with fewer financial resources.  In 
the same vein, the choice of giving the responsibility of co-ordinating the Action 
Plans against forced marriages and FGM to the Ministry of Children and Equality 
may be interpreted as a sign of a low political will to implement these action plans. 
 
According to one of the civil servants, a division between ‘immigrant’ violence, like 
forced marriages and FGM, and ‘ordinary’ partner violence was institutionalised back 
in 2000.  The interviewee claimed that later attempts by people working in the 
ministries to deal with these issues jointly have been difficult because two different 
ministries have the main responsibility. 
 
Another interviewed civil servant also emphasised that forced marriages and FGM 
are obviously part of the definition of domestic violence, however, there are special 
Action Plans because there is a need for special measures against these forms of 
violence, and there is a need for specialist knowledge.  The interviewee also thought 
that the real reason is a more practical concern: the Ministry of Justice and Police 
would not be able to handle all the Action Plans, so the responsibility is divided. 
 
In general, the interviewed civil servants and the parliamentary politicians described 
the Norwegian political system as quite open and accessible, also at a high level of 
government.  In their opinion, it is quite possible for women’s organisations to get in 
contact with the government and the access thresholds into the ministries are low.  
The ministries also try to have informal contact with the ‘field out there’ and they 
often invite organisations to ‘brainstorming meetings’ before preparing an Action 
Plan.  This is consistent with Nyhagen Predelli’s report from 2003 where she claims 
that minority women in part have extensive influence on policy formation, mostly 
through informal meetings (Nyhagen Predelli, 2003: 141). 
 
When asked which authorities they considered important in their political work, 
several of the interviewed women’s organisations mentioned the Parliament 
(Parliamentary politicians from different parties) and the Ministries, especially the 
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Ministry of Children and Equality.  Some also mentioned the Ministry of Justice and 
Police, the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion, the Ministry of Health and Care 
Services, the Ministry of Research and Higher Education, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (related to international work).  Several of the organisations also mentioned 
Bufdir (the Norwegian Directorate for Children, Youth and Family Affairs) and IMDi 
(the Directorate of Integration and Diversity), both of which manage the different 
financial support schemes for voluntary organisations.  Some of the small local 
women’s organisations also mentioned municipal authorities as important to their 
work.   
 
The Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombud was mentioned by several of the 
interviewees.  The new Ombud was established January 1st 2006.72  The Ombud’s 
mandate is to combat discrimination based on gender, ethnic origin, sexual 
orientation, religion, disability and age.  The Ombud upholds the law and acts as a 
proactive agent for equal opportunity throughout society (the Gender Equality Act, 
the Act on Prohibition of Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion etc.  [the 
Discrimination Act], and the regulations regarding equal treatment provided in the 
Labour Environment Act and the anti-discrimination regulations provided in the 
housing legislation).  The Ombud is also responsible for checking that Norwegian 
legislation and practice are in compliance with Norway’s duties under CEDAW 
(United Nations Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) 
and CERD (United Nations Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination). 
 
The interviewees were divided in their response to the new Ombud.  Particularly, 
interviewees from some of the majority women’s organisations were doubtful about 
the new Ombud: 
 
‘We now have the new Ombud, and we have been very concerned as to how 
that will work for the women’s issue.’  
 
                                            
72 The Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombud replaced the Gender Equality Ombud 
(Likestillingsombudet, 1978-2006), the Centre for Equality (Likestillingssenteret, 1997-2006), and the 
Centre against Ethnic Discrimination (Senter mot etnisk diskriminering, SMED, 1998-2006) (see 
http://www.ldo.no/en-gb/TopMenu/About-ombud/The-history-behind-the-Equality-and-Anti-
Discrimination-Ombud/). 
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‘Our organisation was very opposed to the closing down of the Gender Equality 
Ombud [Likestillingsombudet] and the Gender Equality Council 
[Likestillingsrådet].  We didn’t want that to be joined with the others [the Centre 
for Equality and the Centre against Ethnic Discrimination].  (…) we gave a 
statement about this.’  
 
‘We think that the committees should have been constituted differently, and also 
how they were appointed.  (…) the ‘traditional’ women’s organisations were not 
present.  (…) they should have been more involved in the working groups and 
committees (…)’ 
 
These interviewees were concerned that ‘women’s issues’ and gender-based 
discrimination would gain less attention when they became amalgamated with other 
strands of discrimination.  The quotes also indicate that the ‘traditional’, here 
meaning ‘feminist’ organisations, were not consulted during the process of 
institutional changes.  These responses from majority women’s organisations 
indicate that Stetson and Mazur’s conclusion from 1995 regarding Norway as 
ranking high on access and influence may no longer be ascertained (Stetson and 
Mazur, 1995).  In general, the minority women’s organisations and the 
professionalised organisations working on issues relating to ethnic discrimination 
and racism were more optimistic about the new Ombud.  The re-organising of the 
Ombud was, however, quite new when the interviews were conducted, and many of 
the interviewees had a ‘wait and see’ attitude.   
 
An indigenous minority: Sami women in Norway 
Sami feminists formally began to organise about ten years later (in 1988) than 
migrant women in Norway, and about ten years after the Sami movement itself 
gradually emerged.  Contrary to the organising of black feminism in Norway, Sami 
feminism already had a foothold within the institutions: One of the activists was 
employed at the Sami Council and actively made use of her position for feminist 
purposes also before 1988.  The Sami Council had established a Women’s 
Committee in 1986, and activists were eager to push women and gender equality 
issues from the margin to the centre.  The Sáráhkká – Sami Women’s Organisation, 
was established in 1988, while the SNF-Sámi NissonForum for women was 
established in 1993.  Sami feminist activists have played an important role in arguing 
for women’s rights in the reindeer herding industry, and they have also addressed 
gender discimination in election campaigns for the Sami Parliament which was 
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established by the Sami Act of 1987.  The formation of a separate Women’s List to 
the Sami Parliamentary election can be seen as a reaction to the exclusion of a Sami 
feminist woman from the top of a political candidate list.73     
 
According to interviewees, majority women’s organisations have largely been absent 
in Northern Norway – at least from the perspective of Sami women’s agenda and 
interests.  Some instances of co-operation with ethnic majority feminists have been 
identified, such as in the national television fund-raising campaign for women in 
2005, and in the women’s umbrella organisation FOKUS, whose member 
organisations are involved in foreign aid.  A particular disappointment with FOKUS, 
however, was expressed due to a rejected application for financial support.  FOKUS 
has adjusted its funding guidelines and project support is now limited to projects in 
the ‘South’.  This has had quite negative effects for Sámi NissonForum, which bases 
its work on a West-East Arctic axis, and not on a North-South axis.   
 
One of our respondents underlined insufficient communication with public authorities, 
be they Norwegian or Sami.  For example, Sami women are unable to comment on 
the national CEDAW reports from Norway, as they do not have the necessary 
resources and feel completely sidelined by government institutions and by the rules 
governing the election of the Norwegian NGO delegation to the annual meetings of 
the CEDAW committee.  Moreover, government equality agencies in Oslo have 
appeared to take little or no interest in discrimination experienced by Sami women in 
Northern Norway.  According to one interviewee, the ‘Ombud’ does not even read 
newspapers from Northern Norway, ‘despite the responsibility of the Ombud to be 
concerned with racism in the media’.  The interviewee also deplored the absence of 
Sami women in the Nordic gender quality work, and represented the neglect to be a 
lack of recognition. 
 
7.2.2 Limited discursive space 
In this sub-section we focus mainly on the discursive opportunities and barriers that 
organisational actors face in their political work.  While the institutional and 
                                            
73 Separate Women’s Lists were used in the 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995 elections to the Sami 
Parliament.  For further information, see our country report from Norway. 
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discursive opportunities are closely linked, we here examine the discursive side: 
what issues and demands, and also which actors, are considered reasonable, 
sensible, and legitimate? (Koopmans, 2004: 451).  We focus specifically on violence 
against minority women, but also on ‘women’s issues’ in general, and the framing 
and attempts at reframing these issues (Snow and Benford, 1992; Verloo, 2005). 
 
Cultural framing of minority violence and a narrow picture of minority women’s 
issues 
 
Violence against women has been a central issue for the women’s movement since 
the 1970s, and there has been a continuous expansion of the way this issue has 
been framed: 
 
‘When the Women’s Shelters were started in 1978 this issue [violence against 
women] was seen as a private matter.  But through this struggle which has 
been led by many actors, the attitudes have changed.  A parallel process has 
been the general view of violence; earlier it was only physical violence, whereas 
now there’s also the psychological violence, the consequences for children, a 
larger focus on rape in recent years, and also forced marriages, female genital 
mutilation, prostitution and trafficking.  So there has been a process regarding 
what has been considered to be violation of women.’  
 
According to this interviewee, the women’s movement has succeeded in widening, 
and thereby reframing, the issue of violence against women.  Related to this 
expansion of the issue of violence against women is the feminist critique of the 
gendered public/private dichotomy and the definition of what constitutes a political 
issue (Pateman, 1987 and Okin, 1991, cited in Verloo and Lombardo, 2007: 28).  
‘Feminist actors have struggled in favour of a broader definition of the “political” that 
includes all the so-called “private” and “personal” issues, such as violence against 
women (…)’ (Verloo and Lombardo, 2007: 28).   
 
However, the interviewees mentioned several barriers in their attempts to influence 
politically: 
 
‘There is a general resistance regarding this issue [violence against women].  
But when I ask for meetings at the Parliament or with Ministers, I seldom get a 
‘no’.  (...) Do I have an impact every time?  I don’t.’  
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‘Why do you think only women have been dealing with women’s issues all these 
years?  Because these issues are related to taboo and shame.  Resistance - it 
is because we sort of accuse men.  What is it with these men who continue to 
beat women?’  
 
These quotes illustrate that the organisations have met a general resistance 
because the issue is violence against women.  They indicate that this is a ‘women’s 
issue’ and, therefore, an issue with low status and priority.  Violence against women 
is connected to shame and taboo, but is also a criticism of men.  Still the 
organisations have experienced that they have been included as legitimate actors by 
politicians. 
 
However, several of the interviewees from both majority and minority women’s 
organisations highlighted the fact that that violence in relation to minority and 
majority women is understood differently: 
 
‘It is hard to try to give a more nuanced picture [about violence against minority 
women].  We [majoritised Norwegians] love to have others at the bottom of the 
pecking order and to criticise immigrants’ culture.  But violence against women 
happens in all cultures.  (…) we try to show what ethnic Norwegian men do to 
women.  We try to use statistics; violence and the consequences of violence 
are practically similar (…).’ 
 
‘When we talk about minorities [and violence against women], it is seen in an 
immigration perspective.  And then we go and change the immigration laws, 
instead of seeing this [violence against minority women] in a gender equality 
perspective and a human rights perspective.  So therefore, when we do 
lobbying, we have to be extremely cautious regarding what we say.  What 
happens?  They change the laws in order to make it more difficult for minorities 
to enter this country.  We don’t want that.’ 
 
These quotes illustrate an intended and strategic effort to reframe the issue of 
‘minority violence’.  There is also an understanding of a dominant cultural framing of 
‘minority violence’ where this is seen as a form of violence that is ‘cultural’ and 
‘special’.  As mentioned previously, the Government Action Plans in Norway 
regarding violence, with one general plan against domestic violence, and two 
separate plans against forced marriages and female genital mutilation, respectively, 
also underscore this representation and generates a divide between ‘general’ 
violence and ‘special’ violence, where the latter category is linked to ethnic minorities 
(Bredal, 2007: 57-58).   
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In the second quote above, the interviewee said that violence against minority 
women is seen in ‘an immigration perspective’, and linked it to a more restrictive 
immigration policy.  In an article from 2007, Connie Roggeband and Mieke Verloo 
analyse how the framing of gender and migration has changed from 1995 to 2005 in 
the Netherlands, and they argue that the problem of integration has increasingly 
been defined as a cultural problem.  In this problem representation there is an 
implicit understanding of the majority culture as unproblematic.  The unequal gender 
relations in the migrant culture (primarily among Muslims) are seen as problematic.  
In this period Roggeband and Verloo (2007: 280) identify two parallel shifts where 
migrant women are seen as key to integration of minorities in the integration policy, 
and where migrant women also became the central subject in gender equality policy.  
Culturally legitimised violence against women became a main focus in this new 
dominant framing.  During the time period from 1995 to 2005, the central problem 
changed from being a social structural problem related to issues like education and 
the labour market, to a strictly cultural problem.  Discrimination by the Dutch majority 
society is not mentioned as a challenge to integration processes (ibid.: 280-281). 
 
In Norway, Christine M. Jacobsen and Randi E. Gressgård (2002) have analysed the 
white paper No. 17 (1996-1997) about immigration and the multicultural Norway74 
and they also found that immigrant tradition and culture is seen as the problem of 
integration.  The issues relating to immigrant women that are mentioned are forced 
marriages and female genital mutilation.  Jacobsen and Gressgård (2002) resemble 
Nyhagen Predelli (2003) and Skjeie and Teigen (2007) in the problematic way 
gender and ethnic equality are related: gender equality as the norm and ethnic 
inequality as the deviant. 
 
The quote above indicated that this dominant cultural framing of minority violence is 
also evident in a Norwegian context, and the interviewee found it hard to challenge 
this understanding of ‘minority violence’ as ‘special’ and ‘cultural’.  However, the 
quotes also indicate a conscious strategy of reframing this definition of ‘minority 
violence’ into a ‘gender equality frame’ and a ‘human rights frame’. 
 
                                            
74 St. Meld. Nr. 17 (1996-1997) Om innvandring og det flerkulturelle Norge. 
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One of the interviewees from a minority women’s organisation emphasised the 
problem of framing violence against minority women as ‘cultural’: 
 
‘It is problematic to have a huge divide between migrants and Norwegians 
because of culture.  For instance a girl who has been beaten up at home, and 
they say; ‘but that is how it is in your culture’ or ‘you can’t be with a boy with a 
different religion.  That is not allowed in your culture’.  That irritates me.  A 
Norwegian girl, I mean both girls and boys have the same rights.  When I 
grow up in Norway, why should I be treated any different?  There is a huge 
difference between Norwegians and migrants because of the respect for my 
culture.  I don’t have any respect for a culture which means discrimination and 
suppression.  And religion is an excuse for all these suppressions.  That is the 
problem.’  
 
The cultural framing can lead to a misunderstood ‘respect for culture’ where ‘culture’ 
is the explanation and also an excuse of perpetrating violence.  One interpretation of 
this quote is that a reframing of this issue into a human rights issue would be a better 
strategy in working against violence against women. 
 
Some of the problem representations of ‘minority violence’ in the interviews with 
women from majority women’s organisations illustrated a view of ‘minority violence’ 
as ‘cultural’.  This cultural framing may also lead to a fear of interfering:  
 
‘We are very aware that we can’t come and tell them [minority women] how 
things are supposed to be.  We are very aware of that.  For instance regarding 
female genital mutilation, I think that is something minority organisations have 
to deal with.  It’s illegal in Norway, but it is passed on by heritage in the culture 
and it’s a battle they need to take.  We would rather be a help and a resource.  
But it is not something we feel that we need to take the lead on.’  
 
When ‘minority violence’ is understood as ‘special’ and ‘cultural’ it also makes it ‘their 
problem’, not a general ‘women’s issue’.  It supports the image of ‘them’ versus ‘us’; 
the ‘suppressed minority woman’ versus the ‘liberated majority woman’.  This 
stereotypical image of a minority woman is an issue that was raised in several of the 
interviews, especially by interviewees from minority women’s organisations: 
 
‘(…) There is a very big focus on minority women, but it is very one-sided, and 
you see that through the women we meet in the work that we do.  (…) the 
women who come to us are not oppressed.  They are ordinary women, often 
strong women, and they don’t come here because of their own problems, but 
because of problems that their husbands or sons experience in society.  (…) 
there is a disparity between what you read in the newspaper and the focus you 
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see all the time - and where all the resources go also - and what we actually 
see here on a daily basis.’  
 
‘A whole group [a ‘middle’ group] of [minority] women are missing in [the public 
domain].  You have the ones on the bottom and the ones on top, but most 
women are in between there somewhere.  What do we know about them?  How 
are they doing?’  
 
‘You read all the time about those [minority women] who are getting beaten by 
these men and abused by their families - and yes; they exist.  Those who don’t 
learn the language and don’t get out of the house - and yes; they exist.  But 
many actually get out of the house (…) and you meet many of those young 
moms who haven’t been here long but who speak Norwegian with their 
children.  (…) they don’t fit the picture of ‘the others’.’ 
 
These quotes illustrate a wish to broaden the agenda regarding minority women.  
The focus has mainly been on violence against minority women, and even if work 
against violence against women is important, it does not have to be the entire 
picture.  One interviewee said that the organisation has been in contact with the 
Ministry of Children and Equality and the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion and 
has tried to remind them about the whole picture.  However, their experience is that 
they have not been heard because ‘there is no room for it’.  According to the 
interviewee, other issues like forced marriages and female genital mutilation are so 
overwhelming, that it becomes difficult to broaden the focus and get other issues 
besides ‘crisis gender equality’ on the political agenda.  According to Roggeband 
and Verloo (2007: 286), ‘negative representations of migrant women as traditional, 
backward and (potentially) victims may limit the discursive opportunities for 
identification and participation of migrant women, and thus may have the opposite 
effect from what government aims to accomplish’.  Our analysis indicates that the 
narrow picture of minority women as victims of violence is a barrier for addressing 
other issues concerning minority women.  ‘Ordinary’ equality issues such as 
discrimination in the labour market are not considered reasonable, legitimate, and 
sensible with respect to minority women. 
 
Another interviewee emphasised the barriers regarding the three year rule: 
 
‘(…) Especially when it’s about the Immigration law and the Immigration 
authorities and regarding special considerations to specific problems that 
women might have.  Of course we’ve met barriers; we meet barriers all the 
time.  Nothing is easy, nothing is for free.  We have to work very hard to have 
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an impact on these issues.  (…) abused [immigrant] women and their rights or 
lack of rights for thirty years, that’s the prime example.  But in general; to get a 
problem of principle on the agenda is not easy.’  
 
Here the interviewee addressed the barriers regarding the discrimination of women 
in the Immigration law, and the special problems for abused women without an 
independent resident permit.  This has been a long battle where the organisations 
have met political resistance.  The interviewee also mentioned barriers connected to 
getting ‘big principle issues’ on to the political agenda.  This view is shared by many 
of the interviewees: 
 
‘But it’s easier to get that [attention, to be heard] when it comes to the ‘small 
stuff’, for instance health in jail, women being discriminated in prison because 
they are women, female genital mutilation, forced marriages - single issues like 
that.  Instead of the big principle issues where it’s more difficult to pick a side.’  
 
‘We work with structure.  (…) we have been working for a better law against 
ethnic discrimination.  (…) on the one side, we work structurally, and on the 
other side, we also meet individual people who bring us cases.  These cases 
can highlight several things concerning the structural problem.’  
 
According to the interviewees, it is easier to get attention on some types of issues 
than others.  They also said that it is easier to address a ‘big principle issue’ if you 
have a specific case which illustrates a more general problem.  One of the strategies 
is to “use” specific cases to get media attention and then go forward with a ‘big 
principle issue’ that has been highligted through such specific cases.  However, in 
general, the organisations experienced difficulty in getting these ‘big principle issues’ 
on the political agenda. 
 
Several of the interviewees also pointed to the general image of ‘minorities’ as ‘the 
other’ and the difficulty in presenting a more balanced picture: 
 
‘When it comes to [minority] women, then you have this image of ‘the other’ and 
everything is characterised by that image.  If you go to the Ombud’s [The 
Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombud] webpage you’ll see how they make 
mistakes like that.  (…) they have a heading with ‘violence’ or something like 
that and then as a subheading; ‘FGM’ and ‘forced marriages’.  (…) it is not right.  
They turn it into something ‘ethnic’, and not something ‘general’.  (…) their 
culture is so and so, right.  This will affect the general work against violence 
against women because in that sense Norwegian men do not practice violence 
then.  And you don’t have any measures to combat it [‘minority violence’] 
because it’s supposed to be culture, right.’  
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This quote illustrates the discursive barrier some of the organisations meet in their 
attempts to reframe forced marriage and female genital mutilation as a part of the 
general definition of ‘violence against women’.  This, in turn, will affect the political 
work against these forms of violence because the same measures are not being 
used in the attempts to combat ‘minority violence’ and ‘general violence against 
women’. 
 
One of the parliamentary politicians also problematised the narrow picture of minority 
women in the public debate: 
 
‘The media sets the agenda when they get a tip about an issue.  The NRK 
[Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation] had a big story about female genital 
mutilation which was self-initiated, and they present it like a huge problem in 
Norway.  We are in a situation where we don’t know the extent of this problem, 
and we can neither confirm nor reject what the NRK says.  That was quite a 
frustrating situation.  But it ends up with some political initiatives, for instance a 
report about this issue.  (…) however, it is stigmatising that the media always 
has this agenda …  The Norwegian people must think that all immigrant girls 
are married by force or victims of female genital mutilation.  It is a much 
stigmatised picture of immigrant girls because they are usually only mentioned 
in those settings, otherwise they are made invisible.’  
 
This politician referred to the extensive focus on issues like FGM, forced marriages 
and what Anja Bredal (2007: 60) calls ‘hypervisibility’ in the media.  This attention 
has resulted in hasty efforts by the government to combat this type of violence.  
However, these issues are not included in the long-term work against domestic 
violence (Bredal, 2007: 60). 
 
Reasonable, sensible, and legitimate actors? 
The interviewees mentioned several barriers in their attempts to influence politically: 
 
‘Barriers when we try to influence policy-making; we are young women, 
hysterical, feminists … Yes.  (…) you notice domination techniques when you 
meet people, when the State Secretary [statssekretæren] has a meeting with 
the organisation and then that’s it, you know.  Therefore it’s important that we 
know what we are talking about, that we are clear on when we know and when 
we do qualified guessing, we try to limit that.  (…) but we see that it’s positive to 
come from [our organisation] because we are very good at having 
documentation for what we say.’  
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Some of the interviewees experienced that they have to be very well prepared in 
order to be taken seriously by the government representatives.  The interviewee 
quoted above used words like ‘hysterical feminists’ and, thereby, made a reference 
to a stereotypical picture of women being irrational and men being rational.  This 
quote illustrates that an organisation with a feminist agenda represented by young 
women has to have documentation to support claims-making and demands.   
 
An interviewee from a minority organisation also addressed the issue of being 
viewed as a reasonable, sensible, and legitimate actor: 
 
‘(…) things are viewed as more reliable if it comes from a white researcher 
rather than from a black organisation.  (…) it is the same thing about gender, 
right, if you go 20 to 30 years back, if a man said something and a woman said 
something - which one would be considered the most reliable?  It had to be the 
man.  (…) so it’s not easy to be the new group in the game.  You will not be 
heard, you will not be believed.’   
 
‘Especially when you are in a meeting in a Ministry where it is very hierarchical.  
(…) if I’m there with a male colleague [both with an ethnic minority background], 
then it’s about him being a male and I’m just a woman with him.  However, if I’m 
there with a white female colleague, then I’m the ‘immigrant woman’, the 
immigrant ‘alibi’ who’s just tagging along.  So you meet that.  But it’s very 
subtle, right.  (…) but very many, especially women, know what I’m talking 
about because they’ve had that experience themselves.  (…) with a male 
colleague I’m a woman, and that’s that.  Then you are kind of “second”.  But 
with a white, female colleague, I’m black and then I’m “second” again.’  
 
These quotes describe a subtle hierarchy where the categories ‘gender’, ‘race’ and 
‘ethnicity’ come into play.  In the interviewee’s experience, claims have been 
regarded as less trustworthy when they are forwarded by a black organisation 
compared to a white researcher.  The interviewee addressed both a gender 
hierarchy and a racial/ethnic hierarchy.  Confusion arises, however, when a black 
man and a white woman come together; ‘where do you place them in the hierarchy?  
Who do you address first?’  This quote is an example of the complex intersection of 
gender and ethnicity as lived experience. 
 
Some of the interviewees were concerned with who is considered to be the 
legitimate representative for a minority group: 
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‘(…) we cannot have such a great respect for imams.  When something 
happens, they [politicians, the government] go to the imams and ask them.  
(…) they don’t represent me.  (…) in my opinion religion is a private matter.  
(…)’  
 
This interviewee, who is member of a secular organisation, criticises the Norwegian 
government for always having a dialogue with religious leaders, for instance imams, 
and seeing them as spokespersons for certain ethnic minority communities.  The 
interviewee found this to be highly problematic.  This view is in accordance with 
feminist critiques of multiculturalism: that it is usually the more powerful members of 
a group (generally male) who are selected as spokespeople, and their versions of 
the community’s practices are heard in intercultural dialogue and debates (Okin, 
1999; Phillips, 2007).  Women’s voices (as a minority within the minority), on the 
other hand, are not being heard.  The interviewee from this minority women’s 
organisation argued that the religious and the ‘conservative’ are the ones who are 
being heard, not the ‘modern’ voices, both men and women, who work against 
honour-related violence.  The interviewee claimed that it is very difficult to work for 
minority women’s rights and against honour-related violence because conservative 
and religious people in the minority community blame her and the organisation for 
stigmatising the minority group.   
 
Her organisation works for women’s rights and focuses especially on honour-related 
violence both in her home country and in Norway.  The organisation is, thus, 
addressing problems that women are facing as a minority within a minority in the 
Norwegian context.  In her view, ‘modern’ women have to ally themselves with 
‘modern’ men within the minority community, against the ‘conservative’ men and 
women within the same community.  The perspective of the interviewee can be 
interpreted within what is called the minorities within minorities problem in normative 
political theory.  This literature draws attention to the way groups can oppress 
internal minorities, in this case women, and the risk that policies of multiculturalism 
will reinforce power inequalities within groups (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2005).   
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Some interviewees from another minority women’s organisation have had a different 
experience: 
 
‘I think it’s very positive that we have been listened to.  I have had a meeting 
with the State Secretary to the Minister of Children and Equality.  (…) we had a 
meeting where I presented our work and I think the response was quite positive.  
(…)’  
 
This organisation has primarily worked against female genital mutilation, and their 
experience is that they have been taken seriously and been regarded as a legitimate 
actor.  This organisation represents women’s rights as compatible with Islam, and in 
this representation the empowering of women takes place within a religious frame.  
The organisation makes a distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ by arguing that 
FGM is a cultural tradition, and that it is not required by Islam. 
 
One interpretation of these different experiences is that an organisation may be seen 
as a more legitimate actor for the minority group if their work against so-called 
‘honour-related’ violence is framed within a ‘cultural frame’.  This would indicate that 
when ethnicity is connected with racism, the sensibility vanishes, however, when 
ethnicity is connected with culture, the sensibility and legitimacy increases.   
 
Views of organisational actors by civil servants and parliamentary politicians 
According to one of the parliamentary politicians, the women’s movement is a 
relevant actor today, as much as it was in the 1970s.  She thinks that the women’s 
movement plays an important role by raising issues and making demands especially 
concerning violence against women.  In her view there are still many issues that 
need to be addressed, and the women’s movement will have an important role to 
play in the years to come.  However, the common view among the interviewed 
politicians and the civil servants, is that the majority feminist organisations have been 
absent in relation to minority women’s issues.  They seem to be more engaged in 
majority women’s issues.  One of the politicians thought that majority women’s 
organisations have not included minority women’s issues in their agenda.  In her 
view, minority women are still not a part of ‘we’ the women, and there is a divide 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  Majority women’s organisations are afraid of being accused 
of being racist, this politician argued.  The Norwegian Women’s Public Health 
Association (Norske Kvinners Sanitetsforening) is mentioned as a majority non-
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feminist women’s organisation that has engaged in dialogue with minority women, 
and as a result they have also taken some political initiatives. 
 
According to several of the interviewed politicians and civil servants, the 
organisations which have been politically active concerning violence against women 
are the umbrella organisations representing the Women’s Shelters and also the 
organisations working on rape.  The Administration of Women’s Shelters 
(Krisesentersekretariatet) and Norwegian Crisis Center Association (Norsk 
Krisesenterforbund) were especially mentioned as very engaged in violence against 
minority women and they also have an important role as ‘watchdogs’.  The majority 
feminist organisations have not been that visible.  Some of them, like for instance the 
feminist group Ottar, are active in the public debate about pornography and 
prostitution.  In general, however, the majority feminist organisations have not been 
particularly active in contacting the parliamentary politicians or the civil servants.   
 
The parliamentary politicians and the civil servants also mentioned organisations as 
such as OMOD which addresses public discrimination and minority women’s rights, 
ORKIS (Oslo Red Cross International Centre), Self-help for immigrants and refugees 
(SEIF) and Human Rights Service (HRS).  In relation to forced marriages, honour 
killings and female genital mutilation, SEIF, HRS and the MiRA Centre have been 
active politically.  Some of these organisations have different approaches to specific 
issues, such as forced marriages: HRS has a more confrontational approach, 
whereas MiRA is more focused on dialogue. 
 
Among minority women’s organisations the MiRA Centre was mentioned by all the 
politicians and civil servants as an important actor.  According to one of the 
politicians, there are few other minority women’s organisations with strong voices, 
and the existing organisations are generally small and weak.  Although there are 
many organisations in the ‘minority field’, coupled with a few strong individual voices, 
the field is very fragmented and it is difficult to know who the individual voices 
actually represent.  According to one of the politicians, it is particularly difficult to 
know what most minority women want or think.  This resonates with the findings in 
Nyhagen Predelli’s study from 2003, where she argues that the minority women’s 
organisations that are working actively to influence policy-making are few and they 
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do not represent all the different groups of minority women in Norway (Nyhagen 
Predelli, 2003: 148).  The organisations that represent minority women and work 
politically and professionally are still very few, and even if they do a good job, one of 
the interviewed politicians wanted to see more broad membership-based 
organisations in order for more strong voices to be heard.  In general, this politician 
found it problematic that the majority define minority women’s problems, and 
therefore saw a need for more and stronger minority women’s organisations that 
engage in political issues. 
 
7.2.3 Claims-making, opportunities and constraints at the national policy level  
In this sub-section we examine how the interviewed women’s organisations in 
Norway work in order to achieve political influence. 
 
Formal participation: Consultations (hearings), boards and commissions 
In our document mapping of selected consultations or hearings we focused on two 
areas: 1) violence against women; and 2) racism and ethnic discrimination (related to 
violence against women) (Halsaa and Thun, 2008; see also Appendix B in our 
country report from Norway).  The main purpose was to complement the findings 
from interviews with women’s organisations with documented claims and issues 
made by these organisations in Norway.  We also wanted to identify the extent to 
which women’s organisations have been invited to comment on government policy 
proposals, and the extent to which they have actually commented.  Herein, we focus 
on the invitation structure, which is important in regards to both the institutional and 
the discursive opportunity structures: What organisations are invited by the Ministries 
to participate in these consultations (hearings) and are, thus, seen as legitimate 
actors within different fields?  Moreover, to what extent have the organisations 
actually commented? 
 
In the mapping we focused on three law proposals concerning violence in close 
relations, protection against forced marriage, and changes in the Immigration Act. 
 
Three recent national law proposals were selected: 
1. Changes in the Penal Code on violence in close relations (and annulling the act 
on vagrancy): Ot.prp.113 (2004-2005) (Om lov om oppheving av løsgjengerloven 
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og om endringer i straffeloven mv.  (eget straffebud mot vold i nære relasjoner 
mv.)).75 
2. Changes in the Immigration Act (protection against forced marriages and 
maltreatment in marriage, and protection of foreign employees’ working 
conditions and salary) (2004-2005): Ot.  prp.  109 (Om lov om endringer i 
utlendingsloven (beskyttelse mot tvangsekteskap og mishandling i ekteskap og 
vern av utenlandske arbeidstakeres lønns-og arbeidsvilkår mv.).76 
3. Changes in the Immigration Act (On foreigners’ admittance to the country and 
their residence here) (2006-2007): Ot.  prp.  75 (Om lov om utlendingers adgang 
til riket og deres opphold her (utlendingsloven)).77  
 
This selective mapping does not provide the whole picture of the invitation structure 
and so forth, but it does provide an insight into the opportunity structures.  Our 
interviews with organisational actors provide their views of consultations or hearings 
as a channel for influence. 
 
The general picture concerning the invitation structure is that the majority women’s 
organisations were invited by the Ministries to comment on proposals concerning 
violence in close relations, but not invited to hearings about the Immigration Act.  
Forced marriages and the three year rule are issues dealt with in the Immigration 
Act.  These issues are related to violence against minority women and address the 
intersection between violence and ethnic discrimination.  Here, however, the majority 
women’s organisations are absent - they were not invited by the Ministries to 
comment and they did not take the initiative to send in their comments. 
 
Only a few of the minority women’s organisations were invited to comment on the 
proposal concerning violence in close relations.  The organisations which receive 
funding from the financial support scheme for nationwide organisations in support of 
                                            
75 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/regpubl/otprp/20042005/Otprp-nr-113-2004-2005-
.html?id=186166  
76 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/krd/dok/regpubl/otprp/20042005/Otprp-nr-109-2004-2005-
.html?id=186028 
77 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/aid/dok/regpubl/otprp/20062007/otprp-nr-75-2006-2007-
.html?id=474152 
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immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, had been invited to give comments.78  
This pattern of selective inclusion was also found by Skjeie and Teigen (2007) in 
their research on two Norwegian government proposals concerning legal regulations 
to prevent forced marriages.79  They concluded that ‘the invitation structure for these 
two hearings are not exactly tailor-made in order to include minority political and 
gender political organisational interests’ (Skjeie and Teigen, 2007: 30, our 
translation).  Skjeie and Teigen (2007) also emphasise that participation in hearings 
is demanding and requires resources.  Therefore, small and local migrant 
organisations do not always answer even if they are invited to participate.  Their 
study also shows that gender political organisations, with the exception of 
organisations with a clear ‘help agenda’, are not invited to participate in consultations 
about forced marriages. 
 
Skjeie and Teigen claim that ‘(…) objectives of gender representivity and ethnic 
diversity seem to exist nearly as separate spheres in Norwegian politics (…)’ (Skjeie 
and Teigen, 2007:35, our translation).  They relate the two separate spheres to the 
debate about the relationship between the ‘old’ women’s movement and 
spokespersons for ethnic minorities, and the criticism of the majority feminists in 
Norway for not having engaged with minority women’s issues (Salimi, 2006; Bredal, 
2005, in Skjeie and Teigen, 2007: 30). 
 
The pattern of inclusion suggests a selective inclusion (Kjellman, 2007; Skjeie and 
Teigen, 2007) where some organisations are ‘institutionalised’ as consultative bodies 
within certain policy fields, whereas other organisations are excluded (institutional 
opportunities).  The invitation structure also says something about which 
organisations are seen as legitimate actors within different fields (discursive 
opportunities).  There is little evidence of an intersectional approach concerning 
violence against women.   
 
                                            
78 For more details regarding which organisations are invited by the Ministries to participate in these 
consultations (hearings), to what extent have they actually commented, and what their comments 
were, in Appendix B to the Norwegian country report. 
79 One is the proposal from the Ministry of Justice and Police about changes in the Penal Code from 
2002 and the other one is the proposal from the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion about 
changes in the Immigration Act concerning forced marriages from 2006. 
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Our mapping and interviews with women’s organisations also support the selective 
inclusion concerning consultations (hearings).  According to one majority women’s 
organisation that works primarily with violence in close relations, they are primarily 
invited to hearings about violence against women.  They have not been invited to 
hearings about immigration issues, but gave their comments even if the organisation 
had not been invited to do so.  Another interviewee from a majority women’s 
organisation said: 
 
‘I don’t think that we have given statements during the consultation process on 
issues where we have not been invited.  I guess that is because we haven’t felt 
the need to do it.’ 
 
This organisation did not take the initiative to give any comments.  This organisation 
has not been invited to respond to the Immigration Act, and the quote can be 
interpreted as if the organisation does not consider these issues as relevant 
‘women’s issues’.  However, it can also suggest that the organisation is not aware of 
some of the issues that are included under the laws relating to Immigration, such as 
forced marriages and the three year rule.  Another possibility is that they thought the 
proposals were adequate and did not need amending. 
 
One of the minority women’s organisations was invited to one of the consultations 
about forced marriages, but that was the first and only time they had been invited to 
comment on proposals by the authorities: 
 
‘We sent our consultation statements to the Ministry [about forced marriages].  
We do that sort of thing.  We think that it is important, it’s to have something to 
say.’  
 
The interviewee emphasised the importance of having an opinion in this matter and 
also of participating in this political process. 
 
An interviewee from one of the professionalised NGOs was rather critical of all the 
proposals that were sent to consultative bodies concerning the new Immigration Act: 
 
‘(…) The Immigration Act [Utlendingsloven] - there has been several changes.  I 
don’t remember if it was last year or the year before, but calls for consultations 
came constantly.  So we don’t write consultation statements in regard to the 
Immigration Act anymore, I mean in regard to the single changes that come.  I 
 224 
remember one year, if you didn’t have a full-time employee to work on that then 
it was just … (…)’  
 
According to the interviewee, all the proposed changes and the following 
consultations actually constituted a “democratic problem” since the intension of the 
consultation process is to obtain views from affected parties.  The organisation 
received quite a few proposals in a relatively short amount of time, and in the 
interviewee’s view this impeded a thorough procedure of review of laws and legal 
measures.  The perspectives of minorities, including both positive and negative 
effects, were supposed to be considered.  In the interviewee’s view, however, it was 
difficult to do this properly when several law proposals, some of them quite 
extensive, were being sent to the organisations within the space of a few months. 
 
Another reason for not giving a comment on the law proposal on the Immigration Act 
was that some organisations did not agree with any of the proposals concerning the 
suggested minimum age of 21 for marriage partners80 in order to prevent forced 
marriages: 
 
‘Sometimes it seems like everything is sort of decided beforehand.  But 
sometimes it can still be important to make certain points.  For instance in 
regard to the proposal of a 21 year demand.  We didn’t answer that hearing 
because they said that if we introduce this [21 year old demand] then it will be 
like this or like this or like this.  We were totally against this [21 year old 
demand] and then there is no point in considering these proposals against each 
other.  (…) what we did instead was to have two appeals where we gathered 
several minority organisations.  (…) and the proposal was stopped.  It [an 
appeal] was very good because we could put focus somewhere else and not on 
this proposal and write consultation statements in regard to that (…)’  
 
According to the interviewee, other strategies were more efficient in this matter, and 
the use of appeals was successful in order to shift the focus away from the Ministry’s 
proposal.  The co-operation with several minority organisations was also viewed as 
instrumental in stopping the proposed 21 years minimum age.  This sort of response 
suggests a protest, both to the proposals by the Ministry and also to the way this 
channel of influence was set up.  The Ministry had the initiative and the power to 
include and exclude organisations and other consultative bodies.  The Ministry was 
                                            
80 A demand that both marriage partners have to be at least 21 years of age in order to obtain 
resident permit for a spouse or co-habitant. 
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also proposing different law changes and the consultative bodies were merely 
supposed to comment on some already set alternatives. 
 
Several of the respondents considered participating in consultations as time 
consuming: 
 
‘We do that as well, but we try not to do too much of it because it is very time-
consuming.  (…) We do it on some issues, but we probably only do a fraction of 
what [mentions another women’s organisation] do.  But we do it when we think 
that we have something to say that no one else will say.’  
 
Even if the interviewee found this time-consuming, she thought it important to give 
comments to proposals when the organisation can provide a perspective that 
otherwise would not be heard.   
 
Whether the interviewees thought they exercised any actual influence through 
commenting on the proposals by the Ministries differed from one informant to the 
next: 
 
‘We try to influence policy-making, we try that all the time.  We write statements 
during consultation processes.  (..) We write about anti-discrimination issues.  
(…) So there are quite a few consultations.  It takes a lot of time, but we see 
that it works because we get accepted and our point of view is being heard in 
the areas in which we have expertise.  It is important to concentrate on what we 
are competent to do instead of trying to write about absolutely everything.’  
 
According to this interviewee, the organisation has an actual influence through the 
system of consultations.  However, the organisation has to prioritise issues on which 
they have a special expertise. 
 
Other interviewees also considered this channel of influence to be important, both in 
order to add different voices and to be recognised as legitimate actors in a certain 
policy field.  One interviewee from a minority women’s organisation said that her 
organisation was very active and they always sent comments on the proposals they 
are invited to comment on.  The comments are cited quite a lot by the authorities, 
and even if she could not say for sure that their suggestions actually had an impact, 
she thought that the organisation had an influence on certain issues.  She especially 
mentioned the Immigration Act and violence against women. 
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Another interviewee from a minority women’s organisation also mentioned that the 
organisation had some influence with regards to the issue of female genital 
mutilation: 
 
‘Some of the points that were already included in the consultation invitation we 
received was a result of what we have been working on.  (…) we sent our 
consultation statement and the other organisations did as well, and later we 
were invited to a meeting where several other [minority] organisations 
participated.  (…) also a mosque was there.  It was very exciting.’  
 
This quote indicates that the organisation had been working actively on this issue 
before being invited to comment on the proposal, and it had also been working 
actively through other channels of influence. 
 
Other interviewees also emphasised the use of alternative channels of influence: 
 
‘Consultation statements is not always … sometimes it’s a lot of work and you 
never know how much impact you’ll have until afterwards.  I guess I believe 
more in meetings with Parliamentary politicians and the government in that 
regard.’  
 
This quote indicates a more ambivalent view of the influence of organisations 
through this corporative channel.  The interviewee was critical of how much influence 
her organisation actually had in relation to the amount of time spent on writing these 
comments. 
 
‘(…) it is very seldom that a consultation statement changes what’s already 
decided.  (…) we don’t prioritise consultations.  We don’t have the possibility to 
do that.  (…) of course, if we get a consultation invitation from The Norwegian 
Directorate of Immigration [UDi] about gender-based persecution or abuse of 
women we would answer that.’ 
 
This interview suggests that comments on proposals do not have that much 
influence, and that the issues in the proposal have, in fact, already been decided 
beforehand.  According to this view, the consultative bodies do not have any actual 
influence and they are merely invited to comment on the proposals because the 
authorities need legitimacy for a law proposal. 
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‘You need to be involved in advance rather than afterwards.  (…) plus it takes a 
lot of time and it’s not always easy.  Especially some things can be quite … how 
should I put it?  The language is sometimes not for ordinary people.  (…)’  
 
This quote indicates that the organisation needs to get its views heard and included 
before proposals are formally sent to consultative bodies.  In other words, the 
organisation’s views have to be included already in the proposal from the Ministries.  
This statement indicates an involvement through other channels of influence in order 
to achieve “real” impact.  The quote also raises another issue which was mentioned 
in several of the interviews; namely the language in which the proposals are written, 
which is quite difficult if you are not an expert in law and this can be a real barrier.   
 
Another barrier mentioned by most of the interviewees was the lack of resources 
which meant that the organisations do not have the capacity to comment on 
proposals: 
 
‘(…) We don’t have any employees, and somebody has to do it [write 
consultation statements].  (…) We have to prioritise, we really have to prioritise.  
(…)’  
 
This interviewee from a majority women’s organisation underlined the point made 
earlier: namely the time-consuming nature of commenting on proposals and the 
need to have paid staff in order to be able to make this channel of influence a 
priority.  However, one of the interviewees from a professionalised NGO, which has 
a paid staff, also said that the issue of capacity was one reason why they were not 
able to comment on all the proposals they were invited to give comments on: 
 
‘We are invited to contribute to many calls for consultations.  (…) we prioritise 
where we can because of capacity.  (…) we prioritise issues we actually work 
with.  We get calls about issues concerning immigrants, refugees, first 
generation [immigrant], second generation [immigrant], and integration.  But we 
don’t have a chance to answer all of them.’  
 
An interviewee from a professionalised NGO said this about political strategies for 
small minority women’s organisations: 
 
‘They [small minority women’s organisations] have to participate, but I don’t 
know.  I wouldn’t choose that [consultations].  If I had limited resources and had 
to choose, it wouldn’t be the main thing.  (…) I would promote issues in a 
different way.  It’s not that difficult to get a meeting with the members of 
Parliament.  And it would be good to have a relationship with several of the 
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Parliamentary committees.  It depends what your focus is, but it’s good that 
they know who you are and they know that you exist and what your focus is.  It 
is also worth the effort to send some letters and raise some issues to the 
Ministers in a certain field and then follow up on it afterwards.  Get something in 
the media, rather than writing consultation statements.  If you have limited 
resources you have to choose.’  
 
Her advice is to prioritise more informal channels of influence, rather than focusing 
too much on comments to proposals from the Ministries.  It is worth noting, however, 
that several of the interviewees from minority women’s organisations wished actually 
to be invited to more hearings: 
 
‘We have received invitations [to participate in consultations] by the Ministry of 
Justice and Police and the Ministry of Children and Equality.  (…) but it has not 
been directly to [our organisation], rather through other organisations like 
OMOD or some [minority] organisations which have written letters to us and 
asked for our support.  So we’ve said: “Yes, we support those issues”.  (…) I 
think that is important.  The more [organisations] who support, the more likely 
you are to have an impact.’  
 
This quote illustrates the need for several organisations to collaborate on certain 
issues, but the interviewee also wanted her organisation to be included in this 
channel of influence.  This can be interpreted as a wish to be seen as a legitimate 
political actor through inclusion in this formal channel of influence. 
 
One of the interviewed civil servants said that there is a huge challenge in 
transferring the knowledge of organisations ‘out in the real world’ and making use of 
it.  Some of the organisations do not have the required ability to impart their 
knowledge in writing.  In general, she thinks there are few formal initiatives taken by 
the organisations and that they lack knowledge concerning how the central 
government administration operates.  In her experience, there is a good chance of 
having an influence through the system of public consultations as long as the 
comments are well written, to the point, and substantiated with sufficient knowledge 
about the issue.  In cases where voluntary organisations can provide civil servants 
with good arguments, they might be taken into consideration and thus affect the 
outcome.  However, this also depends on the issue, on what opinions other strong 
actors hold on the issue, and on the political priorities defined at any given time.   
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Participation in publicly appointed boards and commissions that prepare policy 
initiatives is another way of influencing policy through the formal corporative channel.  
Some of the interviewees mentioned this kind of participation as a political strategy 
where they can influence policy proposals at an early stage: 
 
‘You have to see how you use your time and energy; see where you can 
achieve most influence.  Sometimes you have to try to act more in advance 
rather then after [proposals are made].  (…) we have worked very hard for 
minority representation in committees that write proposals which will be sent out 
for hearing.  In that way you are taken into consideration in advance.’  
 
This interviewee from a professionalised NGO considered participation in 
committees to be an effective political strategy: 
 
‘We are and we have been part of some committees and boards.  (…) one of 
the reasons to be represented there is the general idea of representation and 
democracy.  Another reason is that things happen in a process and to be there 
from the start.  (…) you might not be heard immediately, but over time you’ll 
have an influence.  And also the acknowledgement that you exist at all.  (…)’  
 
‘Earlier this year a health committee was appointed and one wanted a broad 
representation; “gender”, “geography”, and “age”, but not “ethnicity”.  So we 
asked for an expansion in the committee, and the inclusion of someone with a 
minority background.  Then they told us that they had been thinking about it, but 
they didn’t know of any suitable person with an immigrant background.  (…) So 
we sent this case to the Ombud and they have sent a letter to the Ministry.  (…) 
If you’re not present where decisions are made you are not a part of it, you are 
not visible, and you’re not being taken into account.’  
 
These quotes also illustrate the need to be present at an early stage in the policy-
making process and thus potentially having a larger impact on the framing and the 
focus of a proposal.  Another issue raised in this quote is the importance of including 
minority representatives in publicly appointed committees, both because of the 
representation of different voices and the democratic aspect, and the 
acknowledgement of living in a diverse society and to prevent certain perspectives 
from being silenced. 
 
Some interviewees, however, criticised the widely used practise of government-
appointed boards and commissions.  One interviewee from a minority women’s 
organisation claimed that every issue has a committee and a lot of money is spent 
on these committees.  In her opinion, committees that are writing reports and 
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proposals concerning minorities often consist of majority Norwegians, usually 
experts.  Critical minority voices are silenced and the work that minority women have 
done in order to put these issues on the agenda is made invisible, she claimed.  
Several minority interviewees addressed what they think is a ‘stealing of knowledge’ 
from minorities by majority experts in the increasingly professionalised field of ‘ethnic 
minority issues’.  One interviewee argued that the when decisions are made by 
committees or groups with members who are appointed by the state (usually 
experts), minority women’s organisations are excluded from deliberations within such 
entities.  Moreover, if a minority woman is included, it is usually at a later stage, and 
the terms and conditions of the debate have already been decided.  It, thus, does not 
really matter whether she is critical or not because she does not have that much 
influence anyhow. 
 
Another related criticism put forward by some of the interviewees from minority 
women’s organisations, was that the issues relating exclusively to minority women 
were being professionalised.  Most of the work is done by specialists or experts, and 
the women’s movement is not regarded as an important actor anymore.  Nyhagen 
Predelli (2003: 149) also addresses the issue of increased professionalism in the 
field of minority women’s issues, and links it to the general professionalisation and 
centralisation of the voluntary sector.   
 
Informal participation: Lobbying and dialogue 
 
The interviewed organisations varied regarding the extent to which they used 
lobbying as a political strategy.  Some interviewees considered informal contact like 
lobbying and meetings with members of parliament, politicians in the Ministries and 
civil servants to be an effective way of influencing policy-making:  
 
‘It is best to talk face to face.  A letter is a bit impersonal.  (…) not everybody 
reads it.  (…) but by talking to a person - I’ve talked to many politicians with 
direct eye contact - and by using a language that makes it easier for them to 
understand, rather than writing a letter.’  
 
This interviewee from a minority women’s organisation emphasised the personal 
element and the importance of making personal relations and advocating issues face 
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to face with politicians.  Several of the interviewees argued the importance of 
knowing whom to contact: 
 
‘(…) You have to find people who have strategic positions and who might be 
visible in the debate.’  
 
‘Sometimes an issue concerns many different authorities; then you need to 
challenge them all.’  
 
‘Often we try to aim as high as we can; preferably a Minister.  That seldom 
happens, but maybe the State Secretary.  Yes, we try to aim high.’  
 
These interviewees underlined the need to be strategic regarding whom to approach.  
In their opinion, it is important to locate people in different political parties who have 
an interest in the issue you are concerned with, and make direct contact with these 
politicians.  You also have to challenge the various relevant authorities.  Another 
interviewee from a professionalised NGO is reluctant to call these initiatives 
‘lobbying’: 
 
‘Lobbying is not the right word for the work that we do.  If there is a principle 
problem we go to the public authority, the politicians or the committee or the 
Ministry that deals with that issue and who can improve the situation.  Then we 
go there directly and address the problem.  It is not lobbying, it’s rather 
information sharing and proposals for improvement.  (…) lobbying is more that 
you wander the halls in the Parliament and the Ministries.  We don’t do that, we 
don’t have the time for that sort of thing.’  
 
According to this interviewee, a direct approach is not the same as “lobbying”, which 
in her opinion is time-consuming and less productive.  Several of the interviewees 
said that it is necessary for organisations to have meetings with politicians, but they 
do not have the resources and they cannot afford to have someone to do lobbying.   
 
The quote above also illustrates a point made by several interviewees, namely the 
need to present a concrete or specific suggestion, and not only a general frustration 
or criticism.  There is a greater chance of having an impact if you can provide 
productive solutions to a problem.  The need to be able to document your views is 
also seen as essential in order to be taken seriously: 
 
‘We try to arrange meetings [with politicians in government] when we have 
people with important information; not just to say: “We think so and so”, rather: 
“This is our experience on this issue and here you have the facts”.  (…) We try 
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to have people with a lot of knowledge of the field when we address certain 
issues.  Then it’s also easier to get appointments.’  
 
‘If we have several cases about the same issue it’s easier to engage because 
then it’s not only qualified guessing.  Then we have some numbers and 
statistics to show.  We would like to have an impact and we very much want to 
be able to document what we’re saying.’  
 
‘We have spent some time getting in contact with the parties that are now in 
government.  They are especially interested in certain cases and we can get a 
meeting.  (…) the smart thing to do, I guess that depends on the case and it 
varies.  The most important thing is that you say something when it needs to be 
said, you can’t cry out every time if you want to be taken seriously on the right 
issues.  You also need to have the documentation and then you’ll be heard.’  
 
Several of the interviewees also claimed that a meeting is not the final goal if your 
organisation wants to have influence, it is merely the beginning: 
 
‘If you have a meeting with someone - some people think that a meeting in itself 
is enough - but you have to understand how to use that meeting as a platform 
for further work.’  
 
‘For the most part we get the meetings we want, as long as we are flexible.  (…) 
however, a meeting in itself doesn’t necessarily mean that we’ll have an impact.  
(…) a meeting in itself simply means that they listen to what you have to say 
and then they do whatever they want to do afterwards.’  
 
These quotes indicate that an informal dialogue meeting can have a downside; 
namely as a forum where organisations are being heard but are not necessarily 
having any real influence.  However, the interviewees emphasised the need to use 
such meetings as a platform for further work.   
 
Some of the interviewees were more negative towards the use of informal contact 
with politicians: 
 
‘I can’t say that we don’t do lobbying, but we try to use that as little as possible.  
However, there are quite often hearings at the Parliament.  (…) but we only do 
that when we think that we have to.  (…) sometimes we take the initiative and 
other times the Parliamentary politicians do.’  
 
Part of the scepticism towards lobbying can be interpreted as a fear of becoming too 
‘personal’ with people in positions of power and of compromising the role of the 
organisations as independent ‘watchdogs’: 
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‘Our goal is neither to kick downwards or to the side, but rather to kick upwards 
and to make the politicians accountable, that is to politicise the whole thematic 
[violence against women].  We participate in many reference groups and co-
operation groups, also with the police.  The police have a lot of power.  A 
policeman said to me once: “it’s not easy; one day you kick us in the back, and 
the next day you sit here [at a co-operation meeting”’.  I said: ‘Yes, I have that 
role.  It’s not personal, but I am a “watchdog”, and if you don’t do your job, it’s 
my job to go out in public and say something.  (…)’ 
 
‘One day we have a meeting with a Minister here (…) and we have a good 
professional dialogue.  The next day, we criticise the same Minister.  That is 
independence.’  
 
‘We have been invited to the Parliament to talk about [minority] women’s 
situation.  (…) One Member of Parliament called me and asked me if I wanted 
to be a member of her party and work with their women’s movement.  But I 
didn’t want to become a member.  (…) Then I would always have to think about 
the party, what the party says, but I’m not like that.  I think without limitations.  
I’m not totally opposed to joining a party, but I think it’s best for me not to be 
member of a party.’  
 
These quotes illustrate in different ways a view shared by several of the 
interviewees, namely that the independent role of these organisations is paramount. 
 
According to one of the parliamentary politicians, the organisations are usually the 
ones who contact the politicians in their efforts to have an influence on policy-
making.  Some organisations have been present at hearings in parliamentary 
committees.  The politicians sometimes contact organisations, usually concerning 
new political initiatives when they need input from those who are affected by certain 
issues.  Sometimes individuals make contact and have meetings with politicians at 
which they tell their personal stories.  According to one of the politicians, stories of 
young women who have experienced forced marriage or female genital mutilation 
have been crucial inputs in policy-making processes in these areas over the past 
eight to ten years.  This also raises the question of legitimacy, which was also 
addressed in Nyhagen Predelli’s study from 2003; the degree of influence by single 
individuals compared to organisations that represent several members (Nyhagen 
Predelli, 2003: 149). 
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A combination of different strategies 
 
Some of the interviewees emphasised a dual strategy in their political work towards 
the government: they participate both in the formal corporate channel, including 
boards, commissions and consultations (hearings), and they participate informally by 
lobbying and setting up meetings with politicians.  The media was also mentioned by 
most of the interviewees as an important strategy to put issues on the agenda: 
 
‘Really you have to use many different approaches.  One thing is to prepare 
statistics and reports, so it’s not only ‘we have experienced...’.  (…) you also 
have to ask for meetings with the political parties and the party groups at the 
Parliament [Stortinget] and also with the different Ministries.  So that is one 
strategy.  The other is to draw attention to certain issues by using the media.  
The media has an immensely important role.  We use the media very 
purposefully.’  
 
‘We have a very important role as instigators.  One of the most important 
means is to draw attention to violence against women.  To make this issue 
visible in the public sphere.  You create a debate; you highlight very negative 
sides of society [violence against women].’  
 
Many of the interviewees considered use of the media as an important strategy in 
order to get public attention to the issues they are concerned with and, thereby, put 
these issues on the agenda of politicians in power.  However, several of the 
interviewees emphasised the need to know how to use the media:  
 
‘(…)it is important how you handle the media.  Many people talk too much for 
too long.  You have to know that if you highlight one small thing then it’s much 
easier for the other person to get interested.  That decides whether the issue 
will be taken up or not.  And it is also important to see what’s happening; to 
know what’s going on today to be able to make your move.  You need to make 
several phone calls and to follow up on that issue.  It might not be interesting 
today, but maybe the day after tomorrow.  (…)’  
 
According to this interviewee, the organisations have to be able to present their 
message in a strategic way in order to get the media attention they want.  They also 
have to follow the media debates and current events closely in order to seize an 
opportunity for their issues to be of relevance. 
 
Several of the interviewees also emphasised the importance of being well prepared 
when contacting the media: 
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‘We contact the media when we have an issue of principal importance.  Of 
course if we have some people or cases who can exemplify this matter, that’s 
good.  However, if you go to the media you really have to know the issue, 
otherwise it might ‘hit you in the head’.  When the media takes on a matter of 
principal importance it might reach the political agenda.  Then you might get to 
meet politicians to discuss the issue or they want more information about the 
issue.  So by informing through the media, through reports, inform as much as 
possible, then you might get a chance to sit down and talk with experts and the 
bureaucracy.  You don’t always need to talk to a Minister, but you need to 
present the problem where it belongs and maybe you’ll have an impact.’  
 
‘We don’t scream wolf if there’s no wolf.  (…) if we beat the big drum; if you go 
to the media or initiate a meeting and thump the table you have to know what 
you are doing; you have to know the case really well and you have to know 
what you are saying.  Otherwise it can hit you in the head horribly.  (…) so we 
continue working.  We do a lot of serious hard work and then we will be heard 
sooner or later.  (…)’ 
 
These quotes emphasise that one has to be prepared to discuss issues that have 
been put on the agenda, and one has to be able to substantiate the arguments that 
you put forward.  The media attention might give the organisation a platform from 
which to reach policy-makers and thus be a starting point for further political work: 
 
‘When the politicians have decided on priorities and have resources, then you 
are only at the starting phase.  After that you have to do something about it; 
that’s when the serious work comes into the picture.  We had an Action Plan 
against forced marriages in 1998 and we took that Action Plan in 1999 and we 
used it for all it was worth.  We had seminars and meetings around the country, 
allied with the Shelter Movement, and we raised awareness about this.  We 
started to work with the youth.  If we hadn’t done that it [the Action Plan] would 
have been lying in the drawer at the Ministry and collecting dust.  So when an 
issue has reached the political agenda, then you have to do something about it.  
You have to work in order for change to happen, for improvement.’  
 
When an issue reaches the political agenda and an Action Plan has been worked 
out, the organisations have to use this plan to push the authorities to follow up and 
implement policies.  One of the interviewed civil servants also emphasised this 
aspect of the organisations’ political work and their role as ‘watchdogs’ in order to 
influence political outcomes. 
 
Some of the interviewees emphasised the way they use the media channel 
strategically also in order to give a more balanced picture of minorities and ‘minority 
violence’: 
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‘One of the most important [strategies] is the media.  Especially with regards to 
minorities in order to give a more balanced picture, even if the media always try 
to paint a “black and white picture”.  These women are stigmatised because we 
talk about minorities as if they were one homogenous group.  We have, 
however, experienced that there are huge variations.  But you see how the 
media present murders of women; if there is an ethnic Norwegian man, he’s 
portrayed as a good man, a good worker, a good neighbour, he played with the 
kids and so on.  There is almost an obituary written about him.  However, if you 
see how the media portray men with a minority background:  “he was practically 
a barbarian”.  It probably feels good for the Norwegian society to say that kind 
of thing.  And then they go on by talking about “honour killings”.’  
 
According to this interviewee, the media - even if they often paint a ‘black and white’ 
picture - can be used strategically to paint a more nuanced picture.  The interviewee 
claimed that ‘majority violence’ and ‘minority violence’ are presented differently in the 
media, and the organisation wants to contribute a more balanced picture and, thus, 
draw attention to violence against women in general - regardless of whether 
minorities or majorities are involved. 
 
The way the interviewees talk about media strategies suggests that they strategically 
frame their issues in order to get attention and put certain issues on the agenda.  
One dimension of this is related to forming bridging frames that fit with cultural belief 
systems or dominant discourses in order to negotiate a frame that will work politically 
(Benford and Snow, 2000, in Bacchi, 2005: 203).  However, the quote above also 
indicates a strategy of reframing the dominant discourse about “minority violence” 
and extending the general frame of violence against women. 
 
One of the interviewees from a feminist majority women’s organisation described 
demonstrations as a conscious strategy to get media attention:  
 
‘The street is often an underrated arena.  But it is all about getting room; room 
to talk, room to act.  That’s what it’s all about.  A demonstration will get you that 
room to talk; room to talk in all the media channels.  A demonstration is 
important in its own right because it teaches people to do something about an 
issue with their own hands and feet.  It is a very important part of a strong civil 
society.  (…) but we also want to stage demonstrations in order to get attention 
from the media so that we can go out and argue on all channels, radio, TV and 
newspapers, afterwards.’  
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Another strategy has been to present the organisation as a tough and aggressive 
actor: 
 
‘(…) one thing is to build something when there is a situation of progress.  Then 
you can present yourself as more likable.  But in order for us to succeed it has 
been necessary not to be forgotten.  Since feminism and women’s issues 
haven’t been the most popular things to write about in a positive way, then this 
has been a good strategy.  (…) we don’t care if they like us or not as long as 
they are afraid.  This has been a deliberate strategy, very thought through.’ 
 
This media strategy has been deliberate in order to increase the attention to feminist 
issues at a time when such issues have otherwise received little attention. 
 
The experience of an interviewee from another feminist majority organisation was 
that the media had tried to use them: 
 
‘The media often call us, but it is not so often that they contact us after we 
deliver a press release.  (…) sometimes they call us but we don’t fit the image 
they had of a “feminist”.  (…) they think: “We want some crazy women who 
thinks that only women should have it all” or something like that, and when we 
say what we actually think about the issue, it’s not that relevant after all.  (…) 
but all in all I think the media contacts us quite often and I don’t have that many 
bad experiences.’  
 
According to the interviewee, the journalist already has a story and a picture of the 
archetypical ‘feminist’ that he or she wants the organisation to represent in the story.  
The quote also indicates that the organisation has experienced difficulties in their 
attempts to get attention to their issues and to set the agenda in the media. 
 
7.2.4 Co-operation, competition and division of labour between women’s 
organisations 
In this sub-section we examine the organisations’ views of co-operation and strategic 
alliance in order to influence political decision-making.   
 
Some of the interviewees claimed that majority feminists are not interested in co-
operation with organisations working with ‘minority issues’: 
 
‘However, I say it again, as I’ve said before (…), ethnic Norwegian women’s 
organisations have not been on the front line for their fellow sisters.  That is a 
fact.  (…) in the beginning when we started to address forced marriages or 
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arranged marriages with a higher or lesser degree of force as we call it.  We 
have met a lot of opposition, both from [minority] communities, also women’s 
organisations within these communities, and from what I call Norwegian well-
educated cultural relativists, women who thought that we blew things out of 
proportion because arranged marriages were a culture and we had to respect 
that.  We said that we are talking about the force in that culture; we are talking 
about the negative aspects of the culture.  It took several years before they - 
both within and outside the [ethnic] communities - said that arranged marriages 
are okay, but force is not.’  
 
This interviewee from a professionalised organisation addressed the opposition - 
both from majority feminist organisations and from minority organisations - when 
they put issues like female genital mutilation and forced marriages on the agenda.  
However, there are examples of co-operation between different organisations on 
certain issues, and several interviewees argued that co-operation on specific issues 
can be a good strategy to put political pressure on the authorities: 
 
‘We have common interests with many others [organisations].  How can we 
work together?  For instance minority youth (…) and minority women’s 
organisations.  (…) how can we co-operate in order to put political pressure?  
(…) one has to think about co-operating on certain issues (…)’  
 
‘We know each other in all the organisations, the nation wide organisations [in 
support of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees], especially the larger 
organisations.  We know each other, we meet at meetings, and everybody 
knows who works with what.  (…) we know of each other and we co-operate on 
certain issues, but we are independent organisations.  (…) we co-operate on 
issues if it’s necessary.’  
 
‘Sometimes we have to think about the big picture, not just single issues and 
the battles you have to fight to win the war.’  
 
These quotes from different interviewees indicate that the organisations think 
strategically about co-operation on certain issues.  According to some of the 
interviewees, co-operation can be difficult because different organisations have 
different views and some issues are seen as controversial, for instance the 
criminalisation of those who buy sex.  One interviewee said that her organisation had 
been in favour of the criminalisation of buyers of sex acts, but they no longer have an 
opinion on this issue.  They now try to help prostitute women in other ways, and are 
able to co-operate both with organisations who are in favour of criminalisation and 
those who are against it.  This can be viewed as a strategic effort to make alliances 
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with different organisations which are very opposed to each other on a controversial 
issue.   
 
Some of the interviewees mentioned mobilisations where the women’s movement - 
also sometimes in co-operation with professionalised NGOs - have been able to 
work politically together and to have an impact.  One example of successful co-
operation that was brought up in the interviews was the ‘Volda - case’: 
 
‘(…) co-operation with [a feminist organisation] and other networks.  To 
illustrate; the ‘Volda case’.  A female student reported that she had been raped 
by another student, but the case was dropped.  Then he filed for defamation 
[injuriesøksmål] because of slander because she had talked to someone.  At 
the same time sexual violation and a change was out on a hearing.  (…) we 
used March 8th, we had demonstrations (…) we lobbied; wrote letters to the 
Minister of Justice and we got huge media attention.  (...) then the Defamation 
Act [injurieloven] was passed in 2000.  (…) The Supreme Court [Høyesterett] 
said: “Women who have been violated take precedence over men’s honour” 
and it gave women the right to tell about violations …  It was a big victory.  (…) 
it is a story about the women’s movement where we fought together.  We went 
to Volda, we had demonstrations’ (…) it shows that the women’s movement has 
power and the importance of working together.  Then we can use one single 
case, like that case in Volda, and accomplish change.’   
 
This story illustrates a mobilisation where the women’s movement was able to use a 
range of strategies and also to influence policy-making. 
 
Another mobilisation in the women’s movement mentioned by several of the 
interviewees was the work regarding the three year rule in the late 70s and 80s. 
 
‘We started in the 80s.  (…) we have been fighting in all these years.  In 1991 it 
was taken into the regulations of the Immigration Act; a woman who breaks out 
of the marriage because of abuse might stay [‘kan få bli’ paragraph].  Then we 
mobilised women in the Parliament and we were able to change it to should 
stay [‘skal’ paragraph].  (…) however, this is a paragraph that the government, 
the immigration authorities have never liked.  So it has been two steps forwards 
and one step backwards all along for nearly 30 years now.  (…) the definition of 
abuse has been under dispute.  (…) so we have fought all the way.’  
 
‘(…) there has been talk about changing the three year rule.  We have fought 
for making this three year rule into one year.  (…) they talk about different 
requirements [tilknytningskrav], about earning a certain amount in order to be 
able to get married [to someone abroad].  I think that is discriminatory in relation 
to a group of people.  (…) it is only to prevent immigration.’  
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One of the interviewees from one of the oldest minority women’s organisations also 
mentioned the work regarding the three year rule as an issue where they were able 
to mobilise all Norwegian women’s organisations and they all stated that the law was 
discriminatory to women.  They were able to use some cases in order to highlight 
discrimination in the Immigration Act of 1988.   
 
This mobilisation regarding the Immigration Act of 1988 and the three year rule is an 
example which was highlighted by several of the interviewees from different 
organisations, both majority and minority women’s organisations and 
professionalised NGOs that were working on this issue at the time.  This example 
shows that during the 1980s, the women’s movement was able to mobilise around 
an issue at the intersection of women’s issues and discrimination on the grounds of 
ethnicity.  However, there have not been many examples of similar co-operation in 
the 1990s and the 2000s.  The new Immigration Act of 2008 did not lead to a 
comparable mobilisation.  Compared to an issue like forced marriage, the three year 
rule also received little attention in relation to the new Immigration Act.  The mapping 
of the comments from the consultation process regarding this law and the comments 
specifically concerning the three year rule indicates that some of the same 
organisations are still actively engaged in this issue, but among these there were 
mainly one established minority women’s organisation and some professionalised 
NGOs.  However, none of the membership-based majority women’s organisations 
were involved.  The organisations included in our study, which commented on this 
issue, agreed with the proposal by the Committee on Immigration Act’s report (NOU 
2004: 20) that the regulation should be included in the law, and disagreed with the 
proposed reversal of the ‘shall’- regulation to a ‘might’- regulation.  They also wanted 
women who had been victims of violence to be granted immediate residence 
permits, preferably after one year instead of three.  The Ministry of Labour and 
Inclusion agreed with the first two demands, but not the last.81  
 
The lack of more extensive mobilisations in the women’s movement might also be 
explained by a combination of an increased professionalisation in the voluntary 
                                            
81 See Appendix B in the Country Report from Norway. 
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sector (Melve, 2003: 173-174) and the institutional opportunity structure which is 
characterised by separate spheres (Skjeie og Teigen, 2007).   
 
According to the interviewed politicians, many of the organisations have become 
increasingly professionalised and are having regular contact with politicians: they call 
and ask for meetings, and they influence policy-making.  In the view of the 
politicians, the strategic thing to do is to make contact with the political parties that 
initially disagree with the organisation’s point of view; if you are able to persuade 
them, then you can actually have an impact.  The most professional organisations 
are aware of this strategy and have a broad approach where they initiate meetings 
with different political parties.   
 
Several of the interviewees emphasised the division of labour between the 
organisations: 
 
‘We work more with individual people, case after case after case, one individual 
after the other.  Whereas most of the other organisations [nationwide 
organisations in support of immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees] work 
more theoretically.  (…) one has found one’s niche.’  
 
‘There are organisations, like OMOD, who work against public discrimination, 
and the anti-racist centre and so on.  So it [ethnic discrimination, anti-racist 
work] is a specific field of expertise, and we don’t replicate.  (…) but we work for 
equal rights and equal value, and that is a basic work against discrimination.  
We do it our way.  (…) so of course we do anti-discriminatory work.’  
 
‘We can’t say that much about the [minority] women who are oppressed.  (…) 
others work with them.  If you go to them [SEIF or MiRA] you will hear about 
them.  We try to cover other areas because that is also very important and it 
can’t be left out of the picture.  It is not because we don’t think that there are 
many oppressed women, it is rather that others do that work.  Our job is to 
highlight the ordinary women and their every day lives.’  
 
‘We don’t work directly with racism because we have organisations like OMOD 
[Institution against Public Discrimination].  OMOD addresses racist cases.  They 
are a public organisation which is well known for dealing with racist issues.  So 
whenever there are cases like that, we co-operate with OMOD.  We are in close 
contact and give information and support each other.  Whenever there are 
cases like that, we demonstrate together with them.  But [our organisation] does 
not directly address racist issues in relation to the authorities; OMOD and the 
anti-racist centre do that, and also other organisations that have been in the 
game longer and have people with expertise in these issues.’  
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Statements like ‘we don’t replicate work’ and ‘one has found one’s niche’ indicate a 
strategic division of labour between the organisations.  Quotes like ‘it [ethnic 
discrimination, anti-racist work] is a specific field of expertise’ and ‘[our organisation] 
does not directly address racist issues in relation to the authorities: OMOD and the 
anti-racist centre do that, and also other organisations that have been longer in the 
game and have people with expertise in these issues’, also indicate separate 
spheres and increased professionalisation. 
 
One of the interviewees from a ‘professionalised NGO’ explained the need for 
someone to do political work full-time: 
 
‘(…) After a while we saw the need for an umbrella organisation.  When there 
was a consultation: Who’s responsible writing consultation statements?  (…) 
when the authorities contacted us; who should they contact?  (…) who should 
lobby at the Parliament [Stortinget]? (…)’  
 
Some of the small membership-based minority women’s organisations did not think 
that they had the skills to work politically because they did not have the expertise in 
certain fields.  Some of the larger membership majority women’s organisations also 
claimed that participation in consultations and political co-operation with other 
organisations are time-consuming and they do not have the resources to prioritise 
these types of political strategies.  Considering that, for instance, calls for 
consultations are sent by the Ministry to affected parties, increased 
professionalisation can be seen as problematic because the membership based 
organisations either do not have the competence or the financial resources to 
participate and, thereby, influence policy-making on issues that concern them. 
 
‘There have been some historical changes.  These days there are no great 
political movements.  If someone thinks that the Norwegian women’s movement 
exist today, I’d like to ask where it is.  Most of the work today is done by 
specialists and experts and so on.’  
 
‘The difference is that [our organisation] is a women’s movement.  We existed 
before there was money involved in issues like forced marriages and so on.  
We discussed these issues long before they became ‘popular’ issues.  (…) but 
other organisations became interested because there was money in it.  They 
are a result of the state’s immigration and integration politics which are based 
on short lived measures and projects.  But these issues [forced marriages and 
so on] are complicated issues (…).’  
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Another issue that was raised in some of the interviews is the existing competition 
among the voluntary organisations: 
 
‘Organisations often have a tendency to pursue one’s own goals.  Sometimes 
you can have a problem regarding co-operation with people who do other 
things.  (…)’  
 
‘When I started in this job I must have been the most naïve person in Norway.  I 
went to all the different organisations and said:  “I think we can co-operate” (…)’  
 
One explanation for the competition between the organisations put forward by some 
of the interviewees was the lack of financial resources and the struggle to be seen as 
legitimate and sensible actors.  The interviewees viewed the authorities as partly 
responsible for this competition because no one has enough money.  Even if 
organisations have found their niche and work with issues from different angles, it 
can still be difficult to get all the organisations to co-operate about an issue.  One 
interviewee said that she had to navigate and make different alliances with different 
organisations on different issues. 
 
The interviewees from the small membership-based minority women’s organisations 
emphasised the need to co-operate with others in order to have political influence: 
 
‘We [our organisation] can’t do that much alone, so we have to find partners to 
co-operate with in order to be able to influence policy.  One part of this work is 
through the Council for immigrant organisations [Innvandrerrådet].  (…) we try 
to do it that way.  Our organisation is small and we can’t do it alone, that’s 
impossible.’  
 
‘It is good if we can co-operate with somebody [other organisations] on a 
campaign and influence the authorities.  (…) we [mentions another minority 
organisation] have written a letter together.  (…) this letter will be sent to the 
media.’  
 
One strategy is to try to influence politically in co-operation with other minority 
organisations through the Council for Immigrant Organisations [Innvandrerrådet].  
The interviewee mentioned issues like ethnic discrimination in the work place, quotas 
in the public sector, and equality (both gender and ethnic equality).  Another strategy 
is to support each other on certain issues, such as public consultations on forced 
marriage.  The general impression from the interview data is that the small minority 
women’s organisations have mainly made alliances with each other on some issues 
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and also with professionalised NGOs, primarily working with ethnic discrimination 
and so on.  In relation to political influence there are few examples of co-operation or 
alliances between the majority and the minority women’s organisations. 
 
7.2.5 Summary remarks about the Norwegian case 
In section 7.2 we have examined some of the opportunities and constraints that 
women’s organisations in Norway highlighted during interviews about their possible 
influence on policy-making.  We have focused on attempts at influence through the 
corporate channel (Rokkan, 1987).  We have looked at the organisations’ 
participation both in the formal correct channel (including participation hearings, 
publicly appointed boards and commissions) and their informal participation 
(including lobbying and dialogue) (Skjeie and Teigen, 2004).  Other strategies 
mentioned by the interviewees are the media, demonstrations and strategic alliances 
with other organisations.  Our study shows that the organisations use a combination 
of different strategies in order to influence policy-making. 
 
There is evidence of co-operation or alliance across the ethnic divide in our interview 
material, but there is not much evidence on themes related to violence against 
women and ethnic discrimination/racism.  This finding probably has different 
explanations.  The organisational landscape is complex and dynamic, which means 
that there is a plurality of representations of the relationship between the 
organisations.  Of course, our study does not present the whole picture of co-
operation, alliance and other political strategies that are used by organisations to 
influence policy-making on ‘women’s issues’ and ‘ethnic minority issues’.  Our main 
focus has been on themes related to violence against women and ethnic 
discrimination/racism, with special attention to issues related to the intersection 
between the categories ‘gender’ and ‘ethnicity’.  Thus, our findings reflect such a 
focus.  Our research is also based on interviews with selected organisations and 
there are, probably, examples of co-operation and alliance that has not been 
reflected in our interview material.  However, our research findings can indicate 
some tendencies. 
 
An important finding relates to the relative invisibility and lack of voice experienced 
by Sami women’s organisations in several arenas, ranging from locally, within the 
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Sami community itself, to national political arenas, and to the Nordic and 
international arenas.  Sami women find themselves without the chance to be heard 
in the Nordic political system on an independent basis, as well as in international 
institutional processess such as the CEDAW reporting.  A solution to this problem of 
multi-level exlusion is represented to be the institutionalisation of Sami feminism, 
perhaps in the form of a Sami women’s centre with funding from the national 
government.  On the other hand, responsibility lies not only on Sami women 
themselves, but also on majority women’s organisations and government institutions, 
who must seek to open up for a broader representation of, and participation by, Sami 
women in political processes. 
 
Earlier studies indicate a selective inclusion of movement groups (Skjeie and Teigen, 
2007; Kjellman, 2007).  The pattern of selective inclusion in the areas of ‘gender 
issues’ and ‘ethnicity issues’ point to two separate spheres and certain field-specific 
opportunities for organisational activists (Skjeie and Teigen, 2007).  The financial 
support schemes illustrate the separate spheres of ‘gender equality issues’ and 
‘immigrant/minority issues’.  These institutional opportunity structures also indicate a 
discursive understanding of majority women’s organisations as working politically 
with ‘gender equality issues’, whereas minority women’s organisations mainly work 
with ‘immigrant/migrant issues’.  Some organisations are ‘institutionalised’ as 
consultative bodies within certain policy fields, whereas other organisations are 
excluded (institutional opportunities).  The invitation structure also says something 
about which organisations are seen as legitimate actors within different fields 
(discursive opportunities). 
 
Our own mapping of selected law proposals concerning violence in close relations, 
protection against forced marriages and changes in the Immigration Act (see 
Appendix B in the Country Report from Norway), support the claim of selective 
inclusion.  One aspect of the institutional opportunities is the invitation structure in 
regards to formal consultations of proposals that the Ministries send to affected 
parties (hearings).  The general picture concerning the invitation structure was that 
the majority women’s organisations were invited by the Ministries to comment on 
proposals concerning violence in close relations, but not invited to hearings about 
the Immigration Act dealing with forced marriage and the three year rule.  These 
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issues are related to violence against minority women and address the intersection 
between violence and ethnic discrimination.  However, here the majority women’s 
organisations are absent - they were not invited by the Ministries to comment and 
they did not take the initiative to send in their comments. 
 
Only a few of the minority women’s organisations were invited to comment on the 
proposal concerning violence in close relations.  The organisations which receive 
funding from the financial support scheme for nationwide organisations in support of 
immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, had been invited to give comments.  The 
divide between ‘minority violence’, like forced marriages and FGM and the ‘ordinary’ 
partner violence was institutionalised in 2000, with different government ministries 
responsible for different sub-types of violence against women.  There is little 
evidence of an intersectional approach concerning violence against women.  
Nevertheless, the recent reorganising of The Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombud 
in 2006 points to a more intersectional approach, but it remains to be seen how the 
Ombud will actually contribute to implementing such an approach in government 
policies. 
 
Several of the interviewees from both majority and minority women’s organisations 
underscored that violence in relation to minority and majority women is understood 
differently: there is a dominant cultural framing of ‘minority violence’ where this is 
seen as a form of violence which is ‘cultural’ and ‘special’.  Violence against minority 
women is also seen in ‘an immigration perspective’, and often linked to a more 
restrictive immigration policy.  When ‘minority violence’ is understood as ‘special’ and 
‘cultural’ it also makes it ‘their problem’, not a general ‘women’s issue’ and ‘our 
problem’.  It supports the image of ‘them’ versus ‘us’; the ‘suppressed minority 
woman’ versus the ‘liberated majority woman’. 
 
Our study shows that the women’s organisations (including some majority women’s 
organisations) that have tried to challenge this dominant understanding of ‘minority 
violence’ have experienced this as a difficult task.  However, some of the interviews 
indicate a conscious strategy of reframing this definition of ‘minority violence’ into a 
‘gender equality frame’ and a ‘human rights frame’.  Several of the organisations 
working with ‘minority issues’ have also tried to broaden the focus regarding minority 
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women, but have found this difficult because the political authorities have mainly 
been focusing on violence against minority women (‘crisis gender equality’), rather 
than on ‘ordinary’ equality issues such as education or labour market participation.  
Our analysis indicates that the narrow picture of minority women as victims of 
violence is a barrier for addressing other issues concerning minority women. 
 
The common view among the interviewed politicians and the civil servants is that the 
majority feminist organisations have been absent in relation to minority women’s 
issues.  They seem to be more engaged in majority women’s issues.  In their view, 
minority women are still not a part of ‘we’ the women, and there is a divide between 
‘us’ and ‘them’.  One explanation forwarded was that majority women’s organisations 
are afraid of being accused of being racist.  While there are many organisations in 
the ‘minority field’ and also a few strong individual voices, the field is very 
fragmented and it is difficult to know who the individual voices actually represent.  On 
the whole, the organisations that represent minority women and work politically and 
professionally are still very few, and there seems to be a need for more and stronger 
minority women’s organisations that engage in political issues. 
 
7.3 The Case of Spain 
 
In section 7.3 we discuss relations between women’s organisations and various 
government institutions in Spain that are involved with women’s issues (politically 
and strategically, but also historically) as these have been presented by women 
activists interviewed in our research.  Strategies for participation, ways to overcome 
barriers, implementation issues and ways to increase women’s political 
representation are discussed in relation to political opportunity structures in Spain. 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, political opportunity structures are defined by Tarrow (2006: 
12) as ‘features of regimes and institutions (for example, splits in the ruling class, 
political alignments, the presence or absence of influential allies, the threat or lack of 
repression, and the changes in any of these) that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s 
collective action’.  Using this definition, the aim is to understand how political 
opportunities link the state with the women’s movement in Spain.  While specific 
women’s movements are embedded in particular locations, they are shaped by the 
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broader set of political constraints and opportunities that characterise both the 
national and international contexts in which they operate (McAdam et al., 2006: 3). 
 
7.3.1 Political party affiliation as opportunity structure 
The relationship between the feminist movement and the socialist government has 
historically been very close since the 1980s when state feminism constituted a way 
forward for the women’s movement.  Most women occupying official positions in the 
government bureaucracy, as well as some of those who had been active members in 
political parties, have had some involvement with the feminist movement from early 
years (field notes, 2007). 
 
Some interviewees expressed a clear preference for the politics of the ‘left’, 
explaining that this is due to the Socialist party actively addressing claims made by 
the women’s movement in the past years.   
 
‘We had a ferocious campaign in this country to reform the 1989 Code [the 
Penal Code]82.  Because even if we had a Socialist party, it was still sexist.  
We changed that law that year…but since then, everything that we had to 
integrate in the law since 1997, everything we fought for, no government 
listened until this one…10 years with this law in our hands, edited by jurists, 
but no government wanted to accept it.  This is why the women think that JR 
Zapatero is a myth, he made it possible that the equality law was enacted, we 
also asked for this …’ 
(Interview, June 2007) 
 
Another interviewee argued that such political opportunity structures were created 
during Zapatero’s government to support the claims made by feminists, and stressed 
how Zapatero’s position and ideology has facilitated the feminist movement.  She 
quoted him saying 
 
‘You can’t be a socialist if you are not a feminist.’ 
(Zapatero - as quoted by interviewee, Madrid, June 2007) 
 
                                            
82 ‘The accusations of women were made in the name of “honesty”; if she was seen “going out” at 4 
am and they assume she was not honest, she could have been raped, abused with no consequences 
for the aggressor’.  (interview, 2007). 
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Another respondent explained that they have key political support from the higher 
rank politicians of the Socialist party:  
 
‘Within the Socialist party we have two or three collaborators, who are very 
close and with direct links to the party (…); the member of the citizenship 
participation of the executive [committee], is an essential help for the feminist 
movement.’ 
(Interview, Madrid, June 2007) 
 
Such views were supported by several other respondents and they highlight political 
opportunities that were created during the PSOE governance (since 2004) to 
promote gender equality legislation and anti-violence legislation in Spain.  These are 
examples of how political opportunities operate as ‘structuring cues’ for social 
movements, being at the same time key to understanding the results of social 
movements (Kjellman, 2007; McAdam, 2006).  They involve, particularly, two of the 
institutional opportunity features described by McAdam (2006), namely, the 
‘openness of an institutionalized political system’; and ‘the stability of a broad set of 
elite alignments’ (McAdam 2006: 27). 
 
Another interviewee stressed how, on the other hand, such political opportunities for 
the women’s movement were stopped during the time of the People’s Party 
governance (Partido Popular):  
 
‘I have to say it (because we all experienced it like this) that it was an 
important stagnation regarding gender equality policies while the People’s 
Party governed.  Even if they say they invented the equality policies, we know 
very well that this was a stagnation time (…).  We, the feminist women’s 
organisation of that time, about 10 or 12, got together and created a feminist 
network against gender violence and we drafted an anti-violence law, which 
we presented to the People’s Party.  They sent us away saying that they 
already had an ‘integral’ plan against violence and that was sufficient.’   
(interview, Madrid, June 2007) 
 
Women’s organisations can, thus, be said to have attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, 
to create a political opportunity for themselves by drafting the legislation against 
gender violence which could subsequently be presented to the governing political 
party at that time.  Other interviewees from majority organisations discussed similar 
aspects in relation to the formal and informal affiliations their organisations have with 
certain government entities.  Paradoxically, however, informal opportunities are, 
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especially, believed to be created through formal networks, such as those 
established through party membership.   
 
As suggested in Chapter four, the provision of financial resources to women’s 
organisations facilitates both the formation and mobilisation of such groups, and 
represents an institutional opportunity structure.  Yet, party affiliation can create 
different political opportunities for women’s organisations in relation to financial 
resources.  On several occasions, tensions were mentioned in relation to the 
perceived level of influence and support (often viewed in terms of financial 
opportunities) received by women’s groups with tight membership to a political party.  
During our conversations with feminist activists from Madrid, several women’s 
organisations were identified as being affiliated to the Socialist Party (field notes, 
Madrid, May 2007). 
 
Ethnic minority respondents particularly suggested that the party affiliation of some 
women’s organisations creates ‘political allies’ that could later facilitate different 
types of opportunities (financial, social, political), but at the same time they argued 
that this can act as a mechanism of exclusion, especially for those (newer) groups of 
women with less political involvement and less access to ‘elite’ groups or political 
‘allies’.  One respondent explained that none of the current political parties represent 
their interests as a minority group.   
 
‘We as an entity don’t have to be linked with any political party.  Because ours 
is a fight for human rights and because today there is one government and 
tomorrow another.  (…).  There are partial things that one party has [in its 
ideology], some very good ones [...], but on the whole, I don’t like any.  I don’t 
belong to any political party.’ 
(Interview, February, 2008) 
 
Another respondent talking on the same issues, however, stressed a different type of 
recognition and inclusion towards the Spanish Romani minorities coming from the 
recent socialist government:  
 
‘The Gypsy group never had their own state and they don’t ask for it, but then 
there is no government that defends their rights and interests.  The Gypsies 
live in all European countries and there are always organisations that are 
consulted, but there is a high price for having Gypsy representatives in the  
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politics of this country.  But the government of the ‘left’, I mean in Cataluña, 
but also the Zapatero Government, created certain entities with a willingness 
to incorporate them.  There is criticism, as always, but at least we have these 
entities that did not exist before.  For example at the national level, the State 
Council of the Gypsy group was created (Consejo Estatal del Pueblo Gitano).’ 
(Barcelona, 2007) 
 
Other ethnic minority respondents also recognised that the current socialist 
government has taken a more active approach to women’s organisations, by inviting 
them to participate in political processes and the delivery of public services, and by 
providing public funding for various parts of their operations.  Moreover, after the last 
election won by Zapatero and the Socialist Party, a new development within brought 
a historical change in this respect.  For the first time, in July 2008 a woman from an 
ethnic minority background was placed in a strategic position within executive 
government, as leader of the party’s strategy on integration and community 
cohesion.  This nomination has created an unprecedented political opportunity for 
minority women and their organisations. 
 
On the other hand interviewees who openly declared their political involvement 
claimed that their organisations do not receive any additional support due to their 
party activism.  Respondents who acknowledged their political affiliation with the 
Socialist party explained how this affiliation is based on the socialist ideology which 
purportedly better reflects a feminist ideology.  At the same time they also stressed 
that this affiliation did not create any formal financial or other types of support for 
their organisation.  One such respondent explained:  
 
‘The organisation has no involvement with the Party, not hierarchical, not 
functional, not economical.  The party does not give us money, we are not 
part of any hierarchical line of the party; nobody tells us which way to go, nor 
what to do.  We, the girls of PSOE, are important, but this is because a certain 
number of the council of members are party members; but we never ask 
those who come here if they are from any party, we only ask if they adhere to 
the feminist ideology.’ 
(Madrid, June 2007) 
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Another interviewee who talked openly about party affiliation also argued that her 
organisation holds similar values to the Socialist party (PSOE).  In this case the 
respondent referred to the stand this party has towards citizenship integration, which 
purports to be free of stereotyping and ethnic prejudice.  She said:  
 
‘The left understands that the situations of justice depend on circumstances 
that can change, and the right understands the circumstances with which one 
is born and as belonging to their ‘nature’.  I consider this to be the 
fundamental difference, therefore I think that the left has ideology, while the 
right has interest; they are two distinct things.  For this reason, when we say 
that you should vote for the ‘left’ so we can all be better, we are not only 
saying ‘vote only because this is my party’, we are saying a lot more than 
this.’ 
(Interview, Madrid, June 2007) 
 
This section has shown that political involvement is viewed by most of the 
interviewees as a critical element in developing political opportunities.  They claimed 
their co-operation and alliances with both government entities and partner women’s 
organisations to be generally good, although influence is believed to be dependent 
on the leadership of a particular government (i.e., a socialist government). 
 
7.3.2 A slow journey towards recognition and common spaces, but different 
interests and influence? 
The relationship between the state and key women’s organisations is nurtured 
through formal and informal dialogue and co-operation which might be seen as part 
of both the institutional and the discursive side of the political opportunity structure.  
This sub-section discusses the opportunities available to majority and minority 
women’s organisations for strengthening this relationship, both with each other and 
with the state.  It is assessed through the use of ‘common spaces’ created for 
feminist debate. 
 
Most representatives interviewed for this study talked about the importance of 
creating such common spaces for debate, where collaborations and interaction with 
each other and with the government can develop.  They argued that inter-
organisational collaborations are critical in trying to approach and engage with the 
government on gender related issues, particularly with respect to promoting 
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legislation on gender equality and gender violence, but also in creating informal 
networks and organising events and campaigns. 
 
Some respondents argued that such collaborations are mostly initiated during 
various types of feminist encounters.  They range from formal spaces, such as 
forums, round tables, seminars and workshops, where different women’s groups 
come together for legislative proposals, initiatives or changes, white papers or ad-
hoc committees, to more informal spaces such as organising events, campaigns, 
lobbying and celebrations on November 25th (International Day against gender 
violence) and on the International Women’s Day on March 8th.   
 
Organising these events has not been free of divisions and controversy.  Within the 
feminist movement there has been a quite open division between the more radical 
feminist groups, including lesbian groups, former extreme left party members but 
currently non-political activists, also referred to as ‘women of Barquillo’, and the more 
liberal feminists groups.  This historical division is, however, by most respondents 
presented in positive terms.  For example, a long time activist who identifies herself 
as belonging to the left said:  
 
‘There is another point of encounter, where there is the more radical feminism 
with which we have contact, these are necessary people and it is very 
important that they exist.  We meet in Barquillo 48, there are some buildings 
there (…) Some of them [radical feminists] (the majority of whom are not 
connected to any political party), at some point had some connection with the 
[communist] National Party (NP) movement, the communist extra-
parliamentary party which disappeared, from the extreme left.  They are 
reticent, [but] they are necessary because they know the utopia and beyond, 
and are almost without any other ties.’ 
(Interview, Madrid, June 2007) 
 
In Spain, the 8th of March is regarded not only as an important feminist symbol, a day 
of protest against male dominance and a celebration of the struggle for women’s 
liberation and equality with men, but also as a symbol of progress and the 
modernisation of Spain, where a variety of collective actors like government 
agencies and other public institutions, political parties and labour unions, are invited 
along to various groups of feminist activists and women’s groups and associations 
(Sundman, 1999). 
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Social anthropology literature suggests that organised collective events like the 
women’s demonstration in Madrid have significant similarities with religious rituals, 
which in times of crisis and conflict may produce solidarity in the absence of shared 
values, unity and consensus (Kertzer, 1988, in Sundman, 1999).  Sundman (1999) 
argues that such rituals and symbols may be used by social movements that lack an 
overall organisational structure, as they enable the binding together of scattered 
groups and make the participants and the public see such groups as expressions of 
a common political force. 
 
In terms of political opportunities created by such events, there is a danger that 
these ‘rituals’ create further divisions, especially in situations where the feminist 
movement speaks for ‘other’ subordinated, stigmatised, powerless and 
disadvantaged groups.  This is a more silent type of division that has recently 
emerged between majority and minority women’s groups, and this division is not 
always acknowledged at or during various feminist types of encounters.  Such 
division is discussed less in terms of collaborations to advance the feminist ideals 
and more in terms of barriers the immigrant women have to participate or be 
included in the majority’s movement. 
 
The National Observatory for Gender Violence is one such critical space that allows 
women’s agency to be directly involved with the government’s work on gender 
violence programs.  The Observatory was mentioned numerous times by both 
majority and minority women interviewees.  Such inclusion of women’s organisations 
in government consultations and policy implementation is a clear example of an 
available political opportunity structure.  Other state institutions mentioned by both 
groups of respondents (majority and minority women activists) as being actively 
involved in co-operation on gender related programmes, were the Ministry of Work 
and Social Affairs, the Justice Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and especially the 
Women’s Institute.  Respondents discussed these relations in terms of opportunities 
for political interaction and policy change, but more specifically they argued that 
these formal contacts create financial opportunities for their organisations (as most 
violence programmes are financed from Government funds).  Respondents argued 
that the Women’s Institute (WI) continues to play an important role for most women’s 
organisations in Spain, but some distinctions need to be made in terms of 
 255 
representation and inclusion of different actors from the women’s movement.  In a 
recent article Valiente (2007) explores the role of the WI from 1983 until 2003 in 
creating policy allies with the feminist movement on various policy areas, including 
job training, abortion, prostitution, political representation, and unemployment 
protection.  She identifies several conditions that can facilitate the Women's 
Institute’s ability to act as an ally of the feminist movement, such as leadership and 
informal networks to support the politics of the ‘left’.  Other facilitating conditions are 
to debate the issues in the policy arena and to maintain the policy arena open to the 
intervention of various policy and social actors.  However, claims brought forward by 
the Women’s Institute have mostly been related to gender equality and less so to 
other forms of oppression and discrimination affecting minority and migrant women, 
as our findings repeatedly suggested. 
 
Importantly, some Romani Spanish minority representatives do not feel represented 
by any government, despite their recognition of positive recent changes regarding 
the integration and advancement of the Romani Spanish minority in the society 
(historically a marginalised and stereotyped group).  A Romani minority respondent 
said that the City Hall of Madrid, as well as the Women’s Institute, had provided 
consistent support to their organisation since its beginnings (including financial 
support).  This had made it possible for her organisation to develop several 
integration programmes that have been running for the last decade, as well as the 
latest ‘manifiesto’ (a document claiming equal rights and integration in the labour 
market for Romani women).  She claimed that stronger ties now exist among 
organisations serving similar groups, such as the Romani organisations or the 
majority organisations focusing on similar issues (gender violence), or those based 
on political affiliation. 
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In Spain, ethnic minority women respondents and their organisations have been less 
engaged with and involved in the political agenda setting on women’s issues than 
ethnic majority women have.  This is reflected in how they are perceived by civil 
servants interviewed for this study, who consider that not only is there a 
differentiated influence on gender policy between the two groups, but that the fight is 
taking place at different levels (of impact).  One civil servant said: 
 
‘They [the organisations of immigrant and majority women] start from distinct 
conditions.  The immigrant women -   if they get together it is because they 
share a specific problem.  The Spanish women meet every time less to share 
this ‘class’ of things.  The immigrants meet to share problems, and moreover 
to find solutions, to save time, resources, everything.’ 
(Madrid, March 2008) 
 
A perception of immigrant women as inhabiting a subordinate position was made 
explicit when representatives from ethnic minority women’s organisations discussed 
their relation to the state, their involvement with and influence on gender policy.  
While they recognised having received increased support from the State (more so 
during the socialist years), they mainly stressed the barriers encountered in bringing 
up issues of racism and discrimination – (issues typically led and forwarded by 
immigrant men) - on the majority feminist agenda; an agenda which they argued is 
generally influential in terms of impacting gender policy. 
 
However, minority women respondents claimed that their influence and relationship 
with various government entities has progressed since 2006, and that their struggle 
to integrate a more nuanced approach to gender violence has been recognised and 
is increasingly being considered by key political players.  Key government institutions 
and partners they mentioned, in addition to those mentioned by majority 
organisations above, are the Department for Integration and Immigration, the 
Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, and more local women’s networks, forums and 
councils.  At the regional level, the Council of Women of the Autonomous 
Community of Madrid is considered a space that glues together all women’s 
organisations active in the region.  Similar structures can be found in other regions in 
Spain, as part of the decentralised government. 
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Some minority women respondents observed that at the local level, there is a 
tendency for political opportunities being increasingly opened to people of immigrant 
origin (emphasising how Latin American immigrants are perceived as being given 
preference in local political contexts, compared to other immigrant groups).  One 
minority respondent said:  
 
‘The Socialist party in the Community of Madrid included a migrant woman 
from Colombia to be candidate for a deputy position in the community of 
Madrid, and [they] put her in a very good position so she can be elected, and 
this we think is very important.’ 
 
At the same time, several ethnic minority interviewees argued that international 
players, NGOs and various other networks have impacted many of the minority 
women’s organisations in their quests for recognition.  They claimed to have 
received critical support during the initial set-up of their organisation.  Support had 
been received from organisations such as Amnesty International, Movement for 
Peace, Disarming and Liberty, Euro Net – FGM and European Network for Gypsy 
Women, among others. 
 
The interviewed civil servants viewed ethnic minority organisations as generally 
being represented in the higher forums by men, on issues such as discrimination, 
work integration, and human rights (field notes, Madrid, 2007).   
 
‘This makes it hard to recruit women minority organisations that work on the 
areas of our interest and have impacted policy.’ 
(Madrid, October 2007) 
 
This argument, which was mentioned several times during the course of this study, 
demonstrates that minority women’s organisations are not believed to have had a 
significant influence on legislation regarding gender equality and violence against 
women.  Ethnic minority women, thus, appear to have been doubly silenced in 
Spain: firstly on ethnic minority and immigrant issues, which are dominated by male 
community and organisational representatives; and secondly on gender equality 
issues, which are dominated by majority women’s movement actors. 
 
Moreover, a dominant view held by many of the interviewed majority women was 
that ‘they’ (immigrant or ethnic minority women) learn from ‘us’ (ethnic majority 
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women), and through informal networks.  Informal networks of ethnic and migrant 
women are then thought to facilitate more formal voluntary associations in a second 
stage, where the networks mature and then empower women with less information 
and knowledge about their rights, such as women who work in the domestic sector, 
of which 70 per cent are believed to be immigrant women.  Through these informal 
channels, majority respondents argued, migrant women have access to information 
they would not otherwise have.  For example, it was suggested that they may learn 
how to protect themselves against domestic violence from the Spanish women they 
work for.  Although such views were also shared by minority women respondents, 
the implications for their alleged inability to organise, associate or protest was clearly 
stressed only by majority women, with the ‘excuse’ made on their behalf that they 
work very long hours, care for their children and often live with no documents and 
under men’s strict supervision. 
 
This led to a situation where little if any recognition is given (by both feminist majority 
women and government representatives) to the fact that minority women’s groups 
may hold different types of priorities and positions in advancing their agenda.  One 
majority respondent claimed that ethnic majority women have little intention to 
actually influence the government on issues pertaining to immigrant women: 
 
‘I personally do not know that there was any serious, authentic movement in 
favour of the rights of the immigrant women.’ 
(Interview, Madrid, June 2007) 
 
Although such a statement sheds light on the lack of integration of minority issues on 
the majority agenda, it also shows that there is a clear recognition of the fact that 
majority women have a better position and increased political opportunities to 
advance change or introduce new items pertaining to minority groups. 
 
Other respondents explained this disconnection in light of the government’s non-
comprehensive immigration policy, while continuing to place the ‘blame’ on minority 
and migrant women’s lack of organisation. 
 
‘The immigration policies are a bit paralysed and this affects directly the way 
[migrant] women are attended.  You can see an intention to take them into 
consideration [by the government], but it is not altogether developed nor 
attended to.  The problem also lies in knowing who are their representatives.  
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We are now part of Spanish women’s associations who are going to defend 
the rights of the immigrant women, but the immigrant women are not yet 
organised in Spain.’ 
(Madrid, June 2007) 
 
Along the same lines, when discussing migrant women’s involvement in public 
policy, another majority respondent who represents an important umbrella 
organisation mentioned as a critical space for encounters by other respondents, 
placed the ‘blame’ for their non-involvement on the allegedly limited immigration 
policy currently carried out in Spain.  She said:  
 
‘This is a theme that I know less about, and it is more complicated because it 
has to do with general social integration politics of all the immigrants in our 
country, more difficult always for the immigrant women…  But this is a topic 
that we don’t work a lot on and therefore it is difficult for me to give you a 
more detailed opinion.’ 
(Madrid, June 2007) 
 
Such perceived divisions between minority and majority women’s agency is also 
reflected in how the government addresses migrant women’s issues, i.e., on a 
separate agenda than that put forward by majority feminist activists.  The question 
remains, therefore, who are the more influential players and what are the issues that 
they put forward on the political agenda?  Koopmans et al. (2005: 16) argue that in 
any given political context there is a fluid and dynamic set of opportunities and 
constraints that can enable or hinder the success of collective action.  However fluid 
the opportunities are, however, structural inequalities, such as those rooted in ethnic 
and gender differences, may have a direct impact on mobilisation. 
 
7.3.3 Claiming the fight against gender violence: implementation in an ‘unjust’ 
justice system? 
As discussed above, majority women interviewed in this study hold values specific to 
socialist and radical feminism, which tend to focus on women as a group and to 
challenge the ideologies of capitalism and especially patriarchy.  They argued that 
one of the most powerful ways in which patriarchy is represented in Spain is through 
certain legal structures, which in their view can hinder the development, the impact 
and the implementation of several laws aimed at reducing and eliminating gender 
violence. 
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For the first part of the 1980s and into the 1990s, gender equality policy has been at 
the very top of the agenda for most women’s organisations in Spain, prompted by an 
increasingly strong belief that women must work side by side with men, on a gender 
equal basis, in all spheres of life, from private to public domains.  This was followed 
in recent years (since the mid 1990s) by an uptake of issues regarding violence 
against women. 
 
Throughout the interviews, the respondents explained that not only did they 
encounter resistance at the political level, experienced mainly during the 
conservative years, when there was a limited political will to pass key gender 
legislation, but it is also reflected in how the judicial process is alleged to (mal-) 
function.  Many respondents described the judicial power of judges as inadequate 
and perceived judges as lacking a complex understanding of issues pertaining to 
women who experience gender-related violence, leading to situations where the 
society blames the women.  One interviewee said: 
 
‘This is a cultural problem, we have the instruments now [reference to the Law 
on gender violence passed in 2007] but the very justice system is incapable of 
understanding the very problem [referring to gender violence].  The women 
activists who work with these issues [of gender violence] know that this is 
different from any other penal problem […] and the [psychological] processes 
that follow, but the society says “but women withdraw their complaints”, “the 
women don’t react”.’ 
(Interview, Madrid, June 2007) 
 
Other respondents perceived the justice system as being flawed by the alleged 
powerful and non-comprehensive position of the judges.  One interviewee said:  
 
‘The Gender Violence Law is not providing results because the judges are 
permanently boycotting [it].  The legislature (Judicatura) in this country, [I am 
not sure how it is in other European countries, [is it like this, that] the judges 
left being judges, stricto sensu, for converting into political judges, supporting 
certain political ideologies.  Look what is happening with the Constitutional 
Court (Tribunal Constitucional) […] the same goes on with the Gender 
Violence courts, where they say systematically that women put forward false 
accusations and complaints.  When I started in the Gender Violence 
Observatory I proposed to investigate if false complaints can be proven.  
There were none.’ 
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The interviewee further explained how the judges’ discretion in gender violence-
related cases can hamper implementation of the law:  
 
‘The big problem I see is with applying the law because of the judges; this 
judicial resistance, at least in our country, you could only counter it by 
imposing imperative laws, if you cut off the arbitrary judicial power.  Because 
they use this arbitrary judicial [power] to undo the law […] It is about trying to 
make the law into a protocol.  In medicine, the protocols proved to be 
valuable, especially for treating serious illnesses.’  
(Interview, Madrid, October 2007) 
 
Along the same lines, another respondent argued that implementation fails because 
of the judges who apply the law.  She blamed the judges’ lack of understanding on 
an alleged lack of education with respect to gender violence issues:  
 
‘The law is applied by the judges; the other day we met a judge who said that 
it can’t be that a woman with a university degree experiences [gender] 
violence (…).  The training of professionals is critical.  The training of judges is 
critical... the problem is that the judges are in charge of their own training.  
They have this institution that gives them regulations and they don’t let 
anyone enter there (…).  They receive training for five hours and [then] they 
consider themselves gender experts.’ 
(Interview, Madrid, June 2007) 
 
Focusing on the same types of current barriers to the implementation of the new 
gender violence law, another respondent stressed the potential of recent legislative 
changes in the long run:  
 
‘The law is very complicated and I think we are still in a very experimental 
phase.  There are a lot of problems with the judges to be able to apply this 
law.  The police are [increasingly] collaborating [and] some others are 
[increasingly] becoming more aware and familiarised.  The Law is only from 
last year and it will take about 10 years before it will work.’ 
(Interview, Madrid, February 2008) 
 
The implementation and impact is also considered from a national versus 
regional/local perspective, as women’s movements are believed to have different 
impact at each of these levels.  The national organisations are believed to have more 
impact on legislation, such as getting laws passed, but also mostly because 
influential national women’s associations are perceived to be linked with party 
politics, such as the PSOE and the Partido Popular (PP) (field notes, Madrid, 2007).  
At the regional level, women’s organisations are believed to be more influential in 
implementing policy.  However, the local political scenario can also be a critical 
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barrier for implementation.  One example mentioned during an interview was 
Navarra, where abortion is not practiced despite the fact that abortion is legally 
permitted through national legislation.   
 
‘Women from that region have to travel if they need an abortion, because they 
would not find a public clinic that would perform abortion, and the private ones 
cost way too much so they can’t afford it.  It is a way to exclude women from 
their rights.’ 
(Field notes, Madrid 2007) 
 
Another interviewee also focused on the application of the law in different regions:  
 
‘This country is a specialist in making a lot of laws, but then you have to follow 
through ... and this is where the difficulties emerge, I want to say it’s failing 
with many measures of the anti-violence law […] how they are applied in 
many autonomous communities.  There are a lot of measures taken at the 
local level, a lot of procedures on women’s issues, in a small city hall if you 
go, you will find that somebody takes care of specific programmes, training, 
prevention, education, on sex-education, anti-violence, employment ...  […] 
But those more conservative communities are worse off …’ 
(Interview, Madrid 2007) 
 
However, respondents stressed that women’s movements from Andalucía, Cordoba, 
Valencia, Navarra, and Cataluña (in particular Barcelona) have been important in 
impacting different gender-related laws, such as the divorce law, the gender violence 
law, and the gender equality law (field notes, Madrid, 2007). 
 
Although key instruments have been developed during the past years to prevent and 
combat gender violence in Spain, both at the national level and sub-national and 
local levels, major implementation issues seem to remain.  They can be identified on 
two levels, one formal and one informal.  On a formal level such issues are mostly 
related to the judicial processes and to key actors involved in the organisation and 
administration of the judicial system.  On a more informal level, however, there are 
critical aspects pertaining to certain women’s groups – such as the migrant or 
minority groups, whose claims and demands regarding gender violence may be 
altogether missed both by government and by majority women’s organisations.  
These types of implementation issues need to be equally prioritised and brought 
forward on the feminist agenda in order to advance social integration and 
representation among all women in Spain. 
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7.3.4 Women’s organisations and the creation of national political plans to 
promote gender equality and reduce violence against women 
The analysis of qualitative interviews which constitutes the basis of our study in 
Spain shows that claims made by women’s organisations have come mostly from 
majority organisations with large membership, well known for lobbying and advocacy 
on issues of violence against women, as well as those with political influence in the 
Socialist government.  Spanish women’s organisations have called for a 
comprehensive law against gender violence since 1993.  A number of campaigns 
were carried out until 1998, when the Socialist Party took up the challenge and 
invited such organisations to prepare the first draft law against gender violence, filed 
in Parliament by the Socialist Parliamentary Group on December 16, 2001.  A vote 
was taken to accept the proposal, which was finally rejected due to the votes of the 
then ruling Popular Party.  Below are a number of selected women’s organisations 
that are frequently engaged with the government in amending issue-based policy 
and legislation pertaining to various aspects of gender violence. 
 
THEMIS – Association of Women Lawyers 
Foundation of Separated and Divorced Women 
Enclave Feminista 
Progressive Women’s Foundation (Fundación Mujeres Progresistas) 
Women’s Foundation (Fundación Mujeres) 
CAVAS, Association in Support of Women Victims of Rape 
Committee for Protection of Bad Treatment Against Women 
Network of Feminist Organisations against Gender Violence (La Red de 
Organizaciones Feministas contra la Violencia de Genero) 
 
Government consultations with women’s organisations increasingly take place 
through key government entities, such as the Rector Council within The Women’s 
Institute and the National Observatory against Gender Violence (which also 
organises issue-based “platforms” and national, regional or local workshops and 
meetings).  In a selective mapping of documents from Spain our emphasis was on 
the claims-making forwarded by these two institutions and on the outcomes of these 
claims, as evidenced by governmental policy and legislation (for further details about 
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the methodology used in the mapping of documents, see the individual country 
report from Spain). 
 
In the past four years, the current socialist government has placed gender equality at 
the forefront of its political agenda, recognising that inequality and discrimination are 
incompatible with a democratic society.  The inclusion of gender violence as a form 
of discrimination against women by the Spanish government followed several 
developments in the international realm.  These include the 1985 Third World 
Conference on Women organised by the United Nations in Nairobi, when abuse 
against women was, for the first time, recognised as a form of discrimination, later 
mirrored in Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW which called on governments to 
adopt prevention and protection measures in the area of violence against women.  
Later, in 1993, at the second Congress on Human Rights held in Vienna, violence 
against women was, for the first time, defined as gender violence (Ag 48/104).  In 
1994, moreover, the Human Rights commission assigned responsibilities to states 
for acts of violence against women (Annual Report, National Observatory against 
Gender Violence, 2008). 
 
As mentioned above, the Women’s Institute (WI) has played a major role in 
developing gender policy in Spain and in bringing women’s issues on the 
government’s agenda.  Equality plans were initially created by the WI, as main 
instruments for articulating gender policy.  They comprised a structured set of 
initiatives, approved by the Cabinet, on a variety of issues affecting women, including 
gender violence.  Plan I (1988-1990) initiated the first legislative reforms to create a 
legal basis for equality, and Plan II (1990-1995) described the practical measures for 
equal opportunity.  Plan III (1997-2000) was the first step for the formulation and 
development of policies and programmes to achieve equality for women. 
 
The beginning of these equality plans came after the initial campaign against 
domestic violence in 1983, followed by the opening of the first shelter for battered 
women in 1984 (Instituto de la Mujer 1994; 1999).  By 1997, 129 shelters provided 
services to victims.  By the late 1990s, there was one centre for every 302,000 
inhabitants in Spain; a proportion lower than the recommendation forwarded in a 
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Resolution of the European Parliament in 1997 - a shelter for every 100,000 
inhabitants (Public Ombudsman, 1998). 
 
In 1997 gender violence was mentioned as a section within the third National 
Equality Plan (1997-2000).  This plan, issued by the Women’s Institute (which at that 
time was placed within the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs) on March 1997, 
discussed violence against women (section 7), particularly in response to the fourth 
Women’s World Conference in Beijing from 1995, where it was acknowledged that 
‘violence against women is an obstacle against gender equality, against peace and 
development of communities, impeding women to enjoy their rights and fundamental 
liberties’ (fourth Women’s World Conference, Beijing, 1995).  In the third National 
Equality Plan, gender violence is defined as physical, psychological and sexual 
maltreatment that can take form in various ways, including rape, abuse, sexual 
intimidation, trafficking of women and forced prostitution. 
 
A specific area (section 8) of the third National Equality Plan is devoted to women 
facing social exclusion.  According to the plan, women face diverse forms and 
degrees of social exclusion.  The key categories mentioned here are immigrant 
women, women from the Romani community, women involved in prostitution (often 
mentioned in connection with drug consumption and HIV infection), women in prison 
or detention centres, and single mothers.  The plan argues that, although very 
diverse, all these groups experience a precarious economic situation, which further 
undermines their involvement and full inclusion in society.  As concrete measures to 
address these issues, the plan proposes (among other things) the creation of 
alternative residence homes, such as Respite Centres as well as Day Centres for 
women; the promotion of programmes addressing the labour and social inclusion of 
immigrant and Spanish Romani women; and training support for social professionals 
working in this area.  Another key area mentioned in this plan (following 
recommendations of the Women’s World Conference in Beijing), is to support the 
creation of associations and non governmental organisations with the purpose of 
enhancing women’s agency and enable women to influence their social, political and 
cultural lives. 
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Following the third National Equality Plan, Spain published the first Plan of Action 
Against Domestic Violence in 1998.  The plan was developed by the Women’s 
Institute in collaboration with women’s organisations.  This Action Plan contains 
proposals for measures to combat violence against women in the fields of 
prevention, education, support services for victims, health, legal reforms, and 
research. 
 
Consequently, the Plan of Action against gender violence was revised and 
developed for 2001-2004.  This plan defines goals for each area of action, the 
actions to be taken, and the bodies responsible for the implementation of various 
measures.  However, only one area of violence against women is addressed, namely 
domestic violence.  The 2001 plan was not considered comprehensive by most 
women’s organisations involved in the lobbying, therefore several protests and 
campaigns took place that year (such as Zero Tolerance to Gender Violence in 
2002, (Tolerancia cero con la violencia de género) (Red feminista, 2008).   
 
In September 2002 the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
and the Office of the Attorney General established the Observatory against Domestic 
and Gender-based Violence to provide follow-up to the treatment of domestic and 
gender-based violence within the Spanish justice system.  The Observatory provides 
follow-up to individual judicial decisions and resolutions concerning measures to 
protect the victims of such violence. 
 
The Organic Law 1/2004 on Integrated Protection Measures against Gender 
Violence was passed in December 2004, as the first of this kind in Spain and in 
Europe.83  This law began to address some of the recommendations of the fifth 
CEDAW periodic report from Spain.  Several women’s organisations, and members 
of the Rector (Executive) Council of the Women’s Institute, participated in policy 
processes and successfully influenced policy as well as legislative and administrative 
measures, as reflected in this document  (National Observatory against Gender 
Violence, Annual Report, 2007).  Additionally, several regional governments 
                                            
83 The legislation governing this plan up to that point was Law 27/2003, 31st July 2003 (reguladora de 
la Orden de protección de las víctimas de la violencia doméstica). 
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(Comunidades Autonomas) in Spain passed gender violence-specific legislation.  
The national law completes a series of legislative reforms, which started after 
Franco’s dictatorship was abolished.  Since then, the Spanish central state policies 
with regard to violence against women (VAW) included extensive legal reforms, 
however with limited services for victims of violence. 
 
A National Plan to Heighten Awareness and Prevent Gender Violence was issued in 
December 2006, by the Spanish Congress, for a period of two years.  This National 
Plan brings forward additional claims made by women’s organisations (through the 
Rector Council of Women’s Institute) as well as trying to address critical issues 
highlighted in the fifth periodic CEDAW report from July 2003.  It is considered the 
most comprehensive plan developed in Spain so far. 
 
Whilst creating additional services, the National Plan also aims to address some of 
the implementation critiques forwarded by women’s organisations.  The plan is 
structured along two dimensions: prevention, and communication and information.  
In principle, the strategies identified in the plan along these dimensions should help 
achieve the plan’s strategic objective to improve the response regarding gender 
violence both within the family environment and within the society. 
 
Throughout the Plan, women’s organisations are recognised as mobilising and 
participating actors, providing expertise and support towards achieving some of the 
identified objectives.  They are mentioned because of their preventative role (through 
the education programmes they provide), and because of their dissemination of 
information regarding various aspects of gender violence.  They are also referred to 
in relation to their role in lobbying, campaigning and securing a new political vision 
for gender violence policy. 
 
Other points of concern that arose from the CEDAW fifth periodic report from Spain 
(2003/2004) in relation to the position of immigrant women, women in prison, and 
women with disabilities, have been also addressed in the 2006 Plan.  However, 
recent reports from Amnesty International, together with claims made by ethnic 
minority women’s groups, argue that these efforts have not been prioritised in the 
same manner as other policies.  For example, the National Plan, although 
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recognising that educational activities to prevent gender violence in the community 
should pay particular attention to the diversity of pupils, such as those with 
disabilities, or those pertaining to immigrant or minority groups, does not offer any 
concrete measures (besides publishing gender violence preventative guides for 
parents) of how that is to be achieved or who is accountable for implementing such 
measures. 
 
Several critiques have been forwarded by women’s organisations, especially in 
relation to the implementation of this law, as violence against women continues 
seriously to affect many women.  Between 2001 and 2008, 425 women were killed 
by their partner or ex-partner in gender/domestic violence cases in Spain, with 71 of 
the murders occurring in 2007 and 88 women up to October 2008 (Red Feminista, 
accessed October 10, 2008). 
 
In the first phase after the law was issued, proposals from women’s organisations 
included the creation of Violence Against Women Courts staffed by professionals 
trained in gender violence; increased educational programmes, with a clear focus on 
the prevention of violence; increased material and human resources for the 
implementation of the law; and expansion of the reach of the law, especially in 
health, education, care systems, police interventions, and judicial responses 
(Amnesty International, 2008). 
 
Some of these issues have been partially resolved in the last two years, such as the 
set up of ‘Violence Against Women Courts’ in 2005 (Juzgado de violencia sobre la 
mujer), and several other improvements in the dissemination of the law, such as the 
issuance of educational materials about awareness, prevention, detection and 
intervention measures in cases of gender violence to schools, hospitals and other 
local services, including the police.  Training for professionals was also achieved 
with the support of numerous women’s organisations with special grants to combat 
gender violence from the government.84 
 
                                            
84 In 2007, the Spanish government designated over 280 million Euros for the fight against gender 
violence directed towards women.   
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Formal coordination and collaborations between the General Council of the Judiciary 
(Consejo General del Poder Judicial) together with the special Gender Violence 
Courts and the police in issuing citations (protection orders) was also approved in 
2005.  These new legislative measures are intended to provide increased legal and 
psychological assistance to victims of gender violence, including penal and judicial 
protection, as well as psychological treatment for the aggressors. 
 
However, representatives from women’s groups have complained that progress in 
fighting domestic violence continues to be hampered by delays made by judges and 
police in enforcing court sentences or orders, and the lenient treatment of 
perpetrators in some cases.  The courts are overwhelmed with cases and are short-
staffed, so prosecutions can take a long time.  After the creation of the special courts 
for violence against women in 2005 and the end of 2007, 69,400 men were 
prosecuted and 48,971 convicted.  In 2007 alone, 126,293 complaints were filed.   
In its latest annual report from 2007, the National Observatory of Gender Violence 
(Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, Collection: Against Gender Violence 
Documents, 2007) also claims that there is too much emphasis on penal and judicial 
measures, as opposed to few prevention measures, particularly with respect to 
measures targeted at the education system.  The report also argues that treatment 
services offered to abusers is very unevenly spread across different regions and that 
overall there is a strong doctrinal resistance to the concept of gender violence and its 
positioning in the framework of discrimination.  The same report calls for a higher 
level of institutional synergy in approaching gender violence and gender equality. 
 
7.3.5 Racism and discrimination in relation to violence against women 
Throughout the Organic Law 1/2004, the National Plan on the Prevention of Gender 
Violence, The Annual Reports and the latest evaluation of the implementation of the 
law (Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, 2006), there is very little mention of how 
other gender violence-related issues pertaining to immigrant and ethnic women are 
to be addressed.  As argued previously, issues of racism and discrimination in 
relation to violence against women need to be further integrated in the larger gender 
violence debate in Spain. 
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Following the recommendations of the 5th periodic CEDAW report, the Spanish 
Government was asked to supply numerical evidence of gains, if any, made by 
immigrants in bettering their situation, since the government had apparently not been 
able to evaluate the impact of its anti-discrimination policies on immigrants.  In the 
experience of the CEDAW Committee, the necessary reforms to eliminate 
discrimination could not be put in place unless there was factual evidence with which 
to diagnose the problem. 
 
Several amendments were implemented with regard to Female Genital Mutilation 
(FGM).  The first amendment was to introduce article 149, par.  2 to the Criminal 
Code, stating that ‘any person inflicting any of various types of genital mutilation on 
another shall be punished with six to twelve years of imprisonment’ (Codigo Penal).  
(FGM was previously mentioned in the Organic Law 11/2003, on Specific Measures 
related to Law and Order, Domestic Violence and Social Integration of Foreigners as 
a single offence.)  The second change was the Organic Act 3/2005 amending 
Organic act 6/1985 on Judiciary Power, on the prosecution of acts of female genital 
mutilation outside Spanish soil.  This act empowers Spanish Authorities to pursue 
female genital mutilation even when the offence is committed abroad (Women’s 
Institute, 2007).   
 
There is little current information about how such changes are carried out in practice.  
One report about FGM, covering the time period between 1999 and 2004, conducted 
by The Commission of Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunity, was submitted to the 
European Parliament in July 2001.  It reviews all the legislation and proceedings up 
to that point and requires further action towards abolishing and penalising this crime 
as a violation of human rights.  Following previous recommendations, another project 
that assessed the FGM situation in Spain prior to 2005 was conducted by Fundación 
Mujeres, (Women’s Foundation) under the Daphne 2003-2004 Programme 
(Fundación Mujeres, Report on the Spanish Situation, 2004).  This report lists local, 
regional and national legislative efforts to combat FGM and other types of honour-
related violence.  A few non-governmental organisations involved in disseminating 
information about combating FGM are listed; they include CEAR, ACNUR, Amnesty 
International, Amam España and the Women Lawyers’ Themis.  However, more 
analysis of the implementation of the latest amendments is needed in order to 
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assess whether the necessary resources are being put into prevention, detection, 
and especially follow-up, of FGM higher-risk cases.   
 
Women in minority communities often face multiple discriminations, but due to the 
fact that immigrant women’s issues are currently dealt with by distinct political, 
administrative and legal bodies, such multiple discriminations are, therefore, not 
addressed in the necessary comprehensive manner.   
 
The Organic Law 1/2004, mainly tailored to address domestic violence, has little 
reference to immigrant women.  There is, however, explicit description of how 
Protection orders should be handled when foreign women are the victims of gender 
violence, which is also reflected by Organic Law 4/2000 of the Rights, Liberties and 
Social Integration of Foreigners in Spain.  This law is the main legal act that 
establishes the right to independent residence for women foreigners who are victims 
of domestic violence and sexual exploitation (including those with irregular status in 
Spain) (Protection of Migrants, UN, 2007).  For example, women who initially entered 
Spain under the Family Reunification Act and who are dependent on the ‘abusive 
partner’, can obtain an independent residence permit.  Women who reside illegally in 
Spain, can request, based on the Order of Protection, authorisation for temporary 
residency for humanitarian reasons.  During this time, the sanction due to the 
illegality should be suspended.  The order of protection can not only be required by 
the victim, but also by family members and by social services.  The law recommends 
that the order of protection be required at the same time the complaint is made, 
although it is also possible to require it later.  The court has to issue the order within 
72 hours of the request, after an individual consultation with the victim and the 
aggressor.  However, this residency is only valid for one year, and does not carry a 
work permit.  This can be requested in a similar manner as the residency, on 
grounds of exceptional difficulties.  All victims of gender violence who cannot work, 
can register with the local authorities and are entitled to receive social benefits 
(Renta Activa de Inserción) provided that they register as active job-seekers and 
attend specialised training courses.  According to Law 1/2004 children of foreign 
victims of domestic violence have immediate access to schools, even when 
residency change is required.   
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However, such protection measures do not thoroughly discuss immigrant women’s 
cultural, legal and economic ability to make use of the law.  Amnesty International 
has, on several occasions, denounced ‘the administrative invisibility and vulnerability 
of undocumented immigrant women’, especially those facing gender violence, who 
are denied a residence permit and access to support and assistance after breaking 
up with their partner.  In the latest report (2007), Amnesty International argued that 
victims of domestic violence continue to face obstacles in obtaining protection, 
justice and social services, with migrant women facing additional difficulties in 
accessing essential resources, such as financial assistance, psychological treatment 
and shelters.   
 
Amnesty International’s report (2007) argues that key provisions of the law are still 
being developed or are being implemented too slowly.  However, some positive 
measures had been introduced, such as a protocol for health workers dealing with 
victims of domestic violence.  According to the same report, in terms of the use of 
health services, immigrant women find it easier to obtain an entitlement card in Spain 
than elsewhere in Europe, even if they have irregular immigration status (Amnesty 
International, 2007).   
 
In 2005 the Secretariat of State for Immigration and Emigration established the 
Spanish National Observatory on Racism and Xenophobia (Protection of Migrants, 
UN, 2007).  The main objective of this centre is to carry out periodic surveys of the 
situation of racism and xenophobia in Spain, which involves gathering data, expert 
analysis and publication of a detailed diagnosis of the situation.   
 
The work of this National Observatory is, however, limited in bringing up migrant and 
minority women’s issues along with those of racism and discrimination.  Apart from 
the trafficking of women (ECRI, 2006), little mention of women migrants is found in 
such reports.   
 
Both our in-depth interviews and our mapping of selected documents from Spain 
underscore that further work needs to be done in the area of racism and 
discrimination, especially with regard to the use of various aspects of the gender 
violence law, in relation to ethnic minority and immigrant women.   
 273 
 
7.3.6 Summary remarks about the Spanish case 
In section 7.3 we have emphasised the historically close relationship between the 
feminist movement and the Socialist party in Spain.  Particular advances have been 
made concerning gender equality and violence against women policies under the 
current socialist government headed by Zapatero (since 2004).  Examples include 
the new law on gender violence from 2004, and a subsequent national plan on the 
prevention of gender violence from 2006, on which the women’s movement in Spain 
has had considerable impact.   
 
In Spain an important role is played by a government agency, the Women’s Institute, 
in developing gender equality policies.  Despite early fears that the WI would 
substitute the role of the women’s movement in advancing the cause of gender 
equality and women’s rights, the WI has recently been viewed more favourably as it 
has, increaslingly, consulted the women’s movement in developing its policies.  The 
WI in general and the National Observatory for Gender Violence in particular, 
provide potential spaces for both minority and majority women to participate in 
policy-making processes (see, however, Valiente 2007).   
 
The integration of immigrant and ethnic minority women’s interests and concerns has 
been a considerable challenge in Spain, both within the women’s movement as such 
and within state-formulated policies and action plans.  The law on gender violence 
from 2004 focuses mainly on domestic violence, with little reference being made to 
immigrant and ethnic minority women.  The national plan to prevent gender violence 
issued in December 2006 does address some issues related to immigrant women, 
but the plan has been met with criticism about shortcomings in this area.85  A 
particular problem concerns immigrant women with insecure immigrant status who 
have been subjected to domestic violence.  On the whole, there is little evidence of 
an intersectional approach concerning violence against women.   
 
                                            
85 A more recent development from January 2009, which lies outside the time period considered in 
our report, is the new plan to prevent gender violence against immigrant women for the period 2009-
2012, published by the Ministery of Equality (‘Plan de atención y prevención de la violencia de género 
en población extranjera immigrante’).   
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In Spain there appears to be a division between immigration and integration of ethnic 
minorities as one sphere of politics, while gender equality constitutes a different 
sphere, with little or no overlap between the two.  Those who “fall between the 
cracks” in both spheres are immigrant and ethnic minority women.  The gender 
equality agenda appears to be mainly, if not exclusively, set by majoritised women in 
Spain, while minoritised women are largely on the sidelines as a result of a 
combination of factors (such as a lack of organisations primarily concerned with 
minority women’s interests, and a lack of inclusion of minority women in the majority 
women’s movement and in political decision-making processes).  In the sphere of 
immigration and integration politics, minoritised men, often the leaders of immigrant 
and minority ethnic voluntary associations, are perceived as spokespersons for 
entire communities.  In our analysis we have documented that immigrant and ethnic 
minority women in Spain are often perceived as victims and as lacking in agency due 
to alleged cultural forms of oppression.  In such a political climate, it will be 
necessary for immigrant and ethnic minority women themselves to mobilise and 
demand inclusion in political processes.  Moreover, majority women have a 
responsibility in creating more inclusive forms of participation, in the form of widening 
the political agenda to include ethnic minority women’s interests, and including ethnic 
minority women in political discussion, mobilisation, and decision-making processes.  
Some advances have been made, particularly since 2006, as some ethnic minority 
women are being heard in political debate.  No less than a cultural shift seems to be 
required, however, in order to change the ways in which both the women’s 
movement and the state engages with ethnic minority women in Spain. 
 
7.4 The Case of the UK 
 
In this section our analysis focuses on contemporary policy processes in the United 
Kingdom in the period from 1997 and onwards in which Labour has been the 
incumbent governing party.  Many women’s organisations and feminist academics 
have been critical of the Labour government’s level of engagement with gender 
equality politics (Lovenduski, 2005; Benn, 2000; Coote, 2000; see also Chapter 2 of 
the UK country report); however, at the same time it is widely recognised that this 
administration has done much more than previous governments to advance policies 
that promote gender equality (see Annesley et al., 2007).  Prior to the 1997 General 
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Election, the strategy by which the Labour party sought to attract women voters 
included the promise of a Ministry for Women.  After the election this was scaled 
down to a Women’s Unit located within the Cabinet Office and two Ministers for 
Women (one senior and one junior post).  The election of a number of women and 
feminists to positions of power, both within Parliament itself (partly on the basis of all-
women shortlists) and within government, also promised increased opportunities for 
women-friendly policies formulated from above. 
 
Since 1997, the ‘women-friendly’ Labour government can be said to have provided a 
new set of opportunity structures for women’s organisations to influence policy; 
however, there has been resistance within the Labour government to labelling their 
own policies as ‘feminist’ and taking on board a fully-fledged feminist agenda.  New 
Labour might to some extent have feminised British politics and policy, but whether 
its emphasis on developing women-friendly policies centred on supporting women’s 
roles in the labour market makes the government and the state feminist is a debated 
issue.  If the ‘weak’ definition of state feminism suggested by Kantola and Outshoorn 
(also referred to in our Chapter 4) is accepted, namely that state feminism ‘denote[s] 
the efforts by women’s policy machineries to pursue social and economic policies 
beneficial to women’, then the British state would, arguably, qualify as feminist.  If, 
however, our definition of feminism is limited to activity that explicitly challenges the 
dominant gendered power relations and confronts the gender order (McBride and 
Mazur, 2008; see also our Chapter 3), then the implementation of women-friendly 
policies does not make the British state feminist as long as it does not aim to combat 
more entrenched gendered structures of inequality (see Annesley et al., (2007: 19-
20).  Although women’s movement demands are, to some extent, being advocated 
‘inside the state’ (Lovenduski, 2005 b: 4), by individual women ministers and women 
MPs, and by women’s and gender policy agencies, it might be overstated to claim 
that the current government has institutionalised a form of ‘state feminism’.86 
 
A continued, albeit, uneven and incoherent mobilisation from below, through 
women’s organisations, has kept pressures on government to perform on gender 
                                            
86 See however Sones (2005: 174), where Labour government minister Tessa Jowell declares that 
‘the fact is, this is the most feminist government in history’.   
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equality policies.  This mobilisation has, at times, been characterised by pressure 
from individual organisations, while at other times organisations have joined in 
alliance and voiced stronger collective demands.  Furthermore, women’s 
organisations have sometimes displayed disagreement by voicing competing and 
conflicting demands on the state.   
 
The mobilisation of women’s groups, organisations and movements in any given 
social and political context depends partly on the social problems of gender, 
inequality that are identified as critical and that, as such, merit the mobilisation of 
collective protest.  In the 1970s the women’s liberation movement in England 
identified equal pay, equal education and job opportunities, free contraception and 
abortion on demand, free 24-hour nurseries, and an end to male violence against 
women among the critical demands it would forward at a collective level.  While 
some of the old demands have been met through policy changes, others continue to 
be voiced strongly by participants in the current women’s movement, including equal 
pay and an end to violence against women.  New demands from women’s 
organisations that have arisen due to changing social and political contexts often 
concern the same broad themes that were raised in the 1970s.  Current demands 
related to issues such as female genital mutilation, forced marriage, the trafficking in 
women and prostitution, and the licensing of lap-dancing clubs, have all been added 
to the violence against women agenda.  Compared with the 1970s, however, there is 
no broad formal agreement among women’s movement actors on the critical claims 
of gender equality that should be addressed and prioritised by the state. 
 
The immediate section below outlines the main features of the national political 
opportunity structure that provide opportunities and constraints for women’s 
organisations in their attempts to influence policy.  The focus is on opportunity 
structures at the state level (Westminster); opportunity structures specific to the 
devolved governments in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland are not included in 
the overview.  Further sections dealing with the UK case include a discussion of the 
particular discursive dispute over definitions and strategies that is taking place within 
the policy area of violence against women, and an examination of the ways in which 
women’s organisations seek to influence policies at the national level and the claims 
they make in relation to such influence. 
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7.4.1 Institutional and discursive political opportunities 
Following Koopmans et al., (2005: 19- 20), we make a distinction between general 
and field-specific institutional and discursive opportunity structures.  In the UK, the 
general institutional opportunity structure reflects the main features of the political 
system, such as the party system, the system of government, power balances, and 
so on.  Since New Labour came to power in1979, the corporatist and tripartite 
features of Britain’s political system have generally diminished (if not vanished); 
however, across this period, pressure groups, including social movement actors, 
have experienced more inclusive governmental practices (Budge et al., 2004; Jones 
2004; Lovenduski, 2007).87   
 
Within a pluralist model of competition between different group interests, pressure 
groups and social movements are expected to voice their particular interests and 
attempt to influence government policy.  Rather than being locked in fixed, 
corporatist structures, particular organisations may be part of small policy 
communities with a relatively stable membership of ‘insider groups’88 that consult 
regularly with politicians and civil servants on particular policy issues, or part of 
larger policy networks characterised by a more unstable or ‘shifting membership of 
groups and experts who [are] only occasionally consulted’ (Jones, 2004: 255-256; 
see also Scharpf, 1999).  Both formal and informal interaction between different 
types of actors in such policy communities and networks may influence the formation 
and implementation of public policy.  Although pressure groups and social movement 
actors do not have any formal decision-making power, their participation in decision-
making processes may involve the power to present ideas or definitions of particular 
issues (Berven and Selle, 2001: 16), or the power to define particular policy 
problems and how they should be dealt with (Lovenduski, 2005b). 
 
Organisations that seek political influence have alternative means and strategies 
available in terms of where and how they attempt to exert such influence.  Political 
parties, Parliamentary party groups, individual members of Parliament, 
                                            
87 Tripartite refers to power sharing between government, business, and labour organisations (see 
Hayward, 2006).   
88 The term ‘insider groups’ was coined by Grant (1985).   
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Parliamentary Select Committees, Ministers and other members of government, and 
civil servants, are examples of actors being approached by women’s movement 
organisations.  Available strategies and tactics that promote non-confrontational and 
dialogic interaction include participation in public government consultations, 
participation in working groups and external advisory groups, submitting petitions, 
lobbying, and informal meetings.  As we will see below, the organisations we have 
interviewed report varying degrees of access to high level ministers and civil 
servants.  While some have informal and direct access to ministers, others are 
limited to formal contact and/or indirect access through civil servants.  Most of the 
interviewed organisations have contacts with one or more individual MPs.  Moreover, 
they spend a substantial amount of organisational resources on responding to public 
government consultations.  Media coverage may also be used to seek the attention 
of policy-makers, and further pressure may be exerted through more confrontational 
tactics, including demonstrations and sit-ins.  Demonstrations in which women’s 
organisations have participated in 2008 include a rally organised in support of 
Southall Black Sisters against Ealing Council’s decision to cease funding the 
organisation, and demonstrations organised outside Parliament in support of current 
abortion legislation. 
 
The UK political system also exhibits field-specific features such that each particular 
political field (for example, ‘gender equality’) is characterised by designated 
institutions, policy communities and networks, and ways of working.  In our analysis 
we are particularly concerned with ‘women’s policy machineries’, ‘women’s policy 
agencies’ or ‘institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women’ – or those 
government institutions that ‘pursue social and economic policies beneficial to 
women’ (Kantola and Outshoorn, 2007: 3).  Each political field, such as ‘gender 
equality’ might be further broken down into various issues (e.g., gender pay gap; 
violence against women), and each of these might have their own field-specific 
institutions and agencies.  Research has shown that different policy fields ‘offer very 
different political opportunity structures from women’s point of view’, and our 
research supports these findings (ibid.: 7). 
 
It is not a straightforward task to produce an overview of the opportunity structures 
that are particularly relevant to the women’s movement in relation to gender equality 
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policies and policies on violence against women.  The UK gender machinery is 
fragmented and poses challenges to government attempts at policy coordination as 
well as to women’s organisations that wish to lobby government institutions.  Our 
focus is, therefore, on the main institutions that deal with gender equality policies, 
with a particular emphasis on policies related to violence against women issues.   
 
As mentioned above, a new government institution called the Women’s Unit (WU), 
later named the Women and Equality Unit, WEU), was established by the Labour 
government in 1997.  In 2007, the functions of the WEU were transferred to the 
newly created Government Equalities Office (GEO), thus signalling a shift towards a 
more intersectional approach to structural disadvantage.  The GEO is responsible for 
the government’s overall strategy on equality, and currently leads on policies related 
to the equality strands of gender and sexuality.  Responsibility for other major 
equality strands which are part of the intersectional approach are, however, located 
outside the GEO, as policy implementation related to the disability and age strands 
are led by the Department for Work and Pensions, while policy implementation 
related to the race and faith/belief strands are led by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government.   
 
The WEU has, throughout its roughly ten years of existence, been criticised for poor 
leadership and lack of resources.  Our interviews with representatives from both 
women’s organisations and civil servants indicate that the WEU and now the GEO is 
generally not perceived as central to advocacy and lobbying efforts.  This could of 
course mean that women’s organisations do not take advantage of an existing 
opportunity structure, but alternatively it gives an indication of the WEU’s rather weak 
political position (and the GEO’s similarly poor standing with regard to women’s 
issues).  The many and shifting locations of the WEU (it has variously been 
subsumed under the Cabinet Office, the Department for Work and Pensions, the 
Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Trade and 
Industry, and the Department for Social Security) has signalled a lack of significance 
within the overall government structure (Squires and Wickham-Jones, 2004; Hunter 
and Swan, 2007: 486).  One of our interviewees described the WEU as ‘nomadic’, as 
it has moved around in government, ‘according to the Minister that was in charge’.  
This nomadic existence has, according to the interviewee, ‘led to it being in a 
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powerful position at times, and a weaker position at other times, depending on who 
the Minister was and depending on which Ministry it was [located within]’.   
 
The current Minister for Women and Equality, Harriet Harman, is a long-standing 
feminist with high credibility among women’s organisations.  In recent years, the 
WEU has been led by various women Ministers, with or without feminist credibility in 
the women’s movement (see Lovenduski, 2005a: 162).  Political scientist Joni 
Lovenduski is very critical of what she calls ‘the Women’s Ministry’ in terms of its 
credibility among civil servants and also its capacity to accomplish, and suggests 
that ‘its fortunes may indicate that it exists largely for cosmetic reasons’ (Lovenduski, 
2005a: 164).  Lovenduski’s critical view is echoed by some of our interviewees.  ‘I 
think it has made a difference to have a person that is responsible for women’s 
equality in the Minister for Women.  But if she has no resources and no power then it 
is not very useful’, said one interviewee.  Our interviewees also pointed to other 
ministers with feminist credibility, and these were not exclusively women.  Vernon 
Coaker, Home Office Minister for Domestic Violence, is an example of a male 
minister with an increasing standing among women’s organisations.  ‘Some of the 
strongest advocates for gender that I have met in the last six months in the 
government have been male ministers,’ stated one interviewee. 
 
A clearer indication of a government shift towards intersectional approaches to 
equality is demonstrated through the establishment of the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission (EHRC) in October 2007, which opened up a new opportunity 
structure for the women’s movement and incorporated the functions of the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC) which, in particular, was lobbied by the women’s 
movement on issues relating to the labour market.89  Interviews with women’s 
organisations and civil servants alike showed a welcoming attitude towards the new 
intersectional thinking embedded in the GEO and the EHRC, but also demonstrated 
a guarded sentiment in terms of the extent to which women’s concerns and gender 
issues would be on the agenda within institutional structures where these compete 
with the faith and race agendas and their concomitant lobbies.  Indeed, some of 
these sentiments are shared by the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
                                            
89 See http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/Pages/default.aspx. 
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which in July 2008 recommended that the 
UK government should ‘take the necessary steps to ensure that national machinery 
for the promotion of equality continues to give priority attention to gender equality 
and discrimination against women’ (CEDAW, 2008: 6; our emphasis). 
 
In terms of gender equality issues such as pay and pensions, the Department for 
Work and Pensions provides opportunity structures for the women’s movement.  
Other important departmental opportunity structures are provided by the Department 
of Health (women’s health issues), the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (funding of the women’s sector, including the new government 
emphasis on engaging with women’s faith groups), and the Ministry of Justice 
(women in the criminal justice system and women at risk of offending).  The 
governmental opportunity structures relevant to violence against women issues are 
spread over different institutions, including the Home Office (domestic violence, 
trafficking, prostitution), the Forced Marriage Unit (joint unit between the Home Office 
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office), the Department of Health (female 
genital mutilation), the Government Equalities Office (overall strategy on gender 
equality, including violence against women) and the Crown Prosecution Service 
(prosecution of offenders and support to victims).  As we will see below, the 
fragmented nature of government structures dealing with violence against women 
issues is a point of contention for the women’s movement.   
 
Another important opportunity structure for women’s organisations is the Women’s 
National Commission (WNC), established in 1969 with an original membership of 50 
women’s organisations.  The WNC is formally a Non-Departmental Public Body 
financed by the UK government and set up to provide independent advice to the 
state in policy matters concerning women.  As such, it is also an opportunity 
structure for the government in terms of soliciting views and potentially gaining 
legitimacy for policies from a broad range of women’s organisations.  Currently, the 
WNC umbrella represents more than 450 partners (Donaghy, 2007), defined as 
‘women and women’s organisations in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
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Wales’.90  It is located ‘alongside’ the Government Equalities Office (GEO) and is 
chaired by Baroness Joyce Gould.  The WNC’s new director from September 2008 is 
Barbara-Ann Jones, who has recently lead the International and EU Gender Equality 
Team within the GEO.  The work of the WNC is overseen by the Chair and a board 
of 15 Commissioners who represent the WNC membership. 
 
The WNC has prioritised its work in so-called ‘workstreams’ which have been 
followed up through working groups.  The Violence Against Women Working Group 
(formed in 2002 and led by WNC Commissioner and Professor Liz Kelly since 2005) 
and its sub-groups have been of particular importance.  In addition to producing 
written consultation responses to the government, the VAW Working Group has 
played a key role in the formation of the End Violence Against Women Coalition 
Campaign (EVAW) and in the production of the Making the Grade reports from 2005 
and onwards.  These reports have examined and evaluated government 
departments on their performance in tackling violence against women (WNC, 2006).  
The VAW working group has a high standing among external actors, including our 
interviewees, and is frequently visited by ‘… representatives from the Home Office, 
Department of Health, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Women and Equality 
Unit’.91  
 
The WNC has also been instrumental in developing and supporting the Muslim 
Women’s Network which was established in 2002.  Patricia Hewett, then Minister for 
Women, asked the WNC to set up the Network ‘to help bring the voice of Muslim 
women to Government’ (WNC, 2006: 6), thus creating a new opportunity structure 
for both the government and for Muslim women and their organisations.  The 
Network, in collaboration with the WNC, has carried out a ‘listening exercise’ among 
Muslim women around the country resulting in the report ‘She Who Disputes: Muslim 
Women Shape the Debate’ (Muslim Women’s Network 2006).92  
                                            
90 www.thewnc.org.uk/about_is/index.html, accessed November 23, 2007. 
91 www.thewnc.org.uk/wnc_work/violence_against_women.html, accessed March 27, 2006.   
92 The WNC also played the key role in providing participants for then Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
then Minister for Women Ruth Kelly who in May 2006 invited Muslim women to talk directly to the 
government about their experiences (see Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006).  
In another development, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the Communities Secretary Hazel Blears 
launched the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group (NMWAG), an independent and informal 
group of 19 Muslim women, in January 2008, thus creating a new opportunity for Muslim women to 
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In addition to its work on violence against women and on creating opportunities for 
dialogue between the government and Muslim women, the WNC plays an important 
role in shadowing the government’s international work on gender equality, especially 
in relation to the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and to CEDAW.  The 
WNC represents women’s NGOs in the CSW, and as part of its remit the WNC 
writes shadow reports to the national reports submitted to CEDAW by the UK 
government (WNC, 2005; WNC, 2007).  The shadow reports are produced in 
consultation with WNC’s member-organisations, and thus provide women’s 
organisations with the opportunity to influence the institutionalised questioning of the 
UK government by the CEDAW Committee and, in the longer run, also the 
opportunity to influence the formation and development of UK gender equality 
policies.   
 
Other issues the WNC has engaged in recently are women migrants and asylum 
seekers, women’s human rights, and gender and trade.  A government-solicited ‘light 
touch review’ of the WNC in 2007 highlighted a need for more active engagement 
with its member-organisations, but confirmed the WNC’s role as ‘an important 
mechanism to enable government to connect directly with women’s organisations’ 
(Donaghy, 2007: 7).  The review also stated that the WNC ‘has an impact and 
influence which justifies its budget’, noting a budget size of £330,000 for the financial 
year from April 2006 to March 2007 (ibid.: 7 and 3).  In September 2008, the WNC 
budget was increased from £330,000 to £434,000, thus signalling a continued 
importance of the WNC in relation to government.93  In general, interviewees 
expressed positive attitudes towards the WNC’s existence and its work, but argued 
that its budget size puts real constraints on what it can actually be expected to 
achieve, both in terms of policy influence and in terms of contact with its member 
                                                                                                                                       
influence government policies and for the government to solicit views from Muslim women (see 
www.communities.gov.uk/news/corporate/680335, accessed September 11, 2008.  NMWAG was 
explicitly formed as part of the government’s work against terrorism, but its remit includes advising the 
government on education, employment and religious issues such as women’s role in the mosque.   
93 See the press release from the Government Equalities Office, ‘Harriet Harman strengthens 
Women’s National Commission’, September 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.equalities.gov.uk/news/prpage16.htm (accessed October 23, 2008). 
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organisations.  One interviewee, for example, stated that the WNC ‘may not work as 
efficiently or as effectively as it ought to and it is desperately short of money, always’. 
 
Furthermore, the review noted that the WNC’s independent role ‘can mean that it is 
placed in a difficult position at times bringing unpalatable messages to government 
ministers’ (ibid.: 10).  As Stokes (2003: 200) has observed, ‘… there is a fine line 
between overt lobbying and behind the scenes manoeuvring and as a governmental 
body the WNC’s remit is to collect and present the views of women, not to take a 
position or to promote those views’.  Indeed, the WNC might sometimes find itself in 
a rather awkward position as an independent but government-financed body which 
has in its remit to provide advice, while WNC member organisations might want the 
WNC to take a more active role in lobbying the government.  One interviewee 
pointed to the limited opportunity the WNC thus provides in terms of influencing the 
government: ‘The Women’s National Commission is funded by government, a part of 
government, but then can only be so critical because it is essentially a part of 
government’.  Some women’s organisations and individual feminists have suggested 
that the WNC is so weak in terms of influencing government that they have proposed 
the establishment of a new organisation called UK Women’s Voices.  The MP Joan 
Ruddock has been central to this effort, in conjunction with representatives from the 
National Alliance of Women’s Organisations (NAWO) and other women’s 
organisations.94  According to an interviewee, it is looked upon as problematic that 
the WNC does not actively use Parliamentarians.  ‘Now I suppose the WNC might 
say “but that is not our role.  Our role is as a link between ministerial level, 
government level and the women’s groups”.  But you could also make the case that 
government is also Parliament’, said the interviewee, who would welcome another 
organisation, but only insofar as it does not undermine the WNC. 
 
In summary, following McAdam (2006) the institutional opportunity structure includes 
relatively stable elements such as the party system, the Parliamentary system, and 
government institutions (some changes in the field-specific institutional structures 
                                            
94 The idea of establishing an ‘independent consortium […] to represent a more collective women’s 
voice to government’ is noted in the minutes of a Meeting of Key Women’s Groups, 15 May 2007, 
minuted by NAWO and accessed on NAWO’s website in November 2007.  A further meeting entitled 
UK Women’s Voices was held in July 2007 and minuted by NAWO (accessed on NAWO’s website in 
November 2007).   
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have been outlined above, but on the whole the system can be characterised as 
stable).  Moreover, the following dynamic or volatile features of the institutional 
opportunity structure can be said to encourage collective action and political protest 
by women’s movement actors in the UK: a relatively open political field system (in 
the sense that non-governmental organisations have access) with a relatively stable 
set of policy communities and networks, the presence of elite allies within 
government (Labour feminists in power) and a political will by the governing party to 
engage in women-friendly policies including violence against women issues.  These 
dynamic aspects allow women’s movement actors opportunities actively to engage in 
government consultations, lobbying and alliances with system representatives (such 
as politicians and civil servants). 
 
Gender equality policies and policies to counter violence against women are not only 
formulated and implemented within national borders.  Within the UK itself, current 
VAW policies vary between Westminster and the devolved governments of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.  Moreover, supra-national institutions like the European 
Union, the Council of Europe, and the United Nations also engage in promoting 
gender equality and women’s rights in their member states, and international 
agreements, conventions and human rights charters play an increasingly important 
role in the development of national policies and standards.  Women’s movement 
actors also actively use internationally agreed standards and conventions in order to 
put political pressure on their national governments (see (Kantola and Outshoorn, 
2007: 9; Hawkesworth, 2006; Antrobus, 2004).  Our country report on the UK 
includes an examination of the extent to which the interviewed women’s 
organisations engage in international advocacy through various institutions and 
mechansms. 
 
In the discussion above we have highlighted institutional opportunity structures.  
However, opportunity structures may also be discursive, as suggested by Koopmans 
et al., (2005).  While the institutional side consists of ‘the structure of the political 
system and the composition of power in the party system’, the discursive side 
consists of ‘established notions of who and what are considered reasonable, 
sensible, and legitimate’ (Koopmans, 2004: 451).  As such, discursive opportunities 
may determine which claims gain policy and media attention, which claims resonate 
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with claims by other actors, and which claims gain legitimacy in public discourse 
(Koopmans et al., 2005: 19).  In our research context, that of the women’s 
movement, it is thus relevant to consider which actors are discursively established, 
either by the state (government actors) or by movement actors themselves as 
‘reasonable, sensible and legitimate’.  One way of studying this is to examine who is 
talked about as ‘natural’ to invite to particular events (such as hearings, committee 
meetings, consultations, etc.), or who is perceived as a legitimate representative of a 
particular group or issue.  Another way is to ask organisations who they have made 
alliances with or co-operated with, or who they view as central actors alongside 
themselves in policy areas such as gender equality and violence against women.  
The discursive side of the political opportunity structure is perhaps most clearly 
demonstrated by the state’s policy documents (such as green papers, white papers, 
and consultation papers) relating to the preferred role and legitimacy of women’s 
organisations as part of the voluntary sector.  Such documents provide the 
ideological framework within which the voluntary sector in general and women’s 
organisations in particular must navigate and negotiate.  In ideological terms, the 
state may for example support women’s organisations and include them in policy-
making in order to promote values linked to participatory democracy.  On the other 
hand, women’s movement actors themselves produce discourse, and their policy 
documents give us insights into how they present themselves, other movement 
actors and the state, and how they view the available discursive political 
opportunities.  In addition to the discursive establishment of actors, political issues 
and demands may also be established as ‘reasonable, sensible and legitimate’ or as 
unreasonable or illegitimate.  In other words, problem representations and particular 
types of framing of issues are elements of the discursive opportunity structure that 
women’s movement actors engage with.   
 
7.4.2 Domestic violence or violence against women? The dispute over 
definitions and strategy 
In 2008 the End Violence Against Women Campaign (EVAW) published ‘Realising 
Rights, Fulfilling Obligations: A Template for an Integrated Strategy on Violence 
Against Women for the UK’ (Coy, Lovett and Kelly, 2008).  The document can be 
seen as a discursive strategy taken up by women’s movement actors in order to 
create new discourse and new political opportunities, with the ultimate aim of 
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changing government policy.  Its authors note that the ‘document is the culmination 
of decades of work by activists and academics who have lobbied for violence against 
women (VAW) to be recognised as a cause and consequence of gender inequality, 
and for governments to respond with the measures required by international human 
rights obligations’ (ibid.: acknowledgments page).  This long journey of claims-
making by women’s movement actors includes the following three basic demands on 
the state:  
 
• To recognise that ‘domestic violence’ is not a gender-neutral social phenomenon 
and that it is perpetrated mostly by men against women, and thus to 
acknowledge that violence against women is linked to inequalities between 
women and men.95 
• To recognise that violence against women can take different forms, including 
domestic violence, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and violence linked 
to perceptions of family honour. 
• To develop and implement an integrated strategy on violence against women that 
acknowledges a gender-based framework, a human rights framework, and 
linkages between different forms of violence against women. 
 
These movement demands have repeatedly been supported through policy 
statements made by the United Nations and the Council of Europe (Kelly and Lovett, 
2005; Hagemann-White and Bohne, 2007), including most lately by the CEDAW 
Committee, which in its response to the UK’s 5th and 6th reports stated its concern 
regarding the ‘absence of a comprehensive national strategy and programme to 
combat all forms of violence against women and girls’ (CEDAW, 2008: 8-9).  Despite 
such high-profile international support, on the whole the demands listed above are 
still largely unmet by the British government, which continues to pursue single issues 
through specific action and delivery plans relating to domestic violence, forced 
marriage, trafficking, prostitution, sexual violence and abuse.  In stark contrast, the 
devolved government of Scotland has produced, with extensive input from Scottish 
                                            
95 The notion that violence against women is rooted in patriarchy has long been advocated by the 
Women’s Aid movement and by feminist academics in the UK.  Southall Black Sisters added the 
notion of a racist patriarchal state to the discourse on violence against women (see Kantola, 2006: 73-
99).   
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Women’s Aid, a joined-up strategy on domestic violence (see Mackay, 2008: 28; Coy 
et al., 2008: 12).  The British government’s ‘silo-approach’ to violence against 
women issues is evidenced in the fragmented and segmented approach to policy, as 
various government departments and units are responsible for different parts of the 
policy agenda.  However, as we will see below, a significant event which might signal 
a turning point in the dispute over definitions and strategy is the Crown Prosecution’s 
new Strategy and Action Plans (CPS, 2008).  In this section we take a closer look at 
claims-making by both movement and government actors in relation to definitions 
and strategies concerning violence against women policies.   
 
An outstanding achievement by the WNC and EVAW is the production, since 2005, 
of the Making the Grade reports which purport to provide ‘an independent analysis of 
government initiatives on violence against women’ (EVAW, 2005: title page; see also 
EVAW, 2006 and EVAW, 2007).  For the first Making the Grade report, the WNC 
sent letters to all government departments, stating that it was undertaking an ‘audit’ 
of the government’s work on violence against women.  All departments were asked 
to provide written replies which would be published in an overall, annual report.  In 
the report, all departments were given individual scores, with an overall score given 
to the central government as a whole for its work on violence against women.   
 
The WNC, and later on the EVAW campaign, has managed to collect individual 
responses from government departments.  These have been scored and, in most 
cases, been found wanting.  On a scale from zero to ten, only two government 
departments scored above five in the last report (the Crown Prosecution Service with 
seven, and the Home Office with six), while the overall score was just above two 
(EVAW, 2008: 5). 
 
The grading process has been met with critique and resistance from some politicians 
and civil servants, while others have seen it as a positive contribution towards policy-
development.  In a strategic move to address criticism, responsibility for the report 
was changed from the government-funded Women’s National Commission to the 
independent EVAW Campaign, as the WNC’s remit is, as noted above, limited to 
that of providing advice to government.  The production of Making the Grade could 
potentially be perceived as involving campaigning and lobbying, which therefore 
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made it more suitable for a non-governmental organisation like EVAW to take it on.  
EVAW claims to represent ‘seven million individuals and organisations across the 
UK’ and is thus among the largest organisational collectives of women in the UK.96  
Overall, the three Making the Grade reports produced to date represent an 
achievement for the women’s movement as a whole and for the EVAW campaign 
and the WNC in particular, as the reports have raised expectations and increased 
pressure on the government, while at the same time providing the women’s 
movement and EVAW with invaluable public and political legitimacy provided by the 
sheer fact that government departments have taken the reporting process seriously. 
 
All Making the Grade reports reiterate, among several recommendations, the basic 
claims that ‘the UK Government should develop an overarching strategy and action 
plan to end violence against women’, and that ‘… the strategy should commit all 
Departments to working to the UN definition of violence against women’ (EVAW 
2008: 17).  The definition currently used by the Home Office reads:  ‘… domestic 
violence is any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse between adults 
who are or have been in a relationship together, or between family members, 
regardless of gender or sexuality’.97  Although practices such as forced marriage and 
female genital mutilation are included in the Home Office definition, the non-
gendered nature of the definition contrasts sharply with that of the United Nations’ 
General Assembly Resolution from 1993, which states that ‘the term ‘violence 
against women’ means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to 
result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including 
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in 
public or in private life’.98  According to EVAW (2008: 14), the UK signed up to the 
UN definition in 1995, but usage in government departments varies between that of 
the Home Office definition and that of the UN.  This creates, according to EVAW, a 
‘definitional soup [that] makes it impossible to compare outcomes and reinforces the 
silo mentality that dilutes current efforts’ (EVAW 2008: 28). 
                                            
96 See www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk (accessed September 16, 2008).   
97 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/reducing-crime/domestic-violence/ accessed 16 
September 2008. 
98 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/104, December 20th, 1993, ‘Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women’ (see 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.48.104.En ; accessed 16 September 2008. 
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The women’s movement has had a clear and indisputable role in putting violence 
against women issues on the political agenda and in establishing and providing 
services to women who have been subjected to violence.  Currently, however, a 
central claim by women’s movement actors is that the dispute over definitions has 
implications for how policies and strategies are formed and implemented to tackle 
violence against women; the key issue being whether these are formed and 
implemented on the basis of definitions that are gender-neutral or gender-based.  
The state is perceived as unwilling to accept the claim that violence is gender-based: 
‘The women’s movement, the feminist movement [...] is trying to push forward the 
violence against women agenda at a time when the government is trying to keep it 
very gender-neutral’.  The claim from women’s organisations is that a gender 
equality framework will make a difference in terms of prevention strategies and 
service provision (Coy et al., 2008).   
 
Women’s organisations representing ethnic minority women have been successful in 
putting issues like forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and honour crimes on 
the political agenda, and also in providing specialist services, but they also insist that 
the government needs to adapt a framing of these issues which acknowledges 
gender and human rights perspectives, and that different types of violence against 
women must be addressed through an integrated perspective.  ‘What is the 
difference between white killings and honour killings, you know.  It is ultimately the 
same; a lot of violence’, stated one interviewee.  Several interviewees underscored 
that the various forms of violence should not be perceived in terms of culture, race or 
religion, but rather within a wider context of gender inequality and gender violence.  
Interviewees argued that ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ can be used ‘as an excuse for control 
of women’, while ‘patriarchy’ and ‘gender inequality’ can be used to condemn 
practices in which men seek to control women.  A representative from an 
organisation which bases its work on the UN definition of violence against women 
argued that: 
 
‘part of that is to recognise that violence against women occurs universally 
across cultures, across religion and ethnicity and class, and it is also about 
recognising that whilst it occurs universally there are specific forms or specific 
manifestations that do affect specific women or specific groups of women.  But 
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what we are talking about is placing that in the context of violence against 
women and not taking that out of the context and treating it as an individually 
isolated situation.  Particularly with BME women, if you are thinking about black 
and ethnic women it is too easy to fall into the trap of using cultural analysis or 
focussing on race or religion, when actually what you are talking about is 
violence and it is gender, and it is gender driven.’  
 
Furthermore, some interviewees pointed to ‘negative policy developments’ in relation 
to immigration controls that are said to have followed from not linking forced 
marriage practices with gender inequality.  The policy developments referred to 
include the proposal to raise the age requirement for a spouse from abroad from 18 
to 21 (Border and Immigration Agency, 2007: 6).  Another interviewee lamented that 
‘the narrow focus on domestic violence excludes other forms of harm against 
women.  [...] The wider [agenda] of violence against women is absolutely essential.  
So if you think about things like forced marriages and honour crimes and FGM, often 
they are actually not recognised within that theoretical framework by policy makers, 
by agencies.  And actually, unfortunately, by some women’s groups as well’.  The 
interviewee went on to claim that by not including such issues in a wider violence 
against women agenda and not linking them to gendered inequalities, the 
government is perpetuating a stereotypical view of ethnic minority communities in 
general and of Muslim communities in particular.  The interviewee did not deny that 
these types of crimes occur in ethnic minority communities, ‘but it is just the way it is 
framed and the way it is problematised that is problematic.  [...].  We need to be 
framing it in the wider discourse and that has not happened’.  According to the 
interviewee, the fact that there is a specially designated forced marriage unit within 
government reinforces stereotypical views of ethnic minorities, and perpetuates a 
‘colonial framework of looking at violence against women’.   
 
In a response to Making the Grade 2007, the Government Equalities Office (GEO) 
published a ‘cross-government narrative’ on the work government is doing to tackle 
violence against women (GEO, 2008).  In this document, the current Minister for 
Women and Equality, Harriet Harman claims that ‘… in the past several years we 
have worked across government to ensure an integrated approach to tackling 
violence against women’ (GEO, 2008: 4).  Through its claims-making the 
government, is thus, actively contesting the claim from women’s organisations that it 
lacks an integrated approach to VAW.  The ‘cross-government narrative’ lists current 
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‘cross-government action plans’ for the policy areas of domestic violence, sexual 
violence and abuse, human trafficking, violent crime, prostitution, and rape (ibid.: 7).  
Three Inter-Ministerial Groups are listed as mechanisms through which coordination 
across government departments has taken place on the issues of ‘domestic 
violence, sexual violence and abuse, prostitution and human trafficking’ (ibid.: 33).  
Despite the claim to cross-government work, however, the different policy areas are 
not joined-up in a single strategy and action plan that would cover all forms of 
violence against women.  The women’s movement demand for an integrated 
strategy, thus, remains partly unmet. 
 
Among the interviewed women’s organisations there is consensus about the need to 
continue the dispute over definitions and strategies.  One of the arguments is that 
different types of violence are linked, and that this requires an integrated approach: 
‘So there are these links between pornography, sexualised clubs, prostitution [and] 
trafficking, and then there are links to sexual violence, domestic violence, forced 
marriages and honour crimes.  And these things all link up and if they have a 
strategy that actually deals with it as a whole [...], then it is more beneficial than just 
picking off individual issues [...].  There is research that shows that the people who 
were domestic violence perpetrators were also the people who were committing 
sexual offences on the street.  So these sorts of links need to be made’.  Another 
interviewee noted that ‘the idea of a strategy’ is ‘the big thing people are working for 
and the big thing that the government is resisting, unfortunately’.  The interviewee 
argued that ‘if the government does not have an agreed definition of violence against 
women it is very hard for them to see what they are trying to tackle and where they 
are making progress.  If they have no data, no gender-segregated data on violence 
against women, they cannot see where the problem is.  If they have no targets they 
cannot see where they are making progress’.  When asked why the government 
might be unwilling to meet the demand for an integrated strategy, the interviewee 
suggested that although particular individuals in government, including women 
ministers, might be positive, ‘there is no real will within government to do this.  There 
are no votes in it so why would they bother?’ 
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A third interviewee who lamented the lack of an integrated strategy linked this to the 
state’s failure to acknowledge the gender dimension of violence:  
 
‘We don’t have an over-arching structure in this country, we don’t have any 
strategy, we don’t have any action plan, we don’t have any law, so we have no 
recognition of violence against women.  We have general criminal law and that 
is what is used [...].  We said a particular issue for us is rape, then it is rape, it is 
sexual violence, but that is part of violence against women continuing.  So if we 
are talking about sexual violence, then we also need to be aware of the impact 
that has on domestic violence, because a lot of sexual violence occurs within 
domestic violence.  So [...] that is why we are pushing to look for a definition of 
violence against women, but the government is very, very, resistant to that.’  
 
Another interviewee from the same organisation also speculated about the reasons 
why the government might be resistant to an overall strategic approach to violence 
against women:  
 
‘I wonder if it is resources.  If you accept the argument of violence against 
women, you introduce violence against women legislation, you accept the 
definition, [and] then you have got to put resources into recognising that all 
these crimes are crimes against women in the context of violence against 
women.  And I think it is that, it is very easy, isn’t it, if you think about it, to pick 
out areas that you want to prioritise within that, so domestic violence has 
received a lot of attention, quite rightly.  However the other issues have not, 
quite wrongly.  But at the end of the day it is resource led and it is political led, 
in terms of what issues they want to pick and choose out of that whole agenda 
and promote those.’  
 
Among the interviewed politicians and civil servants there are mixed views on the 
debate over definitions and strategies.  One interviewee, who agrees with the 
women’s movement claim that the government lacks an integrated strategy on 
violence against women, stated that ‘one of the problems about our policy at the 
moment [...] is that for instance our domestic violence policy is not gender-based’.  
The interviewee went on to say that ‘there is no point in talking about [forced 
marriage and so-called honour killings] as if they are different, isolated things.  They 
are all part of a power and gender-based perspective and I think having a more 
holistic strategy is the way we have got to go’.  According to the interviewee, 
‘ministers who are long-standing feminists understand this’, but there is, allegedly, 
still opposition to this line of thinking both within the government itself and within 
competing political parties. 
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Other interviewees who could be said to represent views embedded in the state 
apparatus, however, are more reluctant to accept a gender-based analysis of 
violence and the implications this would have for the formulation and implementation 
of policies.  One interviewee, for example, highlighted the importance of policy 
effectiveness, and did not, as does the women’s movement, link the effectiveness to 
a gendered analysis of the problem of violence.  The interviewee stated that ‘the 
government’s criteria [for developing policy] would be the effectiveness of that policy 
[...].  There is not really a motivation in terms of ethnic minority rights or women’s 
rights so much as the motivation to eradicate the practice because of the severity of 
the abuse’.  The interviewee continued: ‘... from my point of view 15 per cent of our 
cases are male so we do not treat [the issue] as gender-based.  Although we fully 
recognise that 85 per cent of our case load is female, it does not affect our response.  
But I think this is the issue, if you get hung up on the politics almost of whether it is 
violence against women, whether it is violence against minority communities, 
whether it is culturally motivated, religiously motivated, whatever it might be, it is 
almost a distraction from what government needs to do and is doing, which is 
concentrating on finding solutions’.  The type of claims-making represented in these 
quotes seem to suggest that how a problem is defined does not necessarily have 
any bearing on the type of policy response to that problem, or the effectiveness of a 
particular policy response.  The claims-making forwarded by women’s movement 
actors, on the other hand, suggests that problem definitions are highly relevant and 
indeed determine policy responses.  The basic movement claim is that by 
acknowledging the gendered basis of violence against women, the government will 
be able to link policies on different types of violence against women, which in turn 
will improve the effectiveness of policies aimed at prevention and service provision. 
 
Another type of view forwarded by interviewed government representatives is in tune 
with the GEO’s cross-government narrative and emphasises that the government 
actually has a joined-up strategy on violence against women, and that the women’s 
movement’s failure to acknowledge this amounts to a ‘perception problem’.  One 
interviewee argued that the government has a strategy on violence against women in 
all but name, and suggested that the dispute over definitions and strategies amounts 
to a question of semantics.  The interviewee emphasised that government has action 
plans on domestic violence, sexual violence, trafficking and prostitution.  ‘Because 
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we do not have something called the National Violence Against Women strategy 
everyone thinks we have not got one.  [...] we are doing domestic violence, sexual 
violence, prostitution, and trafficking; what is it we are not doing?  Where are the 
other bits of violence that is not being tackled by government in a coherent and 
strategic way?’  The interviewee pointed to Harriet Harman’s narrative of government 
efforts to tackle violence against women (GEO 2008) as illustrative of the coherent 
and strategic view taken by government, and continued:  ‘I think it is a disagreement 
about perception.  I think there is a political lobby which is the feminist lobby that 
says unless it says violence against women we’re not going to have ...  We’re going 
to keep pushing until we get one, even though we’re thinking well actually if you 
looked at our strategies, the different strategies we’ve got, they are all joined up’.  
The interviewee also argued that policies relating to violence against women will 
always be relevant to different government departments, and that it would, therefore, 
not be sensible to demand that a Ministry for Women should deal with all women’s 
issues.  Instead, the interviewee emphasised that women’s issues should be 
mainstreamed and ‘the prism of gender’ should be applied across all government 
departments.  These arguments seem to be in agreement with those of women’s 
movement actors, which also emphasise the mainstreaming of gender, the 
mainstreaming of VAW, and the need for a government office to ‘lead the co-
ordination of an approach to VAW embedded in a gender equality framework’ (Coy 
et al., 2008: 34). 
 
A new and different government approach to women’s movement demands is 
exemplified in the new Violence Against Women Strategy and Action Plans launched 
by the Crown Prosecution Service in April 2008 (CPS 2008; hereinafter called the 
CPS Strategy).  The CPS Strategy is in many ways radical as it signals an entirely 
new policy approach which meets all the basic claims made by women’s movement 
actors in relation to an integrated and gendered strategy on violence against women.  
As such, it represents a significant victory for the women’s movement, which has 
lobbied strongly towards not only the CPS but also the British government as a 
whole for such an integrated and gendered approach.  Unusually, the CPS Strategy 
directly acknowledges the impact of the End Violence Against Women Campaign: 
‘This CPS VAW strategy and action plans take on board the recommendations of 
EVAW’, where the EVAW recommendations included a more joined-up VAW 
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strategy (CPS, 2008: 5).  The CPS Strategy also recognises and gives legitimacy to 
the Making the Grade reports which originated within the Women’s National 
Commission and which have later been undertaken by EVAW. 
 
One of our interviewees described the move CPS has undertaken from a narrow 
emphasis on domestic violence to a broader violence against women perspective in 
its policy formulation and implementation, and stated that ‘probably the thinking 
[implied in this move] did come from the campaigning from outside groups’.  In 
particular the interviewee mentioned the End Violence Against Women Campaign 
‘which originally was run by the Women’s National Commission, but now is actually 
linked to Amnesty International as well as the WNC’, and also the Making the Grade 
reports produced by EVAW.  ‘That was actually something that was very useful for 
us internally, to be able to take to our senior management, to say look we are being 
requested for information on this.  And we do work around these strands but we 
don’t have anything that is actually joined up’.  The CPS has moved to a joined-up 
strategy with linked action plans, and the CPS strategy on VAW now includes 
‘domestic violence, rape and sexual offences, forced marriage, so-called honour 
crimes, FGM, trafficking, prostitution, crimes against older people because that is 
predominantly affecting women, child abuse, pornography and sexual harassment at 
work’.  The development of the new strategy was in part based on a three-month 
external consultation, to which 44 responses were received; 30 of these were from 
non-governmental organisations including women’s organisations such as the 
Fawcett Society, Women’s Resource Centre, EVAW, Welsh Women’s Aid, Jewish 
Women’s Aid, Eaves Housing and the Poppy Project, and Refuge.99  Such 
consultation procedures are not new to the CPS as this government department has 
embedded quite a systematic approach to consulting external organisations and 
agencies.  The claim from women’s movement actors that definitions and strategies 
have an impact on policy formulation and implementation was explicitly 
acknowledged by this interviewee, who stated that ‘a lot of lessons from domestic 
violence [...] could be passed across some of these issues [rape, forced marriage, 
honour crimes].  But even more importantly we were aware that actually we often 
                                            
99 For a full list of participating NGOs and statutory agencies, see 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/equality/vaw/vaw_report.html (accessed September 23, 2008).   
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were reinventing the wheel around policies and practices where things were quite 
similar ...’.  The interviewee argued that both coordination and efficiency were seen 
to improve from an integrated strategic approach to VAW, and that a gendered 
framework would produce more targeted interventions: ‘This gendered 
understanding helps us realise the nature and the dynamics that go on in these 
crimes and we will be able to address them more’. 
 
In terms of internal institutional and political resistance towards the changes in 
strategy, the interviewee claimed that ‘there wasn’t any opposition overall, which we 
were surprised at, though to begin with internally there was not quite as clear an 
understanding about the gendered framework, why it should be women rather than 
actually just violence against any vulnerable victim’.  Although external resistance 
and concerns were expected in relation to the explicit gendered approach to VAW 
expressed in the consultation documents, the CPS strategy did not receive strong 
opposition; only one response stated disagreement with the gendered approach.  
The interviewee acknowledged that the changes embedded in the new CPS Strategy 
followed from claims and demands from the women’s movement, and repeatedly 
asserted that changes made sense as service delivery would probably improve as a 
result: ‘we would have more successful prosecutions, which is what one of our 
targets is, we will actually support more victims, which is another of our targets’. 
 
This interviewee, together with other research participants, frequently repeated the 
same names of particular individuals in conjunction with perceptions about 
receptiveness to ideas and demands from women’s movement actors.  In particular, 
the current Minister for Women Harriet Harman, Attorney General Baroness 
Scotland, and Solicitor General Vera Baird, are regarded as having a positive 
orientation towards a VAW strategy.  However, the level of influence they may exert 
on government policy remains contested and debated.  ‘I don’t think you would have 
this systematic implementation if you didn’t actually have the sponsorship of those 
committed individuals within the organisation and at ministerial level’, said one 
interviewee.  Another interviewee was sceptical about how influential feminist voices 
are in government, and claimed that the Minister for Women ‘has very little actual 
power within the Cabinet.  She is seen as being disempowered ...’. 
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During the interviews, all research participants were asked to evaluate the following 
claim forwarded by EVAW in the first Making the Grade report: ‘Much of the good 
work [on violence against women] is dependent on the sponsorship and efforts of 
committed individuals at both Ministerial and Government official level.  As these 
people move on, resources and personalities shift and the work is jeopardised’ 
(EVAW, 2005: 8).  Overall, interviewees expressed agreement with EVAW’s claim.  
Furthermore, some interviewees questioned the Labour government’s commitment 
to gender equality, while others also questioned whether a change of government 
would jeopardise existing gender machinery institutions.  One interviewee who 
reflected on whether gender equality and women’s rights are institutionalised said 
that ‘when something is institutionalised it is not dependent on individuals, it won’t 
change because individuals go, it is embedded in the culture, it is embedded in all 
those processes and norms and attitudes.  Has gender been institutionalised?  I am 
not sure.  To a much larger extent than it was 20 years ago’.  Another interviewee, 
however, expressed the view that the Conservative Party is also now taking gender 
issues seriously:  ‘[they are] taking this on board now, [...] particularly issues of 
discrimination’.  The interviewee mentioned trafficking and domestic violence as 
issues that have been picked up by the Conservative Party. 
 
Despite the government’s attention to ‘women-friendly issues’ such as child care and 
parental leave arrangements, and cross-government attention to VAW issues, the 
interviewees from women’s organisations represented the view that in general, 
gender issues are not prioritised on the government’s political agenda.  ‘If you did a 
word search of Tony Blair’s speeches you would very rarely find women or gender 
referred to.  In fact I suspect never.  I could be wrong about that but I know people 
have done that and found nothing.  Gordon Brown [...] is more committed to the 
principal of equality but he does not understand gender equality ...’, claimed one 
interviewee, while another actually stated that ‘Gordon Brown has been the biggest 
feminist there has ever been in government’.  In agreement with other interviewees, 
this respondent also argued that the government does not currently perceive gender 
equality as a political issue that represents any electoral advantage, and that it is 
thus relegated down the list of political priorities.  A lack of political will on the part of  
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government to engage with the women’s movement’s demand for an integrated 
strategy was also linked to electoral politics: 
 
‘There are no votes in it [an integrated VAW strategy] so why should they 
bother?’  
 
‘So what we have are a small number of women ministers who have a particular 
axe to grind.  So for domestic violence for a number of years women ministers 
have been campaigning on that issue and they have made some headway.  So 
what you have is little pockets within government of really fabulous things that 
are happening and particularly on domestic violence, but the idea of getting 
every part of government to sign up to a [violence against women] strategy is 
just too difficult.  So, not unreasonably, women ministers have said, ‘we are not 
going to bother with any of that.  We are just going to do the things that we can 
do in our department where I have control’.  
 
In summary, the dispute over definitions and strategy in relation to violence against 
women issues is ongoing, and the women’s movement is continuing to exert 
pressure on the government to change its policies towards an integrated strategy 
based on a gendered analysis of the problem of violence.  The continuing pressure 
is evidenced most explicitly in the Making the Grade reports produced by the WNC 
and EVAW, and also in attempts by movement actors to ‘do the government’s job for 
them’ in writing up a template for an integrated government strategy (Coy, Lovett and 
Kelly, 2008).  Further pressure on government to change its definitions and integrate 
policies is also mounted through international mechanisms such as the CEDAW 
convention, to which we will return below.   
 
The basic claim which the government should accept, according to women’s 
movement actors, is that violence against women is a gendered issue, rooted in 
structural gender inequalities, and that any serious attempts to tackle violence 
against women must be based on a gendered analysis of the problem.  But the 
terms ‘domestic violence’ and ‘violence against women’ remain contested, and so far 
it is mainly one government department that has fully taken on board the women’s 
movement claims for an integrated strategy based on a gendered framework.  From 
our interviews and from government documents as well, it seems that the British 
state is resisting the claim that violence against women is a gendered issue.  
Professor Catherine Itzin, however, who currently heads the government’s Victims of 
Violence and Abuse Prevention Programme, has recently pointed to the difference in 
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policy approaches between ‘damage limitation and harm minimisation interventions’ 
versus prevention and reduction of the ‘incidence and prevalence of domestic 
violence’.  She is pessimistic about reducing the incidence and prevalence of 
violence against women unless the UK government recognises that domestic 
violence ‘is defined as men’s violence and abuse of male power’ (Itzin, 2000: 378). 
 
7.4.3 Claims-making, opportunities and constraints at the national policy level 
In this section we examine more broadly the claims-making and problem 
representations forwarded by organisational and government representatives (civil 
servants and politicians) in relation to political influence at the state level.  The 
section is not intended to provide a full analysis of recent political advocacy work by 
women’s organisations and its impact on public policy, but focuses instead on 
examples of strategies and claims to influence that were emphasised by the 
interviewed organisational representatives.  Further and systematic research will 
have to be carried out on the extent to which women’s organisations participate in 
public consultations and the extent to which their consultation statements and other 
lobbying attempts resonate with actual policy outcomes.   
 
Room for influence 
The interviewed representatives from women’s organisations agree that since 
Labour came to power in 1997, the political climate has become more favourable to 
putting gender issues on the government’s agenda.  The organisations note that 
since 1997 a political will to engage with women’s organisations has emerged and 
that access to decision-makers has improved markedly.  Increased political will and 
access are seen partly as resulting from a change in government per se, and partly 
as stemming from an influx of women politicians, and especially feminist ones, in 
government and Parliament.  One interviewee who saw the Labour government as 
having made a difference to the organisation’s impact, said ‘that is why our access is 
so good, that is why a lot of the major changes we have been able to secure, 
because the party that is in government is feminist in a lot of ways’.  This 
interviewee, as well as other respondents, mentioned in particular Harriet Harman 
and other high-ranking female politicians in government, and the increased number 
of women in Parliament since 1997.  Most of the interviewed women’s organisations 
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have contacts with both government ministers and with women Parliamentarians.  
The influence of particular ministers on specific issues, including violence against 
women issues, was noted by many interviewees.  For example, one interviewee 
agreed that there is a political will to take on board gender issues: ‘I think that is 
correct, there is the political will with a little ‘p’ […] with the senior managers within 
the organisation.  But one aspect that has been a great advantage which has to be 
looked at as well, is the influence of ministers, which is from above downwards’.  The 
interviewee went on to mention particular ministers ‘who have been really pushing on 
these issues for a number of years’. 
 
Moreover, feminists have become ‘insiders’ to government not only as politicians and 
ministers but also as civil servants at state and local levels, and are now in a position 
where they can draw on previous movement contacts and provide access to 
women’s organisations: ‘those of us who are leading on this work have come from 
the women’s movement background, so the history of it is actually we do have quite 
good connections with the voluntary sector before we actually were working in these 
posts, and then working in these posts we can [...] use that to an advantage of 
bringing in the information from those organisations that we have worked with for a 
long period of time’.  The potential for the state to provide ‘women-friendly’ policies 
has thus been greatly enhanced by the election of women politicians to positions of 
power and by the hiring of civil servants with a background from the women’s 
movement.  A ‘feminism from above’ or at least ‘women-friendliness from above’ can 
thus be said to be combined with a ‘feminism from below’ through the continued 
political mobilisation of women in electoral participation and in women’s 
organisations (Hernes, 1987). 
 
One respondent perceived political successes in relation to violence against women, 
child care and gender equality as also due to cross-party work, and not only as a 
result of Labour’s exclusive efforts.  It is no longer only the Labour Party that can 
claim an interest in gender issues, as competing political parties have realised that 
women’s votes can be fought over by demonstrating engagement in women’s and in 
gender issues.  Another interviewee who emphasised a current political will to 
engage in women’s and gender issues and to engage women’s organisations, also 
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noted that such political will does not exist only in the government but also in the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party. 
 
Some organisations have more contact with government than others.  An 
interviewee from an organisation with extensive contacts in government said that her 
organisation has ‘very good relationships with government’, and links this to the 
organisation’s ‘reputation for expertise [...] and for having very high quality, useful 
data and analysis.  So in that way we have access in terms of securing the meetings 
with the people that we need to meet with’.  The organisation also has a high 
standing in feminist government circles, and contact is a two-way process: ‘They 
also call us and we also call them’.  Despite what the interviewee sees as privileged 
access, however, the organisation does not automatically achieve influence: ‘that 
doesn’t necessarily mean that what we say is always taken on board.  So we may 
have the relationship access, but we still have to persuade in terms of this is what we 
think you should do’.  ‘The doors are open on having the conversation, but actually 
influencing the agenda, it has been easier than if it was a different government I think 
on some issues, but you still have to make the case.  You are still trying to persuade, 
you are still having to do advocacy work’, said the interviewee.  Another interviewee 
from the same organisation agreed that ‘access has been extremely good’ in the last 
few years.  However, barriers to influence arise due to limited organisational 
capacity, a perceived general lack of public awareness of gender issues, and also a 
perceived lack of awareness among politicians and civil servants.  The interviewee 
saw a clear connection between the presence and number of women in Parliament 
and the shape of public policy, and suggested that if further increases in the number 
of women Parliamentarians were to happen, ‘then public policy would [...] be easier 
to change’. 
 
An organisation that has lobbied on specific violence against women issues relevant 
to ethnic minority and immigrant women since the early 1990s, echoed the view that 
the Labour government has brought along increased political opportunities for 
women’s organisations: ‘you see the changes really only came about, 1997 when the 
Labour government came into power and then we started talking to the Home Office 
Minister’.  According to the interviewee, ‘there was a kind of momentum’ that the 
organisation was able to take advantage of in attempting to influence government 
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policy.  The organisation has been particularly successful in lobbying towards 
changes in the rules applied to immigrant women on marriage visas who are 
subjected to violence and who risk deportation.  Its political impact on this issue was 
recognised by all key players, including other women’s organisations, politicians, and 
civil servants.  The interviewee agreed that the organisation has good political 
access, and it is being approached by government as a key player.  However, the 
interviewee also emphasised that the organisation sometimes has to demand 
access: ‘sometimes you have to really push your way in, because otherwise you 
won’t be heard at all’.   
 
Interviewees agreed that the Labour government has given more political attention to 
gender issues in general, but also to issues pertaining to ethnic minority women in 
particular.  For example, issues such as forced marriage and honour crimes have 
been placed on the political agenda and policies dealing with such issues have been 
developed and implemented.  Clearly the media has also had a role in putting these 
issues on the agenda, but women’s organisations such as Southall Black Sisters, 
Newham Asian Women’s Project, Imkaan, Rights of Women, Karma Nirvana and 
others have also been able to influence the agenda and the direction of policy 
intervention.  Some interviewees perceived there to be a particular window of 
political opportunity now in terms of women’s organisations being listened to by 
government on black and ethnic minority women’s issues.  However, some 
respondents found that the government’s interest in such issues might have resulted 
not so much from a genuine interest in women’s issues, but more from an interest in 
curbing violent acts of terror: ‘I think a lot of that is down to anti-terror work’, said one 
interviewee. 
 
As noted, the interviewed organisations do not experience the same level of access 
to and influence with government.  One interviewee, for example, stated that ‘quite 
frankly we are not big players with the government.  We chip away at stuff and we 
have small victories’.  The interviewee suggested that other organisations, such as 
the Fawcett Society, Women’s Aid Federation England, YWCA, and Refuge have 
more political influence than the organisation she represented. 
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The interviewees were asked to name organisations they collaborate with and 
organisations they perceived to be influential in policy circles.  While one interviewee 
mentioned Southall Black Sisters, CAADA, Women’s Aid, Refuge, and Imkaan, 
another interviewee referred to Women’s Aid, Refuge, EVAW, Southall Black Sisters, 
and Imkaan.  This interviewee also mentioned black women’s groups in general, but 
suggested that while Asian women’s organisations are being included in policy 
circles, there is ‘a big gap’ in relation to Black African and Caribbean women’s 
organisations.  A third interviewee referred to EVAW, Women’s Aid, Refuge, SBS, 
Newham Asian Women’s Project, Karma Nirvana, Iranian and Kurdish Women’s 
Rights Organisation, and the recently formed Muslim Women’s Advisory Group.  The 
interviewee also emphasised the importance of the WNC and its VAW Working 
Group.  A fourth interviewee felt that ‘at the moment there is no really very large 
women’s organisation’ but mentioned Fawcett, Working Families, the Women’s Aid 
movement, and the Women’s Resource Centre as important women’s organisations. 
 
These examples illustrate that it is often the same organisations that are being 
perceived as important or as having access to policy circles.  Among those that were 
most often referred to by interviewees are Southall Black Sisters, Imkaan, Fawcett 
Society, Women’s Resource Centre, Women’s Aid, Refuge, and the End Violence 
Against Women Campaign (EVAW).  These organisations are, thus, being 
discursively framed as important and legitimate actors within the policy community.  
As suggested previously in this chapter, these women’s organisations are part of a 
small policy community with a relatively stable membership of ‘insider groups’100 that 
consult quite regularly, either formally or informally, with politicians and civil servants 
on particular policy issues (Jones, 2004).  A similar observation has been made by 
Lovenduski (2007: 161), who notes the post-1997 ‘emergence of a feminist policy 
network of politicians, women’s movement actors and policy agencies’ dealing with 
‘women’s issues’. 
 
In turn, such formal and informal interaction between ‘insider groups’ in the policy 
community impacts on the formation and implementation of public policy.  As argued 
above, although pressure groups and social movement actors do not have any 
                                            
100 The term ‘insider groups’ was coined by Grant (1985).   
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formal decision-making power, their participation in policy communities and 
networks, and their occasional media participation, may involve the power to present 
ideas or definitions of particular issues (Berven and Selle, 2001: 16) or the power to 
define particular policy problems and how they should be dealt with (Lovenduski, 
2005b). 
 
The interviewed women’s organisations claim that they are sometimes able to put 
issues on the political agenda, while at other times they are constrained by the 
government’s own agenda.  New issues have been put on the government’s agenda 
partly due to the sustained efforts by women’s organisations.  For example, women’s 
organisations that since the 1970s have pioneered the delivery of services to victims 
of violence have been highly successful in putting the issue of domestic violence on 
the government’s agenda.  Today, such organisations feel they must argue for the 
need of continued services to women, and also for specialist services dealing with 
particular forms of violence against women.  Moreover, the closure of refuges and 
resources for Black and Minority Ethnic and Refugee Women,101 including women 
seeking asylum, is on the current lobbying agenda of several women’s organisations. 
 
Moreover, organisations such as Women’s Aid have more recently managed to put 
the issue of child abuse on the government’s agenda, and work to integrate 
children’s needs into service provision.  Another example of an issue that has been 
fought for by women’s organisations over a long period of time is that of women who 
kill their violent partners.  Since the late 1980s and early 1990s Southall Black 
Sisters and Justice for Women have campaigned for this issue to be put on the 
government’s agenda, Justice of Women having been directly inspired by Southall 
Black Sisters’ campaign on behalf of Kiranjit Ahluwalia.  ‘Optimistically when we set 
out we thought right, what we have got to do is change the laws and attitudes in 
society around the issue of battered women who kill’, said an interviewee who 
worked on this issue.  ‘Let’s look at this one issue about women being jailed for life 
for fighting back against violent men, whereas men get away with murder’.  Among 
the tactics used to get the issue onto the political agenda were national 
demonstrations, court demonstrations, picketing of the Home Office, and media 
                                            
101 The term was found on the Women in London website.   
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attention.  Moreover, a central tactic has been to help individual women by 
supporting them and by assisting with their court cases.  Through a long-lasting 
campaign, women’s organisations eventually managed to raise this issue on the 
political agenda and to change laws as well (see below). 
 
Another issue related to violence against women that has been put on the agenda is 
that of female genital mutilation.  FORWARD has played a unique role in pushing 
this issue and also in establishing government legislation that criminalises FGM 
whether it is being performed at home or abroad.  None of the interviewed 
organisations claimed actually to have put the issue of forced marriage on the 
political agenda, but several of them have played major parts in defining or 
representing the issue.  Both forced marriage and so-called honour crimes are 
issues that have arisen more recently on the government’s agenda.  ‘We didn’t have 
things like forced marriage and honour crimes talked about ten years ago in the way 
that they are now’, said one interviewee.  On the other hand, reflected the same 
interviewee, ‘It is almost like the government are setting the agenda for us and we 
need to be going back to us setting the agenda around issues that impact on our 
communities’.  The interviewee noted the recent government interest in Muslim 
women and in specific violence against women issues that are being linked to 
Muslim communities in particular, and argued that issues like forced marriage and 
the honour crimes debate are ‘almost like a diversion from addressing [...] structural 
inequalities, responsibility, and accountability’.  Larger issues relevant to minority 
communities, such as education and labour market participation, are neglected by 
government and overseen by women’s organisations that are busy responding to the 
government’s agenda, suggested the interviewee, who found it frustrating to spend a 
lot of time and energy on one issue like forced marriage when there are so many 
other inequalities that need to be addressed: ‘Access to the labour market, 
employment, education and all these things, and we are chasing over one [...] issue.  
It is so frustrating, we want to be doing the other stuff [related to] broader 
citizenship’.  A similar argument has been put forward by Dustin, who claims that ‘In 
the UK, where some black, Asian and Muslim women’s groups have now established 
themselves as ‘stakeholders’, they are only consulted by government on ‘minority 
women’s issues’ – ‘honour’ violence, FGM and forced marriage – and rarely on 
broader gender and immigration issues’ (Dustin, 2006: 14). 
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Some of the interviewed politicians and civil servants also emphasised that the 
government has had a key role in putting women’s and gender issues on the 
agenda.  One interviewee, for example, saw the women’s movement as ‘quite 
effective’ in producing lobby material, but stated that ‘they have been sporadically 
effective in terms of the policy agenda’.  The interviewee also said that ‘some of it is 
not their fault; we came in with quite a heavy women’s agenda ....’.  According to this 
respondent, the women’s movement has not been able to set the agenda, while 
feminist politicians have played a more important role: ‘Things tend to have 
happened, from my perspective, by women MPs [...] So what sticks in my mind are 
more things that women MPs have initiated but with support from women’s 
organisations’.  This example illustrates the relationship between a ‘feminism from 
above’, where feminist insiders in government are pushing the agenda, and a 
‘feminism from below’, where the women’s movement mobilises independently or in 
collaboration with actors that possess political power.  Another interviewee 
suggested that the government, and not women’s organisations, have pushed 
forward the intersectional agenda which combines structural inequalities such as 
gender, age, race, faith, and sexuality within the remit of new government-sponsored 
institutions such as the EHRC and the GEO.  A third interviewee painted a more 
nuanced picture where women’s groups feed directly into policy strategies and there 
is a ‘partnership’ between government and such groups: ‘there is quite a tight 
partnership; they are key contributors to our agenda.  They don’t see it but what they 
feel we should be looking at is obviously something we give a lot of weight and 
credence to’. 
 
Strategies to achieve influence 
In this section we look at how the interviewed women’s organisations work in order 
to achieve influence on the political agenda and on the development and 
implementation of public policies.  These strategies include, but are not limited to, 
participation in government consultations, formal and informal meetings with high-
level government politicians, MPs, and civil servants, participation in stakeholder and 
expert groups, giving expert evidence, and participation in policy forums. 
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The strategy most commonly used by women’s organisations to influence public 
policy is that of participating in governmental consultations, which can be said to be 
a reactive strategy more than a pro-active one.  Occasionally, however, women’s 
organisations are consulted prior to government documents being published, which 
might give them a chance to provide more direct and active input to government 
strategies and plans.  For example, the Forced Marriage Unit is currently conducting 
a public consultation on statutory guidance in relation to forced marriage (FMU, 
2008).  The Unit has involved some organisations, including SBS, Newham Asian 
Women’s Project, and Karma Nirvana, in the drafting stage of the consultation.  
These and other organisations will have a further chance to respond more formally in 
the consultation stage. 
 
Every year the government issues many public consultations that are relevant to the 
interests of women’s organisations.  We have looked at four specific examples of 
recent government consultations; two on general gender policy issues and two on 
policy issues related to ethnic minority and/or immigrant women in particular.  An 
examination of these four consultations does not provide enough information to 
discuss the participation and possible impact of women’s organisations on these 
policy issues, but it does provide an insight into the types of women’s organisations 
that opt to spend time and resources on them.  Put differently, it can tell us 
something about the extent to which women’s organisations viewed these particular 
consultations as offering opportunities to influence policy. 
 
On the first issue, that of the Equalities Review, an interim report for consultation 
was published in March 2006 (Equalities Review, 2006).  Responses to the review 
were published in 2007 (Equalities Review, 2007).  It is interesting to observe that on 
this consultation, which included many equality issues relevant to women, women’s 
organisations only constituted about ten of the 124 organisations that are named 
participants in the consultation.  Among these were Engender, the Fawcett Society, 
The Muslim Women’s Resource Centre, WNC, WNC’s Violence Against Women 
Working Group, Women’s Voice, and the WRC. 
 
On the second issue, that of the Discrimination Law Review, which includes the 
proposal to establish a single equality bill covering various forms of discrimination 
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including gender, faith, age, disability, and sexuality, the government issued a 
consultation paper in September 2007 (DCLG, 2007).  The government’s response 
to the consultation was published in July 2008 (DCLG, 2008) and listed just short of 
600 participating organisations.  Among these 600, we were able to identify about 
twenty women’s organisations, including EVAW, Engender, Fatima Women’s 
Network, Fawcett Society, Muslim Women’s Network UK, National Council of 
Women of Great Britain, Rights of Women, Scottish Women’s Aid, Welsh Women’s 
Aid, Women’s Aid, WNC, and WRC.   
 
On the third issue, that of forced marriage, the government issued a consultation 
paper entitled ‘Forced marriage.  A wrong not a right’ (Home Office 2005), and asked 
for responses to proposals that included the criminalisation of forced marriage.  A 
summary of responses was published in June 2006 (Home Office 2006).  Women’s 
organisations were divided on the issue of whether a specific criminal offence of 
forced marriage should be created, but eventually the government decided against 
criminalisation (see below).  Among the 132 named consultation participants (of a 
total of 157 responses), there are just over 20 women’s organisations.  These 
include Amina Muslim Women’s Resource Centre, Asian Women’s Resource 
Centre, FORWARD, Imkaan, Muslim Women’s Helpline, National Council of Women, 
NAWP, Refuge, Rights of Women, Southall black Sisters, WNC, WRC, Women’s 
Aid, and some local Women’s Aid centres. 
 
On the fourth issue to be considered here, that of marriage to partners from 
overseas, the government published a consultation paper in December 2007 (Border 
and Immigration Agency, 2007).  A policy document following the consultation was 
published in 2008, entitled ‘Marriage Visas: The Way Forward’ (UK Border Agency, 
2008).  Among the 60 listed responses were about 15 women’s organisations (ibid: 
97).  These included FORWARD, Imkaan, Latin American Women’s Rights Services, 
NAWP, Refuge, Rights of Women, Southall Black Sisters, the WNC, and Welsh 
Women’s Aid. 
 
The brief examination of the women’s organisations that participated in these four 
specific government consultations reveals that less than ten per cent of the 
organisations responding to the Equalities Review were women’s organisations and 
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only three per cent of those responding to the Discrimination Law Review were 
women’s organisations.  Considering the long-term impact of these reviews on 
gender equality policies and legislation, it is perhaps remarkable that so few 
women’s organisations decided to participate in the two consultations.  On the other 
hand, it could be argued that organisations like the Women’s National Commission 
and the Women’s Resource Centre, which participated in both, represent a large 
number of women’s groups and, therefore, there is no further need for women’s 
organisations to respond.  Budget-limited women’s organisations might also find it 
difficult to justify participation in complex and demanding consultations that would 
require substantial amounts of resources without guaranteeing any influence on the 
political outcome. 
 
In the consultation on forced marriage, however, about 15 per cent of the 
participating organisations were women’s organisations, while about 25 per cent of 
those participating in the consultation on marriage to partners from overseas were 
women’s organisations.  These issues might be perceived as more focused or 
limited, and as more clearly concerned with women, as they deal with aspects of 
violence against women and women’s immigration patterns, and therefore as easier 
to respond to than the Equalities Review and the Discrimination Law Review 
consultations.  Such factors might explain the higher proportion of women’s 
organisations participating in these two consultations.  A quick glance at the 
organisations involved in all four consultations also supports the previously 
suggested perception that a limited number of women’s organisations are members 
of a relatively small policy community dealing with women’s and gender policy 
issues.  Further systematic research needs to be done on the extent of participation 
by women’s organisations in public consultations and also on the question of 
whether their consultation responses represent resonance or dissonance with the 
government’s policy outcomes. 
 
Participation in government consultations does not, of course, guarantee that the 
government will take into account the views forwarded in consultation responses.  
Nonetheless, the interviewed women’s organisations seem to agree that it is a 
worthwhile strategy in order to achieve impact.  Furthermore, consultation responses 
may highlight the expertise of a particular organisation, and may also in turn lead to 
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further involvement in policy processes outside the consultation arena.  One of the 
interviewed organisations which has produced about 15 consultation papers in the 
last 18 months is concerned that women’s voices should be heard: ‘I have this real 
concern that often we are the only one organisation that is responding and if we 
don’t respond there is concern that there will be no response from the women’s 
sector’.  While anyone (be it an organisation or an individual) is free to respond to 
public government consultations, some organisations receive direct invitations from 
government to participate.  This organisation receives such invitations, and the 
interviewee sees it as resulting from continuous work over a long period of time: ‘as 
we have built up the momentum of doing them, obviously we get recognised for that 
and now they start sending them through’.  As a result of its participation in a 
particular consultation, the organisation was approached by the relevant Minister and 
asked ‘to explain further our argument which we did, we put in a further paper in 
writing, just for the Minister, and then we were invited to a meeting’ with four or five 
key ministers.  Another interviewee stated that her organisation has good relations 
with several high ranking politicians in national government, and has also recently 
been invited to discuss priorities with the current Minister for Women, Harriet 
Harman.  ‘So, in terms of getting the ears of politicians, [our organisation] does that 
very well’, said the interviewee. 
 
In addition to formal meetings with government ministers, a few of the interviewed 
organisations also manage to have more informal contact with high level politicians.  
One organisation listed the following strategies that are being used to achieve direct 
influence: behind-the-scenes lobbying, meeting ministers and shadow ministers, co-
ordinating commissions and networks, responding to consultations, participating in 
policy seminars, providing evidence, meeting with politicians (including across party 
lines), and meeting with civil servants in government departments.  The organisation 
is also trying to achieve policy influence more indirectly, through media work and 
collaboration with other organisations, including non-women’s organisations. 
 
The Parliamentary channel is also being used by women’s organisations to influence 
public policy.  Getting members of Parliament to sign an Early Day Motion is one 
strategy used by several of the interviewed women’s organisations, whilst direct 
mailings to all MPs is another.  Some of the organisations have contact with 
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individual MPs who are perceived as orientated towards a feminist agenda, or 
towards women’s issues more generally.  One organisation recounted that it got an 
MP to ask a question in Parliament on its behalf. 
 
Other organisations have developed closer links to civil servants as a way of 
influencing policy: ‘… how we work strategically is that we identify the two loopholes 
that we need to influence.  One is the Parliamentarians’ input, that loophole.  We 
don’t have that much sway with [it].  The other is civil servants, that is the loophole 
we do target, because that is where we know we can make an influence, can make 
changes and can have an impact’.  This organisation perceives civil servants as key 
to influencing government: ‘[it is] very, very much [...] about getting to know and 
building relationships with civil servants, rather than trying to influence MPs and 
ministers.  So we know where our bread is buttered basically, and try to focus our 
efforts on that’.  Several interviewees mentioned and valued links with civil servants, 
and one organisation that, until now, has not cultivated relations with civil servants is 
nevertheless clear that they may provide important political opportunities: ‘... often it 
is the civil servants who will determine the agenda in terms of what goes further and 
I think that is perhaps one of the barriers that we face or one of the issues that we 
haven’t focused on is on building that relationship, because if you can’t get through 
to the civil servant you are never going to get to the minister or the MP’. 
 
Membership in stakeholder or expert groups was also mentioned by several 
organisations as a potential way of influencing government policy.  Furthermore, 
giving evidence to House Select Committee enquiries was also seen as providing 
political opportunities.  One interviewee mentioned specifically that a final House 
Select Committee report ‘heavily relied on our evidence, there were lots of 
references to [us]’.  Several of the organisations interviewed for our report have 
given evidence to a more recent inquiry by the Home Affairs Committee on 
‘Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage and ‘Honour’-Based Violence’ (House of 
Commons, 2008).  The list of 73 organisations that gave written evidence to this 
particular inquiry included the following women’s organisations: Newham Asian 
Women’s Project (NAWP), EVAW.  Refuge, Imkaan, Women’s Aid Federation of 
England, Fawcett Society, Karma Nirvana, Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights 
Organisation, Southall Black Sisters, and Rights of Women (ibid.: 166-167).  Again, 
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these organisations are recognisable as members of a relatively stable policy 
community of ‘insiders’ in the gender and VAW policy sectors. 
 
The interviewees expressed divergent opinions on whether it is a useful strategy to 
influence policy through the Women’s National Commission (WNC).  While one 
interviewee stated that neither the WNC nor the the former WEU are ‘natural routes 
into government’, other organisations emphasised their membership in the WNC and 
their work within the WNC as bringing political opportunities.  One respondent who 
was interviewed before the WEU was subsumed into the GEO expressed doubts 
about the WEU: ‘you do need a power base of developing policy and expertise for 
pushing for change and at the moment we do not know even if the place for us 
exists’.  Yet another interviewee was positive towards both the WNC and the WEU 
and said that ‘those relationships are warm so we can pick up the phone and that 
kind of thing’.  This view was echoed by another interviewee who found the meetings 
of one of WNC’s subgroups to be very useful, as civil servants and ministers are 
regularly invited to speak to the group.  On the one hand, doubts about whether the 
WNC and the GEO (and previously the WEU) can provide women’s organisations 
with political opportunities may be justified due to the limited amount of resources 
that the government has allocated to these institutions.  On the other hand, one of 
our interviewees suggested that women’s organisations might actually be 
overlooking an important route for influence by not ‘knocking at the door’ of the GEO. 
 
Insiders versus outsiders 
We have suggested that organisations such as Southall Black Sisters, Imkaan, 
Fawcett Society, Women’s Resource Centre, Women’s Aid, Refuge, and EVAW are 
part of a relatively stable policy community of ‘insiders’ with access to state-level 
policy circles.  These organisations are regularly drawn on by government to provide 
either formal or informal input to decision-making processes concerning gender 
equality issues, including violence against women issues.  These organisations have 
achieved their insider status as a result of their own hard work and in conjunction 
with the government’s policy to engage with community groups and its need to 
receive policy input in order to achieve legitimacy for policies.  Representatives from 
women’s organisations themselves, however, do not label or present their own 
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organisations as insiders, but rather as outsiders to government, thus emphasising 
their independence from, rather than possible co-optation by, the state. 
 
One interviewee reflected on the changed political context which has given her 
organisation political access: ‘there was a time when we were outside the political 
machinery, we were never invited to these things and we were often on the sidelines 
and just like an add-on.  And you know some things have changed.  Now many of us 
do sit on Home Affairs Committee inquiries about violence against women.  We are 
invited to public engagement events [and] we are seen as contributing to the 
leadership of the community.  I get invitations from Harriet Harman and politicians 
saying you must be involved in this process, we want to hear your voice.  Despite 
‘being allowed in’, however, the interviewee does not perceive her organisation as 
part of the political machinery, and she is sceptical about whether the organisation 
actually has any political influence: ‘even if some of us were there would our 
interests be reflected? We have just got to make sure that our voices get heard, and 
we have a right to be heard’.  She continued: ‘[...] often you just think, is it [the 
government] just paying lip service? It is almost like talking the talk, but actually 
where is the change?  [...] And often they have already made their mind up …’. 
 
Another interviewee emphasised that her organisation seeks to avoid being co-opted 
by government, and thus tries to avoid engaging in publicly visible events that can be 
linked to party politics:  ‘what you won’t see us doing is on a party political platform 
shaking hands, we just don’t get into that’.  Another organisation decided to leave its 
formal position on a Home Office Working Group on forced marriage in a dispute 
over policy measures and decided to write its own report on the issue.  As these 
examples illustrate, some organisations find that the price to pay for insider status 
might be too high if it is perceived as compromising their interests and their outsider 
status.  The particular organisation that left the Home Office Working Group has 
since drafted a bill on forced marriage with a Labour peer in the House of Lords, and 
is thus not averse to working inside government. 
 
An organisation which has a number of high-level contacts in government also 
insists on representing itself as an outsider: ‘But we are outside of government, we 
are very much non-governmental and we aim to advocate for our agenda’.  The 
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interviewed representatives from women’s organisations are thus keen to portray 
their organisations as being independent from the state.  However, they also find that 
they have to balance their independence with being listened to by the state and, in 
several cases, with being funded by the state.  ‘We are basically representative 
organisations which are funded by the state.  So we have to mobilise within the state 
[...] That is where we have an impact and that is where the people have the power to 
do something about it’, said one interviewee.  The same interviewee noted that her 
organisation has on occasion been critical of government policy, and suggested that 
it has sometimes been excluded from debates and meetings due to its critical 
stance.  ‘People within the establishment are not keen on dealing with us’, said the 
interviewee.  On the other hand, the same organisation is also being invited to 
meetings by government and sits on government committees.  The picture painted 
by this organisation is thus complex and demonstrates the contradictions between 
the insider and outsider status that can be experienced at one and the same time. 
 
The same contradictory picture emerges from an interview with another politically 
influential organisation, where the respondent stated that ‘people [the government] 
do not want to fund us to criticise them’.  The respondent suggested that it is difficult 
to be critical of government policy on the one hand, and receive public funding on the 
other, and that the organisation feels pressured to deliver ‘good news messages, 
that is all ministers want’.  The insider-outsider status is difficult to balance: ‘We have 
to be thinking all the time about how to both appear and be powerful enough to make 
a difference’. 
 
Specific claims to influence 
In this section we are looking at claims-making by women’s organisations in relation 
to specific policy influence.  We are thus only presenting the claims made by 
women’s organisations and we are not attempting to judge whether or not they have 
actually had political influence.  Further research must be undertaken to assess the 
extent to which claims made by women’s organisations resonate with or differ from 
actual policy outcomes.  Organisations acknowledge that it is problematic to pinpoint 
particular examples of influence, as it is often the combined but discrete lobbying of 
several organisations, the existence of a political will and political allies, and also 
 316 
media focus, which together might produce a policy impact over time.  In the words 
of one interviewee, ‘measuring influence in public policy is notoriously difficult to do 
because there are so many factors that influence it and there are so many other 
organisations that are working similarly so it is hard to attribute it to specific 
organisations’. 
 
However, nearly all the interviewed organisations are able to point to specific 
examples of policy issues where they claim to have had political influence.  The 
issues are related either to general policies or gender policies that impact on women, 
or to specific policies that impact on women.  An example of a general policy area 
where one organisation claims to have had an impact is that of the recent pension 
bill which, according to the interviewee, ‘basically adopted every single 
recommendation that we had been making, and that is a huge triumph for us’.  
Another example of a claim to influence from the same organisation relates to a 
2003 Select Committee enquiry into the proposed Equality and Human Rights 
Commission.  The organisation was invited to submit formal evidence and the 
published Committee report included references to the organisation (Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, 2004).  Furthermore, the organisation claims to have 
been influential in reforming the law against rape.  Another interviewee from the 
same organisation stated that its lobbying efforts also produced ‘a significant 
influence on [...] the instruction of the Gender Equality Duty, and suggested that its 
research and lobbying efforts have led to an increase in the number of sexual 
assault referral centres, which is something we have lobbied very hard for’. 
 
An organisation that has played a central role in campaigning for resources for the 
women’s sector has used various strategies to influence government policy on this 
issue; these include a broad-based campaign involving other women’s organisations 
and parliamentary lobbying through their local MP, including raising support for an 
early day motion in the House of Commons.  In turn, the parliamentary attention 
given to the issue led to the local MP being invited to meet the Minister responsible 
for the third sector.  Contact with the local MP originated at a time when the 
organisation was experiencing funding problems and its activities were in danger of 
being dramatically reduced.  The campaign for increased funding to the sector 
resulted in continued government funding for the organisation itself as well as the 
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definition and highlighting of a specific policy problem: ‘I think it was hugely 
successful.  Hugely successful for us as an organisation in that we didn’t have to 
make redundancies and become a shadow of an organisation that we were.  And [...] 
it really did raise the profile of the women’s sector with key decision makers, for 
example the Minister for the third sector’, said the interviewee.  Thus, through 
lobbying efforts the organisation managed to sustain itself and to raise the issue of 
funding of the women’s sector on to the national political agenda.  The interviewee 
reflected that, in general, it is difficult for the organisation to be pro-active, and that 
the campaign for increased funding to the women’s sector is ‘the only kind of pro-
active thing that we do.  We have really small victories, like some government 
department might mention women’s organisations and strategy, which sounds like 
nothing, but it actually takes an enormous amount of work [for us] for government 
departments to include women’s organisations because they are so not on the 
agenda’. 
 
The organisation FORWARD has been a pioneer both nationally and internationally 
in relation to the issue of female genital mutilation.  In the UK, it was instrumental in 
establishing the first legislation against FGM in 1985.  FORWARD also argued for 
the second Act on FGM from 2003, which prohibited and criminalised FGM 
committed abroad.  Prior to the second Act, it was instrumental in pushing for a 
parliamentary hearing on the issue and participated in the committee that drafted the 
outcome document from the parliamentary hearing (see House of Commons Library 
2003).  The organisation soon became internationally recognised and has effectively 
supported other countries in developing policies on FGM.  FORWARD’s work has 
led to policy developments in the UK related to child birth complications, training, and 
specialist services, and the organisation is actively involved with the NHS and with 
local health authorities on such issues.  It has also worked in partnership with the 
Metropolitan Police and with the Central London Mosque.  In addition, it has taken 
up the issue of child marriage with a campaign focused on Africa, and in the UK it 
has engaged in policy discussions about forced marriage, including representation 
on a parliamentary forum on forced marriage. 
 
In relation to the government’s consultation paper which asked for responses to the 
proposal of criminalising forced marriage, FORWARD argued for criminalisation with 
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the argument that this would send a strong message to the community.  In doing so, 
it went against the advice from other women’s organisations, including organisations 
representing ethnic minority women, who argued that victims of forced marriage 
would be reluctant to having their family members prosecuted and that 
criminalisation would contribute to further stigmatisation of ethnic minority 
communities.  One of the organisations that argued against criminalisation and 
eventually supported a civil bill instead explained: 
 
‘Because civil remedies are quite different, and a lot of women who contact us, 
just to give you an example, on domestic violence injunctions, say the police 
tried to get them to criminalise, the police try to get them to press charges, but 
they don’t want to press charges because it is not about the criminalisation of 
these perpetrators, it is about stopping that violence and if a civil remedy can do 
that and they can still have protection, then that is what they are telling us’.  
 
Women’s organisations were thus divided on the issue of criminalisation of forced 
marriage.  When, after the consultation, the government decided against 
criminalisation, several of the interviewed women’s organisations could claim that 
their resistance to, and lobbying against, criminalisation had in effect had a 
significant policy impact. 
 
Several of the organisations that argued against the criminalisation of forced 
marriage thus continued their campaign against such practices by assisting Lord 
Lester to draft a private members bill which placed legal remedies to forced marriage 
within the remit of the existing Family Law Act.  These organisations, which included 
Southall Black Sisters, Ashiana Network, Rights of Women, Refuge, Hounslow 
Domestic Violence Network, Asian Family Counselling Service, Khatun Sapnara, 
Imkaan, and Newham Asian Women’s Project, were all thanked for their efforts in a 
personal letter from the then Prime Minister Tony Blair.102  The letter marked a 
milestone in the campaign against forced marriage as it celebrated new legislation to 
combat the problem and gave legitimacy and credit to the women’s organisations 
that stood firmly on the anti-criminalisation line. 
 
                                            
102 For the letter which was sent on April 21, 2007, see http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page11504. 
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Interviewees from several women’s organisations claimed credit for winning the 
argument against the proposed criminalisation of forced marriage, although not all of 
them shared the perception that new legislation, albeit placed within the context of 
the Family Law Act, was needed.  One of our interviewees described her 
organisation’s participation in the campaign in the following way:  ‘We got a big 
victory really, that it [forced marriage] was placed within the Family Law Act’.  
Another interviewee claimed that her organisation ‘played a significant role in the 
way in which debates about violence against women in minority communities have 
played out’, including an important role in lobbying on the issue of forced marriage.  
The organisation has also lobbied on policies related to women’s immigration and 
citizenship, their rights and access to services, and employment issues.  In relation 
to its lobbying efforts on women and citizenship, the organisation does not claim to 
have had much impact: ‘We have been arguing for years for change and nothing has 
happened [...].  Women who claim asylum and are fleeing gender-based persecution 
are being returned back to their countries of origin.  And we have argued for a 
number of years now that they should have the right to stay’. 
 
A significant victory for Southall Black Sisters (SBS) and other women’s 
organisations is the concessions made by government to immigration law in 1999 
and 2002, which allowed victims of domestic violence with insecure immigration 
status the right to remain in the UK.  SBS worked directly with Home Office Ministers 
on these concessions, and the changes that were made to government policy 
provide a clear example of policy impact which is widely acknowledged by the 
women’s sector and also by other actors in the policy community.  An interviewee 
said that although the SBS did not get ‘everything they wanted’, they achieved 
something important ‘because it does help a significant amount of women who now 
don’t face deportation if their marriage breaks down as a result of domestic violence’. 
 
Another long-standing campaign by women’s organisations is the effort to abolish 
the ‘no recourse to public funds’ rule, which also affects immigrant women on marital 
visas who have been subjected to domestic violence.  As stated above, concessions 
to the immigration law allow victims of domestic violence to argue that they should 
have the right to stay in the UK if they leave their violent partners.  Despite the 
concessions, however, immigrant women are in practice faced with both long and 
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costly processes in which they have to argue their case.  At the time they leave their 
violent partners, they may find that women’s refuges cannot take them in as the 
refuges cannot access public funding for housing costs on their behalf.  According to 
an interviewee, what is preventing women from leaving a violent relationship is not 
so much the fear of deportation as the fear of destitution, and the no recourse rule is 
perceived as ‘the biggest problem we are coming across with women’.  Amnesty 
International and Southall Black Sisters have estimated that 600 women each year in 
the UK fall victim to the ‘no recourse’ rule (Amnesty International UK and Southall 
Black Sisters, 2008). 
 
Several women’s organisations have joined forces with SBS and are continuing the 
campaign against the ‘no recourse rule’.  These include Imkaan, NAWP, Poppy 
Project (Eaves Housing for Women), Refuge, Women’s Aid England, and Women’s 
Resource Centre.  The Home Office had previously paid into a temporary ‘no 
recourse fund’ located within Women’s Aid, and has more recently promised some 
policy measures that will alleviate the difficult situation for women who are at risk of 
further violence because they cannot access refuges (see House of Commons, 
2008: 77).  This change in government policy was also mentioned by one of the 
interviewed civil servants, who recounted that the current Minister for Domestic 
Violence, Vernon Coaker ‘announced at the Home Affairs Select Committee that we 
are now introducing [...] support for those women who have got no recourse to public 
funds but are granted indefinite leave to remain’.  Another civil servant who 
mentioned the Home Office’s recent commitment to change its approach to no 
recourse stated that ‘SBS is a huge driver on this’ and that no recourse is a ‘real 
issue’ for practitioners and those who deliver services, thus acknowledging the 
importance of the campaign to abolish the rule.  Participants in the campaign against 
the no recourse rule claim this development as another concession on the part of 
government: ‘they [the government] have been working on that now and that has 
taken a long time and a lot of political pressure and lobbying for many years [...]; we 
have cracked a nut, because now the government has made an announcement 
about introducing some reform’.  It is unlikely, however, that new changes to the no 
recourse rule will entirely satisfy women’s organisations that also perceive a need for 
further reform to immigration law. 
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As mentioned previously, organisations like Southall Black Sisters and Justice for 
Women have managed to push the issue of ‘battered women who kill’ onto the 
political agenda.  One of our interviewees estimated that about 30 women kill violent 
men every year.  Justice for Women has campaigned for changes to the laws, first 
via case law (through the Courts) and later on via statute law (through Parliament).  
The core of the organisation has been a small number of activists, working closely 
together and with key lawyers.  ‘So we decided to work with the current law and see 
how it could be improved and [our organisation] is a well-known campaign.  We have 
made good use of the media’, said an interviewee.  Eventually the campaigning paid 
off when, in the Appeals case of Emma Humphreys, a ‘cumulative provocation’ 
defence was allowed and thus established a legal precedent which could be used in 
future court cases.  The interviewee noted that ‘[we] got that change in the law which 
was excellent’, and stated that the organisation has managed to be influential 
because it is regarded as representing expertise on the issue: ‘[…] they will listen 
because we are Justice for Women and they will listen to what we will say, we have 
got a reputation of being serious people who have made changes in the law, who 
understand the law.  We are experts, it is expert opinion’.  The interviewee also 
noted that Justice for Women had been invited to participate in the government’s 
homicide law consultation which recently reviewed homicide laws with a particular 
focus on ‘battered women who kill’ and the defences of Provocation and Diminished 
Responsibility.  Justice for Women received a special hearing in relation to a specific 
submission made by the organisation to the Law Commission.  Recent suggested 
changes to the law in relation to provocation have also been claimed as a victory for 
the organisation (see Bindel 2008), but at present it remains an open question 
whether proposals forwarded by the Law Commission and favoured by Justice for 
Women will become Law. 
 
7.4.4 Summary remarks about the UK case 
Our discussion of the UK case has not set out to assess the extent to which the 
Labour government has promoted feminist or women-friendly policies; rather it has 
sought to review the disputes over definitions and strategies in relation to VAW 
issues.  From the discussion, however, it is clear that claims made by the women’s 
movement about these issues have not been accepted by the government as a 
whole, despite significant developments within the Crown Prosecution Service.  
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Current government policies dealing with VAW do not focus explicitly on women and 
are formulated in gender-neutral terms.  This seriously weakens any claim to feminist 
politics.  As long as the state is unwilling to take on board a gendered perspective on 
VAW issues and also on other policy issues affecting women and men, the state can 
hardly be said to espouse feminism.  The term ‘feminism’ should be reserved for 
policies that explicitly challenge the dominant gendered power relations or confront 
the gender order (see McBride and Mazur, 2008).  The label ‘women-friendly’, 
however, signals an emphasis on the interests and needs of women as a group (see 
ibid.).  Even though the Labour government seems to use gender-neutral language 
to promote its family-friendly policies, these policies do in fact promote the interests 
of women and thus amount to being ‘women-friendly’.  Our analysis equates with 
that of Annesley and her colleagues who argue that ‘New Labour is focusing on 
feminising politics and policy, which means developing policy for women, rather than 
engendering politics and policy which seeks to address and alter existing gender 
structures and patterns.  Equating gender with women [...] places distinct limits on 
what New Labour, however ambitious, can achieve’ (Annesley et al., 2007: 20).  
There is, thus, a clear need for the women’s movement to continue its collective 
mobilisation of women in order to affect policy changes that can both challenge and 
alter gendered structures of inequality. 
 
In section 7.4 we have seen that, since coming to power in 1997, the Labour 
government has provided women’s movement actors with new political opportunities 
and has presented and actualised a political will to engage with women’s 
organisations.  The state’s gender machinery has been developed through the 
creation of a special Ministry for Women and a dedicated Women’s Unit, but the 
overall machinery dealing with gender equality policies is perceived as fragmented, 
weak, and under-resourced.  These features put constraints on what the government 
is able to do to achieve gender equality policies, but also on what the women’s 
movement can achieve through lobbying these institutions.   
 
A broad specter of women’s organisations in the UK, including majority and minority 
organisations, participate actively in a discursive struggle with the state over 
definitions and strategies in relation to violence against women.  The women’s 
movement argues that domestic violence is not a gender-neutral phenomenon, but a 
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phenomenon rooted in inequalities between women and men.  Moreover, the 
women’s movement seeks to promote an integrated approach and strategy to 
violence against women, where different forms of violence are all addressed within a 
gender-based and a human-rights based framework.  The agreement between 
majority and minority women’s movement actors on these issues is noticeable, as is 
the resistance towards the proposals from the state.  Lately, however, the Crown 
Prosectution Service has taken a leading role in moving the state towards the 
position of the women’s movement on these matters. 
 
We have seen that women’s movement actors actively engage in institutional 
political opportunity structures such as government consultations, expert and 
stakeholder groups, and formal and informal meetings with high-level politicians and 
civil servants.  Women’s organisations are, thus, using a mix of both reactive and 
pro-active strategies in order to influence policy outcomes.  We have argued that a 
number of organisations, roughly between ten and 20, are part of a relatively stable 
policy community of ‘insider groups’ that consult regularly, either formally or 
informally, with politicians and civil servants on particular policy issues.  The extent 
to which the policy community is open or closed is significant, as it determines the 
ease with which new groups and organisations can achieve access to policy circles.  
Although public consultations are in principle open to every organisation, our 
analysis has revealed that it is often the same organisations that participate in 
different consultations.  Moreover, the same organisations tend to be invited to 
meetings, to provide evidence, or to sit on expert or stakeholder groups.  There 
seems to be a division between, on the one hand the women’s organisations that are 
insiders in the policy community, and on the other hand the women’s organisations 
that can be said to constitute the broader women’s movement. 
 
These findings mirror those from Norway, where women’s organisations are 
‘selectively included’ in policy-making processes, such that majority organisations 
are invited to contribute to ‘mainstream’ gender equality issues, while minority 
organisations are invited to contribute to ‘crisis gender policies’ that address 
particular issues such as forced marriage and female genital mutilation perceived as 
relevant to ethnic minority and immigrant women.  In the UK, the same distinction 
between ‘mainstream gender equality issues’ and ‘crisis gender policies’ concerning 
 324 
immigrant and ethnic minority women applies.  However, majority and minority 
women’s organisations appear to be increasingly invited to contribute to both ‘types’ 
of gender policy issues, as evidenced by the participation of majority and minority 
women’s organisations in some recent government consultations.    
 
7.5 Conclusion  
 
In this concluding section we highlight some of the similarities and differences that 
have become apparent between Norway, Spain, and the UK during the course of our 
investigation.   
 
All three countries have developed new field-specific institutional opportunity 
structures, with opportunities for women’s movement actors to mobilise and 
participate in political decision-making processes concerning gender equality in 
general and violence against women in particular.  Specific governments led by 
single political parties or a coalition of political parties have opened up new and 
increased political opportunities for the women’s movement in Norway (various 
Labour and Labour-led coalition governments), Spain (Zapatero’s Socialist Party 
government) and the UK (Blair’s and subsequently Brown’s Labour government).   
 
As stated in Chapter 1, in 1995 Mazur and McBride Stetson classified Norway as a 
country with a policy machinery (the Equal Status Council) that provided a high level 
of policy access for feminist groups, and a machinery that had a high level of policy 
influence on equal employment policies (Mazur and McBride Stetson, 1995: 275-
277).  Since 1995, the Norwegian policy machinery has been reorganised, and new 
government institutions supporting gender equality policies have been created.  The 
Ministry of Children and Equality has a crucial role in developing gender equality 
policies, while violence against women issues are divided between various 
government departments, and migrant issues are located within yet another 
government department.  The role of the newly established (2006) Equality and Anti-
Discrimination Ombud (which has replaced the previous Gender Equality Ombud), is 
to combat discrimination based on gender, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, religion, 
disability and age.  We have yet to see how, and the extent to which, the Ombud will 
take on intersectional approaches over time to inequality in practice.  Women’s 
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organisations in Norway contested the establishment of the new Ombud.  They 
lamented the loss of both a centre for knowledge about gender inequality and the 
watchdog role that were previously embedded in the Gender Equality Ombud.  
Concerns were also voiced about the status of gender inequalities within the new 
structure.   
 
The Norwegian gender equality machinery has continued to provide access for 
feminist and women’s groups, and to influence government policies dealing with 
equal employment opportunity and other gender equality issues.  Both access and 
influence have, however, been unequally distributed between various majoritised 
and minoritised organisations and between various gender policy areas.  For 
example, minoritised women’s organisations have almost exclusively been consulted 
on “ethnic minority women’s issues” related to gender violence (Nyhagen Predelli, 
2003), while  majoritised women’s organisations have been consulted on a much 
broader range of gender equality issues (see below).  In general, women’s 
organisations in Norway reported that they lack spaces in which to meet and discuss 
movement politics. 
 
In 1995, both the UK and Spain were classified by Mazur and McBride Stetson as 
countries with policy machineries that enjoyed high influence on equal employment 
policies, but the policy machineries in both countries were considered as giving “low 
access” to feminist groups (Mazur and McBride Stetson, 1995: 275).  In the UK, the 
relatively strong position of the then Equal Opportunities Commission was taken as 
an indicator of the high influence enjoyed by this specific gender policy machinery on 
equal employment policies.  Since 1997 and the election of the Labour Government, 
the gender policy machinery in the UK has developed significantly in terms of new 
institutions and wider access to feminist and women’s groups.  Today it could be 
argued that the various parts of the policy machinery in the UK is giving relatively 
high access to a small and stable number of women’s organisations that actively 
seek to influence government policy.  The current gender machinery is, however, 
considered relatively weak in terms of government influence, and feminist groups do 
not always think it worthwhile to direct their advocacy and lobbying efforts through 
institutions such as the Government Equalities Office. 
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As in Norway, a significant step towards an intersectional approach to inequality by 
government has been taken in the UK with the establishment of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, which includes gender, sexual orientation, race, 
disability, religion and belief, and age in its remit.  Moreover, the Government 
Equalities Office is leading the government’s overall strategy on equality with a lead 
role for policies related to the equality strands of gender and sexuality (other major 
equality strands include disability, age, race, and faith/belief, but the responsibility for 
these located within various other government departments).  As in Norway, violence 
against women issues are divided between different government departments, thus 
creating, according to interviewees and documents from women’s organisations, a 
fragmented ‘silo-approach’ to such issues.  Women’s organisations in the UK have 
demanded a more integrated and gender-based approach to violence against 
women issues, but have so far been met with a mixture of government resistance, 
alleged agreement, and accomodation.  For example, the Home Office continues to 
use a non-gendered definition of domestic violence, while the Government Equalities 
Office claims that the government actually has an integrated strategy towards 
violence against women.  The Crown Prosecution Service, on the other hand, has 
explicitly followed the recommendations of the End Violence Against Women 
Campaign in its latest national strategy plan.   
 
Moreover, parts of the picture from Norway of an unequal distribution of access and 
influence in relation to types of women’s organisations and types of gender policy 
areas also applies to the UK.  Again, it appears that minoritised women’s 
organisations are often being consulted on “ethnic minority women’s issues” related 
to gender violence, and that they are less often consulted on other issues such as 
education, the labour market, et cetera.  In the UK, however, majoritised women’s 
organisations seem to increasingly engage in “ethnic minority women’s issues”, not 
only related to gender violence, but also related to the labour market and political 
participation (the primary example being the Fawcett Society).   
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In Spain, recently labelled by the BBC as a country ‘now at the vanguard of the fight 
for gender equality’,103 The Women’s Institute (Instituto de la Mujer), a government 
institution dedicated to gender equality, is a key player in policy-making related to 
both gender equality and violence against women.  The recently established National 
Observatory for Gender Violence also provides an important opportunity structure for 
women’s movement organisations in Spain.  Moreover, the recently formed (April, 
2008) Ministry of Equality is now overseeing the WI and is developing new measures 
to combat gender violence among immigrant groups.  While Spain has recently 
made significant advances in gender equality policies, also in comparison with other 
European countries, the national government institutions in Spain have yet to 
develop intersectional approaches to inequalities (Bustelo, 2009). 
 
In 1995, as we have seen, Mazur and McBride Stetson classified Spain as a country 
with a policy machinery (the Women’s Institute) that enjoyed high influence on equal 
employment policies, but it was considered as giving “low access” to feminist groups 
(Mazur and McBride Stetson, 1995: 275).  Indeed, in 1995, Valiente noted the close 
ties between the Instituto de la Mujer and the socialist political party PSOE and that 
“the IM does not favour the mobilization of the feminist movement (or of public 
opinion) as a way of advancing demands that go beyond PSOE gender equality 
compromises” (Valiente 1995: 234).  The IM has continued to play a significant role 
in Spanish gender equality policies, and both the conservative People’s Party 
government from 1996 until 2004 and the subsequent (and current) Socialist Party 
government have continued to support gender equality policies.  Moreover, the 
current government has strengthened the gender machinery through the recently 
created Ministry of Equality and its several entities including the ‘Equality Policies 
General Secretariat’, signalling the high value it places on gender equality through 
the appointment of a Cabinet consisting of an equal number of women and men and 
through the creation of an array of new laws to support gender equality (Bustelo and 
Ortbals, 2007: 207).  In terms of political access for feminist and women’s 
organisations, the picture in Spain is more of a division between majoritised and 
minoritised organisations.  While majoritised women’s organisations are being 
                                            
103 ‘Diverging paths on gender equality’, BBC News 10 May 2008 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7375230.stm  
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consulted on various gender equality issues, minoritised organisations have yet to 
achieve a participatory role in the dialogue, design and implementation of gender 
equality policies broadly conceived. 
 
Despite the presence of field-specific opportunity structures for women’s 
organisations seeking to impact on policies relating to gender equality and violence 
against women, our case-studies have made it clear that ethnic majority women’s 
organisations in all three countries in reality have more opportunities to mobilise 
collectively and participate politically than ethnic minority women.  A range of factors 
may contribute to an understanding of this situation.  Although further research is 
needed, our studies indicate that majority women’s organisations seem to be 
consulted on a broader range of issues than minority women’s organisations.  While 
majority women seem to be consulted on issues such as education, the labour 
market, and other social and economic issues, minority women seem to be 
consulted on issues that are perceived as being specific to minority cultures (e.g., 
forced marriage, FGM, honour killings, and, at least in the UK, community responses 
to terrorist activities).  Moreover, as these issues are perceived as specific to 
minority cultures, they are often located in different parts of the government 
apparatus.  Against the advice and claims-making by women’s organisations, 
divisions between ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ types of violence against women are thus 
institutionalised as separate issues (they are located in different government 
ministries) and are discursively kept apart because they are talked about separately 
from other ‘mainstream’ types of violence against women (e.g., domestic violence).  
Such a fragmented ‘silo-approach’ to violence against women issues effectively 
hinders the integration of various violence against women issues and perpetuates a 
distinction between certain types of issues that are regarded as caused by violent 
male behaviour, while other types of issues are regarded as caused by ‘culture’ or 
‘tradition’.  These types of divisions also produce barriers in terms of minority 
women’s participation in more overall political debates, be they either about gender 
equality or violence against women.  Moreover, they produce barriers in terms of 
majority women’s participation in issues that are defined as relevant only to 
minoritised women.  Majority women may feel that issues such as FGM, forced 
marriage, and honour killings do not concern them, and either the absence of 
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concern or an actual involvement with such issues are two alternative strategies that 
may both invoke a fear of being labelled as racist. 
 
Dominant discourse denotes specific forms of violence, such as forced marriage, 
FGM and honour killings as cultural products, while other forms of violence (e.g., 
domestic violence) are, to some extent, recognised as being rooted in gender 
inequality.  When forced marriage and FGM are perceived as issues relevant only to 
immigrant and ethnic minority populations, they are identified as “immigration” or 
“integration” issues, or as “cultural” issues (cultural here signifying ‘other’ cultures 
than the dominant one).  In other words, the state participates in a cultural framing of 
specific ‘minority types of violence’, while domestic violence is increasingly framed 
as a problem arising from male dominance and violence.  Domestic violence is, thus, 
more readily perceived as a gender equality issue and a human rights issue, than is 
forced marriage and FGM.  State resistance towards a gendered framing of domestic 
violence is, however, evident in the case of the UK, at least on the part of the Home 
Office, albeit with the important exception of the Crown Prosecution Service which 
has recently adopted the gendered UN definition of violence against women.  The 
Norwegian and Spanish states seem, on the other hand, to have accepted a link 
between domestic violence and gender inequality.  It is notable that the Spanish 
government has taken steps to identify violence against women as a gender-based 
issue, thus signalling a more progressive politics than the UK government.  Lacking 
in Spain is a sustained and integrated approach to different forms of violence against 
women including forced marriage, FGM, and honour-based violence.104 
 
Women’s movements in Norway, Spain and the UK seek to reframe all forms of 
violence against women into a gender equality frame and a human rights frame.  A 
joint movement effort is most apparent in the UK, where majority and minority 
women’s organisations have joined initiatives such as the End Violence Against 
Women Campaign (EVAW).  In Norway and in Spain, majority women’s 
organisations have not fully engaged with ethnic minority women, and it could be 
argued that ethnic minority women’s voices have, to a large extent, been ignored or 
                                            
104 See, however,the new plan to prevent gender violence in immigrant communities published in 
January 2009 (this plan falls outside the time period investigated in our report, but it is an important 
new development in Spain) http://www.migualdad.es/noticias/pdf/090109Planinmigracion.pdf  
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silenced in the context of the majority women’s movements in these two countries.  
In Norway, however, some majority women’s organisations have begun to discuss 
ethnic minority women’s interests (including Kvinner på tvers, 
Krisesentersekretariatet, Kvinnefronten, JURK, KiA and Norske Kvinners 
Sanitetsforening).  In Spain, on the other hand, the majority women’s organisations 
included in our study have so far not expressed any direct interests in taking up 
ethnic minority women’s interests.  In the UK, where organisations are more mixed 
(there are not so clear distinctions between majority and minority organisations in the 
UK, as many organisations are now composed of individuals of different ethnic 
backgrounds), organisations such as Women’s Aid and the Fawcett Society have 
taken significant steps to embrace and accept ethnic minority women’s interests and 
concerns.   
 
In summary, women’s movements in all three countries are promoting broader and 
more integrated definitions of, and approaches to, violence against women.  The 
women’s movements seek to reframe violence against women both discursively and 
institutionally.  Discursively, such reframing is sought through the employment of a 
wide definition of violence against women, and institutionally the reframing is sought 
through an integration of different forms of violence against women within the same 
government structures.  In this regard the women’s movements have some way to 
go in terms of convicing the governments in Norway, Spain, and the UK about the 
need for policy changes.   
 
Gender inequality on the one hand, and racial and ethnic equality on the other, 
appear as two more or less separate and distinct spheres, at least in Spain and 
largely also in Norway.  There is evidence of more sector overlap in the UK, where 
black women’s organisations constitute ‘a clear section within the black voluntary 
sector generally and the voluntary sector as a whole’ (Davis and Cooke, 2002:  32).  
The issues of gender inequality and racial and ethnic inequality are, however, largely 
dealt with by different government institutions and agencies in all three countries, 
with recently established government institutions that to various degrees seek to 
apply intersectional approaches to inequality.  Correspondingly, different parts of the 
voluntary sector participate in policy-making processes in the two areas, albeit with 
some overlap in the cases of Norway (the MiRA Centre for migrant women) and the 
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UK (black women’s organisations).  Although there are exceptions to this picture, we 
would argue that the sphere of gender equality policy is largely dominated by 
majority women’s organisations, while minority women mainly have a say on 
particular issues such as forced marriage and FGM (see also Dustin, 2006).  
Although more research needs to be done, our case studies indicate that the sphere 
of racial and ethnic equality policy is, on the other hand, largely dominated by ethnic 
minority and immigrant organisations that are often led by men (at least in Norway 
and in Spain).  A problem identified in interviews with women activists in Spain and 
the UK is that men are, allegedly, often perceived to represent entire minority 
communities, as governments engage with male community leaders as 
spokespeople for both women and men.  Women’s interests may, at least in some 
cases, at worst be ignored or overlooked, and at best be interpreted and represented 
by men.  As a result, ethnic minority and immigrant women may sometimes 
effectively be silenced in, or largely excluded from, both spheres of politics.  In the 
case of Norway, our research has supported the notion of a selective inclusion of 
movement groups (Skjeie and Teigen, 2007), where the government practice 
reinforces a separation between majority and minority organisations and between 
particular policy areas.  In Spain, we would argue that the inclusion and participation 
of ethnic minority and immigrant women is a general problem – notwithstanding the 
actual sphere of politics.  Thus, minoritised women in Spain are not fully participating 
in the gender equality sphere, nor in the racial and ethnic equality sphere.  This is 
clearly a problem, not only for minoritised women themselves, but also for 
majoritised women and the mainstream women’s movement, and for the Spanish 
state.  In the UK, we have observed that minority and majority women’s 
organisations are increasingly responding to issues arising from both spheres. 
 
An important issue that illustrates overlap between the different agendas of gender 
equality and racial/ethnic equality is that of immigrant women with insecure 
residence status who experience domestic violence.  In all three countries, these 
women experience a lack of protection due to current legislation.  Depending on their 
length of residence, immigrant women who experience domestic violence may be 
denied, residence permit and refused access to government support and assistance.  
Moreover, it can be difficult for women’s shelters to take in victims, as they may also 
be denied government funding.  Majoritised and minoritised women’s movement 
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organisations in Norway, Spain, and the UK are working to different extents to 
address this issue, with varying degress of success (as evidenced by changes and 
continuities in laws applying to immigrant women with insecure residence status who 
experience domestic violence). 
 
We have mentioned a recent movement towards intersectional approaches to 
gender inequality, demonstrated in the UK by the establishment of the EHRC and to 
some extent the GEO, and in Norway by the creation of the new Ombud.  Spain has 
yet to form a government institution that specifically addresses intersectionality, and 
the new Ministry of Equality (2008) has, according to Bustelo (2009), only begun to 
show a concern with intersectional approaches to inequality.  Importantly, however, 
women’s movement actors in both Norway and the UK have expressed fears in 
relation to whether or not priority will be given by such new intersectional institutions 
to women’s and gender equality issues.  The UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) shares such concerns, and in 2007 asked 
the Norwegian government to provide an assesment of the effctiveness of the new 
machinery – the Anti-Discrimination and Equality Ombud – as compared to the 
previous Gender Equality Ombud, which focused exclusively on gender equality.105 
Furthermore, in July 2008, in its comment to the UK’s submitted report, CEDAW 
argued that the UK government should ‘take the necessary steps to ensure that 
national machinery for the promotion of equality contibues to give priority attention to 
gender equality and discrimination against women’ (CEDAW 2008: 6; our emphasis).  
This recommendation should be followed up by all countries interested in developing 
gender equality policy measures and protecting women’s rights.   
                                            
105 See Appendix B in the country report from Norway.   
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8 CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This final chapter emphasises the main issues and evidence that have emerged 
during our research for this cross-country report.  It starts with a discussion of some 
of the key conceptual and empirical contributions we attempt to make to the overall 
FEMCIT project and to wider discussions on the political and academic arenas.  It 
then goes on to summarise and discuss key findings related to the two main themes 
of our investigation:  relations between ethnic minority and majority organisations in 
the women’s movements in Norway, Spain and the UK, and political opportunities, 
claims-making and resonance within the contexts of women’s movements in these 
three countries.  The chapter ends with a brief section on future research, and a 
section on good practice and policy recommendations that have arisen during the 
course of our case-studies in Norway, Spain and the UK and that are applicable to 
all three countries.   
 
This cross-country report has sought to summarise and, to some extent, reinterpret 
findings from the three countries, whilst also taking a further step in a research 
process aiming towards a more comprehensive comparison between the three case 
studies.  As such, it is to be considered a ‘work in progress’.  As described in 
chapters one and five, this cross-country report is based on case studies of selected 
women’s organisations mainly, bot not only, based in the capitals of Norway, Spain 
and the United Kingdom, and on select mappings of documents produced by 
women’s organisations and by governments in these three countries.  The 
interviewed organisations are all, to varying degrees, seeking to influence national 
policy-making processes that in various ways impact upon women.  Our focus has 
been on two major aspects of organisational activities: 
 
1. Relations between ethnic ‘majority’ and ethnic ‘minority’ women’s organisations in 
the women’s movements, with a special view to representations of co-operation, 
unity and dispute. 
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2. How women’s organisations use political opportunity structures to influence 
gender policy and anti-racist policy, with a special view to policies on violence 
against women (VAW) and issues of racism and ethnic discrimination related to 
VAW, and the problem-representations and claims-making forwarded by 
women’s organisations in relation to such policies. 
 
As stated in the introductory chapter, our research focus on violence against women 
issues has included domestic violence, forced marriage, honour crimes, female 
genital mutilation, and racism and discrimination related to violence against women.  
The issues of rape, prostitution, and human trafficking, which are also violence 
against women issues, are outside the remit of our analysis.   
 
8.2 Conceptual and Empirical Contributions 
 
This project is part of the larger FEMCIT integrated project, and constitutes a 
contribution to one of the six citizenship dimensions of FEMCIT.  The main emphasis 
in Work Package 4 is on women’s ethnic and religious citizenship, while the 
dimensions addressed by other FEMCIT Work Packages include political, social, 
economic, sexual and bodily, and intimate citizenship.  Strand 1 of Work Package 4 
is especially concerned with gender and ethnic dimensions of citizenship practice 
within the women’s movement itself and within the nation-state contexts of Norway, 
Spain and the UK. 
 
‘Ethnic citizenship’ is applied tentatively as a theoretical and empirical concept.  As 
we see it, ‘ethnic citizenship’ must be linked to demands for justice and a new set of 
anti-racist and anti-discrimination policies that have developed at different points in 
time in Norway, Spain and the UK.  Such policies might include individual and/or 
collective protection and freedom from racism and discrimination, and also freedom 
from religious hatred, and protection of national minorities and indigenous people’s 
rights.  Legal, political and social links should also be made between gender and 
ethnic citizenship.   
 
On the whole, laws on gender equality and racism/discrimination were instituted 
roughly at the same time in the UK, with Race Relations Acts passed in 1968 and 
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1976, the Equal Pay Act in 1970, and the Sex Discrimination Act in 1975.  A 
corresponding institutionalisation of relevant government machineries such as the 
EOC (Equal Opportunities Commission) and the CRE (Commission for Racial 
Equality) took place in the mid 1970s (1975 and 1976, respectively).  In Norway, 
gender laws were introduced before laws concerning racism and discrimination, with 
the Gender Equality Act enacted in 1978 and the Anti-Discrimination Act in 2005.  
The institutionalisation of relevant government machineries in Norway were also 
phased in by stages, with the Equal Pay Council established as early as 1959, 
transformed into the Equal Status Council in 1972.  Furthermore, the Gender 
Equality Ombud was established in 1978, and SMED (Centre Against Ethnic 
Discrimination) was established in 1998 (SMED was closed down in 2005 and its 
responsibilities were taken over in 2006 by the then new Gender Equality and 
Discrimination Ombud).  In Spain, both legal and institutional mechanisms for the 
regulation of gender and racial/ethnic relations were introduced at a later stage than 
in both the UK and Norway.  The Women’s Institute, a national government agency 
in Spain, was formed in 1983, and the National Observatory against Racism and 
Discrimination was established in 2005.  In 2003, an intention by government to 
create a Council for the Advancement of Equality of Treatment and non-
Discrimination of People on the Grounds of Racial and Ethnic Origin was 
announced, but according to Bustelo (2009: 8) this has still not been formally 
implemented.The gender violence law was enacted in 2004, while the gender 
equality law was enacted in 2007.  In 2000, a law on the rights and liberties of 
foreigners in Spain and social integration was introduced and later amended.   
 
Citizenship can be viewed in terms of identity, belonging and participation, and 
ethnic citizenship is directly concerned with the identity, belonging and participation 
of ethnic/national minority, immigrant and indigenous groups of people.  Our focus in 
this regard has been two-fold:  firstly, we have examined the inclusion and 
participation of minoritised women within the broader women’s movements in 
Norway, Spain and the UK, and secondly, we have studied the inclusion and 
participation of minoritised (and majoritised) women in dialogue and consultation with 
government in relation to gender equality and violence against women policies.   
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Anti-racist feminists and women activists have demanded the right to be heard and 
participate as legitimate representatives of ethnic/national minority, immigrant and 
indigenous women.  In terms of the status of the Sami people in Norway, Semb 
(2007) has suggested that this particular indigenous people has experienced a 
change in their citizenship status from citizens to ‘citizens plus’, as they now enjoy 
citizen rights both as any other citizen of the Norwegian state and additional citizen 
rights as an indigenous people (Semb, 2007).  We would argue that the status of any 
minority, immigrant and indigenous group which is discriminated against and 
experience racism and discrimination can be defined as one of ‘citizen minus’, thus 
signalling the lack of equal citizenship rights in terms of identity, belonging and 
participation.  In particular, minority, immigrant and indigenous women, who often 
find themselves to be a ‘minority within a minority’ (Eisenberg and Spinner Halev, 
(2005), may suffer from a lack of equal status both within the majority society (as a 
minority) and within the minority community (as women).  The term ‘citizen minus’ 
differs from those of ‘margizen’ and ‘quasi-citizen’ or ‘denizen’ (Castles and 
Davidson, 2006: 94-96), in that it both considers (a lack of) formal citizenship rights 
and goes beyond formal citizenship rights to include more informal dimensions of 
citizenship linked to identity, belonging and participation in various spheres including, 
but not limited to, the political sphere, the economic sphere, the social sphere, and 
the intimate sphere.   
 
But the demand for ethnic citizenship has not only concerned ethnic minority women 
and their fight to be recognised by the state, and indeed by the larger women’s 
movement, as legitimate voices.  Indeed, the demand has also been addressed to 
majoritised women who are called upon to address their own hegemonic positions 
both within the women’s movement itself and within the broader society.  ‘Ethnic 
citizenship’ is, therefore, both a concept related to individual and collective rights, 
and also a concept that refers to relations between minoritised and majoritised 
individuals and groups in society.  Equal ethnic citizenship thus signals that both 
minoritised and majoritised groups and individuals are constantly engaged in 
dialogues and debates that seeks to change the assumptions by which some groups 
are constructed as minoritsed and majoritsed, and to eliminate the conditions by 
which some groups experience racism and discrimination.   
 
 337 
In relation to the state, ethnic citizenship demands have for example been voiced in 
relation to immigrant women with insecure immigrant status who experience 
domestic or other forms of violence.  On this particular issue, ethnic and gendered 
citizenship claims come together and force a more intersectional approach to 
inequality.  It can also be argued that ethnic and gendered citizenship claims are 
being forwarded by women’s movement actors who seek to convince the state that a 
broad and integrated approach to violence against women is needed.  In particular, 
the refusal to deem certain types of violence against women as products of ‘culture’ 
and ‘religion’, while other forms of violence are seen as rooted in male dominance, 
can be said to constitute a claim for equal citizenship by women of ethnic/national 
minority, immigrant and indigenous backgrounds. 
 
Our study has been grounded in existing research on women’s movements, 
gendered citizenship, and multiculturalism.  Through their mobilisation and activism, 
women’s movements practise gendered citizenship by highlighting gendered 
inequalities and arguing for increased gender equality and justice.  Women’s 
movement actors seek to alter citizenship regimes on a broad array of arenas, 
including politics, work, religion, the family, and intimate relationships.  In our study 
we have paid particular attention to how the majority and minority women’s 
movements’ organisations has problematised and framed violence against women 
issues, including domestic violence, forced marriage, honour crimes, female genital 
mutilation, and immigration rules that discriminate against women with insecure 
residence status who have been subjected to violence in intimate relationships.  An 
inclusive notion of citizenship as practice, together with formal rights protecting 
women from harm, implies a gender equal society free from these types of violence.  
In our study, we have sought to examine how various women’s organisations, 
through their strategies and claims-making, work towards protecting women and 
eliminating gendered violence.   
 
Our analysis has also been based on theoretical approaches which emphasize the 
importance of political opportunity structures and framing processes.  The political 
opportunity structures approach highlights the specific socio-political context in which 
a particular social movement is embedded.  We have discussed both institutional 
and discursive aspects of political opportunity structures and how they give rise to 
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different and changing opportunities and constraints for women’s movements in 
Norway, Spain, and the UK.   
 
Our analysis has shown that all three countries have developed new field-specific 
opportunity structures, with opportunities for women’s movement actors to mobilise 
and participate in political decision-making processes concerning gender equality in 
general and violence against women in particular.  However, the legitimacy of the 
institutional gender machineries in Norway, Spain and the UK among women’s 
movement actors vary quite substantially.  In particular, the UK government’s gender 
machinery is generally perceived as fragmented, under-resourced and lacking in 
political clout and initiative.  Indeed, some of the most central components of the 
institutional gender machinery in the UK are perceived by some women’s 
organisations as either irrelevant or too weak to make a difference.  In Norway, the 
institutional gender machinery appears as having, until recently, been quite strong 
and legitimate among majority women’s movement actors, but the newly created 
Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud has been met with mixed expectations by 
majority and minority women’s organisations.  Whether gender equality issues will 
lose significance in relation to other equality issues within the remit of the new 
Ombud is an open question.  The same scepticism has been raised towards the new 
Equality and Human Rights Commission in the UK.  In Spain, women’s organisations 
have been included in political processes first and foremost by the Women’s 
Institute, a government institution dedicated to gender equality, but it remains to be 
seen how effectively they will be included in consultations by new gender machinery 
institutions like the new Ministry of Equality.  While Spain has recently made 
significant advances in gender equality policies, the government has yet to develop 
institutional intersectional approaches to inequality.   
 
In Norway, Spain and the UK, women’s and gender issues, including violence 
against women issues, are dealt with by a plethora of government institutions.  This 
segmentation further fragments the opportunity structure available to women’s 
organisations and, possibly and probably, also weakens the political strength and 
importance assigned to both institutions and issues.  In particular, our study has 
demonstrated a clear call from women’s movements (at least in Norway and the UK) 
for governments to formulate an integrated approach to violence against women, 
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which includes not only domestic violence but also issues such as forced marriage, 
female genital mutilation, honour-based violence, and human trafficking.  The 
integration of such issues should, according to women’s movement actors (and 
supported by the United Nations and its Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), be based on a gendered and human 
rights approach to violence against women.  Women’s movements are, thus, arguing 
against a gender-neutral approach to violence against women, and against an 
approach that defines particular types of violence, including forced marriage, female 
genital mutilation and honour-based violence, as products of culture and/or religion, 
rather than as products of male domination. 
 
We have also argued for the usefulness of discourse and frame analysis in our study 
of women’s movement actors and their claims-making.  In particular, we have sought 
to examine how different women’s movement actors frame themselves, other actors 
and the issues they engage with.  The research has focused on relations between 
ethnic ‘majority’ and ethnic ‘minority’ women’s organisations in the women’s 
movements in Norway, Spain and the UK.  Our interest in these relations originated 
from a concern with the 1970s and 1980s critiques of contemporary white, middle-
class women’s movements as ethnocentric and blind to the importance of ‘race’ and 
ethnicity.  Put simply, we wanted to investigate whether these critiques are still being 
voiced, and if so, to what extent?  Drawing on inspiration from Sudbury (1998), we 
sought to understand whether ‘majority’ women’s organisations have embraced and 
accepted, or resisted and rejected, the interests of ‘minority’ women, and the extent 
to which ‘majority’ and ‘majority’ women’s organisations have formed alliances in 
order to influence public policy.   
 
One of our first insights was that the ethnic ‘majority – minority’ distinction applied to 
organisations in women’s movements is simply too simple.  The sheer diversity and 
complexity of each of these categories make it difficult to meaningfully use the 
distinction.  On the one hand, organisations that were founded by white feminists in 
the 1970s might have undergone changes which make it difficult to place them in the 
‘majority’ category.  Some organisations were established as majority-minority 
mixed, or have perhaps developed towards a more mixed internal composition.  On 
the other hand, the category ‘minority’ includes a variety of ethnic minority groups, 
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and also immigrant groups and indigenous peoples.  Furthermore, local, regional, 
national and trans-national dimensions intersect with majority and minority 
categories and make it difficult to delimit any particular group, be it a majoritised or 
minoritised group.  For example, Sami people have roots in several countries in the 
North, and may see themselves as one Sami nation while in fact living in and moving 
between different nation states.  Another example is Romani people in Spain, where 
the ‘Spanish Roma’ are being distinguished from ‘the new Roma’ immigrating 
recently to Spain from Eastern European countries.  Likewise, group labels such as 
‘black’, ‘white’, or ‘migrant’ are complex and sometimes contested, and do not clearly 
and immediately signify or identify any particular group.   
 
Despite these complexities, we have retained usage of the ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ 
categories, signalling that some groups are non-privileged while others are privileged 
in some or most relations.  How groups of people are labelled and label themselves 
is in large part determined by existing power relations and power differentials 
between different groups.  We have, therefore, found it useful to apply the concepts 
of ‘majoritised’ and ‘minoritised’, proposed by Gunaratnam (2003), interchangeably 
with the ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ concepts, thus indicating ’the active processes of 
racialisation that are at work in designating certain attributes of groups in particular 
contexts as being in a ‘minority’ (ibid.: 17). 
 
8.3 Relations Between Ethnic Minority and Majority Organisations in 
Women’s Movements in Norway, Spain and the UK  
 
In Chapter 6 we examined how different organisations within contemporary women’s 
movements in Norway, Spain and the UK position themselves in relation to other 
movement actors, and the implications such positioning may have for the building of 
alliances and co-operation through ‘strategic sisterhood’.  Our main focus here has 
not been on unity or disunity between different majoritised organisations, but rather 
on co-operation, unity and disunity between majoritised and minoritised women’s 
organisations and between ethnic minority women’s organisations.  Such a limitation 
is justified by the design and topic of our research, which is limited to the policy area 
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of violence against women (including domestic violence, forced marriage, honour 
crimes, and female genital mutilation), and that of racism and discrimination with 
particular relevance to violence against women.  Had our study included other 
issues, such as rape, prostitution and human trafficking, the focus of our analysis 
would also have shifted in terms of where we are looking for unity and disunity.   
 
With this proviso in mind, we have investigated empirical examples of women’s 
movement activists’ representations of unity and disunity, and examples of formal 
networking, co-operation and alliances between ethnic ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ 
organisations in the women’s movements in Norway, Spain and the UK.   
 
In Chapter 6 we discussed the relations between majoritised and minoritised 
women’s organisations in Norway, Spain and the UK since the 1970s.  The 
interviews with activists displayed a number of differences between Norway, Spain 
and the UK related to the mobilisation of migrant and ethnic minority women and 
their relations to the majority women’s organisations: We noted that ethnic minority 
women in Norway and the UK began to organise during the 1970s - women in the 
UK some years earlier than in Norway - whereas this took place at the end of the 
1980s and in the early 1990s in Spain.  The institutionalisation of public funding of 
women’s organisations also started much later in Spain compared to Norway and the 
UK.  Our analysis also indicated different degrees of co-operation and 
intersectionality.  The UK has the most promising example of a majority feminist 
organisation addressing ethnic discrimination and racism within an intersectional 
approach, and numerous instances of majority organisatons addressing ethnic 
minority issues.  In Norway, too there are several majority women’s organisations 
that display a  basic concern with issues related to ethnic minority women,  while 
Spain displays the least indications of co-operation and a common political platform 
across ethnic divides. 
 
The interviews also displayed a number of similar tendencies in Norway, Spain and 
the UK concerning the mobilisation of migrant end ethnic minority women and their 
relations to the majority women’s organisations:  Women’s organisations are 
embedded within the larger social movement industry, and minority women have 
tended to affiliate with ‘their’ ethnic group, community or movement before 
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establishing separate women’s or feminist organisations.  Feminist organising has 
been an effect of disappointment with various male organisations and gender-mixed 
movements, across ethnic differences. 
 
The mobilisation of feminism and women’s organisations has been deeply influenced 
by international and trans-national trends.  The UN Women’s International Decade 
1975-1995 (Pietilä and Vickers, 1994) opened new policy windows for all kinds of 
women’s organisations and prompted trans-national networking.  The European 
Women’s Lobby was set up to influence the EU’s gender equality agenda, and has 
national units in Spain and the UK.  Norway is not a member of the EU, and lacks a 
similar women’s lobby working towards the European level.  Furthermore, trans-
national movements, such as the Sami Movement, the Romani Movement and the 
Black Liberation Movement, have inspired ethnic minorities to organise at national 
and local levels.   
 
As stated above, an important conclusion based on the interviews is that there is a 
vast variety within and between the categories of ethnic majority and minority 
women’s organisations.  Nevertheless, we argue that ethnic minority women’s 
organisations in general have become legitimate actors and have been incorporated 
in the women’s movements within the three countries.  Referring to Rokkan’s 
concept of barriers to political participation (Rokkan, 1970), we maintain that they are 
accepted as political actors in their own right by majority women’s organisations.  
Their interests are more embraced by and better incorporated into majority women’s 
organisations today compared to the 1970s and 1980s.  In general, however, ethnic 
minority women have yet to achieve significant representation and executive power 
within majority women’s organisations.   
 
We have tried to identify broad types of representations of the relations between 
minority and majority women’s organisations.  For instance, we suggest two 
competing discourses of the relations between ethnic majority and minority women’s 
organisations among majority and minority feminists during the 1970s and  1980s in 
Norway; one discourse of anger among minority feminists and one of irritation 
among majority feminist.  Among the non-feminist women’s organisations we noticed 
one discourse of charity and one of solidarity.  Inspired by Julia Sudbury (1998), we 
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have analysed responses to the claims forwarded by minority feminist and women 
activists among majority feminist and women activists.  There is a general 
agreement among the minority activists that the majority women’s organisations 
have been ethnocentric in Norway, Spain and the UK.  There is little evidence to the 
contrary in the interviews with majority activists.  Intersectional approaches are hard 
to find.  To what extent majority activists have also been racist, is more controversial.  
Respondents from majority feminist organisations would hardly admit to racist 
attitudes or practices, whereas feminist activists from ethnic minority organisations 
emphasise that racism is characteristic not just of public policies but also of feminist 
organisations as long as they do not include anti-racism on their feminist agendas.   
 
The relations between ethnic minority and majority women’s organisations were 
strained from the outset, indicated by minority women interviewees’ talk about being 
overlooked and misrecognised within the larger women’s movements.  Discourses of 
women’s liberation and gender equality have not easily been merged with discourses 
of ethnic discrimination and racism among majority organisations.  Feminism is a 
contested concept, and so are ‘women’s issues’, the relations of men to feminist and 
women’s organisations, and the meaning of religion.   
 
There are important instances of co-operation and allied strategic framing of claims 
across ethnic differences in all three countries, however.  These are generally linked 
to issues of gender violence, and to the growing feminist demand for a holistic and 
integrated public policy against all types of gender violence, be it domestic violence, 
violence in close relations, forced marriage, female genital mutilation, and so on.  In 
Norway, Spain and the UK, the feminist divisions of the 1970s between liberal, 
radical and socialist feminism seem less salient, whereas religion and ethnicity have 
become more prominent issues.  Gender violence, which has been our chosen focus 
in this research project, seems to be a feminist issue with a considerable potential for 
co-operation and strategic framing across ethnic differences.  Migrant women’s 
concern with the discrimination of migrant women in the labour market is less salient 
among the interviewed majority activists.  This may reflect the focus of our research 
question, but it is also likely to mirror different political priorities.   
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A systematic finding across the countries is that religion has become an urgent 
issue, and also an issue which seems more likely to divide than to unite feminist and 
women’s organisations.  The relationship between feminism and multiculturalism is 
prominent in all three countries, with religion in the sense of Islam, and ethnicity in 
the sense of everything but whiteness, as the most visible issues.  Majority women’s 
organisations are generally not addressing ‘whiteness’ or their own ethnicity and 
privilege, although anti-racism and issues related to migrant women have become a 
legitimate issue within women’s movements.  Religion seems to be more disuniting, 
and an incendiary question within and among majority and minority feminist 
organisations. 
 
The interviews have underlined the variations within our main categories ‘majority’ 
and ‘minority’ women’s organisations concerning the question of co-operation and 
conflict between women’s organisations.  Several interviewees resisted employing 
these categories and claimed that they hide more than they revealed.  We also 
noticed some changes in the organisational landscapes – with some development 
towards more ethnically mixed constituencies within what used to be majority 
women’s organisations, and an increased focus on issues related to migrant women 
among ethnic gender-mixed majority organisations.  Today, we find examples of 
organisations that are more ethnically mixed than they once were.  This is promising 
in terms of a broader engagement with intersectional approaches to women’s issues.  
Our findings of more ethnically mixed organisations further complicate the labelling 
of categories of women’s organisations as majority or minority organisations.  They 
should stimulate a continued debate on how to talk about ethnicity and race in the 
organisational landscape and elsewhere.   
 
The presumption that co-operation and the framing of a common platform across 
ethnic differences would empower the feminist movement has gained some support.  
We have seen evidence of movement impact when women’s organisations 
coordinate their claims and are able to sustain public pressure.  This does not imply, 
however, that we find organising on the basis of ethnicity - white or otherwise - to be 
politically unadviceable.  Quite the contrary, there seems to be a clear need for 
autonomous ethnic minority/indigenous women’s organisations to articulate the 
particular identities, interests and concerns of minority women within and beyond the 
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women’s movement, and to pressure the majority women’s organisations to address 
whiteness and privilege. 
 
We also believe that majority feminist organisations would profit from elaborating 
broader, intersectional analyses of women’s rights and addressing their own 
privileges.   
 
8.4 Opportunity Structures, Claims-Making and Resonance: women’s 
movements in Norway, Spain and the UK 
 
In Chapter 7 we have documented the development of new field-specific institutional 
opportunity structures in Norway, Spain and the UK, with opportunities for women’s 
movement actors to mobilise and participate in political decision-making processes 
concerning gender equality in general and violence against women in particular.   
 
In Norway, the Ministry of Children and Equality has a crucial role in developing 
gender equality policies, while violence against women issues are divided between 
various government departments, and migrant issues are located within yet another 
government department.  The role of the newly established (2006) Equality and Anti-
Discrimination Ombud (which has replaced the previous Gender Equality Ombud), is 
to combat discrimination based on gender, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, religion, 
disability and age.  We have yet to see how, and the extent to which, the Ombud will 
practice intersectional approaches to inequality.  Majority women’s organisations in 
Norway contested the establishment of the new Ombud.  In particular, they lamented 
the loss of both a centre for knowledge about gender inequality and the watchdog 
role that were previously embedded in the Gender Equality Ombud.  Concerns were 
also voiced about the status of gender inequalities within the new structure.   
 
The Norwegian single equality machinery with a multiple inequalities agenda  
continues to provide access for feminist and women’s groups, and to influence 
government policies dealing with gender equality issues.  Both access and influence 
have however been unequally distributed over time and between various majoritised 
and minoritised  organisations and between various gender policy areas.  For 
example, most of the minoritised  women’s organisations have almost exclusively 
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been consulted on “ethnic minority women’s issues” related to gender violence 
(Nyhagen Predelli, 2003), while majoritised women’s organisations have been 
consulted on a much broader range of gender equality issues (see below).  In 
general, women’s organisations in Norway reported that they lack spaces in which to 
meet and discuss movement politics. 
 
Since 1997 and the election of the Labour Government, the gender policy machinery 
in the UK has developed significantly in terms of new institutions and wider access to 
feminist and women’s groups.  Today it could be argued that the various parts of the  
policy machinery in the UK is giving relatively high access to a small and stable 
number of women’s organisations that actively seek to influence government policy.  
The current gender machinery is however considered relatively weak in terms of 
government influence, and feminist groups do not always think it worthwhile to direct 
their advocacy and lobbying efforts through institutions such as the Government 
Equalities Office. 
 
As in Norway, a significant step towards an intersectional approach to inequality by 
government has been taken in the UK with the establishment of the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which includes gender, sexual orientation, race, 
disability, religion and belief, and age in its remit.  Moreover, the Government 
Equalities Office is leading the government’s overall strategy on equality with a lead 
role for policies related to the equality strands of gender and sexuality (other major 
equality strands include disability, age, race, and faith/belief, but the responsibility for 
these are located within various other government departments).  As in Norway, 
violence against women issues are divided between different government 
departments, thus creating, according to interviewees and documents from women’s 
organisations, a fragmented ‘silo-approach’ to such issues.  Women’s organisations 
in the UK have demanded a more integrated and gender-based approach to violence 
against women issues, but have so far been met with a mixture of government 
resistance, alleged agreement, and accomodation.  For example, the Home Office 
continues to use a non-gendered definition of domestic violence, while the 
Government Equalities Office claims that the government actually has an integrated 
strategy towards violence against women.  The Crown Prosecution Service, on the 
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other hand, has explicitly followed the recommendations of the End Violence Against 
Women Campaign in its latest national strategy plan.   
 
Moreover, parts of the picture from Norway of an unequal distribution of access and 
influence in relation to types of women’s organisations and types of gender policy 
areas also applies to the UK.  Again, it appears that minoritised women’s 
organisations are often being consulted on “ethnic minority women’s issues” related 
to gender violence, and that they are less often consulted on other issues such as 
education, the labour market, etc.  In the UK, however, majoritised women’s 
organisations seem to increasingly engage in “ethnic minority women’s issues”, not 
only related to gender violence, but also related to the labour market and political 
participation (the primary example being the Fawcett Society).   
 
In Spain, the Women’s Institute, is a key player in policy-making related to both 
gender equality and violence against women.  The recently established National 
Observatory for Gender Violence also provides an important opportunity structure for 
women’s movement organisations in Spain.  Moreover, the recently formed (April 
2008) Ministry of Equality is now overseeing the WI and is developing new measures 
to combat gender violence among immigrant groups.  While Spain has recently 
made significant advances in gender equality policies, also in comparison with other 
European countries, the national government institutions in Spain have yet to 
develop intersectional approaches to inequalities (Bustelo, 2009).   
 
The WI has continued to play a significant role in Spanish gender equality policies, 
and both the conservative People’s Party government from 1996 until 2004 and the 
subsequent (and current) Socialist Party government have continued to support 
gender equality policies.  Moreover, the current government has strengthened the 
gender machinery through the recently created Ministry of Equality and its several 
entities including the ‘Equality Policies General Secretariat’, signalling the high value 
it places on gender equality through the appointment of a Cabinet consisting of an 
equal number of women and men and through the creation of an array of new laws 
to support gender equality (Bustelo and Ortbals, 2007: 207).  In terms of political 
access for feminist and women’s organisations, the picture in Spain is more of a 
division between majoritised and minoritised organisations.  While majoritised 
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women’s organisations are being consulted on various gender equality issues, 
minoritised  organisations have yet to achieve a participatory role in the dialogue, 
design and implementation of gender equality policies broadly conceived. 
 
Despite the presence of field-specific opportunity structures for women’s 
organisations seeking to impact on policies relating to gender equality and violence 
against women, our case-studies indicate that ethnic majority women’s organisations 
in all three countries in reality have more opportunities to mobilise collectively and 
participate politically on a broader range of issues than ethnic minority women.  A 
range of factors may contribute to an understanding of this situation.  Although 
further research is needed, our studies indicate that majority women’s organisations 
seem to be consulted on a broader range of issues than minority women’s 
organisations.  While majority women seem to be consulted on issues such as 
education, the labour market, and other social and economic issues, minority women 
seem to be consulted on issues that are perceived as being specific to minority 
cultures (e.g., forced marriage, FGM, honour killings, and, at least in the UK, 
community responses to terrorist activities).  Moreover, as these issues are 
perceived as specific to minority cultures, they are often located in different parts of 
the government apparatus.  Against the advice and claims-making by women’s 
organisations, divisions between ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ types of violence against 
women are thus institutionalised as separate issues (they are located in different 
government ministries) and are discursively kept apart because they are talked 
about separately from other ‘mainstream’ types of violence against women (e.g., 
domestic violence).  Such a fragmented approach to violence against women issues 
effectively hinders the integration of various violence against women issues and 
perpetuates a distinction between certain types of issues that are regarded as 
caused by violent male behaviour, while other types of issues are regarded as 
caused by ‘culture’ or ‘tradition’.  These types of divisions also produce barriers in 
terms of minority women’s participation in more overall political debates, be they 
either about gender equality or violence against women.  Moreover, they produce 
barriers in terms of majority women’s participation in issues that are defined as 
relevant only to minoritised women.  Majority women may feel that issues such as 
FGM, forced marriage, and honour killings do not concern them, and either the 
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absence of concern or an actual involvement with such issues are two alternative 
strategies that may both invoke a fear of being labelled as racist.    
 
Dominant discourse denotes specific forms of violence, such as forced marriage, 
FGM and honour killings as cultural products, while other forms of violence (e.g., 
domestic violence) are, to some extent, recognised as being rooted in gender 
inequality.  When forced marriage and FGM are perceived as issues relevant only to 
immigrant and ethnic minority populations, they are identified as “immigration” or 
“integration” issues, or as “cultural” issues (cultural here signifying ‘other’ cultures 
than the dominant one).  In other words, the state participates in a cultural framing of 
specific ‘minority types of violence’, while domestic violence is increasingly framed 
as a problem arising from male dominance and violence.  Domestic violence is thus 
more readily perceived as a gender equality issue and a human rights issue, than is 
forced marriage and FGM.  State resistance towards a gendered framing of domestic 
violence is however evident in the case of the UK, at least on the part of the Home 
Office, albeit with the important exception of the Crown Prosecution Service which 
has recently adopted the gendered UN definition of violence against women.  The 
Norwegian and Spanish states seem, on the other hand, to have accepted a link 
between domestic violence and gender inequality.  It is notable that the Spanish 
government has taken steps to identify violence against women as a gender-based 
issue, thus signalling a more progressive politics than the UK government.  Lacking 
in Spain is a sustained and integrated approach to different forms of violence against 
women including forced marriage, FGM, and honour-based violence.106 
 
Women’s movements in Norway, Spain and the UK seek to reframe all forms of 
violence against women into a gender equality frame and a human rights frame.  A 
joint movement effort is most apparent in the UK, where majority and minority 
women’s organisations have joined initiatives such as the End Violence Against 
Women Campaign (EVAW).  In Norway, several majority women’s organisations find 
it difficult to address issues related to ethnic minority women, and to attract members 
with a minority background.  In Spain, majority women’s organisations have not fully 
                                            
106 See, however, the new plan to prevent gender violence in immigrant communities published in 
January 2009 (this plan falls outside the time period investigated in our report, but it is an important 
new development in Spain) http://www.migualdad.es/noticias/pdf/090109Planinmigracion.pdf  
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engaged with ethnic minority women, and it could be argued that ethnic minority 
women’s voices have to a large extent been ignored or silenced in the context of the 
majority women’s movements.  In Norway, however, a number of majority women’s 
organisations have discussed ethnic minority women’s interests .  In Spain, on the 
other hand, the majority women’s organisations included in our study have so far not 
expressed any direct interests in taking up ethnic minority women’s interests.  In the 
UK, where organisations are more mixed (there are not so clear distinctions between 
majority and minority organisations in the UK, as many organisations are now 
composed of individuals of different ethnic backgrounds), organisations such as 
Women’s Aid and the Fawcett Society have taken significant steps to embrace and 
accept ethnic minority women’s interests and concerns.   
 
In summary, women’s movements in all three countries are promoting broader and 
more integrated definitions of, and approaches to, violence against women.  The 
women’s movements seek to reframe violence against women both discursively and 
institutionally.  Discursively, such reframing is sought through the employment of a 
wide definition of violence against women, and institutionally the reframing is sought 
through an integration of different forms of violence against women within the same 
government structures.  In this regard the women’s movements have some way to 
go in terms of convicing the governments in Norway, Spain, and the UK about the 
need for policy changes.   
 
Gender inequality on the one hand, and racial and ethnic equality on the other, 
appear as two more or less separate and distinct spheres, more so in Spain than in 
Norway where there are examples of sector overlap.  There is most evidence of 
sector overlap in the UK, where Black women’s organisations constitute ‘a clear 
section within the black voluntary sector generally and the voluntary sector as a 
whole’ (Davis and Cooke, 2002: 32).  The issues of gender inequality and racial and 
ethnic inequality are, however, largely dealt with by different government institutions 
and agencies in all three countries, with recently established government institutions 
that to various degrees seek to apply intersectional approaches to inequality.  
Correspondingly, different parts of the voluntary sector participate in policy-making 
processes in the two areas, albeit with some overlap in the cases of Norway (the 
MiRAResource Centre) and the UK (Black women’s organisations).  Although there 
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are exceptions to this picture, we would argue that the sphere of gender equality 
policy is largely dominated by majority women’s organisations, while minority women 
mainly have a say on particular issues such as forced marriage and FGM (see also 
Dustin, 2006).  Although more research needs to be done, our case studies indicate 
that the sphere of racial and ethnic equality policy is, on the other hand, largely 
dominated by ethnic minority and immigrant organisations that are often led by men 
(at least in Norway and in Spain).  A problem identified in interviews with women 
activists in Spain and the UK is that men are allegedly often perceived to represent 
entire minority communities, as governments engage with male community leaders 
as spokespeople for both women and men.  Women’s interests may, at least in 
some cases, at worst be ignored or overlooked, and at best be interpreted and 
represented by men.  As a result, ethnic minority and immigrant women may 
sometimes effectively be silenced in, or largely excluded from, both spheres of 
politics.  In the case of Norway, our research has supported the notion of a selective 
inclusion of movement groups (Kjellman, 2007, Skjeie and Teigen, 2007), where the 
government practice reinforces a separation between majority and minority 
organisations and between particular policy areas.  In Spain, we would argue that 
the inclusion and participation of ethnic minority and immigrant women is a general 
problem – notwithstanding the actual sphere of politics.  Thus, minoritised women in 
Spain are not fully participating in the gender equality sphere, nor in the racial and 
ethnic equality sphere.  This is clearly a problem, not only for minoritised women 
themselves, but also for majoritised women and the mainstream women’s 
movement, and for the Spanish state.  In the UK, we have observed that minority 
and majority women’s organisations are increasingly responding to issues arising 
from both speres.   
 
An important issue that illustrates overlap between the different agendas of gender 
equality and racial/ethnic equality is that of immigrant women with insecure 
residence status who experience domestic violence.  In all three countries, these 
women experience a lack of protection due to current legislation.  Depending on their 
length of residence, immigrant women who experience domestic violence may be 
denied residence permit and refused access to government support and assistance.  
Moreover, it can be difficult for women’s shelters to take in victims, as they may also 
be denied government funding.  Majoritised and minoritised women’s movement 
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organisations in Norway, Spain, and the UK are working to different extents to 
address this issue, with varying degress of success (as evidenced by changes and 
continuities in laws applying to immigrant women with insecure residence status who 
experience domestic violence). 
 
We have mentioned a recent movement towards intersectional approaches to 
gender inequality, demonstrated in the UK by the establishment of the EHRC and to 
some extent the GEO, and in Norway by the creation of the new Ombud.  Spain has 
yet to form a government institution that specifically addresses intersectionality, and 
the new Ministry of Equality (2008) has, according to Bustelo (2009), only begun to 
show a concern with intersectional approaches to inequality.  Importantly, however, 
women’s movement actors in both Norway and the UK have expressed fears in 
relation to whether or not priority will be given by such new intersectional institutions 
to women’s and gender equality issues.  Indeed, we want to suggest that a possible 
‘double de-legitimation’ of the category ‘woman’ is now taking place with the 
establishment of intersectional institutions dealing with multiple inequalities.  A first 
de-legitimation of the category ‘woman’ can be said to have taken place with the call 
by women’s movement actors to destabilise it because it hides actual differences 
between women across class, race/ethnicity, and sexuality.  The critique of the 
essentialist construction of the category ‘woman’ has largely been accepted by 
women’s movements, but movement actors have found it useful to retain the 
category for political purposes.  Arguing for collective women’s rights is difficult 
without using the category ‘woman’.  The introduction of more intersectional 
approaches to inequality, which also have arisen from within the women’s movement 
(Crenshaw, 1997), further emphasises differences between women and the 
importance of interlocking structures of oppression (Hill-Collins, 1991).  
Governments in Europe seem to be increasingly taking on the idea of intersectional 
approaches to inequality through the formation of institutions that base their rationale 
on such approaches.  Both in Norway and in the UK, the establishment of the EHRC 
and the new Ombud have occurred simultaenously with the closure of already 
established gender institutions such as the former Gender Equality Ombud (Norway) 
and Equal Opportunities Commission (UK).  This closure amounts to a significant 
loss of established political opportunity structures for women’s movement actors.  
The ‘double de-legitimation’ implied in the essentialist and intersectional critiques of 
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the category ‘woman’ risk destablising the women’s movement itself and also 
political achievements already made by women’s movements.  When governments’ 
women’s and gender agencies are gone, to where will women’s movements direct 
their claims-making, and what legitimacy, if any, will the women’s movement have in 
forwarding claims about women?  These are crucial questions that will have to be 
addressed by both states and women’s movement actors alike. 
 
8.5 Further Research 
 
While our focus has mainly been on capital-based women’s organisations that seek 
to influence national policy-making, further research should be conducted to explore 
minority-majority relations in local and regional women’s movements, and relations 
between local and regional women’s movements and political decision-making 
processes at those levels of government.   
 
We also suggest more in-depth organisational research to explore the extent to 
which membership, leadership postitions and the agenda of originally ethnic 
majority/minority women’s organisations have become more mixed. 
 
Moreover, more systematic studies should be conducted of if, and how, minoritised 
and majoritised organisations engage with intersectional approaches to inequality, 
and how this affects their claims-making.  As indicated above, with the advent of an 
institutional ‘intersectional era’, it will be of utmost importance to study if, and how, 
the mobilisation and participation of women’s movements in policy-making 
processes will change, and whether and how governments will continue to consult 
women’s organisations in the development of intersectional policy approaches.   
 
8.6 Good Practice and Policy Recommendations 
 
In this last section we present some of the good practice and policy 
recommendations that have emerged during the course of our study.  These 
recommendations apply to all three cases and will improve women’s citizenship in 
Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom (for more country specific recommendations, 
see the individual country reports). 
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• Norway, Spain and the UK have all signed up to the Convention for the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.  Their governments should apply 
the United Nations’ definition of violence against women in their specific formation 
and implementation of policies directed towards violence against women.  This 
should include the acknowledgment of VAW as a women’s rights and a human 
rights issue.   
• The governments in Norway, Spain and the UK should develop integrated and 
strategic plans on violence against women which cover all VAW issues, including 
domestic abuse, forced marriage, FGM, honour-related violence, and human 
trafficking.   
• Improved public funding of support services for women who have been subjected 
to violence, including specialist services targeting ethnic minority and immigrant 
women. 
• Safeguarding the rights and protection of women with insecure immigration status 
who experience domestic violence, including the provision of public support for 
housing and social benefits for such women and their children. 
• The governments and their gender machinery institutions in Norway, Spain and 
the UK should support the creation and sustainment of meeting places for 
women’s organisations, including organisations for ethnic minority, immigrant and 
indigenous women.  Likewise, the majoritised women’s movements in these three 
countries should create and support more opportunities for the participation of 
ethnic minority, immigrant and indigenous women to voice their own interests and 
concerns. 
• Increased public funding opportunities for lobbying and advocacy work done by 
women’s organisations.  This would allow women’s organisations, including those 
that represent ethnic minority, immigrant or indigenous women, to allocate specific 
resources to their participation in government consultations and in CEDAW and 
CERD shadow reporting processes, and would give them a voice more generally 
in the formation and implementation of government policy initiatives. 
• The international and trans-national work of women’s movement organisations 
(including participation in CEDAW and CERD consultation processes and the 
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production of shadow reports to these agencies) should be encouraged and 
developed through increased government support. 
• Governments should widen its participation criteria in different policy areas and 
include both majoritised and minoritised women’s organisations in consultation 
processes dealing with gender equality, intersectional equalities, and racism and 
discrimination. 
• Intersectional approaches to inequalities are generally welcomed by women’s 
movement actors and are a step forward, but the governments in Norway, Spain 
and the UK should ‘take the necessary steps to ensure that national machinery for 
the promotion of equality continues to give priority attention to gender equality and 
discrimination against women’ (CEDAW, 2008: 6). 
• The creation of national, web-based databases of women’s organisations in each 
country.  Such databases would be useful for politicians and civil servants who are 
recruiting participants for government consultation processes.  Moreover, it would 
be useful for women’s organisations to create networks, coalitions and alliances 
amongst themselves; especially inclusive networks supporting the participation of 
ethnic minority, immigrant and indigenous women’s organisations.  Such websites 
are also useful tools for academic researchers. 
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Ombud The Equality and Anti-discrimination Ombud, earlier the Gender 
Equality Ombud 
OMOD Institution against Public Discrimination 
ORKIS Oslo Red Cross International Centre 
Ot.prp. Propositions to the Odelsting, Odelstingsproposisjoner, or green 
papers 
OWAAD Organisation of Women of African and Asian Descent 
PLP Parliamentary Labour Party 
PP Partido Popular (People’s Party) 
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Socialist Party) 
RCRP Rape Crisis Research Project 
ROW Rights of Women 
RWRP Refugee Women’s Resource Project (at Asylum Aid) 
SBS Southall Black Sisters 
SEIF Self-help for immigrants and refuges 
SMED The Centre against Ethnic Discrimination 
SNF Sami Nisson-Forum 
St.meld. Reports to the Parliament from a Ministry, Stortingsmelding, or white 
papers 
SUS ‘Stop under suspicion’ 
TUC Trade Unions Congress 
UDi The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 
UGT Union General de Trabajadores (National Union of Workers) 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
VAW Violence against women 
 381 
WA Women’s Aid 
WAF Women Against Fundamentalism 
WAITS Women Acting in Today’s Society 
WANGO  World Associations of Nongovernmental Organisations 
WAR Women Against Rape 
WAVE Women Against Violence Europe Network 
WEU Women and Equality Unit 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WI  Women’s Institute 
WLM Women’s Liberation Movement 
WNC Women’s National Commission 
WP Work Package 
WRA  Women’s Rights Association 
WRC Women’s Resource Centre 
WU Women’s Unit 
WWEN Wales Women’s European Network 
 
